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
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✓ *1820*
ΕΠΕΑ ΠΤΕΡΟΕΝΤΑ,

OR THE

VERSIONS OF PURLEY.

BY

JOHN HORNE TOOKE.

A NEW EDITION,

REVISED AND CORRECTED

By **RICHARD TAYLOR, F.S.A. F.L.S.**

WITH NUMEROUS ADDITIONS

FROM THE COPY PREPARED BY THE AUTHOR FOR REPUBLICATION :

TO WHICH IS ANNEXED HIS

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being distinguished by brackets [], he may use his own judgement as to its relation to the text.

A work of such celebrity, connected with studies to which I had been much attached, having been thus intrusted to my care, I was tempted, during its progress, to hazard a few notes in my capacity of Editor: and though it may have been presumptuous in me to place any observations or conjectures of mine on the pages of Mr. Tooke, yet I must plead in excuse the interest excited by the investigations which they contain.

ADDITIONAL NOTES

BY THE EDITOR.

VOLUME I. page 155.

The following particulars of the author of *Criticisms on the Diversions of Purley*, published under the assumed name of J. Cassander, are taken from a memoir in the Gentleman's and Monthly Magazines for 1804, the authenticity of which I believe may be relied on. I well remember Mr. Bruckner; and I believe Mr. Tooke had no reason for coupling him with Mr. Windham, ("my Norwich critics, for I shall couple them," see pp. 217, 218 and Note, 232, &c.) except that he resided in the city for which Mr. Windham was returned to Parliament.

" The Rev. John Bruckner, born in the island of Cadsand, 26—educated at Franeker and Leyden, where he obtained pastorship, and profited by the society of Hemsterhuis, Ickenaer, and the elder Schultens. In 1753 he became minister of the Walloon Church at Norwich, and afterwards the Dutch—till his death, May 12, 1804. In 1767 was printed at Leyden his '*Theorie du Système Animal*,' in the 1 and 10th chapters of the second part of which there is much anticipation of the sentiments lately evolved and incorporated in the writings of Mr. Malthus.

" In 1790 he published, under the name Cassander, from his birthplace, those *Criticisms on the Diversions of Purley* which attracted some hostile flashes from Mr. Horne Tooke in his subsequent quarto edition. This pamphlet displays a profound and extensive knowledge of the various Gothic dialects, and states (p. 16.) that the same theory of Prepositions and Conjunctions so convincingly applied in the *Epesteronta* to the Northern languages, had also been taught concerning the Hebrew and other dead languages by Schultens."

Mr. Bruckner can hardly be considered an opponent of Mr. Tooke, as might be inferred from the style in which he answered by the latter. He imputes a want of care, of knowledge, or of success in some particular instances, but concurs with Mr. Tooke in the main, and bestows great praise on his work, assigning as his motive for publication regret "that a performance, in other respects valuable, and well calculated to open the eyes of the learner with regard to false systems, should remain in its present state, and not be rendered as perfect as the nature of the subject will permit."

To the same purpose he adds, in p. 5 :—" You have not given your system the consistency and solidity of which it is susceptible, and which you were very able to give it, had

you been willing to bestow a little more thought upon it." At p. 32, alluding to some alleged mistakes, "I have been examining your outworks again; and, as I find them absolutely untenable, I would advise you to abandon them in case of a regular attack, and to shut yourself up in your capital work, which is of good design and workmanship, and will stand the best battering-ram in the world, provided, however, you bestow a little repairing upon it." In what follows, I shall point out to you the places where this is most wanted." And in p. 73, "I have read with pleasure, and even with some advantage, your ninth and tenth chapters, which treat of prepositions and adverbs." The light in which you place these parts of speech is new, and well calculated to turn the attention of the studious in general from idle and endless subtleties to the contemplation of truth, and acquisition of real knowledge." "Truth, as you say, has been improperly imagined at the bottom of a well: it lies much nearer the surface. Had Mr. Harris and others, instead of diving deeper than they had occasion into Aristotelian mysteries, contented themselves with observing plain facts, they would soon have perceived, that prepositions and conjunctions were nothing more than nouns and verbs in disguise; and the chapter of the distribution and division of language would have been settled and complete long ago; to the contentment and joy of every body: whereas, in the way they proceeded, their labour was immense, and the benefit equal to nothing."—p. 77.

I may with propriety add here a candid estimate of Mr. Poole's work from the *Annual Review* for 1805.

"Few good books have been written on the theory of language: this is one of them. Philosophic linguists have mostly pursued the Aristotelic, the ancient, method of reasoning, *a priori*; they have rarely recurred to the Baconian, the modern, method of reasoning, *a posteriori*. They

have examined ideas instead of phænomena, suppositions instead of facts. The only method of ascertaining in what manner speech originates, is to inquire historically into the changes which single words undergo; and from the mass of instances, within the examination of our experience, to infer the general law of their formation. This has been the process of Mr. Horne Tooke. He first examined our prepositions, conjunctions, and adverbs; all those particles of speech foolishly called insignificant, and showed that they were either nouns or verbs in disguise, which had lost the habit of inflection. He now examines our adjectives and abstract substantives, and shows that they too are all referable to nouns or verbs, describing sensible ideas.

“Whether this opinion is strictly true, scarcely merits inquiry; it was never applied before on so grand a scale, and in so instructive a manner.”

After mentioning the suggestions of Schultens, Lennep, and Gregory Sharpe, the writer proceeds:—“Such scattered solitary observations may have prepared and do confirm the comprehensive generalizations of Mr. Horne Tooke; but to him the English language owes the pristine introduction of just principles, and a most extensive, learned, and detailed application of them to the etymology of its terms. He has laid the groundwork of a good Dictionary.”

“The good sense with which all the phænomena are explained, the sagacity with which the difficulties are investigated, the force of intellect displayed in every conjecture, these constitute the essence of the treatise, and will cause it to outlast the compilations of a more laborious erudition. This work is the most valuable contribution to the philosophy of language which our literature has produced; the writer may be characterized in those words which Lye applied to Wachter: *ad ornandam, quam nactus est, Spartam, instructissimus venit: in intima artis adyta videtur*

penetrasse, atque inde protulisse quodcunque potuerit illustrando ipsius proposito inservire.”—p. 675.

VOL. I. p. 412.

ABOUT.—Mr. Tooke seems to have gone astray in his account of this word; and very strangely, as its history seems tolerably clear. He appears to have been put on a wrong scent by Spelman, who derives it from the French *Bout* and *Abouter*; and overlooking Skinner’s derivation of it, which he quotes, and Junius’s, which he omits, he says, in p. 414, “Spelman, Junius, Skinner, and Menage all resort to Franco-Gall. for their etymology.” This is certainly not true with regard to Junius and Skinner, however some of the passages as quoted by him from them may have this appearance. What is given from Junius relates to a different word, ‘*BUT, Scopus*,’ and has no reference to **ABOUT**; his account of which, being omitted by Mr. Tooke, I here insert:

“**ABOUT**, circum, circa. A.-Saxones abutan vel abuton dicebant; quæ videri possunt facta ex illo embe utan quod occurrit Marc. 14. 47; *Æn* of ðam þe þan embe utan ꝛodon, Unus ex circumstantibus. Vide tamen Spelmanni Glossarium in Abutare.”

Skinner, as will be seen in the *first* quotation from him, (p. 413.) which is the whole of what he says upon the word **ABOUT**, derives it unhesitatingly from A.S. abutan, ymbutan. The other passages which Mr. Tooke quotes from Skinner treat of **ABUTT** and **BUT**, which he derives from the Franco-Gall. *BOUT*, and have no reference whatever to **ABOUT**.

Skinner errs in compounding Abutan of the Latin preposition *Ab* and the Saxon *utan*; for analogy obviously leads us to consider the *A* as a contraction of the Saxon *On* (as *Again*, on geaen; *Away*, on weg; *Aback*, on bæc, &c.) and

sometimes written with **On**, which requires **butan**, and **itan**.

The word is found in the following forms: **onbutan**, **iton**, **abutan**, **abuton**; **embe utan**, **embutan**, **eutan**, **ymbutan**, **ymbuton**; all orthographical variations of two, **onbutan** and **ymbutan**; and these, though distinct words, as being compounds of **butan** with distinct prepositions **On** and **Ym** or **Ymbe**, yet seem to have coalesced in the course of time, not greatly differing in sense or sound, to form our present word **ABOUT**, which is representative of both. Of this I think no one will doubt who attends to the idiomatic features in which it closely resembles its progenitors, as the following phrases of *Ælfred* and the *Saxon Chronicle* will show: **ƿeoƿƿan abuton**, far about; **þær ymbutan**, thereabouts; **norð utan**, north about; **ƿuð ymbutan**, south about.

A question may remain whether **ymbutan** be **ym-butan**, **y-butan** or **ymb-utan**; but this, from the identity of pronunciation, is immaterial: and with regard to **Onboda**, I cannot imagine where *Mr. Tooke* got it, or how it could be connected with **ABOUT**.

VOL. I. p. 415.

DOWN, ADOWN.—*Mr. Tooke* shows clearly that his predecessors had entirely failed in their endeavours to investigate the origin of this Preposition; and gives a new ingenious conjecture, in the absence of any thing satisfactory.

I have given in the NOTE to p. 420 what occurred to me, first employed upon that part of the work, as the true explanation of this preposition which has so much puzzled our etymologists. The most perplexing questions sometimes admit of a very simple solution. We must return for its origin to our substantive **Down**, A.S. **Dune**, a hill. Those indeed

who looked to this source had been so much at a loss how to connect a preposition signifying *depression* with a substantive which denoted *elevation*, that the question must have seemed to Mr. Tooke quite open for fresh conjecture*. When, however, I met with *Of dune* in Anglo-Saxon, no doubt remained that the mystery was solved; and that all the obscurity had been occasioned by the disappearance of the particle prefixed. There is no need therefore any longer to torture *Dune* or *Down*, and to make it appear to signify the reverse of that which it really means, *a hill*; for as *Of dune* means *Off* or *From Hill*, it must imply Descent; and *Down* is only put for *Adown* or *Of-dune* by an elision of the prefix. As *aduna*, *aduné*, with their compounds, are also found, we can have no doubt that the *A* in this case has arisen from the *Of* rapidly pronounced; and instead of *Adown* being from *a* and the preposition *down*, as Dr. Johnson tells us, the fact is just the reverse,—*Down* is from *Adown* or *Adune*, and *Adune* is from *Of-dune*†.

As the instances which I have as yet found of the use of *Of dune* are but six, of which Lye gives references only to five, and those dispersed under different heads, and, unlike his general practice, without the context, I have thought it might be satisfactory if I furnished the reader with the following:

Under *Of dune*, *Deorsum*, Lye only refers us to *Of* and *Dun*.

* "Conjecture cannot supersede historical fact; and it ought never to be adopted in etymology, unless to explain those words of which the existence precedes record. Mr. Tooke, who had more intellect than northern lore, frequently advances a rash though always an ingenious conjecture: but Mr. Richardson pursues the same untracked course with still less caution, and often connects (like Mr. Whiter in his *Etymologicon*) words as obviously distinct in pedigree as a negro and a white."—*Monthly Review*, N. S. vol. lxxii. p. 86.

† So *Decllois*, from *de* and *cllois*.

Op. Of. De.—"Of þam munte." "Of heoponum.
elo." "Of dune. Deorsum; *Oros.* 3. 5. *Boet.* 25."
Dun. dune. *A down.* Mons; *Ælf. Gl.* 18. gr. 5.
. 24. 3. *Ps.* 67. 16.—of dune. *Downward, down.*
sum; *Oros.* 3. 5. *R. Luc.* 4. 9. *Boet.* c. 33. §. 4. l. 86."
Adun. aduna. adune. Deorsum; *Bed.* 1. 12. *C. Luc.*

Adunafett. Depositus; *Bed.* 4. 6."

Adunearigan. adunertigan. Descendere; *C. Luc.*
Ps. 71. 6. 87. 4."

Adunepeapd. Deorsum. *C. Sax.* 1083."

which I subjoin so much of the context of the passages
ed to as will be sufficient for the satisfaction of the
r.

ing Alfred's Orosius, 3. 5.—And hi leton heopa
gl of dune to fotum. And they let their garments
to their feet.

ing Alfred's Boethius, 25.—Spa bið eac þam tpeopum
um gecýnde biþ up heah to rtanbanne. þeah ðu
hpelcne boh of dune to þæne eorþan. rpelce þu
in mæge. rpa þu hine alætrt. rpa rpprincþ he up.
rگاð riþ hiý gecýnder*. So it is also with the trees,
ich it is natural to stand erect. Though thou tug each
h down to the earth with all thy might; when thou
st it go, then springeth it up, and stretcheth according
nature.

* Validis quondam viribus acta,
Pronum flectit virga cacumen;
Hanc si curvans dextra remisit,
Recto spectat vertice cælum. *De Consol.* lib. 3. metr. 2.

he yerde of a tre that is haled adowne by mightie strength howeth
the crophe adown: but if that the hande that is bente let it gone
e, anon the crophe lokethe vpright to the heuen."—*Chaucer's transl.*

And nif hipe ðonne eþne to feallanne of ðune ðonne up.—33. §. 4. l. 86. And it is not to them easier to fall downwards than upwards*.

To these should be added another, given under the word *Healb*, which Lye thus explains; “Propensus, proclivis, devexus, incurvatus. *Þiden healb*. Istuc proclivis, (thereto inclined); *Boet*. 24. 4. of ðune healbe. De monte devexus; 41. 6.” It will be seen that he has here fallen into a singular mistake in rendering the phrase literally, “de monte,” which he never could have done if the context had not escaped his attention.

Alfred's Boethius, 41. 6.†—And fume biþ *triofete*, fume *fiofenfete*; fume *pleogende*. 7 ealle þeah biþ of ðune healbe piþ þære eorþan. And some be two-

* Aut mersas deducant pondera terras.—*De Consol.* lib. 3. metr. 9.

“—ne flye nat ouer hie, ne that the heuiness ne draw nat *adoun* ouerlowe the yerthes that be plunged in the waters.”—*Chaucer*.

Here observe that Chaucer uses *Adoun*. In the King of Tars we have,

“The table *adoun* riht he smot.”

“His robe he rente *adoun*.”

Warton, ii. 25. 8vo.

and a few lines below :

“Al that he hitte he smot doun riht.”

Ibid. 25.

“And descended a doun to the derk helle.”

P. Ploukman's Crede.

“Theo duyk feol doun to the grounde.”

Davie's Alisaundre, *Warton*, ii. 59.

“That hongen *adoun* to theo grounde.

Ibid. 54.

† Sunt quibus alarum levitas vaga, verberetque ventos,

Et liquido longi spatia ætheris enatet volatu.

Hæc pressisse solo vestigia gressibusque gaudent,

Vel virideis campos transmittere vel subire sylvas.

Quæ variis videas licet omnia discrepare formis;

Prona tamen facies hebetes valet ingravare sensus.

Unica gens hominum oelsum levat altius cacumen &c.

De Consol. lib. 5. met. 5.

some four-footed ; some flying : and yet all be down-
inclined towards the earth*.

Mat. 24. 3.—þa he ƿæt uppan Oluetȳr ðune. As
he upon a mount of Olives.—*For's Gospels.*

Mat. 67. 15—17. Spelman.—Dune Godeȳ, munt
Munt ȝerunnon, ðune ƿæt. to hƿȳ peneȝe
ƿar ȝerunnene. Dune on þam ȝelicod iȝ God,
on on hine.

mons Dei mons pinguis. Mons coagulatus, mons pinguis.
Ad suspicamini montes coagulatos? Mons in quo bene-
dictum est Deo habitare in eo.

Luc. 4. 9. of ðune. *C. Luc.* 4. 9. adune. In these
versions of Luke 4. 9. (If thou be the son of God, cast
thyself down from hence) we see adune in the Cambridge
MS. (Wanley's Cat. p. 152, Lye's C.) supplying the place
of ðune in his R., which is the Rushworth MS. in the
British Library, Wanl. p. 82. In Mareschal's edition the
word is thus rendered, *Eȳȳ þu ȝȳ Godeȳ ȝunu, aȝend*
neonun nȳþeȳ†. Gothic *𐍶𐌵𐌹𐍲𐍯 𐍥𐍯𐍲 𐍥𐌶𐍥𐍲*
𐌶𐌶𐍥†.

The following is the passage answering to this in Alfred's metrical
version, p. 197 :

Some ƿotum tƿam

ƿoldan ƿeððað.

ȝume ƿieȝȝete.

Some fleozende

ƿiðeð under ƿolcnum.

Bið þeah ƿuhta ȝehȳlc

onhnȳgen to hƿuȝan.

hniƿað of ðune.

on ƿeoruld ƿliteð.

ƿilnað to eoƿþan.

Some with two feet

tread the ground :

some fourfooted.

Some flying

wind under the welkin.

Yet is each creature

inclined to the ground,

boweth *adown*,

on the world looketh,

tendeth to the earth.

The representatives of which still remain in the Dutch *neder*, down,
to descend ; Germ. *thalwärts*, downhill. Mr. Gwilt in his *Saxon*
ments, just published, gives a new signification to *nideȳ* and *adune*,
he says, mean *backwards*.

Bede 1. 12.—Tuzan hi eapmlice adun of ðam pealle.
Miserrime de muris tracti, solo allidebantur.

Bede 4. 6.—Ðæt adune aſetton of ðam biſcop rice
ſinſpiſe. Ut deposito Winfrido, &c.

C. Luc. 19. 5.—Aduneartigan (Cambridge MS.) And
in the Durham Book *Cat. Nero*, I find—And cuoeð to him
Zache oeperta (i oepertlice) adune rtig. forðon to
dæge in hur ðin gedæpned iſ me to punián. 7 oepiſ-
tude opſtag adune. Et dixit ad eum, Zacchee, festinans
descende, quia hodie in domo tua oportet me manere. Et fes-
tinans descendit.

Psalm 71. 6.—He aduneartah ſpa ſpa pen on flýr.
Descendet sicut pluvia in vellus.

Psalm 87. 4.—Gepened ic eom mid adunertigend-
um on ſeaþe. Æstimatus sum cum descendantibus in la-
cum.

Psalm 73. 3.—Mount Sion is called þæpe dune.

Matth. 4. 8.—Junius says that the Rushworth MS. has
ðune instead of dune—On ðune heh ſuiðe : where Ma-
reschal has On ſpiðe heahne munt.

Chron. Sax. an. 1083.—And ſcotodun adunpeapd
mid aſepan. And shot downwards with arrows.—And
þa oðre þa ðupa bſæcon þæp adune. And the others
broke down the doors.

I believe it will be found that the adverb and preposition
Down exists in none of the other Teutonic dialects, but
solely in the English language. With regard to the sub-
stantive, Wachter derives it from *Dunen*, turgere.

VOL. I. p. 464.

Verbs compounded with FOR.—The particle *for* prefixed
to Verbs seems to have various significations, which can only
be studied with advantage by bringing together all the Verbs
and Participles in the Teutonic languages compounded with

See *Lamb. ten Kate's Anleiding*, ii. 53. and *Grimm'sutsche Grammatik*, ii. 850, where a large collection and comparison is given.

VER. Gothis *far* et *fra*, A.S. *fra* et *for*, Francis et m. *fär*, *fer*, *fēr*, *fora*, *furi*, per omnes vocales, et sæpe m cum Van. Particula inseparabilis, vario et multi-
i significatu pollens, in compositis, extra composita o.—*Wachter, Proleg.* § v.

The following are some of those which occur in English
lers: *Fordo*, *forhent*, *forsay*, *forthink**, *forgo*, *forlore*,
ined, *forslack*, *forstow*, *forswat*, *forswonk*, *forwon*, *for-*
ted, *forwearied*, *forlent*, *forfered*, *forbarred*, *forfare*,
koln, *forlete*, *forshent*, *forset*, *forwear*, *forwondred*, *for-*
id, *forfreteth*, *forpyned*, *forsleuthede*, *fortorne*, *forgive*,
et, *fordronken*, *fordry*, *forfaite*, *forjudge*†, *forbear*, *for-*
ke, *forbrused*, *fordrive*, *fordwined*, *forgrown*‡, *forkerve*,
last, *forlese*, *forsongen*, *forstraught*, *fortread*, *forwaked*,
wandred, *forwelked*, *forwept*, *forwounded*, *forwrapped*,
velde, *forbid*, *forclose*? *forshame*, *forsake*, &c. &c.

The compounds of *for* and *fore* have evidently been con-
nded, as in the cases of *forego*, to precede, and *forgo* (as
should be written§), to give up: so, *forþreon*, Flem.
rien, to overlook, to despise; *forþreon*, Flem. *veursien*,
oresee. When the particle has a privative signification, it
bably represents the Gothic *fra*: also in *forþigian*, Flem.
geeven, to forgive; which are the collaterals of **FRAN-**
FAN.

The explanation given by Mr. Tooke will not apply to
generality of cases.

"— shall move your Ladyshypp forthynk [*repent* ?] your curtesye
hys behalfe."—Cavendyashe's Letter, in Hunter's *Hallamshire*, p. 81.

Coke Litt. sec. 142, *foris judicatus*!—*Abjudicare, Fleta.*

"— twoo forgrowen fathers resemblyng Enocke and Hely."—
Gen. 283.

See the Errata to Lord Holland's *Life of Lope de Vega*, 1806.

VOL. II. p. 64.

WHINID.—“ ’Tis a common expression in the western counties to call an ill-natured, sour person *vinnid*. For *vinewed*, *vinowed*, *vinny*, or *vinew* (the word is variously written) signifies mouldy. In *Troilus and Cressida*, act 2d, Ajax speaks to Thersites, ‘Thou vinned’st leaven,’ i. e. thou most mouldy sour dough. Let this phrase be transplanted from the west into Kent, and they will pronounce it *whined’st* leaven.”—“Mr. Theobald reads, you *unwinnow’d’st* leaven; others, you *unsalted* leaven. But *vinned’st* is the true reading, ab Anglo-Sax. *fynig* mucidus. Wachterus, *finnen sordes*, *finnig* mucidus, putridus, *finniger speck*, lardum foetidum. Idem Anglo-Saxonibus *fynig* apud Somner et Benson, et inde *fynigean* mucescere.’ This word I met with in Horman’s *Vulgaria*, printed in 1519, folio 162. This bredde is olde and *venyed*: ‘hic panis cariosa est vetustate attactus,’ which not a little confirms my correction and explication.”—*Upton’s Critical Observations on Shakespear*, p. 213:

VOL. II. p. 418.

“We apprehend that Horne Tooke was mistaken in assigning a verbal origin (as being derived from 3rd pers. sing. indic.) to our abstract substantives in *th*; and that they are mostly formed from adjectives. Thus from *long*, *length*, &c.—Now this terminative *th* is as likely to be a coalescence of the article with the adjective, as to be the person of a verb. *The long*, &c. is a natural expression for length, &c. but in order to support Tooke’s derivation, we must suppose a verb *To long*, &c. and define length, *that which longeth*; which would be absurd. Though H. T. was not learned in the northern tongues, his sagacity is still admirable when he is pursuing a wrong scent. Another argument against his opinion is, that those substantives in *th*, which appear to have a verbal origin, assert a passive rather than an active

Thus *math* means *the thing mown*, not *that which th*; so *broth*, *ruth*, *stealth*, and in all these cases the *th* in coalescence with the article forms a natural equitable expression: the *mow* of *hay*, &c. We infer that the *th* is a transposed article."—*Monthly Review*, N. S. '2. p. 83.

Suio-Gothic the definite article is a suffix. *Stealth*, *ver*, is *the act of stealing*, not *the thing stolen*: *birth* is *the act of bearing*, or *the thing borne*.

VOL. II. pp. 465, 469.

THE PRESENT PARTICIPLE.—["*It was formerly in our language by the termination -and. It is now by the termination -ing.*"]

The substitution of the Present Participle in *ing* for the *ant* one in *ande* or *ende* has not, I believe, been satisfactorily accounted for. Mr. Tyrwhitt, speaking of the language of Chaucer, says; "the participle of the present time *ant* to be generally terminated in *ing*, as *loving*; though the old form which terminated in *ende* or *ande* was still in use as *lovende* or *lovande*." Mr. Grant, in his excellent Grammar, p. 141, conjectures that this change may have arisen from the nasal sound given by the Normans to *and* or *aving* led to their being written with a *g*. But this necessarily supposes the termination *ing* not to have existed before the Conquest*; whereas it had always been employed in Anglo-Saxon and in other Gothic dialects to form a large number of Verbal Substantives, such as A.S. *punung*, *mansio*, *ing*, Chaucer; Germ. *die wohnung*; Dutch, *wooning*; &c. &c. Instead, therefore, of *ende* being changed into *ing*, both these terminations coexisted in Anglo-Saxon and

Ande should also have disappeared when *ing* was established. We however find both in use together down to the 16th century.

OL. I.

b

Old English, as they still do in Dutch and German, the one being used for forming the Present Participle and the other the Verbal Substantive.

It follows then that what we are often told by grammarians of the Present Participle being used to form Verbal Substantives cannot be true: for substantives in *ing* had been common in our language for ages before ever the participle had had this termination: and the correspondent verbals in *ing* or *ung* in German and Dutch cannot possibly have any relation to the Present Participle, which in those languages has no such ending. Yet Greenwood and others* tell us that "this participle is often used as a substantive," p. 142; and that the participle "is turned into a substantive."

But let us see whether exactly the reverse may not be the true account of the matter, and try whether, instead of the Participle being used as a Substantive, it be not the fact that the *Substantive* is used as a *Present Participle*; and that our antient Participle in *ende* has been displaced and superseded by the Verbal Substantives in *ing*.

Greenwood adds: "This Participle is used in a peculiar manner with the verb *To Be*, &c., as *I was writing*, &c., and in this case *a* is often set before the *participle* (participle he must have it); as, *He was a dying*, *She came here a crying*, &c. Dr. Wallis makes this *a* to be put for *at*†, denoting

* "From *to begin* comes the participle *beginning*, as, *I am beginning the work*; which is turned into a substantive, as, *In the beginning*," p. 145.

† Participles sometimes perform the office of substantives, and are used as such: as, *The beginning*, *Excellent writing*:" Lindley Murray's *Grammar*; p. 77. "The present participle, with the definite article *the* before it, becomes a substantive:" *Ibid.* p. 183. "Terminations of the substantive of the thing, from the Saxon:—*ing* is obviously the termination of the imperfect participle."—Baldwin's very useful *New Guide*, p. xliii.

† Here Greenwood is inaccurate, for Wallis says, "*valet at seu in*," and that it would be a participle if the *a* were away.

—"*A-twisting*, in *torquendo*, inter *torquendum*, *torquendo jam occupatus*. —*A non est hic loci articulus numeralis, sed particula præpositiva, seu Præ-*

ch as *while* ; e. g. *a-dying*, &c., i. e. *while any one is*

Perhaps *a* is here redundant," p. 143.

opposing his *writing*, and *crying*, and *dying* to be indeed
iples, he might well consider the *a* redundant. But
re substantives, and to this the *a* bears witness. This
rightly states, "is undoubtedly the remains of the
sition *on* rapidly pronounced," and gives as instances,
hinge, *R. Glouc.* 186. An huntynge, 199; on rlep, an
asleep, *Sax. Chron.* Is not *dying* then the verbal
ntive? *He was a-dying.* Ille fuit *in obitu*—a mode
pression, which being in many cases capable of repre-
g the Present Participle in *ende*, was used for it, and
gth, by a subaudition of the *on* or *a*, gradually sup-
ed it.

e following instances, taken from among a number which
collected in an attempt to investigate the subject, may
some light on the progress of this change : and it will
en that I have not met with any case of verbals in *ing*
; employed strictly as Present Participles before the
century ; though in the writers of that period, this use
eedingly prevalent, almost to the exclusion of the par-
e in *ande*, which, however, kept its ground in the Scot-
and Northern writers to a much later period*.

quæ in connexionē valet *at*, seu *in* ; præfigitur verbali *twisting* a
twist addita terminatione formativa *ing*. Si abesset præfixum *a*, foret
ipium Activum, Agentem innuens, *contorquens*. Sed, propter præ-
præpositionem, est hic loci nomen verbale innuens Actionem ; quod
rundiorum vices supplet ; adeoque exponendum erit *in torsione exis-*
eu in torquendo, aut *inter torquendum* ; innuitque Agentem jam in
pere occupatum."—*Gram. Ang.* p. 243.

Dr. Lumsden considers it as a great defect in our language, "that
of the nouns ending in *ing* are at once participles and substantive
."—*Persian Grammar*, Pref. xxv.

1. PRESENT PARTICIPLE IN ANDE, ENDE*.

Matt. 8. 32.—*Gothic* **īþ eis nsgarþandans ƿalliþon in hlika swine.**—*A. Sax.* And hīz ða utzangende ƿerdon on ða ƿƿin.—*Franco. Th.* Sie tho uzgangante fuorun in thiū swin.—*Flemish*, Antw. 1542. En wten menscen gaende, zy in de cudde der verckenēn gegaen. And they going out, went into the swine.

Matt. 9. 2.—**ana liƿka liƿandān.** On bedde licgende. Liccende in bepe. *Durham B.*—*Lig.* gyngē in a bed.—*Wicl.*

Bȳnnende ƿȳp. *Cædm.* 83. burning fire.—*Tpa men*... coman ƿibend. *Chr. Sax.* an. 1137. Two men came riding.—*iiii* willis in the abbei ever ernend. *Hickes*, p. 11. Four wells in the abbey ever running.

Versions of the Gospels (14th century):—"And he prechyde sayande, a stalworther thane I schal come eftar me, of whom I am not worthi downfallande, or knejande, to louse the thwonge of his chaucers."—*Mark* 1. 7. *Beber's Wiclif, Pref.*

"— ruschyt among thaim sa rudly,
Stekand thaim so dispitously,
And in sik fusoun berand doun,
And slayand thaim forowtyn ransoun."

Barbour's Bruce, b. 9. l. 250.

2. VERBAL SUBSTANTIVE IN ING†.

A.S. Pined heom untellendlice pining. *Chron. Sax.*

* "D. est litera participialis, et nota originis ex participio. Solent enim Prisci ex participiis formare substantiva, et terminationem participialem derivatis relinquere, tanquam custodem originis. Hæc una litera nos quasi manu ducit ad permulta vocabulorum secreta intelligenda, quæ certe suam significandi vim non aliunde habent quam a præsentis temporis participio, a quo oriuntur. Hujusmodi sunt, *abend* vespera, ab *aben* deficere; *heiland* servator, ab *heilen* servare; *freund* amicus, a *freyen* amare; *feind* inimicus, a *fien* odisse; *wind* ventus, a *wēhen* flare; *mond* luna, a *manen*, monere."—*Wachter, Proleg.* § vi. See also *Lamb. ten Kate*, ii. 77.

† "UNG.—Omnibus veterum dialectis, si Gothicam excipias, usitatum.

17. Tormented them with unutterable tortures.— ung, combustio; halezing, consecratio; timbung,

nificet non liquet. Sed non ideo meram et arbitriam vocis designationem esse existimem, cum quia vetustas et longus sæculorum ita delevit, quas hodie ignorantur, tum quia jam sæpe vidimus, articulis quosdam inesse secretos significatus, quos neque nostra prior ætas animadvertit.—Præcipuus ejus usus est in formandis vis, non omnibus promiscue, sed iis quæ actionem aut passionem cant. Ita Anglosaxonibus *thancung* est gratiarum actio, Francis et is *auchung* augmentatio, Germanis *samlung* collectio, et alia innu-verbis oriunda. Sæpe etiam uni composito duplicem sensum, et passivum communicat. Inde *verachtung* contemptus, tam is contemnit, quam quo contemnitur.”—*Wachter. Proleg.* § vi.

er de allergeemeenzaemsten onzer uitgangen behoort ons ING (t. ING) dat, agter het worteldeel der *Verba* gevoegt zijnde, een *Famininum* uitmaekt, om de dadelijke werking te verbeelden; WINGE, DOENING *Actio*, van DOEN *agere*. Zoo mede in 't ung, bij ons *Ylinge*, *festinatio*, van 't F-Th. *Ilan* *festinare*; en *eilisung* *salutatio*, van 't F-Th. *Heilizan*, *salutare*, enz: en in 't h heeft men *Unge & Ung & Ing*; als A-S. *Wilmunge* *desiderium*, -S. *Wilnian* *desiderare*; A-S. *Ceapung* & *Ceapung* *emptio*, van 't *span* *emere*; A-S. *For-gaging* *transgressio*, van 't A-S. *For-gagean*; A-S. *Inwununge* *inhabitatio*, van 't A-S. *Immunian* *inhabitare*, in 't Hoogd. komt de UNG zoo gemeen als bij ons de ING; dus D., *Belohnung* *Mercies*, bij ons *Belooning*; enz.

ouder tijd dan 't A-Saksisch en F-Thuitsch ken ik geene voor- of medegetuigen van dezen uitgang. Bij 't M-Gottisch, en 't Kimbrisch, nogte ook in de Grammatica van het tegenwoordige sh laet hij zig niet zien. In het Engelsch gaet het *Participium Adjectiv.* op ING in steê van ENDE, dat bij ons en anderen van e en Kimbrische afkomst zig vertoont; als Eng. *Loving* bij ons; in 't H-D. *Liebende*. Dog voor 't Eng. *Love* *amare*, heeft men *breedsch*, Deensch, en Ysl. *Elska* *amare*, welks *Particip. Præs.* s in 't Zweedsch *Elskande*, in 't Deensch *Elskendis*, en in 't Ysl. *t amans*, enz. Uit welken hoek nu, of uit wat voor een eigen as INGE gesproten zij, heb ik nog niet tot mijn genoegen kon- peuren. Zo men 't van ons *Innige* *intimum*, zou willen afleiden, t de zin nog te gewrongen; behalven dit, zo ken ik geene oud- ter dit *innig* in steê van ons ING zig vertoont, niet tegenstaende idigheid onder 't Oude minst gekreukt is. De M-Gottische ter-

ædificatio, ædificium; *Germ.* die zimmerung; *Dutch*, timmering, a building.—*Fr. Th.* rehtungu, rihtung, regulæ; dolungono, þolung, passionibus; zemanungu, manung, admonitionem; samanungu, ʒeromnung, ecclesiis.—*Gley.*

Temptation, in the Lord's Prayer is expressed by the following, in various dialects: *Goth.* ƿƿƿƿƿƿƿƿƿƿƿƿ*, *Isl.* freisting. *Fr. Theot.* khorunka, chorunga, inchorunka, costunga. *Dano-Sax.* corytnung, corytun, corytnung. *Germ.* bechorunge, versuchung. *Swiss* fersuochung. *Augsb.* versuachong, fersechung. *Fries.* versieking. *Molkw.* voarsiekyng. *Hindelop.* bekoorieng. *Netherland.* becominghe, versoeckinge. *NetherSachs.* versuchung, bekoringe, bedoeringe, betherung. *OberSachs.* versuchung, anfechtung, &c.

Hampole (14th century):—"In the expowning I felogh holi doctors."—*Prologue to Psalter.*

"His apparell is souldier-lyke, better knowen by hys fearce doynge then by hys gay goyng."—*R. Ascham*, p. 26.

3. In the following passages both the terminations occur,

minatie AINS of EINS of ONS, als M-G. *Libains* (Leving), *Fodeins* (Voeding), en *Salbons* (Zalving), enz. zijnde van gelijk geslagt gebruik en zin, zou wel met IN, of *in*, of *on*, of *an*, beantwoord schijnen, dog de agterste G ontbreekt 'er dan nog; en zou 'er sedert in steê van IG moeten bij gekomen zijn; maer met deze onderstelling' zag ik dit op ons voorgemelde INNIG wederom uitdraeijen; 't gene om de bij gebragte rede niet aennemelijk is. Ik staek dan liever het verder gissen, zo lang ik nog niets bedenken kan, dat op een' goeden schijn rust, ofte proeve van overweging' mag uitstaen."—*Lamb. ten Kate*, ii. 81. See also *Grimm's D. Grammatik* ii. 354.

Verbal substantives were formed with each of these terminations; but those in *end* denoted the agent, as *re Dælend*, the Saviour; and those in *ing* the action, or its effect, as *building*, the act or what is produced by it; *chepyng*, traffic, or the place appropriated for it. Wachter says, "*actionem* aut *passionem* rei."

* Die endung *ubnja* scheint unser *ung* zu seyn.—*Adelung's Mithridates*, ii. 188.

but each is employed *appropriately*,—ENDE for the Present Participle, and ING for the Verbal Substantive.

Alfred's Bede:—"De ne pær ondrædende ða beotunge, pær ealðonmanner. lib. l. c. 7. Nequaquam minas principis metuit.

Gospel, Harl. MSS. 5085. Translation in a Northern dialect (14th century):—"This is the testimonge of Ion." "I am a voice of a criand in desert."

"Ther ne is no waspe in this world that wil folloke styngen
For stappung on a too of a styncand frere."

P. Ploughman's Crede.

"...such thyngis that are likand
Tyll mannys herung ar plesand."

Barbour's Bruce, (1357.) b. l. l. 9.

"Hors, or hund, or othir thing
That war plesand to thar liking." l. 207.

Lord Herries (1568):—"Our sovereign havand her majesty's promise be writing of luff, friendship," &c.—*Robertson's Scotland*; App. xxvii.

4. The following are instances of the *indiscriminate* use of ENDE and ING as terminations of the Present Participle.

"—— herdis of oxin and of fee,
Fat and tydy, rakand over all quhare,
In the rank gers pasturing on raw."

Gavin Douglas, b. 3. p. 75.

"—— the tender flouris I saw
Under dame Naturis mantill lurkyng law.
The small fowlis in flokkis saw I fle,
To Nature makand greit lamentatioun."

Sir D. Lyndsay, (1528.) i. 191.

"Changyng in sorrow our sang melodious,
Quhilk we had wont to sing, with gude intent,
Resoundand to the hevinnis firmament." *Ibid.* i. 192.

Lord Herries (1568):—"Or, failing hereof, that she would permit her to return in her awin countrie,

seeand that she was comed in her realm upon her writings and promises of friendship."—*Ubi sup.* App. xxvii.

5. The following are passages from the earliest authors, so far as I have been able * to find, in whose writings the Present Participles are formed by *ing* :

Hampole (middle of the 14th century).—"Thou fattide myn heued in oyle: and my chalys drunkenyng what is cleert†." *Ps.* 23.—I suppose this to be the participle. The version is from the Vulgate, "Et calyx meus inebrians quam præclarus est:" and comes remarkably near the Saxon: *And calic min ðpuncniend hu beapht iȝ. Spelman's Psalter.*

Piers Ploughman (about 1362):—Dr. Whitaker says that in some MSS. both of that poem and of Wiclif's Bible the English has been somewhat modernized. But each of the three of which he gives specimens has present participles in *ing* :

"Thenne a waked Wrathe, whit to white eyen,
Whit a nyvylinge nose, nyppying hus lyppes." *MS. A.*

"Snevelyng wiȝ his nose, and his nekke hangyng." *MS. B.*

"And nyvelyngre wiȝ þe nose, and his necke hangyngre."
MS. Oriel.

"———— al the foure ordres
Prechyngre the peple, for profit of the wombe
And glosyngre the godspel, as hem good lykede."

Chaucer:—"Alas, I wepyng am constrained to begin verse of soroweful matter, that whilom in florishyng studie made

* Further search should be made in the writers of the 12th and 13th centuries, for which I have not time at present. Whatever should delay the publication of this edition would procure the printer more blame than credit, and perhaps deservedly enough. Should I ever have leisure for a little work which I might call *Semi-Saxonica*, the results of future inquiries may find a place there.

† See *Mr. Baber's Wiclif*, lxvii. *Bib. Reg.* 18. D. 1.

de ditees. For lo, rendyng muses of the poetes enditen thinges, &c." *Boet.* b. i. 1.—"Talkyng on the way," yng on the strond." *Marchant's 2nd Tale.* And so . I believe it requires a long search in Chaucer's to find a participle in *ande*.

lif.—In the text printed by Mr. Baber, *ing*, *yng*, are used both for the verbal and the participle: as *dyng*e ydel in the chepyng."—*Matt.* 20. "John bar sing and seide, that I seigh the spirit comyng down alvar."—*John* 1. And in numerous instances the use present participle is avoided by employing the relative *wh*: as "to men that saten at the mete," instead of *he sittande at mete*," in the older version—*Mark*, 6. But among the specimens of the MSS. of the version cited to Wiclif, which Mr. Baber has given, p. lxx. we see the following variation; *MS. Bib. Reg.* 1. c. viii. "pre-
e stoonys hangyng in the forheed, and chaungyng
s:" Mr. Douce's MS. "jemmes in the frount hangende
launging cloths."—*Is.* 3. 22. *Gemmas in fronte pen-*
is, et mutatoria. Where I take *changing* to be a sub-
re,—clothes for a change, not clothes that change.

From all which, it appears that though the use of *ing* for present participle was fully established in the 14th century—the age of Langland, Chaucer, and Wiclif, yet the *ande* was still occasionally used, both being found in some writers, and sometimes in the very same sentence; and in the North, to the end of the 16th century. This seems to be a convincing proof that the change was not effected by an alteration in the sound or orthography of an inflection; but by the rivalry and increasing prevalence of a phrase in cases equivalent to, and which has come at length to be wholly substituted for, our former participle: as if, for instance, instead of *tu recubans sub tegmine*,—thou lying (lic-

genð) under the shade,—we should say, *tu in recubitu*, &c., thou a-lying, &c.

6. I shall now add some instances which may help to explain this change or substitution. It may be superfluous to give instances of verbals with *a* or *an** prefix; but as they may perhaps help to throw light on this inquiry†, I shall add a few.

* That the *a* prefix to many words is the representative of the ancient *on* and not of *at* as Johnson asserts, appears clearly from the following, written indifferently with *on*, *an*, or *a*:

alive:—"The Erle of Salisbury was taken *on lyce*."—*Fabyan*, 383.

aside:—"for hope of life was set *on side*."—*Hall*, Hen. VI. fol. 103.

aboard: *on board*.

asleep:—"With that he fell *on slepe*."—*Holinshed*, death of Edw. IV.

"Fell *on sleep*."—Acts xiii. 36 in our present bibles. So in Barker's 1585; and in Cranmer's 1553. The Dutch translation has "*is ont-slapen*," A.S. *onjlaþan*, obdormiscere.

awake, awoke, A.S. *onpoc*, *apoc*.—*Chr. Sax.* M.S. Laud.

athirst, anhungred, *Matt.* 4. In *Piers Plouhman*, by a change of the aspirate into *f*, these are written *a fynigred* and *a fyrste*, which Whitaker absurdly explains in his Glossary, "frost-bitten and with aching fingers." And pass. 10, p. 151,

... "meny other men, that muche wo suffren
Both *a fyngrede* and *a furst*:"

he paraphrases:—"both galled in their fingers with frost!" But Andrew Borde says of the Cornish man "*Fynger iche do abyd*."

In Weber's *Romances*, iii. 49, we find *an-honge*; and in Trevisa's *Chronicle*, "This geer kyng Henry ordeynede that theeves scholde be *an hanged*."

"Al that lyveth other looketh, a londe and a water."

P. Plouhman, pass. 4. l. 29.

anon, a two:—"It kerueth a two and breaketh a two hem that were made of one fleshe."—*Chaucer, Person's Tale*, fol. 115. *Anon* is A.S. *on an*, *in one*.

Also, on *fixode*, John xxi. 3. *auisseth*, *R. Glouc.* 264. (a fishing). *an honteth. ib.* 283. &c. *on hepgof*, *Chr. Sax.*

† Hickes mentions a Dano-Saxon substitute for the Present Participle; *Thes.* t. i. p. 133.

"—pat beþ ago to daȝ auȝsynge." *Rob. Glouc.* p. 265.
(that are gone to day a-fishing.)

"To morrow ye shall yn huntyng fare."
Squire of Low Degree. Warton, 8vo. 2. 9.

"thus shall ye ryde
On hankyng by the ryvers syde." *Ibid.* p. 11.

"And ride an hawkyng by the rivere."
Chaucer. R. of Sir Thop. v. 3245.

"On huntyng ben they ridden."
Chaucer. Knight's Tale, (1689.)

"The bysshop hadde a faire tour a makyng."
Glossary to Robert of Gloucester, p. 704.

"A knight that had been on hunting."
Prince Arthur, ch. 38.

"When I am called from him I fall on weeping."
Ascham's Scholemaster, fol. 11. b. 1.

And going on huntyng."—*Stow's Summary*, p. 10.
hilest he is in the anointing."—*Prynne's Signal Loy-*
p. 252. "While these sentences are in reading."—
munion Service, in the Offertory. "Whiles that is in
ing."—Coronation of Henry VII. in *Ives's Select Pa-*
p. 115. "Whiles the Offertorie was in playing at
ns."—*Ibid.* p. 136.

Compare the following lines from the description of the
session of Olympias, by Davie, with the corresponding
by Gower:

"There was knyghtis turnyng
There was maiden es carolyng
There was champions skyrmyng,
Of heom and of other wrastlyng,
Of lions chas, of beore baityng." *Warton*, ii. 55. 8vo.

The words in *ying* here are substantives, those which pre-
e them being genitives, [tourneying of knights, caroling

of maidens,] as is seen in the last two lines. Gower turns the phrase by employing the participle :

“ When as she passed by the strete
There was ful many a tymbre beate,
And many a maide carolende.
And thus throughout the town plaiende
This quene unto the plaiene rode.” *Warton, ii. 56.*

Here we have a writer of a later period substituting the Present Participle for the Verbal Substantive, but retaining the old termination of the former.

A greater collection of instances would probably throw fresh light on this change in our language : but enow have been given to prove at least that all speculations founded on the supposed derivation of verbals in *ing* from the Present Participle resemble historical disquisitions in which, facts and dates not being considered of any particular importance, it should be ingeniously argued *a priori* that Hengist and Horsa were sons of Queen Anne and William the Conqueror.

It is evident, moreover, that if the Present Participle were employed as a substantive, it must signify the agent and not the act. We find in Anglo-Saxon and the kindred dialects Dælend, Saviour; Scýppend, Creator; Sæ-liðend, sailor; Riddend, knight; Demend, judge, &c.—and we have even now *Friend* and *Fiend*, which are present participles of the Gothic words for to love and to hate. These signify the doer; but how can the active participle possibly signify the thing done? Make the trial in other languages :

“ — quis fallere possit *amantem* ? ”

“ Quel ennuy la va consumant
D'estre si loing de son *amant*.”

After having told us that “ the present participle with the definite article *the* before it becomes a substantive, and must have the preposition *of* after it, as, *by the observing of which*,”

Lindley Murray gravely adds, "the article *an* or *a* has the same effect."—p. 183. The example he gives of the participle, as participating "not only of the properties of a verb, but also of those of an adjective," is singular enough; "I am desirous of *knowing* him." I think it will be difficult to find any property of an adjective here in the word *knowing*.

In the much-vaunted *History of European Languages* by Dr. Alexander Murray, there is the following account of the Participle :

"The participle of the present tense, which was compounded of the verb and two consignificatives, *NA*, work; and *DA*, do, make; may be exemplified in *WAGANADA*, by contraction, *WAGANDA* and *WAGAND*, shaking. In some dialects, *GA*, go; was used instead of *DA* : Thus, *WAGANGA*, shaking, wagging; which is the participial form adopted in modern English."—vol. i. p. 61.

Here the student might suppose he would find the means of tracing up the participle in *ing* to an earlier date, and in various dialects : but Dr. Murray does not condescend to tell us what these dialects are*. All with him is oracular : he seldom gives us the means of satisfying ourselves of the truth of his marvellous assertions, while he relates all the particulars of the mode in which languages were formed in the first ages of the world, as if they had been revealed to him supernaturally. He gives abundance of elements and radicals, indeed ; but so great a proportion of them are of his own coinage, or moulded to suit his purpose, that the student has no means of distinguishing what is real from what is fabricated. The burthen of the work is, that the following NINE WORDS are the foundations of language :

* Could he have meant that *WAGANGA* is Mosso-Gothic? Without better evidence, we ought not to believe that the word ever existed. Speculations go on very smoothly with those who, like some of our newspaper philosophers, have the manufacturing of their own facts.

of maidens,] as is seen in the last two lines. Gower turns the phrase by employing the participle :

“ When as she passed by the strete
There was ful many a tymbre beate,
And many a maide carolende.
And thus throughout the town plaiende
This quene unto the plaiene rode.” *Warton*, ii. 56.

Here we have a writer of a later period substituting the Present Participle for the Verbal Substantive, but retaining the old termination of the former.

A greater collection of instances would probably throw fresh light on this change in our language : but enow have been given to prove at least that all speculations founded on the supposed derivation of verbals in *ing* from the Present Participle resemble historical disquisitions in which, facts and dates not being considered of any particular importance, it should be ingeniously argued *a priori* that Hengist and Horsa were sons of Queen Anne and William the Conqueror.

It is evident, moreover, that if the Present Participle were employed as a substantive, it must signify the agent and not the act. We find in Anglo-Saxon and the kindred dialects *Dælend*, Saviour; *Scýppend*, Creator; *Sæ-līðend*, sailor; *Riddend*, knight; *Demend*, judge, &c.—and we have even now *Friend* and *Fiend*, which are present participles of the Gothic words for to love and to hate. These signify the doer; but how can the active participle possibly signify the thing done? Make the trial in other languages :

“ ——— *quis fallere possit amantem ?* ”

“ *Quel ennuy la va consumant
D'estre si loing de son amant.* ”

After having told us that “ the present participle with the definite article *the* before it becomes a substantive, and must have the preposition *of* after it, as, *by the observing of which*,”

ey Murray gravely adds, "the article *an* or *a* has the effect."—p. 183. The example he gives of the participle, as participating "not only of the properties of a verb but also of those of an adjective," is singular enough; "I am desirous of *knowing* him." I think it will be difficult to find any property of an adjective here in the word *ing*.

In the much-vaunted *History of European Languages* by Alexander Murray, there is the following account of the participle:

The participle of the present tense, which was compounded of the verb and two consignificatives, *NA*, work; *DA*, do, make; may be exemplified in *WAGANADA*, by action, *WAGANDA* and *WAGAND*, shaking. In some dialects, *GA*, go, was used instead of *DA*: Thus, *WAGANGA*, *ing*, wagging; which is the participial form adopted in modern English."—vol. i. p. 61.

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Could he have meant that *WAGANGA* is Mosso-Gothic? Without any evidence, we ought not to believe that the word ever existed. Speculations go on very smoothly with those who, like some of our newspaper philosophers, have the manufacturing of their own facts.

1. Ag, Wag, Hwag. 2. Bag, Bwag, Fag, Pag. 3. Dwag, Thwag, Twag. 4. Gwag, Cwag. 5. Lag, Hlag. 6. Mag. 7. Nag, Hnag. 8. Rag, Hrag. 9. Swag!—"On which (foundation) he says, "an edifice has been erected of a more useful and wonderful kind than any which have exercised human ingenuity. They were uttered at first, and probably for several generations, in an insulated manner. The circumstances of the actions were communicated by gestures, and the variable tunes of the voice; but the actions themselves were expressed by their suitable monosyllable."—p. 32. All which is further elucidated in Note P, p. 182, where we learn, that in the primitive universal language, BAG WAG meant, Bring water; BAG, BAG, BAG! They fought very much:—and that such he considers "as a just, and not imaginary specimen of the earliest articulated speech."

On the subject of verbals in *ing* he has another extravagant speculation (vol. i. p. 85.), in which he thus deduces from them our verbals in *on*, derived from the Latin and French.

"Under this title also must be noticed all words terminating in *N*, except derivatives from the participles in *ND*, *NT*, or *NE*, which by corruption have lost their final letters. Derivatives from the Latin or French, which terminate in *on*, with a few exceptions, ended in *ANG*, *ING*, or *ONG*, the sign of a present participle*. Indeed there is reason to suspect that they originally stood as follows: *REG*, to direct, govern; *REGIGONGA*, a governing, a *region*; *RELATIGONG* or *RELATIGING*, a *relating*. These harsh but significative terminations were softened into *on*. [*Where? and when?*] Such formations are common in the Teutonic dialects, and perfectly agreeable to the established analogies of the language, being similar to the English verbal nouns which end in *ing*."

* In the second volume, p. 10, he derives the A.Sax. adverbs in *unga*, *inga*, from the present participle!

I will not tire the reader with more of these absurd

Considerable learning is indeed brought forward in work, to which may be applied a maxim for which I have accustomed to feel an hereditary respect: "The more any man hath, the more need he hath of a correct cautious judgment to use it well, otherwise his learning only render him the more capable of deceiving himself there*."

I shall conclude this note by presenting the reader with more speculation on the subject of it. This is from a work which the ingenious author, Mr. Fearn, has named *Tooke*; and which, as coming from a declared opponent, should receive some notice here.

I am a coming,—means, I exist in space—I *on-ing* (ing) COMING: In which instance, as in every other, pronoun, (or noun,) which is the sign of the grammatical agent of the adjective action is, or ought to be, used to form the *nominative* or agent of that action. In the small variety of names for beginning actions which appears, there is perhaps not one that is more logical, though at the same time none more vulgar, or debased, than the phrases 'I am *a COMING*,' 'I am *a GOING*.' When children or servants or other dilatory persons, called upon to do any thing which they must commence with, but which they have not yet begun, and proceed with hesitation or reluctance, the ordinary reply is, 'I am *a COMING*;'—'I am *a GOING* to do it.' Now it is observed among etymologists that *A* means *ON*, and *ON* means *ON*. Hence the real import of the phrase I am *a COMING* is—I am *on*—(onning)—(*one-ing*)—the ACT OF

Preface to Taylor's *Hebrew Concordance*, vol. ii.—Dr. Murray's learned queries are received with great faith by Mr. Fearn. His system, more is transcribed into Cyclopædias, and a Grammar founded upon it has been published in Scotland.

Mr. Fearn here travels too fast for me to keep pace with him.

COMING,—that is (*figuratively*, and *feignedly also*,) I am MAKING Myself ONE WITH THE ACT OF COMING,—which amounts to feigning, ‘I am COMING This Moment.’

“It is equally usual, likewise, to say, He is *a* FISHING. He is *a* RIDING,—He is *a* FIGHTING; even during the *continuation* of either of these actions: in which case, it is plain, the expression is less *figurative*, or *feigned*; because the agent is actually at the moment DOING the action, although he cannot be LITERALLY ONE with it.”—P. 345.

Whatever the reader may make of this, I confess that, of the various ways of treating the subject, I must prefer the Baconian mode pursued by Mr. Tooke*. As in Physics, so in Philology, we shall attain truth by an accurate investigation of facts and phænomena, and not by ingenious conjectures which are independent of, or opposed to, them. Reasonings on language not deduced from the real history of words are of about the same value as speculations in astronomy or chemistry unsupported by an acquaintance with the phænomena of nature†.

With facts, then, for our guides, we find that we need not have recourse to the remotest ages and to nondescript dialects in the investigation of the change of termination in our

* We are told, however, by Dr. Murray, that if Mr. Tooke “had not been misled by some erroneous parts of Locke’s philosophy, and the *weaker materialism* of some unintelligible modern opinions, he would have made a valuable accession to moral as well as grammatical inquiries.”—Vol. ii. p. 342. If Locke’s philosophy, and what is here called Materialism, kept Mr. Tooke clear of such airy conceits as Dr. Murray’s, that at least is something in their favour. See this subject very ably treated in “A Letter on the Immateriality of the Soul, in reply to Mr. Rennel,” (Hunter, 1821), ascribed to a clergyman of the Irish church.

† “The wit and mind of man, if it work upon matter, which is the contemplation of the creatures of God, worketh according to the stuff, and is limited thereby: but if it work upon itself, as the spider worketh his web, then it is endless, and brings forth indeed cobwebs of learning, admirable for the fineness of thread and work, but of no substance or profit.”

Bacon’s *Adv. of Learning*.

ent Participle and its relation to Verbals in *ing*; nor to the speculations and extravagant assumptions: but that the field of inquiry is limited to our own language, and nearly to the period of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries:—and commend those who have opportunity to note any instances prior to the age of Chaucer where a verbal in *ing* is used strictly and unequivocally as a Present Participle.

VOL. I. p. 450. and VOL. II. p. 501 and 505.

such expressions as the following evidently have their origin from the ancient Derivative or Future Infinitive. *The tree is to build*. There are many things *to do*, trees *to plant*, things *to make*, &c. *Hard to bear*. *Fair to look on*. *Easy to turn*. *Good to eat*. *Difficult to handle*. *Sad to tell*. So, in *þyrcame to tellanne, ac hit ne þuhte him nan me to donne*.—*Chr. Sax.* an. 1085. *A house to let*; (which some folks, thinking to show their grammar, write *use to be let*.) *Ages to come*. *He is to blame*.

that is the robe I mean, iwis, through which the ground *to praisen is*." *Rom. of the Rose*, l. 69. "þynges that been *to flien*, and thynges that been *to desiren*."—*B. 2*. "And is hereafter *to comen*."—*P. Plouhman's Creed*. seems to have been first altered by accenting the vowel, instead of using the *nne*, as *to punián*, and then to have been written like the simple infinitive, but with *to* prefixed: "open þe þearf *to halben*"—*Chron. Sax.* an. 1140. Finally the simple Infinitive was not preceded by *to*: "we still say, *I bade him rise*. *I saw him fall*. *You may him go*. *They heard him sing*."

Dr. Grimm considers the Infinitive as declinable, and makes the Future Infinitive a Dative Case, vol. ii. p. 1022.

The form which occurs in Wiclif, "Thou that art *to comen*," *Matt.* 11. 3., would seem to be a corruption of the future infinitive, as it answers to *þu þe to cumenne t*, &c. Yet we find *to makienbe* in Hicckes, ii. 171.

xxiii. ; and, in the Saxon Chronicle, an. 654, instead of *Botulƿ onƿon ƿæt mýnrƿen tymbrian*, MS. *Cot.*, reads, *agan to maciende ƿ mýnrƿen* : a form which often occurs in old *Platdeutsche* : *Matt.* 8. "Wultu uns uthdryven, so vorlöve uns inn de herde swyne tho varende."—*2 Tim.* 4. 1. "Crist Ihesu that *is to demynge* the quyke and deed." "Ihesu Christo, de dar thokamende ys, tho richtende de levendigen und de doden." *Platdeutsche Bible, Magdeburg*, 1545.—"Do began he to bevende." *Bruns Gedichte*, 360 : from which it would seem to have been confounded with the present participle ; unless there should have been a form in which the particle *to* was used with the Present Participle, in the same manner as with the Past and with the Future Infinitive :—as *to-bƿecend*, *to-bƿocen*, *to-bƿecanne*.

I trust that these notes, and the few that are scattered through the work, will not be thought foreign to its design, whether they coincide with Mr. Tooke, or propose explanations differing from those which he has given. It is one of his great excellencies that he always places honestly and fully before the reader all the data from which his deductions are made ; so that even where he may be thought to err he is sure to be instructive.

I have now only to acknowledge with thanks the advice and assistance which I have received in the preparation of this edition from my friends Sutton Sharpe, Esq., and Richard Price, Esq. the able editor of *Warton's History of English Poetry* ; and shall conclude with expressing a wish that the work in its present form may prove acceptable to such as are fond of the studies which it was designed to promote.

Red Lion Court, Fleet Street,
Sept. 29, 1829.

RICHARD TAYLOR.

ΕΠΕΑ ΠΤΕΡΟΕΝΤΑ,
OR THE
VERSIONS OF PURLEY.
PART I.

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TO THE
UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE.

ONE of her grateful Sons,—who always considers acts of voluntary justice towards himself as Favours*,—dedicates this humble offering. And particularly to her chief ornament for virtue and talents, the Reverend Doctor Beadon, Master of Jesus College.

* Notwithstanding the additional authority of Plato's despicable saying—*Cum omnibus solvam quod cum omnibus debeo*†—the assertion of Machiavel, that—*Nissuno confessera mai haver obligo con uno chi non l'offenda*‡—and the repetition of it by Father Paul, that—*Mai alcuno si pretende obligato a chi l'habbi fatto giustitia; stimandolo tenuto per se stesso di farla*§—are not true. They are not true either with respect to nations or to individuals: for the experience of much injustice will cause the forbearance of injury to appear like kindness.

† Senec. de Benefic. lib. vi.

‡ Discor. lib. i. cap. xvi.

§ Opinione del Padre Fra Paolo, in qual modo debba governarsi la Repubblica Veneta per haver perpetuo dominio.



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Non ut laudemur, sed ut prosimus.

Equidem sic prope ab adolescentia animatus fui, ut inania famæ contemnam, veraque consecrer bona. In qua cogitatione sæpius defixus, facilius ab animo meo potui impetrare, ut (quamvis scirem sordescere magis et magis studia Literarum, maximeque ea quæ proprie artem Grammaticen spectant) nihilominus paulisper, non quidem seponerem, sed remissius tamen tractarem studia graviora ; iterumque in manus sumerem veteres adolescentiæ labores, laboreque novo inter tot Curas divulgarem.—G. J. VOSSIUS.

Le grand objet de l'art etymologique n'est pas de rendre raison de l'origine de tous les mots sans exception, et j'ose dire que ce seroit un but assez frivole. Cet art est principalement recommandable en ce qu'il fournit à la philosophie des matériaux et des observations pour elever le grand edifice de la theorie generale des Langues.—*M. Le President de Brosses.*

ΕΠΕΑ ΠΤΕΡΟΕΝΤΑ,

OR THE

VERSIONS OF PURLEY.

INTRODUCTION.

B.

THE mystery is at last unravelled. I shall no longer wonder now that you engross his company at Purley, whilst his other friends can scarce get a sight of him.

This, you say, was President Bradshaw's seat. It is the secret of his attachment to the place. You are secured by the best security, his political prejudices and his enthusiasm. But do not let his veneration for the memory of the antient possessor pass upon you for ever, but let it be to the present.

seat of William Tooke, esq. near Croydon, Surrey.

B

H.

Should you be altogether so severe upon my politics ; when you reflect that, merely for attempting to prevent the effusion of brother's blood and the final dismemberment of the empire, I stand the single legal victim during the contest, and the single instance of proscription after it ? But I am well contented that my principles, which have made so many of your way of thinking angry, should only make you laugh. Such however as they are, they need not now to be defended by me : for they have stood the test of ages ; and they will keep their ground in the general *commendation* of the world, till men forget to love themselves ; though, till then perhaps, they are not likely to be seen (nor credited if seen) in the *practice* of many individuals.

But are you really forced to go above a hundred years back to account for my attachment to Purley ? Without considering the many strong public and private ties by which I am bound to its present possessor, can you find nothing in the beautiful prospect from these windows ? nothing in the entertainment every one receives in this house ? nothing in the delightful rides and walks we have taken round it ? nothing in the cheerful disposition and easy kindness of its owner, to make a rational man partial to this habitation ?

T.

you are making him transgress our only standing
Politics and compliments are strangers here.
ways put them off when we put on our boots ;
ave them behind us in their proper atmosphere,
oke of London.

B.

possible ! Can either of you—Englishmen and
s!—abstain for four-and-twenty hours together
olitics ? You cannot be always on horseback, or
net. What, in the name of wonder, your fa-
topic excluded, can be the subject of your so
at conversations ?

T.

have a strange notion of us. But I assure you
d more difficulty to finish than to begin our con-
ons. As for our subjects, their variety cannot be
bered ; but I will tell you on what we were dis-
g yesterday when you came in ; and I believe
e the fittest person in the world to decide between
le insists, contrary to my opinion, that all sorts
dom and useful knowledge may be obtained by
a man of sense without what is commonly called
ing. And when I took the easiest instance, as I
ht, and the foundation of all other knowledge,

(because it is the beginning of education, and that in which children are first employed,) he declined the proof of his assertion in this instance, and maintained that I had chosen the most difficult: for he says that, though Grammar be usually amongst the first things taught, it is always one of the last understood.

B.

I must confess I differ from Mr. H. concerning the difficulty of Grammar; if indeed what you have reported be really his opinion. But might he not possibly give you that answer to escape the discussion of a disagreeable, dry subject, remote from the course of his studies and the objects of his inquiry and pursuit? By his general expression of—*what is commonly called Learning*—and his declared opinion of that, I can pretty well guess what he thinks of grammatical learning in particular. I dare swear (though he will not perhaps pay me so indifferent a compliment) he does not in his mind allow us even the poor consolation which we find in Athenæus—*εἰ μὴ ἰατροὶ ἦσαν*; but concludes, without a single exception, *οὐδὲν τῶν Γραμματικῶν μωροτέρων*^a.

I must however intreat him to recollect, (and at the same time whose authority it bears,) that—"Qui sapi-

^a Οὐ γὰρ κακῶς τινὶ τῶν ἑταίρων ἡμῶν ἐλεγχθὲν το, εἰ μὴ ἰατροὶ ἦσαν, οὐδὲν αὖν ἢ τῶν γραμματικῶν μωροτέρων.

Deipnosoph. lib. 15.

et literarum divortium faciunt, nunquam ad sapientiam pertingent. Qui vero alios etiam a linguarumque studio absterrent, non antiquæ sed novæ stultitiæ doctores sunt habendi.”

H.

And I spoke my real sentiments. I think Grammar difficult, but I am very far from looking upon it as such : indeed so far, that I consider it as absolutely necessary in the search after philosophical truth ; which, the most useful perhaps, is at least the most pleasant employment of the human mind. And I think it necessary in the most important questions concerning religion and civil society. But since you say so, tell me where it may be learned.

B.

Your look and the tone of your voice were less sensible of the extravagance of your compliment to grammar, would incline me to suspect that you were taking revenge, and bantering me in your turn by an encomium on my favourite study. But, if I suppose you in earnest, I answer, that our English may be sufficiently and easily learned from the excellent Introduction of Doctor Lowth : or from *it* (as well as the *best*) English grammar, given by Jonson.

H.

True, Sir. And that was my first slight answer to our friend's instance. But his inquiry is of a much larger compass than you at present seem to imagine. He asks after the causes or reasons of Grammar^a: and for satisfaction in them I know not where to send him; for, I assure you, he has a troublesome, inquisitive, scrupulous mind of his own, that will not take mere words in current payment.

B.

I should think that difficulty easily removed. Dr. Lowth in his Preface has done it ready to your hands. "Those," he says, "who would enter more deeply into this subject, will find it fully and accurately handled with the greatest acuteness of investigation, perspicuity of explication, and elegance of method,

^a "Duplex Grammatica; alia *civilis*, alia *philosophica*.

"*Civilis*, peritia est, non scientia: constat enim ex auctoritate usuque clarorum scriptorum.

"*Philosophica*, vero, ratione constat; et hæc scientiam olet.

"Grammatica *civilis* habet ætatem in qua viget, et illam amplectuntur Grammatici, dicunt enim sub Cicerone et Cæsare adultam linguam, &c. At *philosophica* non agnoscit ætatem linguæ, sed rationalitatem; amplectiturque vocabula bona omnium temporum."—*Campanella*.

satise intitléd *Hermes*, by *James Harris*, esq. the beautiful and perfect example of Analysis that an exhibited since the days of Aristotle."

T.

recommédation no doubt is full, and the aug-
great; but I cannot say that I have found the
ance to correspond: nor can I boast of any
tion from its perusal, except indeed of hard
nd frivolous or unintelligible distinctions. And
learned from a most excellent authority, that
ce qui varie, tout ce qui se charge de termes
et envelopés, a toujours paru suspect; et non
ent frauduleux, mais encore absolument faux:
il marque un embarras que la vérité ne con-
nt^a."

B.

you, Sir?

H.

really in the same situation.

B.

you tried any other of our English authors on
ect?

Bossuet des Variations des Eglises Protestantes.

H.

I believe, all of them, for they are not numerous^a; but none with satisfaction.

^a The authors who have written professedly on this subject, in any language, are not numerous. Caramuel, in the beginning of his *Grammatica Audax*, says,—“Solus, ut puto, *Scotus*, et post eum *Scaliger* et *Campanella* (alios enim non vidi) Grammaticam speculativam evulgarunt; vias tamen omnino diversas ingressi. Multa mihi in *Scaligero*, et plura in *Campanella* displicuerunt; et pauciora in *Scoto*, qui vix alibi subtilius scripsit quam cum de *Grammaticis Modis Significandi*.”

The reader of Caramuel (who, together with *Campanella*, may be found in the Bodleian Library) will not be disappointed in him; but most egregiously by him, if the smallest expectations of information are excited by the character which is here given of *Scotus*: whose *De Modis Significandi* should be intitled, not *Grammatica Speculativa*, but—an Exemplar of the subtle art of saving appearances, and of discoursing deeply and learnedly on a subject with which we are totally unacquainted. *Quid enim subtilius vel magis tenue, quam quod nihil est?*

Wilkins, part 3. chap 1. of his *Essay towards a Real Character*, says, after Caramuel,—“The first of these (i. e. *philosophical, rational, universal Grammar*) hath been treated of but by few; which makes our learned *Verulam* put it among his *Desiderata*. I do not know any more that have purposely written of it, but *Scotus* in his *Grammatica Speculativa*, and Caramuel in his *Grammatica Audax*, and *Campanella* in his *Grammatica Philosophica*. (As for *Scioppius* his *Grammar* of this title, that doth wholly concern the Latin tongue.) Besides which, something hath been occasionally spoken of it by

B.

must then give up one at least of your positions. as you make it out, Grammar is so difficult that knowledge of it cannot be obtained by a man of sense any authors in his own language, you must send what is commonly called Learning, to the Greek

in his book *De Causis Linguae Latinæ*; and by Vossius *Eristarchus*." So far Wilkins: who, for what reason I do not know, has omitted the *Minerva of Sanctius*; though well worth his notice; and the declared foundation of Scioppius.

Who should confine himself to these authors, and to those, with Wilkins, have since that time written upon this subject, would fall very short of the assistance they might have, and the leading hints and foundations of research which he might obtain, by reading even all the authors who confined themselves to particular languages.

great Bacon put this subject amongst his *Desiderata*, Wilkins says, because "*few* had treated of it;" but because *one* had given a satisfactory account of it. At the same time Bacon, though evidently wide of the mark himself, yet could best how this knowledge might most probably be attained and pointed out the most proper materials for reflection upon. "Illa demum (says he) ut arbitramur, foret prima Grammaticæ species, si quis in linguis plurimis, tam in quam vulgaribus, eximie doctus, de variis linguarum statibus tractaret; in quibus quæque excellat, in quibus præstet ostendens. Ita enim et linguæ mutuo commercio locupletari possint; et fiet ex iis quæ in singulis linguis pulchra anquam Venus Apellis) orationis ipsius quædam formosa imago, et exemplar quoddam insigne, ad sensus animi primendos."—*De Augment. Scient.* lib. 6. cap. 1.

and Latin authors, for the attainment of it. So true, in this science at least, if not in all others, is that saying of Roger Ascham; that—"Even as a hawke fleeth not hie with one wing, even so a man reacheth not to excellency with one tongue."

H.

On the contrary, I am rather confirmed by this instance in my first position. I acknowledge philosophical Grammar (to which only my suspected compliment was intended) to be a most necessary step towards wisdom and true knowledge. From the innumerable and inveterate mistakes which have been made concerning it by the wisest philosophers and most diligent inquirers of all ages, and from the thick darkness in which they have hitherto left it, I imagine it to be one of the most difficult speculations. Yet, I suppose, a man of plain common sense may obtain it, if he will dig for it; but I cannot think that what is commonly called Learning, is the mine in which it will be found. Truth, in my opinion, has been improperly imagined at the bottom of a well: it lies much nearer to the surface: though buried indeed at present under mountains of learned rubbish; in which there is nothing to admire but the amazing strength of those vast giants of literature who have been able thus to heap Pelion upon Ossa. This at present is only my opinion, which perhaps I have entertained too lightly. Since therefore the question has been started, I am pleased at this occa-

being confirmed or corrected by you ; whose
ion, opportunities, extensive reading, acknow-
abilities, and universal learning, enable you to
as of all that the antients have left or the mo-
ave written on the subject.

B.

Sir, your humble servant! compliments, I per-
re banished from Purley. But I shall not be
nticed by them to take upon my shoulders a
which you seem desirous to shift off upon me.
s, Sir, with all your caution, you have said too
now to expect it from me. It is too late to re-
at has passed your lips : and if Mr. T. is of
atiments, you shall not be permitted to explain
lf away. The satisfaction which he seeks after,
y *is to be had* ; and you tell us the mine where
ink it is *not to be found*. Now I shall not easily
suaded that you are so rash, and take up your
as so lightly, as to advance or even to imagine
unless you had first searched that mine yourself,
rmed a conjecture at least concerning the place
you suppose this knowledge is to be found. In-
therefore of making me display to Mr. T. my
ig, which you have already declared insufficient
e purpose, is it not much more reasonable that
ould communicate to us the result of your re-
in ?

H.

With all my heart, if you chuse it should be so, and think you shall have patience to hear me through. I own I prefer instruction to correction, and had rather have been informed without the hazard of exposing myself; but if you make the one a condition of the other, I think it still worth my acceptance; and will not lose this opportunity of your judgment for a little shame. I acknowledge then that the subject is not intirely new to my thoughts: for, though languages themselves may be and usually are acquired without any regard to their principles; I very early found it, or thought I found it, impossible to make many steps in the search after *truth* and the nature of *human understanding*, of *good* and *evil*, of *right* and *wrong*, without well considering the nature of language, which appeared to me to be inseparably connected with them. I own therefore I long since formed to myself a kind of system, which seemed to me of singular use in the very small extent of my younger studies to keep my mind from confusion and the imposition of words. After too long an interval of idleness and pleasure, it was my chance to have occasion to apply to some of the modern languages; and, not being acquainted with any other more satisfactory, I tried my system with these, and tried it with success. I afterwards found it equally useful to me with some of the dead languages. Whilst I was thus amusing myself, the political struggle commenced;

share in which you so far justly banter me, as knowledge that, both in the outset and the profit, I was guilty of two most egregious bluntness in attributing a much greater portion of virtue to individuals, and of understanding to the generality, and of experience of mankind can justify. After an interval therefore (not of idleness and pleasure) again called by the questions of our friend Mr. T. yesterday is not the first time by many that he mentioned it) to the consideration of this subject. I hitherto declined attempting to give him the information he required : for, though the notion I had in usage had satisfied my own mind and answered all purposes, I could not venture to detail to him my preconceived conceptions without having ever made the enquiry into the opinions of others. Besides, I do not at all suspect that my notions, if just, could be useful to myself : and I hoped to find some author might give him a clearer, fuller, and more methodical account than I could, free from those errors and objections to which I must be liable. Having therefore small intervals of leisure, and a great desire to obtain the best information ; I confess I have employed some part of that leisure in reading every thing I could easily and readily procure that has been suggested by others.

—I am afraid I have already spoken with too much presumption : But when I tell you that I differ

from all those who with such infinite labour and erudition have gone before me on this subject; what apology——

B.

Oh! make none. When men think modestly, they may be allowed to speak freely. Come—Where will you begin?—*Alpha*—Go on.

H.

Not with the organical part of language, I assure you. For, though in many respects it has been and is to this moment grossly mistaken, (and the mistakes might, with the help of some of the first principles of natural philosophy and anatomy, be easily corrected,) yet it is an inquiry more of curiosity than immediate usefulness.

B.

You will begin then either with *things* or *ideas*: for it is impossible we should ever thoroughly understand the nature of the *signs*, unless we first properly consider and arrange the *things signified*. Whose system of philosophy will you build upon?

H.

What you say is true. And yet I shall not begin there. Hermes, you know, put out the eyes of Argus:

suspect that he has likewise blinded philosophy :
I had not imagined so, I should never have cast
thought upon this subject. If therefore Philo-
sophy herself has been misled by Language, how shall
we be able to detect his tricks?

B.

begin then as you please. Only begin.



ΕΠΕΑ ΠΤΕΡΟΕΝΤΑ,

&c.

PART I.

CHAPTER I.

OF THE DIVISION OR DISTRIBUTION OF LANGUAGE.

H.

THE purpose of Language is to communicate our thoughts —

B.

You do not mention this, I hope, as something new, or wherein you differ from others?

H.

You are too hasty with me. No. But I mention it as that principle, which, being kept *singly* in contemplation, has misled all those who have reasoned on this subject.

B.

Is it not true then?

H.

I think it is. And that on which the whole matter rests.

B.

And yet the confining themselves to this true principle, upon which the whole matter rests, has misled them!

H.

Indeed I think so.

B.

This is curious!

H.

Yet I hope to convince you of it. For thus they reasoned—Words are the *signs* of *things*. There must therefore be as many sorts of words, or *parts of speech*, as there are sorts of *things**. The earliest inquirers into language proceeded then to settle how many sorts there were of things; and from thence how many sorts of words, or parts of speech. Whilst this method of

* “*Dictio rerum nota : pro rerum speciebus partes quotque suas sortietur.*”—*J. C. Scaliger de Causis L. L.*

strictly prevailed, the parts of speech were very
number: but *two*. At most *three*, or *four*.

ings, said they, must have names *. But there
sorts of things :

Res quæ permanent.

Res quæ fluunt.

must therefore be *two* sorts of words or *parts*
: viz.

Notæ rerum quæ permanent.

Notæ rerum quæ fluunt.

but surely there are words which are neither
um permanentium, nor yet *notæ rerum fluen-*
that will you do with them?—We cannot tell :
and but these two sorts *in rerum natura* : call
those other words, if you will, for the present
†, or inferior parts of speech, till we can find
they are. Or, as we see they are constantly

at this moment Grammar quits the day-light; and
into an abyss of utter darkness.

and convenient name for all the words which we do not
d: for, as the denomination means nothing in particu-
contains no description, it will equally suit any short
may please to refer thither. There has latterly been
pute amongst Grammarians concerning the use of this
article, in the division and distribution of speech: par-

interspersed between nouns and verbs, and seem therefore in a manner to hold our speech together, suppose you call them *conjunctions* or *connectives* *.

This seems to have been the utmost progress that philosophical Grammar had made till about the time of Aristotle, when a *fourth* part of speech was added, —the *definitive*, or *article*.

Here concluded the search after the different sorts of words, or parts of speech, from the difference of things: for none other apparently rational, acknowledged, or accepted difference has been suggested.

According to this system, it was necessary that all sorts of words should belong to one of these four

ticularly by Girard, Dangeau, the authors of the *Encyclopedie*, &c. In which it is singular that they should all be right in their arguments against the use made of it by others; and all wrong, in the use which each of them would make of it himself. Dr. S. Johnson adopts N. Bailey's definition of a *particle*—"a word unvaried by inflection." And Locke defines *particles* to be—"the words whereby the mind signifies what connection it gives to the several affirmations and negations, that it unites in one continued reasoning or narration."

* The Latin Grammarians amuse themselves with debating whether *Συνδεσμος* should be translated *Convinctio* or *Conjunctio*. The Danes and the Dutch seem to have taken different sides of the question: for the Danish language terms it *Bindeord*, and the Dutch *Koppelwoord*.

For words being the *signs* of things, their sorts necessarily follow the sorts of the things *signified*. There being no more than four differences of things, there could be but four parts of speech. The difficulty of the controversy now was, to determine to which of four classes each word belonged. In the attempt which, succeeding Grammarians could neither do themselves nor others : for they soon discovered words so stubborn, that no sophistry nor violence by any means reduce them to any one of the four classes. However, by this attempt and dispute they became better acquainted with the differences of words though they could not account for them ; and found the old system deficient, though they knew not how to supply its defects. They seem therefore to have reversed the method of proceeding from things to words pursued by the philosophers ; and, still allowing the same principle, (*viz.* that there must be as many sorts of words as of things,) they travelled backwards, and sought for the things from the signs : adopting the reverse of the principle ; namely, that there must be as many differences of things as of signs. Misled therefore by the useful contrivances of language, they supposed many imaginary differences of things : and thus greatly increased the number of parts of speech, and in consequence increased the errors of philosophy.

It is to this, that the greater and more laborious Grammarians (to whose genius it is always obvious to remark a multitude of effects than to

trace out one cause) confined themselves merely to notice the differences observable in words, without any regard to the things signified.

From this time the number of parts of speech has been variously reckoned : you will find different Grammarians contending for more than thirty. But most of those who admitted the fewest, acknowledged *eight*. This was long a favourite number ; and has been kept to by many who yet did not include the same parts to make up that number. For those who rejected the *article* reckoned eight: and those who did not allow the *interjection* still reckoned eight. But what sort of difference in words should intitle them to hold a separate rank by themselves, has not to this moment been settled.

B.

You seem to forget, that it is some time since words have been no longer allowed to be the signs of *things*. Modern Grammarians acknowledge them to be (as indeed Aristotle called them, *συμβολα παθηματων*) the signs of *ideas* : at the same time denying the other assertion of Aristotle, that *ideas* are the *likenesses of things* *. And this has made a great alteration in the manner of accounting for the differences of words.

* Εστι μεν ουν τα εν τη φωνη των εν τη ψυχη παθηματων συμβολα —και αν ταυτα ομοιαματα, πραγματα.—Aristot. de Interpretat.

H.

has not much mended the matter. No doubt
 ration approached so far nearer to the truth;
 nature of Language has not been much better
 od by it. For Grammarians have since pur-
 t the same method with *mind*, as had before
 ne with *things*. The different operations of
 d, are to account now for what the different
 ere to account before: and when they are not
 fficiently numerous for the purpose; it is only
 ig an imaginary operation or two, and the dif-
 are for the time shuffled over. So that the very
 me has been played over again with *ideas*,
 as before played with *things*. No satisfaction,
 ement has been obtained: But all has been
 diversity, and darkness. Insomuch that many
 ost learned and judicious Grammarians, dis-
 with absurdity and contradictions, have pru-
 contented themselves with remarking the dif-
 s of words, and have left the causes of language
 for themselves.

B.

the methods of accounting for Language re-
 this day various, uncertain, and unsatisfactory,
 be denied. But you have said nothing yet to
 p the paradox you set out with; nor a single
 o unfold to us by what means you suppose
 s has blinded Philosophy.

H.

I imagine that it is, in some measure, with the vehicle of our thoughts, as with the vehicles for our bodies. Necessity produced both. The first carriage for men was no doubt invented to transport the bodies of those who from infirmity, or otherwise, could not move themselves : But should any one, desirous of understanding the purpose and meaning of all the parts of our modern elegant carriages, attempt to explain them upon this one principle alone, *viz.*—That they were necessary for conveyance——; he would find himself wofully puzzled to account for the wheels, the seats, the springs, the blinds, the glasses, the lining, &c. Not to mention the mere ornamental parts of gilding, varnish, &c.

Abbreviations are the *wheels* of language, the *wings* of Mercury. And though we might be dragged along without them, it would be with much difficulty, very heavily and tediously.

There is nothing more admirable nor more useful than the invention of signs : at the same time there is nothing more productive of error when we neglect to observe their complication. Into what blunders, and consequently into what disputes and difficulties, might not the excellent art of Short-hand writing * (practised

* “The art of Short-hand is, in its kind, an ingenious device, and of considerable usefulness, applicable to any language,

clusively by the English) lead foreign philosophers; who not knowing that we had any other alphabet should suppose each mark to be the sign of a sound! If they were very laborious and very indeed, it is likely they would write as many words on the subject, and with as much bitterness against each other, as Grammarians have done from the sort of mistake concerning Language: until it should be suggested to them, that there may be only signs of sounds; but again, for the sake of distinction, signs of those signs, one under another continued progression.

considered at by travellers that have seen the experience of England: and yet, though it be above threescore years since it was first invented, it is not to this day (for aught I can see) brought into common practice in any other nation."

1. *Epist. Dedicatory. Essay towards a Real Character.*

On the other hand, an art, as I have been told, known only in England.—*Locke on Education.*

Courier de l'Europe, No. 41, November 20, 1787, is the following article:

Monsieur *Coulon de Thevenot* a eu l'honneur de presenter a l'Academie une methode d'ecrire aussi vite que l'on parle, approuvée par l'Academie Royale des Sciences, et dont Sa Majesté a accepté la dedicace. On sait que les *Anglois* sont très-long temps en possession d'une pareille methode pour leur langage, et qu'elle leur est devenue extrêmement utile et utile pour recueillir avec beaucoup de precision les faits publics: la methode du Sieur Coulon doit donc être d'avantageux à la langue Française."

B.

I think I begin to comprehend you. You mean to say that the errors of Grammarians have arisen from supposing all words to be *immediately* either the signs of things or the signs of ideas : whereas in fact many words are merely *abbreviations* employed for dispatch, and are the signs of other words. And that these are the artificial wings of Mercury, by means of which the Argus eyes of philosophy have been cheated.

H.

It is my meaning.

B.

Well. We can only judge of your opinion after we have heard how you maintain it. Proceed, and strip him of his wings. They seem easy enough to be taken off : for it strikes me now, after what you have said, that they are indeed put on in a peculiar manner, and do not, like those of other winged deities, make a part of his body. You have only to loose the strings from his feet, and take off his cap. Come—Let us see what sort of figure he will make without them.

H.

The first aim of Language was to *communicate* our thoughts : the second, to do it with *dispatch*. (I mean

to disregard whatever additions or alterations are made for the sake of beauty, or ornament, usefulness, or pleasure.) The difficulties and concerns concerning Language have arisen almost in consequence of neglecting the consideration of the latter of speech : which, though subordinate to the former, is almost as necessary in the commerce of mankind and has a much greater share in accounting for different sorts of words *. Words have been called inventions and they well deserve that name, when their utility is compared with the progress which could be made without these inventions ; but compared with the rapidity of thought, they have not the right to claim to that title. Philosophers have calculated the difference of velocity between sound and light : but no one will attempt to calculate the difference between speech and thought ! What wonder then that

Le President de Brosses, in his excellent treatise *De la mécanique des Langues*, tom. 2. says—" On ne parle que pour être entendu. Le plus grand avantage d'une langue est d'être claire. Tous les procédés de Grammaire ne devoient tendre à ce but." And again—" Le vulgaire et les philosophes n'ont d'autre but en parlant que de s'expliquer clairement." Art. 160. Pour le vulgaire, he should have added—*promptement*. And indeed he is afterwards well aware of this : In 173, he says, " L'esprit humain veut aller vite dans son langage ; plus empressé de s'exprimer *promptement*, que curieux de s'exprimer avec une justesse exacte et réfléchie. S'il faut choisir l'instrument qu'il faudroit employer, il se sert de celui qui est tout prêt."

the invention of all ages should have been upon the stretch to add such wings to their conversation as might enable it, if possible, to keep pace in some measure with their minds.—Hence chiefly the variety of words.

Abbreviations are employed in language three ways :

1. In terms.
2. In sorts of words.
3. In construction.

Mr. Locke's Essay is the best *guide* to the *first* : and numberless are the authors who have given particular explanations of the *last*. The *second* only I take for my province at present ; because I believe it has hitherto escaped the proper notice of all.

ΕΠΕΑ ΠΤΕΡΟΕΝΤΑ,

&c.

CHAPTER II.

E CONSIDERATION OF MR. LOCKE'S ESSAY.

B.

NOT recollect one word of Mr. Locke's that
ends at all with any thing that you have said.
And Book of his Essay is indeed expressly writ-
On the Nature, Use and Signification of Lan-
But there is nothing in it concerning *abbrevi-*

H.

consider the *whole* of Mr. Locke's Essay as a phi-
cal account of the *first* sort of abbreviations in
ge.

B.

Whatever you may think of it, it is certain, not only
the *title*, but from his own declaration, that Mr.
did not intend or consider it as such: for he
“When I first began this discourse of the *Un-*

derstanding, and a *good while after*, I had not the least thought that any consideration of *words* was at all necessary to it *."

H.

True. And it is very strange he should so have imagined †. But what immediately follows?—"But when,

* Perhaps it was for mankind a lucky mistake (for it was a mistake) which Mr. Locke made when he called his book, *An Essay on Human Understanding*. For some part of the inestimable benefit of that book has, merely on account of its title, reached to many thousands more than, I fear, it would have done, had he called it (what it is merely) *A Grammatical Essay*, or a *Treatise on Words*, or on *Language*. The human *mind*, or the human *understanding*, appears to be a grand and noble theme; and all men, even the most insufficient, conceive that to be a proper object for their contemplation: whilst inquiries into the nature of *Language* (through which alone they can obtain any knowledge beyond the beasts) are fallen into such extreme disrepute and contempt, that even those who "neither have the accent of christian, pagan, or man," nor can speak so many words together with as much propriety as Balaam's ass did, do yet imagine *words* to be infinitely beneath the concern of their exalted understanding.

† "Aristotelis profecto judicio Grammaticam non solum esse *Philosophiæ* partem (id quod nemo sanus negat), sed ne ab ejus quidem cognitione dissolvi posse intelligeremus."

J. C. Scaliger de Causis. Præfat.

"And lastly," says Bacon, "let us consider the false appearances that are imposed upon us by words, which are framed and applied according to the conceit and capacities of the vul-

having passed over the original and composition of our * ideas, I began to examine the extent and certainty of our knowledge; I found it had so near a connexion with words, that unless their *force* and *manner* of signification were first well observed, there could be very little said clearly and pertinently concerning knowledge: which being conversant about truth, had constantly to do with propositions. And though it terminated in things, yet it was for the most part so much by the intervention of words, that they seemed scarce separable from our general knowledge."

And again,—“ I am apt to imagine that, were the

gar sort: and although we think we govern our words, and prescribe it well—*loquendum ut vulgus, sentiendum ut sapientes*;—yet certain it is, that words, as a Tartar's bow, do shoot back upon the understanding of the wisest, and mightily entangle and pervert the judgment. So as it is almost necessary in all controversies and disputations to imitate the wisdom of the mathematicians, in setting down *in the very beginning* the definitions of our words and terms, that others may know how we accept and understand them, and whether they concur with us or no. For it cometh to pass, for want of this, that we are sure to end there where we ought to have begun, which is in questions and differences about words."

Of the Advancement of Learning.

* It may appear presumptuous, but it is necessary here to declare my opinion, that Mr. Locke in his Essay never did advance one step beyond the origin of Ideas and the composition of Terms.

imperfections of Language, as the instrument of knowledge, more thoroughly weighed, a great many of the controversies that make such a noise in the world would of themselves cease ; and the way to knowledge, and perhaps peace too, lie a great deal opener than it does *."

So that, from these and a great many other passages throughout the Essay, you may perceive that the more he reflected and searched into the human understanding, the more he was convinced of the necessity of an attention to Language ; and of the inseparable connexion between words and knowledge.

* " This design (says Wilkins) will likewise contribute much to the clearing of some of our modern differences in religion ;" (and he might have added, in all other disputable subjects ; especially in matters of *law* and *civil government* ;)—" by unmasking many wild errors, that shelter themselves under the disguise of affected phrases ; which, being philosophically unfolded, and rendered according to the genuine and natural importance of words, will appear to be inconsistencies and contradictions. And several of those pretended mysterious, profound notions, expressed in great swelling words, whereby some men set up for reputation, being this way examined will appear to be either nonsense, or very flat and jejune. And though it should be of no other use but this, yet were it in these days well worth a man's pains and study ; considering the common mischief that is done, and the many impostures and cheats that are put upon men, under the disguise of affected, insignificant phrases."—*Epist. Dedicat.*

B.

Yes. And therefore he wrote the *third* Book of his Essay, on—"the Nature, Use, and Signification of Language." But you say, the *whole* of the Essay concerns Language: whereas the two first Books concern the *Origin* and *Composition* of *Ideas*: and he expressly declares that it was not till *after* he had passed over them, that he thought any consideration of *words* was at all necessary.

H.

If he had been aware of this sooner, that is, *before* he had treated of (what he calls) the origin and *composition* of Ideas; I think it would have made a great difference in his Essay. And therefore I said, Mr. Locke's Essay is the best *Guide* to the first sort of Abbreviations.

B.

Perhaps you imagine that, if he had been aware that he was only writing concerning Language, he might have avoided treating of the origin of Ideas; and so have escaped the quantity of abuse which has been unjustly poured upon him for his opinion on that subject.

H.

No. I think he would have set out just as he did, with the origin of Ideas; the proper starting-post of

a Grammarian who is to treat of their signs. Nor is he singular in referring them all to the Senses ; and in beginning an account of Language in that manner *.

* “ Nihil in intellectu quod non prius in sensu,” is, as well as its converse, an antient and well known position.

“ Sicut in speculo ea quæ videntur non sunt, sed eorum species ; ita quæ intelligimus, ea sunt re ipsa extra nos, eorumque species in nobis. Est enim *quasi rerum speculum intellectus noster ; cui, nisi per sensum represententur res, nihil scit ipse.*”

J. C. Scaliger de Causis L. L. cap. lxi.

“ I sensi, ” says Buonmattei, “ in un certo modo potrebbon dirsi ministri, nunzj, famigliari, o segretarj dello 'ntelletto. E acciochè lo esempio ce ne faccia piu capaci,—Imaginianci di vedere alcun principe, ilqual se ne stia nella sua corte, nel suo palazzo. Non vede egli con gli occhi propj, ne ode co' propj orecchi quel che per lo stato si faccia : ma col tenere in diversi luoghi varj ministri che lo ragguagliano di cio che segue, viene a sapere intender per cotal relazione ogni cosa, e bene spesso molto piu minutamente e piu perfettamente degli stessi ministri : Perchè quegli avendo semplicemente notizia di quel che avvenuto sia nella lor città o provincia, rimangon di tutto 'l resto ignoranti, e di facile posson fin delle cose vedute ingannarsi. Dove il principe può aver di tutto il seguito cognizione in un subito, che servendogli per riprova d' ogni particolar riferitogli, non lo lascia cosi facilmente ingannare. Così, dico, è l' intelletto umano ; il quale essendo di tutte l' altre potenze e signore e principe, se ne sta nella sua ordinaria residenza riposto, e non vede nè ode cosa che si faccia di fuori : Ma avendo cinque ministri che lo ragguaglian di quel che succede, uno nella region della vista, un altro nella giurisdizion dell' udito, quello nella provincia del gusto, questo ne' paesi dell' odorato, e quest' altro nel distretto del tatto, viene a sapere per mezzo del discorso ogni cosa in universale, tanto piu de' sensi perfettamente, quanto i sensi cias-

B.

What difference then do you imagine it would have made in Mr. Locke's Essay, if he had sooner been aware of the inseparable connexion between words and knowledge ; or, in the language of Sir Hugh, in Shakespeare, that "the lips is *parcel* of the *mind* *?"

H.

Much. And amongst many other things, I think he would not have talked of the *composition* of *ideas* ;

cuno intendendo nella sua pura potenza, non posson per tutte come lo 'ntelletto discorrere. E siccome il principe, senza lasciarsi vedere o sentire, fa noto altrui la sua volontà per mezzo degli stessi ministri ; così ancora l' Intelletto fa intendersi per via de' medesimi sensi."—*Buonmattei*. Tratt. 2. cap. 2.

* "Divers philosophers hold that the lips is parcel of the mind." *Merry Wives of Windsor*, act 1. scene 4.

Rowland Jones agrees with his countryman, Sir Hugh Evans. In his *Origin of Language and Nations*, Preface, page 17, he says (after others)—"I think that Language ought not to be considered as mere arbitrary sounds ; or any thing less than a part, *at least*, of that living soul which God is said to have breathed into man." This method of referring words *immediately* to God as their framer, is a short cut to escape inquiry and explanation. It saves the philosopher much trouble ; but leaves mankind in great ignorance, and leads to great error.—*Non dignus vindice nodus*.—God having furnished man with senses and with organs of articulation ; as he has also with water, lime and sand ; it should seem no more necessary to form the words for man, than to temper the mortar.

but would have seen that it was merely a contrivance of Language : and that the only composition was in the *terms* ; and consequently that it was as improper to speak of a *complex idea*, as it would be to call a constellation a complex star : And that they are not *ideas*, but merely *terms*, which are *general* and *abstract*. I think too that he would have seen the advantage of “thoroughly weighing” not only (as he says) “the *imperfections* of Language ;” but its *perfections* also : For the perfections of Language, not properly understood, have been one of the chief causes of the imperfections of our philosophy. And indeed, from numberless passages throughout his Essay, Mr. Locke seems to me to have suspected something of this sort : and especially from what he hints in his last chapter ; where, speaking of the doctrine of signs, he says—“The consideration then of Ideas and Words, as the great instruments of knowledge, makes no despicable part of their contemplation who would take a view of human knowledge in the whole extent of it. And perhaps, if they were *distinctly* weighed and *duly* considered, they would afford us *another sort* of *Logick* and *Critick* than what we have hitherto been acquainted with.”

B.

Do not you think that what you now advance will bear a dispute : and that some better arguments than your bare assertion are necessary to make us adopt your opinion ?

H.

Yes. To many persons much more would be necessary ; but not to you. I only desire you to read the Essay over again with attention, and see whether all that its immortal author has justly concluded will not hold equally true and clear, if you substitute the composition &c. of *terms*, wherever he has supposed a composition &c. of *ideas*. And if that shall upon strict examination appear to you to be the case, you will need no other argument against the composition of Ideas : It being exactly similar to that unanswerable one which Mr. Locke himself declares to be sufficient against their being innate. For the supposition is unnecessary : Every purpose for which the composition of Ideas was imagined being more easily and naturally answered by the composition of Terms : whilst at the same time it does likewise clear up many difficulties in which the supposed composition of Ideas necessarily involves us. And, though this is the only argument I mean to use at present, (because I would not willingly digress too far, and it is not the necessary foundation for what I have undertaken,) yet I will venture to say, that it is an easy matter, upon Mr. Locke's own principles and a physical consideration of the Senses and the Mind, to prove the impossibility of the composition of Ideas.

B.

Well. Since you do not intend to build any thing upon it, we may safely for the present suppose what

you have advanced ; and take it for granted that the greatest part of Mr. Locke's Essay, that is, all which relates to what he calls the composition, abstraction, complexity, generalization, relation, &c. of Ideas, does indeed merely concern *Language*. But, pray, let me ask you ; If so, what has Mr. Locke done in the *Third* Book of his Essay ; in which he *professedly* treats of the nature, use, and signification of *Language* ?

H.

He has really done little else but enlarge upon what he had said before, when he thought he was treating only of *Ideas* : that is, he has continued to treat of the composition of *Terms*. For though, in the passage I have before quoted, he says, that “ unless the *force* and *manner* of signification of words are first well observed, there can be very little said clearly and pertinently concerning knowledge ; ”—and though this is the declared reason of writing his *Third* Book concerning *Language*, as *distinct* from *Ideas* ; yet he continues to treat singly, as before, concerning the *Force* * of words ; and has not advanced one syllable concerning their *Manner* of signification.

The only Division Mr. Locke has made of words,

* The Force of a word depends upon the number of Ideas of which that word is the sign.

is, into—*Names* of Ideas and *Particles*. This division is not made regularly and formally ; but is reserved to his *seventh* Chapter. And even there it is done in a very cautious, doubting, loose, uncertain manner, very different from that incomparable author's usual method of proceeding. For, though the general title of the *seventh* Chapter is,—*Of Particles* ;—yet he seems to chuse to leave it uncertain whether he does or does not include *Verbs* in that title, and particularly what he calls “ *the Marks of the Mind's affirming or denying.*” And indeed he himself acknowledges, in a letter to Mr. Molyneux, that—“ Some parts of that *Third Book* concerning Words, though the thoughts were easy and clear enough, yet cost him more pains to express than all the rest of his Essay. And that therefore he should not much wonder if there were in some parts of it obscurity and doubtfulness.” Now whenever any man finds this difficulty to express himself, in a language with which he is well acquainted, let him be persuaded that his thoughts are *not* clear enough : for, as Swift (I think) has somewhere observed, “ When the water is clear you will easily see to the bottom.”

The whole of this vague Chapter—*Of Particles*—(which should have contained an account of every thing but *Nouns*) is comprised in *two pages* and a half : and all the rest of the *Third Book* concerns only, as before, the *Force* of the names of Ideas.

B.

How is this to be accounted for? Do you suppose he was unacquainted with the opinions of Grammarians, or that he despised the subject?

H.

No: I am very sure of the contrary. For it is plain he did not despise the subject; since he repeatedly and strongly recommends it to others: and at every step throughout his Essay, I find the most evident marks of the journey he had himself taken through all their works. But it appears that he was by no means satisfied with what he found there concerning *Particles*: For he complains that “this part of Grammar has been as much neglected, as some others over-diligently cultivated.” And says, that “He who would shew the right use of *Particles*, and what significancy and force they have,” (that is, according to his own division, the right use, significancy, and force of ALL words except the names of Ideas,) “must take a little more pains, enter into his own thoughts, and observe nicely the several postures of his mind in discoursing.” For these *Particles*, he says,—“are all marks of some *action* or *intimation* of the *Mind*; and therefore, to understand them rightly, the several views, postures, stands, turns, limitations and exceptions, and *several other thoughts* of the *Mind*, for which we have either none or very defi-

cient names, are diligently to be studied. Of these there are a great variety, much exceeding the number of Particles." For himself, he declines the task, however necessary and neglected by all others : and that for no better reason than—" I *intend* not *here* a *full* explication of this sort of signs." And yet he was (as he professed and thought) writing on the human *Understanding* ; and therefore should not surely have left mankind still in the same darkness in which he found them, concerning these hitherto *unnamed* and (but by himself) *undiscovered* operations of the Mind.

In short, this seventh Chapter is, to me, a full confession and proof that he had not settled his own opinion concerning the *manner* of signification of Words : that it still remained (though he did not chuse to have it so understood) a *Desideratum* with him, as it did with our great Bacon before him : and therefore that he would not decide any thing about it ; but confined himself to the prosecution of his original inquiry concerning the first sort of *Abbreviations*, which is by far the most important to knowledge, and which he supposed to belong to *Ideas*.

But though he declined the subject, he evidently leaned towards the opinion of Aristotle, Scaliger, and Mess. de Port Royal : and therefore, without having sufficiently examined their position, he too hastily adopted their notion concerning the pretended *Copula*

—“*Is*, and *Is not*.” He supposed with them, that *affirming* and *denying* were operations of the *Mind*; and referred all the other sorts of Words to the same source. Though, if the different sorts of Words had been (as he was willing to believe) to be accounted for by the different operations of the Mind, it was almost impossible they should have escaped the penetrating eyes of Mr. Locke.

ΕΠΕΑ ΠΤΕΡΟΕΝΤΑ,

&c.

CHAPTER III.

OF THE PARTS OF SPEECH.

B.

YOU said some time ago, very truly, that the number of Parts of Speech was variously reckoned : and that it has not to this moment been settled, what sort of difference in words should entitle them to hold a separate rank by themselves.

By what you have since advanced, this matter seems to be ten times more unsettled than it was before : for you have discarded the differences of *Things*, and the differences of *Ideas*, and the different *operations* of the *Mind*, as guides to a division of Language. Now I cannot for my life imagine any other principle that you have left to conduct us to the *Parts* of Speech.

H.

I thought I had laid down in the beginning, the

principles upon which we were to proceed in our inquiry into the *manner of signification* of words.

B.

Which do you mean?

H.

The same which Mr. Locke employs in his inquiry into the *Force* of words: viz.—The two great purposes of speech.

B.

And to what distribution do they lead you?

H.

1. To words *necessary* for the *communication* of our Thoughts. And

2. To *Abbreviations*, employed for the sake of dispatch.

B.

How many of each do you reckon? And which are they?

H.

In what particular language do you mean? For, if you do not confine your question, you might as reasonably expect me (according to the fable) “to make a coat to fit the moon in all her changes.”

B.

Why? Are they not the same in all languages?

H.

Those *necessary* to the communication of our thoughts are.

B.

And are not the others also?

H.

No. Very different.

B.

I thought we were talking of Universal Grammar.

H.

I mean so too. But I cannot answer the whole of your question, unless you confine it to some particular language with which I am acquainted. However, that need not disturb you: for you will find afterwards that the principles will apply universally.

B.

Well. For the present then confine yourself to the *necessary* Parts: and exemplify in the English.

H.

In English, and in all Languages, there are only *two* sorts of words which are *necessary* for the communication of our thoughts.

B.

And they are?

H.

1. Noun, and
2. Verb.

B.

These are the common names, and I suppose you use them according to the common acceptance.

H.

I should not otherwise have chosen them, but because they are commonly employed ; and it would not be easy to dispossess them of their prescriptive title : besides, without doing any mischief, it saves time in our discourse. And I use them according to their common acceptance.

B.

But you have not all this while informed me how many *Parts of Speech* you mean to lay down.

H.

That shall be as you please. Either *Two*, or *Twenty*, or more. In the strict sense of the term, no doubt both the necessary Words and the Abbreviations are all of them Parts of Speech ; because they are all useful in

Language, and each has a different manner of signification. But I think it of great consequence both to knowledge and to Languages, to keep the words employed for the different purposes of speech, as distinct as possible. And therefore I am inclined to allow that rank only to the *necessary* words *: and to include all the others (which are not necessary to speech, but merely *substitutes* of the first sort) under the title of *Abbreviations*.

B.

Merely Substitutes ! You do not mean that you can discourse as well without as with them ?

H.

Not as well. A sledge cannot be drawn along as smoothly, and easily, and swiftly, as a carriage with wheels ; but it may be dragged.

B.

Do you mean then that, without using any other sort of word whatever, and merely by the means of the Noun and Verb alone, you can relate or communicate any thing that I can relate or communicate with the help of all the others ?

H.

Yes. It is the great proof of all I have advanced.

* "Res necessarias philosophus primo loco statuit: accessorias autem et vicarias, mox."

J. C. Scaliger de Causis L. L. cap. 110.

And, upon trial, you will find that you may do the same. But, after the long habit and familiar use of *Abbreviations*, your first attempts to do without them will seem very awkward to you ; and you will stumble as often as a horse, long used to be shod, that has newly cast his shoes. Though indeed (even with those who have not the habit to struggle against) without *Abbreviations*, Language can get on but lamely : and therefore they have been introduced, in different plenty, and more or less happily, in all Languages. And upon these two points—*Abbreviation of Terms*, and *Abbreviation in the manner of signification* of words—depends the respective excellence of every Language. All their other comparative advantages are trifling.

B.

I like your method of proof very well ; and will certainly put it to the trial. But before I can do that properly, you must explain your *Abbreviations* ; that I may know what they stand for, and what words to put in their room.

H.

Would you have me then pass over the *two necessary Parts* of Speech ; and proceed immediately to their *Abbreviations* ?

B.

If you will. For I suppose you agree with the com-

mon opinion, concerning the words which you have distinguished as necessary to the communication of our thoughts. Those you call necessary, I suppose you allow to be the *signs* of different sorts of *Ideas*, or of different *operations* of the mind.

H.

Indeed I do not. The business of the mind, as far as it concerns Language, appears to me to be very simple. It extends no further than to receive impressions, that is, to have Sensations or Feelings. What are called its operations, are merely the operations of Language. A consideration of *Ideas*, or of the *Mind*, or of *Things* (relative to the Parts of Speech), will lead us no further than to *Nouns*: i.e. the signs of those impressions, or names of ideas. The other Part of Speech, the *Verb*, must be accounted for from the necessary use of it in communication. It is in fact the communication itself: and therefore well denominated *Πηυα*, *Dictum*. For the Verb is QUOD loquimur* ; the *Noun*, DE QUO.

B.

Let us proceed then regularly ; and hear what you have to say on each of your *two* necessary Parts of Speech.

* " Alterum est quod loquimur ; alterum de quo loquimur."
Quinctil. lib. 1. cap. 4.

ΕΠΕΑ ΠΤΕΡΟΕΝΤΑ,

&c.

CHAPTER IV.

OF THE NOUN.

H.

OF the first Part of Speech—the Noun,—it being the best understood, and therefore the most spoken of by others, I shall need *at present* to say little more than that it is the *simple* or *complex*, the *particular* or *general sign* or *name* of *one* or *more Ideas*.

I shall only remind you, that at this stage of our inquiry concerning Language, comes in most properly the consideration of the force of Terms : which is the whole business of Mr. Locke's Essay ; to which I refer you. And I imagine that Mr. Locke's *intention* of confining himself to the consideration of the *Mind* only, was the reason that he went no further than to the *Force* of Terms ; and did not meddle with their *Manner* of signification, to which the Mind alone could never lead him.

B.

Do you say nothing of the Declension, Number, Case and Gender of Nouns ?

H.

At present nothing. There is no pains-worthy difficulty nor dispute about them.

B.

Surely there is about the Gender. And Mr. Harris particularly has thought it worth his while to treat at large of what others have slightly hinted concerning it * : and has supported his reasoning by a long list of poetical authorities. What think you of that part of his book ?

H.

That, with the rest of it, he had much better have let it alone. And as for his poetical authorities ; the

* “ Pythagorici *sexum in cunctis agnoscunt*, &c. *Agens*, Mas ; *Patiens*, Fœmina. Quapropter *Deus* dicunt masculine ; *Terra*, fœminine : et *Ignis*, masculine ; et *Aqua*, fœminine : quoniam in his *Actio*, in istis *Passio* relucebat.”—*Campanella*.

“ In rebus inveniuntur duæ proprietates generales, scilicet proprietas *Agentis*, et proprietas *Patientis*. Genus est modus significandi nominis sumptus a proprietate activa vel passiva. Genus masculinum est modus significandi rem sub proprietate agentis : Genus femininum est modus significandi rem sub proprietate patientis.”—*Scotus Gram. Spec.* cap. 16.

Muses (as I have heard Mrs. Peachum say of her own sex in cases of murder) are bitter bad judges in matters of philosophy. Besides that Reason is an arrant Despot; who, in his own dominions, admits of no authority but his own. And Mr. Harris is particularly unfortunate in the very outset of that—"subtle kind of reasoning (as he calls it) which discerns even in things without sex, a distant analogy to that great natural distinction." For his very first instances,—the SUN and the MOON,—destroy the whole subtilty of this kind of reasoning*. For Mr. Harris ought to have known, that in many Asiatic Languages, and in all the northern Languages of this part of the globe which we inhabit, and particularly in our Mother-language the Anglo-Saxon (from which SUN and MOON are immediately derived to us), SUN is *Feminine*, and MOON is *Masculine*†. So feminine is the Sun, ["that fair hot

* It can only have been Mr. Harris's authority, and the ill-founded praises lavished on his performance, that could mislead Dr. Priestley, in his thirteenth lecture, hastily and without examination to say—"Thus, for example, the SUN having a stronger, and the MOON a weaker influence over the world, and there being but two celestial bodies so remarkable; *All nations*, I believe, that use genders, have ascribed to the Sun the gender of the *Male*, and to the Moon that of the *Female*."

In the Gothic, Anglo-Saxon, German, Dutch, Danish and Swedish, SUN is *feminine*: In modern Russian it is *neuter*.

"† Apud Saxones, Luna, *Mona*. *Mona* autem Germanis superioribus *Mon*, alias *Man*; a *Mon*, alias *Man* veterrimo ipso-

wench in flame-colour'd taffata *"] that our northern Mythology makes her the *Wife* of Tuisco.

And if our English Poets, Shakespeare, Milton, &c. have, by a familiar Prosopopeia, made them of different genders ; it is only because, from their classical reading, they adopted the southern not the northern mythology ; and followed the pattern of their Greek and Roman masters.

Figure apart, in our Language, the names of things without sex are also without gender †. And this, not because our Reasoning or Understanding differs from

rum rege et Deo patrio, quem Tacitus meminit, et in *Luna* celebrabant.—Ex hoc Lunam masculino (ut *Hebræi*) dicunt genere, *Der Mon* ; Dominamque ejus et Amasiam, e cujus aspectu alias languet, alias resipiscit, *Die Son* ; quasi *hunc* Lunam, *hanc* Solem. Hinc et idolum Lunæ viri fingeant specie ; non, ut Verstegan opinatur, fœminæ.”—*Spelman's Gloss.* MONA.

“ De generibus Nominum (quæ per articulos, adjectiva, participia, et pronomina indicantur) hic nihil tradimus. Obiter tamen observet Lector, ut ut minuta res est, *Solem* (*Sunna* vel *Sunne*) in Anglo-Saxonica esse *fœminini* generis, et *Lunam* (*Mona*) esse *masculini*.”—*G. Hickes.*

“ Quomodo item *Sol* est *virile*, Germanicum *Sunn*, *fœmininum*. Dicunt enim *Die Sunn*, non *Der Sunn*. Unde et Solem Tuisconis uxorem fuisse fabulantur.”—*G. J. Vossius.*

* *First part of Henry IV.*

† “ Sexus enim non nisi in Animali, aut in iis quæ Animalis naturam imitantur, ut arbores. Sed ab usu hoc factum est ; qui

theirs who gave them gender ; (which must be the case, if the Mind or Reason was concerned in it*.) but because with us the relation of words to each other

nunc masculinum sexum, nunc foemininum attribuisset.—
Proprium autem generum esse pati mutationem, satis patet ex genere incerto ; ut etiam *Armentas* dixerit Ennius, quæ nos *Armenta*.”—*J. C. Scaliger de Causis*, cap. 79.

“ Nominum quoque genera mutantur adeo, ut privatim libros super hac re veteres confecerint. Alterum argumentum est ex iis quæ *Dubia* sive *Incerta* vocant. Sic enim dictum est, *Hic* vel *Hæc* Dies. Tertium testimonium est in quibusdam : nam Plautus *Collum* masculino dixit. Item *Jubar*, *Palumbem*, atque alia, diversis quam nos generibus esse a priscis pronunciata.”

Id. cap. 103.

“ *Amour* qui est masculin au singulier, est quelquefois féminin au pluriel ; de *folles amours*. On dit au masculin *Un Comté*, *Un Duché* ; et au féminin *Une Comté pairie*, *Une Duché pairie*. On dit encore *De bonnes gens*, et *Des gens malheureux*. Par où vous voyez que le substantif *Gens* est féminin, lorsqu’il est précédé d’un adjectif ; et qu’il est masculin, lorsqu’il en est suivi.”

L’Abbé de Condillac, part. 2. chap. 4.

The ingenious author of—*Notes on the Grammatica Sinica* of *M. Fourmont*—says, “ According to the *Grammaire Raisonnée*, les genres ont été inventés pour les terminaisons.” But the Mess. du Port Royal have discovered a different origin ; they tell us, that—*Arbor est feminine, parceque comme une bonne mere elle porte du fruit*.—*Miratur non sua*. How could Frenchmen forget that in their own *la meilleure des langues possibles*, Fruit-trees are masculine and their fruits feminine ? Mr. Harris has adopted this idea : he might as well have left it to its legitimate parents.”—*P.* 47.

* “ Sane in sexu seu genere physico omnes nationes conve-

is denoted by the place or by Prepositions ; which denotation in their language usually made a part of the words themselves, and was shewn by cases or terminations. This contrivance of theirs, allowing them a more varied construction, made the terminating genders of Adjectives useful, in order to avoid mistake and misapplication.

nire debebunt ; quoniam natura est eadem, nec ad placitum scriptorum mutatur. At Poetæ et Pictores in coloribus non semper conveniunt. Ventos Romani non solum finxerunt esse viros, sed et Deos : at Hebræi contra eos ut Nymphas pinxerunt. Arbores Latini specie fœminea pinxerunt ; virili Hispani, &c. Regiones urbesque Deas esse voluit Gentilium Latinorum Theologia : at Germani omnia hæc ad neutrum rejecerunt. Et quidem in Genere, seu sexus distinctione grammatica, magna est inter authores differentia : non solum in diversis linguis, sed etiam in eadem. In Latina, ne ad alias, recurram, aliter Oratores, et aliter Poetæ : aliter veteres, et aliter juniores sentiunt, &c. Iberes in Asia florere dicuntur, et linguam habere elegantem, et tamen nullam generum varietatem agnoscunt."

Caramuel, lxii.

ΕΠΕΑ ΠΤΕΡΟΕΝΤΑ,

&c.

CHAPTER V.

OF THE ARTICLE AND INTERJECTION.

B.

HOWEVER connected with the *Noun*, and generally treated of at the same time, I suppose you forbear to mention the *Articles* at present, as not allowing them to be a separate Part of Speech ; at least not a necessary Part ; because, as Wilkins tells us, “the Latin is without them *.” Notwithstanding which, when you consider with him that “they are so convenient for the greater distinctness of speech ; and that upon this account, the Hebrew, Greek, Slavonic, and most other languages have them ;” perhaps you will not think it improper to follow the example of many other Grammarians : who, though, like you, they deny them to be any part of speech, have yet treated of them separately from those parts which they enumerate. And this

* *Essay*, part 3. chap. 3.

you may very consistently do, even though you should consider them, as the Abbé Girard calls them, merely the *avant-coureurs* to announce the approach or entrance of a Noun *.

H.

Of all the accounts which have been given of the

* J'abandonne l'art de copier des mots dits et répétés mille fois avant moi ; puisqu'ils n'expliquent pas les choses essentielles que j'ai dessein de faire entendre à mes lecteurs. Une étude attentive faite d'après l'usage m'instruit bien mieux. Elle m'apprend que l'Article est un mot établi pour annoncer et particulariser simplement la chose sans la nommer : c'est à dire, qu'il est une expression indéfinie, quoique positive, dont la juste valeur n'est que de faire naître l'idée d'une espece subsistante qu'on distingue de la totalité des êtres, pour être ensuite nommée. Cette définition en expose clairement la nature et le service propre, au quel on le voit constamment attaché dans quelque circonstance que ce soit. Elle m'en donne une idée nette et déterminée : me le fait reconnoître par tout : et m'empêche de le confondre avec tout autre mot d'espece différente. Je sens parfaitement que lorsque je veux parler d'un objet, qui se présente à mes yeux ou à mon imagination, le génie de ma langue ne m'en fournit pas toujours la denomination précise dans le premier instant de l'exécution de la parole : que le plus souvent il m'offre d'abord un autre mot, comme un commencement de sujet proposé et de distinction des autres objets ; ensorte que ce mot est un vrai préparatoire à la denomination, par lequel elle est annoncée, avant que de se présenter elle même : Et voilà l'*Article* tel que je l'ai défini. Si cet *Avant-coureur* diminue la vivacité du langage, il y met en récompense une certaine politesse et une délicatesse qui naissent de cette idée préparatoire et

Article, I must own I think that of the very ingenious Abbé Girard to be the most fantastic and absurd. The fate of this very necessary word has been most singularly hard and unfortunate. For though without it, or some equivalent invention*, men could not communicate their thoughts at all; yet (like many of the most useful things in this world) from its unaffected simplicity and want of brilliancy, it has been ungratefully neglected and degraded. It has been considered, after Scaliger, as *otiosum loquacissimæ gentis Instrumentum*; or, at best, as a mere *vaunt-courier* to announce the coming of his master: whilst the brutish inarticulate *Interjection*, which has nothing to do with speech, and is only the miserable refuge of the speechless, has been permitted, because beautiful and gaudy, to usurp a place amongst words, and to exclude the Article from

indéfinie d'un objet qu'on va nommer: car par ce moyen l'esprit étant rendu attentif avant que d'être instruit, il a le plaisir d'aller au devant de la dénomination, de la désirer, et de l'attendre avant que de la posséder. Plaisir qui a ici, comme ailleurs, un mérite flateur, propre à piquer le gout.—Qu'on me passe cette métaphore; puisqu'elle a de la justesse, et fait connoître d'une manière sensible une chose *tres-métaphysique*."—Disc. 4.

* For some equivalent invention, see the Persian and other Eastern languages; which supply the place of our Article by a termination to those Nouns which they would indefinitely particularize.

This circumstance of fact (if there were not other reasons) sufficiently explodes Girard's notion of *Avant-coureurs*.

its well-earned dignity. But though the Article is denied by many Grammarians to be a Part of Speech ; it is yet, as you say, treated of by many, separately from those parts which they allow. This inconsistency* and the cause of it are pleasantly ridiculed by Buonmattei, whose understanding had courage sufficient to restore the Article ; and to launch out beyond *quelle fatali colonne che gli antichi avevan segnate col—Non plus ultra*. “Dodici,” says he, (Tratt. 7. cap. 22, 23.) “affermiamo esser le Parti dell’ orazione nella nostra lingua. Nè ci siam curati che gli altri quasi tutti non ne voglion conceder piu d’ otto ; mossi, come si vede, da una certa soprastiziosa ostinazione (sia detto con pace e riverenza loro) che gl’ autori piu antichi hanno stabilito tal numero : Quasi che abbiano in tal modo proibito a noi il passar quelle fatali colonne che gli antichi avevan segnate col—*Non plus ultra*. Onde perchè i Latini dicevan tutti con una voce uniforme—*Partes Orationis sunt octo* :—quei che intorno a cent’ anni sono scrisson le regole di questa lingua, cominciavan con la medesima cantilena. Il che se sia da commendare o da biasimare non dirò : Basta che a me par una cosa ridicolosa, dire—*Otto son le parti dell’ ora-*

* What Scaliger says of the Participle may very justly be applied to this manner of treating the Article. “Si non est *Nota*, imo vero si nonnullis ne pars quidem orationis ulla, ab aliis separata, judicata est ; quo consilio ei rei, quæ nusquam extat, sedem statuunt.”—Lib. 7. cap. 140.

zione,—e subito soggiugnere—*Ma innanzi che io di quelle incominci a ragionare, fa mestiero che sopra gli Articoli alcuna cosa ti dica.*

“Questo è il medesimo che se dicessimo—Tre son le parti del mondo: Ma prima ch’ io ti ragioni di quelle, fa mestiero che sopra l’Europa alcuna cosa ti dica.”

B.

As far as respects the Article I think you are right. But why such bitterness against the Interjection? Why do you not rather follow Buonmattei’s example; and, instead of excluding both, admit them both to be Parts of Speech? *

H.

Because the dominion of Speech is erected upon the downfall of Interjections. Without the artful con-

* “Interjectionem non esse partem orationis, sic ostendo. Quod naturale est, idem est apud omnes: sed gemitus et signa lætitiæ idem sunt apud omnes: sunt igitur naturales. Si vero naturales, non sunt partes orationis. Nam eæ partes, secundum Aristotelem, *ex instituto*, non *natura*, debent constare. Interjectionem Græci adverbiiis adnumerant, sed falso: nam neque Græcis literis scribantur, sed signa tristitiæ, aut lætitiæ, qualia in avibus, aut quadrupedibus, quibus tamen nec vocem nec orationem concedimus. Valla interjectionem a partibus orationis rejicit. Itaque Interjectionem a partibus orationis ex-

trivances of Language, mankind would have nothing but Interjections with which to communicate, orally, any of their feelings. The neighing of a horse, the lowing of a cow, the barking of a dog, the purring of a cat, sneezing, coughing, groaning, shrieking, and every other involuntary convulsion with oral sound, have almost as good a title to be called Parts of Speech, as Interjections have. Voluntary Interjections are only employed when the suddenness or vehemence of some affection or passion returns men to their natural state ; and makes them for a moment forget the use of speech * : or when, from some circumstance, the short-

cludimus : tantum abest, ut eam primam et precipuam cum Cæsare Scaligero constituamus.”—*Sanctii Minerva*, lib. 1. cap. 2. *De partibus orationis*, page 17. Edit. Amst. 1714.

* The industrious and exact *Cinonio*, who does not appear ever to have had a single glimpse of reason, speaks thus of *one* interjection :—

“ I varj affetti cui serve questa interiezzione *Ah* et *Ahi*, sono piu di venti : ma v’abbisogna d’un avvertimento ; che nell’ esprimerli sempre diversificano il suono, e vagliono quel tanto che, presso i Latini, *Ah. Proh. Oh. Vab. Hei. Pape, &c.* Ma questa è parte spettante a chi pronunzia, che sappio dar loro l’accento di quell’ affetto cui servono ; e sono

d’ esclamazione.

di dolersi.

di svillaveggiare.

di pregare.

di gridare minacciando.

di minacciare.

ness of time will not permit them to exercise it. And in books they are only used for embellishment, and to mark strongly the above situations. But where Speech can be employed, they are totally useless; and are always insufficient for the purpose of communicating our thoughts. And indeed where will you look for the Interjection? Will you find it amongst laws, or in books of civil institutions, in history, or in any treatise of useful arts or sciences? No. You must seek for it in rhetorick and poetry, in novels, plays and romances.

B.

If what you say is true, I must acknowledge that the Article has had hard measure to be displaced for the Interjection. For by your declamation, and the zeal

di sospirare.
 di sgarare.
 di maravigliarsi.
 d' incitare.
 di sdegno.
 di desiderare.
 di reprendere.
 di vendicarsi.
 di raccomandazione.
 di commovimento per allegrezza.
 di lamentarsi.
 di beffare.
 et altri varj."

*Annotazioni all' trattato, delle Particelle,
 di Cinonio, capitolo 11.*

you have shewn in its defence, it is evident that you do not intend we should, with Scaliger, consider it merely as *otiosum Instrumentum*.

H.

Most assuredly not: though I acknowledge that it has been used *otiose* by many nations *. And I do not wonder that, keeping his eyes solely on the superfluous use (or rather abuse) of it, he should too hastily conclude against this very necessary instrument itself.

B.

Say you so! very *necessary* instrument! Since then you have, contrary to my expectation, allowed its necessity, I should be glad to know how the Article comes to be so necessary to Speech: and, if necessary, how can the Latin language be without it, as most

* “ Il seroit à souhaiter qu’on supprimât l’Article, toutes les fois que les noms sont suffisamment déterminés par la nature de la chose ou par les circonstances; le discours en seroit plus vif. Mais la grande habitude que nous nous en sommes faite, ne le permet pas: et ce n’est que dans des proverbes, plus anciens que cette habitude, que nous nous faisons une loi de le supprimer. On dit—*Pauvreté n’est pas vice*: au lieu de dire—*La pauvreté n’est pas un vice*.”

Condillac, Gram. part 2. chap. 14.

Without any injury to the meaning of the passage, the *article* might have been omitted here by Condillac, twelve or thirteen times.

authors agree that it is *? And when you have given me satisfaction on those points, you will permit me to ask you a few questions further.

H.

You may learn its necessity, if you please, from Mr. Locke. And that once proved, it follows of consequence that I must deny its absence from the Latin or from any other language †.

* 'Ὡς δοκεῖ μοι περὶ Ῥωμαίων λεγεῖν ὁρῶ μελλῶ νυν ὁμοῦ τι πάντες ἀνθρώποι χροῶνται. προθεσεις τε γὰρ ἀφηγήκε, πλην ὀλίγων ἀπάσας, τὰν τε καλουμένων ἀρθρῶν, οὐθεν προσδεχεται τὸ παραπαν.

Πλατωνικά Ζητήματα 3.

"*Articulus nobis nullus et Græcis superfluous.*"

"Satis constat Græcorum *Articulos* non neglectos a nobis, sed eorum usum superfluum."

J. C. Scaliger *de Causis L. L.* cap. 72.—131.

It is pleasant after this to have Scaliger's authority against himself, and to hear him prove that the Latin not only has *Articles*; but even the very identical Article 'O of the Greeks: for he says (and, notwithstanding the etymological dissent of Vossius, says truly) that the Latin *Qui* is no other than the Greek *καὶ ὁ*.

"*Articulum*, Fabio teste, Latinus sermo non desiderat: imo, me iudice, plane ignorat."—G. J. Vossius.

"Displeased with the redundancy of Particles in the Greek, the Romans extended their displeasure to the *Article*, which they totally banished."

Notes on the Grammatica Sinica of Mons. Fourmont, p. 54.

† "L'Article indicatif se supplée sur tout par la terminaison, dans les langues à terminaisons, comme la langue Latine. C'est

B.

Mr. Locke ! He has not so much as even once mentioned the Article.

H.

Notwithstanding which he has sufficiently proved its necessity ; and conducted us directly to its use and purpose. For in the eleventh chapter of the second book of his Essay, sect. 9, he says,—“The use of words being to stand as outward marks of our internal ideas, and those ideas being taken from particular things ; if every particular idea should have a distinct name, names would be endless.” So again, book 3. chap. 3. treating of *General Terms*, he says,—“All things that exist being particulars, it may perhaps be thought reasonable that words, which ought to be conformed to things, should be so too ; I mean in their signification. But yet we find the quite contrary. The far greatest part of words that make all languages, are *General Terms*. Which has not been the effect of neglect, or chance, but of reason and necessity. For, first, it is impossible that every particular thing should

ce qui avoit fait croire mal-à-propos que les Latins n'avoient aucun Article ; et qui avoit fait conclure plus mal-à-propos encore que l'Article n'étoit pas une partie du discours.”

Court de Gebelin, Gram. Universelle, p. 192.

The Latin *quis* is evidently *καὶ ὅς* ; and the Latin terminations *us, a, um*, no other than the Greek article *ὁς, ἡ, ὅν*.

have a distinct peculiar name. For the signification and use of words depending on that connexion which the mind makes between its ideas and the sounds it uses as signs of them; it is necessary, in the application of names to things, that the mind should have distinct ideas of the things, and retain also the peculiar name that belongs to every one, with its peculiar appropriation to that idea. We may therefore easily find a reason why men have never attempted to give names to each sheep in their flock, or crow that flies over their heads; much less to call every leaf of plants or grain of sand that came in their way by a peculiar name.—Secondly, If it were possible, it would be useless: because it would not serve to the chief end of Language. Men would in vain heap up names of particular things, that would not serve them to communicate their thoughts. Men learn names, and use them in talk with others, only that they may be understood; which is then only done, when by use or consent, the sound I make by the organs of speech excites in another man's mind who hears it, the idea I apply to it in mine when I speak it. This cannot be done by names applied to particular things, whereof I alone having the ideas in my mind, the names of them could not be significant or intelligible to another who was not acquainted with all those very particular things which had fallen under my notice.”—And again, sect. 11.—“General and Universal belong not to the real existence of things; but are the inventions and creatures of

the Understanding, made by it for its own use, and concern only *signs*. Universality belongs not to things themselves, which are all of them particular in their existence. When therefore we quit Particulars, the *Generals* that rest are only creatures of our own making ; their *general* nature being nothing but the capacity they are put into of signifying or representing many Particulars."

Now from this necessity of *General Terms*, follows immediately the necessity of the *Article* : whose business it is to reduce their generality, and upon occasion to enable us to employ *general* terms for *Particulars*.

So that the Article also, *in combination with a general term*, is merely a *substitute*. But then it differs from those substitutes which we have ranked under the general head of *Abbreviations* : because it is *necessary* for the communication of our thoughts, and supplies the place of words which *are not* in the language. Whereas *Abbreviations* are *not necessary* for communication ; and supply the place of words which *are* in the language.

B.

As far then as regards the *Article*, Mr. Harris seems at present to be the author most likely to meet with your approbation : for he not only establishes its ne-

cessity, in order “to circumscribe the latitude of genera and species,” and therefore treats of it separately ; but has raised it to a degree of importance much beyond all other modern Grammarians. And though he admits of only two Articles, “properly and strictly so called,” viz. A and THE ; yet has he assigned to these two little words full one fourth part in his distribution of language : which, you know, is into—“Substantives, Attributives, Definitives, and Connectives.”

H.

If Mr. Harris has not intirely secured my concurrence with his Doctrine of *Definitives*, I must confess he has at least taken effectual care to place it compleatly beyond the reach of confutation. He says,

1. “The Articles have no meaning, but when associated to some other word.”
2. “Nothing can be more nearly related than the Greek article ‘O to the English article THE.”
3. “But the article A defines in an imperfect manner.”
4. “*Therefore* the Greeks have no article correspondent to our article A.”
5. However, “they supply its place.”
—And *How*, think you ?
6. “By a *Negation*”—(observe well their method

of supply)—“by a *negation* of their article ‘O;’ (that is, as he well explains himself,)—“without any thing prefixed, but only the article ‘O withdrawn.”

7. “Even in English, we also *express* the force of the article A, in plurals, by the same *negation* of the article THE *.”

Now here I acknowledge myself to be compleatly thrown out; and, like the philosopher of old, merely for want of a firm resting-place on which to fix my machine: for it would have been as easy for him to raise the earth with a fulcrum of ether, as for me to establish any reasoning or argument on this sort of *negation*. For, “*nothing being prefixed,*” I cannot imagine in what manner or in what respect a *negation* of ‘O or of THE, differs from a *negation* of *Harris* or of *Pudding*. For lack however of the light of comprehension, I must

* “It is perhaps owing to the imperfect manner in which the Article A defines, that the Greeks have no article correspondent to it, but supply its place by a negation of their Article ‘O. —‘Ο ανθρωπος επεσεν, THE man fell; ανθρωπος επεσεν, A man fell;—without any thing prefixed, but only the Article withdrawn.”

“Even in English, where the Article A cannot be used, as in plurals, its force is expressed by the same negation.—*Those are THE men*, means, Those are individuals of which we possess some previous knowledge.—*Those are men*, the Article apart, means no more than they are so many vague and uncertain individuals; just as the phrase,—*A man*, in the singular, implies one of the same number.” Book 2. chap. 1.

do as other Grammarians do in similar situations, attempt to illustrate by a parallel.

I will suppose Mr. Harris (when one of the Lords of the Treasury) to have addressed the Minister in the same style of reasoning.—“Salaries, Sir, produce no benefit, unless associated to some receiver: my salary at present is but an imperfect provision for myself and family: but your salary as Minister is much more compleat. Oblige me therefore by withdrawing my present scanty pittance; and supply its place to me, by a *negation* of your salary.”—I think this request could not reasonably have been denied: and what satisfaction Mr. Harris would have felt by finding his theory thus reduced to practice, no person can better judge than myself; because I have experienced a conduct not much dissimilar from the Rulers of the Inner Temple: who having first *inticed* me to quit one profession, after many years of expectation, have very handsomely supplied its place to me by a *negation* of the other.

ADVERTISEMENT.

THE three following chapters (except some small alterations and additions) have already been given to the public in *A Letter to Mr. DUNNING* in the year 1778: which, though published, was not written on the spur of the occasion. The substance of that Letter, and of all that I have further to communicate on the subject of Language, has been amongst the loose papers in my closet now upwards of thirty years; and would probably have remained there some years longer, and have been finally consigned with myself to oblivion, if I had not been made the miserable victim of—*Two Prepositions and a Conjunction*.

The officiating Priests indeed * were themselves of

* Attorney General *Thurlow*—since Chancellor and a Peer.
Solicitor General *Wedderburne*—since Chancellor and a Peer.

Earl Mansfield, Chief Justice.

Mr. Buller—since a Judge.

Mr. Wallace—since Attorney General.

Mr. Mansfield—since Solicitor General and C. J. of the C. Pleas.

Mr. Bearcroft—since Chief Justice of Chester.



rank and eminence sufficient to dignify and grace my fall. But that the Conjunction *THAT*, and the Prepositions *OF* and *CONCERNING* (words which have hitherto been held to have NO meaning) should be made the abject instruments of my *civil extinction*, (for such was the *intention*, and such has been the *consequence* of my prosecution,) appeared to me to make my exit from civil life as degrading as if I had been brained by a lady's fan. For mankind in general are not sufficiently aware that words without meaning, or of equivocal meaning, are the everlasting engines of fraud and injustice: and that the *grimgribber* of Westminster-Hall is a more fertile, and a much more formidable, source of imposture than the *abracadabra* of magicians.

Upon a motion made by me in arrest of judgment in the Court of King's-Bench in the year 1777, the Chief Justice adjourned the decision: and instead of arguments on the merits of my objection, (which however by a side-wind were falsely represented by him as merely *literal flaws* *) desired that *Precedents* might be brought by the Attorney General on a future day. None were however adduced, but by the Chief Justice himself; who indeed produced two. (Thereby de-

* "*Lord Mansfield*,

"If the Defendant has a legal advantage from a *Literal flaw*, *God forbid* that he should not have the benefit of it."

Proceedings in K. B. The King against Horne.

priving me of the opportunity of combating the Precedents and their application, which I should have had if they had been produced by the Attorney General *. And on the strength of these two Precedents alone, (forgetting his own description and distinction of the crime to the Jury,) he decided against me †.

* “*Lord Mansfield,*

“I fancy the Attorney General was *surprized* with the objection.”

† The Attorney General, in his reply, said to the Jury, “Let us a little see what is the nature of the observations he makes. In the first place, that I left it exceedingly short: and the objection to my having left it short, was simply this; that I had stated no more to you but this, that of imputing to the conduct of the King’s troops the crime of murder. *Now I stated it, as imputed to the troops, ORDERED as they were upon the PUBLIC SERVICE.*”

Lord Mansfield to the Jury:

“Read the paper. What is it? Why it is this; that our beloved American Fellow-subjects—in *REBELLION against the State*—not beloved so as to be *abetted in their REBELLION*.” Again,—“What is the employment they (the troops) are *ORDERED* upon? Why then what are *they who gave the ORDERS*? Draw the conclusion.” Again,—“The unhappy resistance to the *LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY* of this kingdom by many of our Fellow-subjects in America: the *LEGISLATURE* of this kingdom have avowed that the Americans *REBELLED*: Troops are *EMPLOYED upon this ground*. The case is here between a *just Government and REBELLIOUS subjects*.”—Again,—“You will read this paper; you will judge whether it is not *denying the Government and Legislative authority of England*.” And again,—“If you are of opinion that they were all murdered (like the cases of *undoubted murders*, of Glenco, and twenty

I say, on the strength of these two precedents alone. For the gross perversion and misapplication of the technical term *de bene esse*, was merely *pour eblouir*, to introduce the proceedings on the trial, and to divert the attention from the only point in question—the sufficiency of the charge in the Record.—And I cannot believe that any man breathing (except Lord Mansfield) either in the profession or out of it, will think it an argument against the validity of my objection; that it was brought forward only by myself, and *had not been alleged before by the learned Counsel for the Printers*. This, however, I can truly tell his lordship; that the

other massacres that might be named), why then you may form a different conclusion.”

And again—“If some soldiers, *Without authority*, had got in a drunken fray, and murder had ensued, and that this paper could relate to that, it would be quite a different thing from the charge in the information: BECAUSE it is *charged—as a seditious Libel tending to disquiet the minds of the People*.” (See the Trial.)

A man must be not only well practised, but even *hackneyed* in *our* Courts of Justice to discover the above description of my crime in the *Prepositions*, OF and CONCERNING. Be that as it may: It is evident that the Attorney General and the Chief Justice did not expect the Jury to be so enlightened; and therefore (*when I had no longer a right to open my lips*) they described a crime to them in that plain language which I still contend I had a right to expect in the *Information*; BECAUSE—“*A seditious Libel tending to disquiet the minds of the people*,”—has been determined to be mere *paper and packthread*, and no part of the *Charge*.

most learned of them all, (*absit invidia*) Mr. Dunning, was not aware of the objection when I first mentioned it to him ; that he would not believe the information could be so defective in all its Counts, till I produced to him an Office Copy : when to his astonishment he found it so, he felt no jealousy that the objection had been missed by himself ; but declared it to be *insuperable* and *fatal* : and bad me rest assured, that whatever might be Lord Mansfield's wishes, and his *courage* on such occasions, he would not *dare* to overrule the objection. And when after the close of the first day, I hinted to him my suspicions of Lord Mansfield's intentions by the "*God forbid*;" and by the perverted and misapplied "*De bene esse*," in order to mix the proceedings on the trial with the question of record ; he smiled at it, as merely a method which his lordship took of letting the matter down gently, and breaking the abruptness of his fall.

Strange as it may appear ! One of those Precedents was merely *imagined* by the Chief Justice, but never really existed. And the other (through ignorance of the meaning of the Conjunction *THAT*) had never been truly understood ; neither by the Counsel who originally took the exception, nor perhaps by the Judges who made the decision, nor by the Reporter of it, nor by the present Chief Justice who quoted and misapplied it.

Mr. Dunning undertook to prove (and did actually

prove in the House of Lords) the *non-existence* of the main precedent. And I undertook, in that Letter to Mr. Dunning, to shew the real merits and foundation, and consequently Lord Mansfield's misapplication of the other. And I undertook this, because it afforded a very striking instance of the importance of the meaning of words; not only (as has been too lightly supposed) to Metaphysicians and School-men, but to the rights and happiness of mankind in their dearest concerns—the decisions of Courts of Justice.

In the House of Lords these two Precedents (the foundation of the Judgment in the Court of King's Bench) were abandoned: and the description of my crime against Government was adjudged to be sufficiently set forth by the Propositions OF and CONCERNING.

Perhaps it may make my readers smile; but I mention it as a further instance of the importance of inquiry into the meaning of words;—that in the decision of the Judges in the House of Lords, the Chief Justice De Grey (who found OF and CONCERNING so comprehensive, clear, and definite) began by declaring that—“the word *Certainty* [which the Law requires in the description of Crimes] is as indefinite [that is, as *Uncertain*] as any word that could be used. Now though *certainty* is so *uncertain*, we must suppose the word *Libel* to be very *definite*: and yet if I were called upon

for an equivalent term, I believe I could not find in our language any word more popularly apposite than *Calumny*; which is defined by Cicero, in his *Offices*, to be—“*callida et malitiosa Juris interpretatio.*”

If there was any *Mistake* (which however I am very far from believing) in this decision, sanctioned by the Judges and the House of Lords; I shall be justified in applying (with the substitution of the single word *Grammatici* for *Istorici*) what Giannone, who was himself an excellent lawyer, says of his countrymen of the same profession:—“Tanta ignoranza avea loro bendati gli occhi, che si pregiavano d'essere solamente Legisti, e non Grammatici; non accorgendosi, che perché non erano Grammatici, eran perciò CATTIVI LEGISTI.”—*Ist. Civil. di Napoli. Intro.*

ΕΠΕΑ ΠΤΕΡΟΕΝΤΑ,

&c.

CHAPTER VI.

OF THE WORD *THAT*.

B.

BUT besides the Articles “properly and strictly so called,” I think Mr. Harris and other Grammarians say that there are some words which, according to the different manner of using them, are sometimes *Articles* and sometimes *Pronouns*: and that it is difficult to determine to which class they ought to be referred*.

* “It must be confessed indeed that all these words do not always appear as Pronouns. When they stand by themselves and represent some Noun, (as when we say—THIS *is virtue*, or δεικτικῶς, *Give me THAT*,) then are they *Pronouns*. But when they are associated to some Noun, (as when we say—THIS *habit is virtue*, or δεικτικῶς, *THAT man defrauded me*,) then, as they supply not the place of a Noun, but only serve to ascertain one, they fall rather into the species of *Definitives* or *Articles*. That there is indeed a near relation between Pronouns and Articles, the old grammarians have all acknowledged; and some words it has been doubtful to which class to refer. The best rule to

H.

They do so. And by so doing, sufficiently instruct us (if we will but use our common sense) what value we ought to put upon such classes and such definitions.

B.

Can you give us any general rule by which to distinguish when they are of the one sort, and when of the other?

H.

Let them give the rule who thus confound together the *Manner* of signification of words, and the Abbreviations in their *Construction*: than which no two things in Language are more distinct, or ought to be more carefully distinguished. I do not allow that *Any* words change their nature in this manner, so as to belong sometimes to one Part of Speech, and sometimes to another, from the different ways of using them. I never could perceive any such fluctuation in any word whatever: though I know it is a general charge brought erroneously against words of almost every denomina-

distinguish them is this.—The genuine Pronoun always stands by itself, assuming the power of a noun, and supplying its place.—The genuine Article never stands by itself, but appears at all times associated to something else, requiring a noun for its support, as much as Attributives or Adjectives.”

Hermes, book 1. chap. 5.

tion*. But it appears to me to be all, Error : arising from the false measure which has been taken of almost every sort of words. Whilst the words themselves appear to me to continue faithfully and steadily attached, each to the standard under which it was originally in-listed. But I desire to wave this matter for the present ; because I think it will be cleared up by what is to follow concerning the other sorts of words : at least, if that should not convince you, I shall be able more easily to satisfy you on this head hereafter.

B.

I would not willingly put you out of your own way, and am contented to wait for the explanation of many things till you shall arrive at the place which you may think proper for it. But really what you have now advanced seems to me so very extraordinary and contrary to fact, as well as to the uniform declaration of all Grammarians, that you must excuse me, if, before we proceed any further, I mention to you one instance.

Mr. Harris and other Grammarians say that the word *THAT* is sometimes an *Article* and sometimes a

* "Certains mots sont *Adverbes*, *Prepositions*, et *Conjonctions* en même temps : et repondent ainsi au même temps à diverses parties d'oraison selon que la grammaire les emploie diversement."—*Buffier*, art. 150.

And so say all other grammarians.

Pronoun. However I do not desire an explanation of *that* [point]: because I see how you will easily reconcile *that* [difference], by a *subauditur* or an abbreviation of Construction: and I agree with you there. But what will you do with the *Conjunction* *THAT*?

Is not this a very considerable and manifest fluctuation and difference of signification in the same word? Has the *Conjunction* *THAT*, any the smallest correspondence or similarity of signification with *THAT*, the *Article*, or *Pronoun*?

H.

In my opinion the word *THAT* (call it as you please, either *Article*, or *Pronoun*, or *Conjunction*) retains always one and the same signification. Unnoticed abbreviation in construction and difference of position have caused this appearance of fluctuation; and misled the Grammarians of all languages both antient and modern: for in all they make the same mistake. Pray, answer me a question. Is it not strange and improper that we should, without any reason or necessity, employ in English the same word for two different meanings and purposes?

B.

I think it wrong: and I see no reason for it, but many reasons against it.

H.

Well! Then is it not more strange that this same impropriety, in this same case, should run through ALL languages? And that they should ALL use an *Article*, without any reason, unnecessarily, and improperly, for this same *Conjunction*; with which it has, as you say, no correspondence nor similarity of signification?

B.

If they do so, it is strange.

H.

They certainly do; as you will easily find by inquiry. Now does not the uniformity and universality of this supposed mistake, and unnecessary impropriety, in languages which have no connexion with each other, naturally lead us to suspect that this usage of the *Article* may perhaps be neither mistaken nor improper? But that the mistake may lie only with us, who do not understand it?

B.

No doubt what you have said, if true, would afford ground for suspicion.

H.

If true! Examine any languages you please, and see whether they also, as well as the English, have

not a supposed *Conjunction* which they employ as we do *THAT*; and which is also the same word as their supposed *Article*, or *Pronoun*. Does not this look as if there was some reason for employing the *Article* in this manner? And as if there was some connexion and similarity of signification between it and this *Conjunction*?

B.

The appearances, I own, are strongly in favour of your opinion. But how shall we find out what that connexion is?

H.

Suppose we examine some instances; and, still keeping the same signification of the sentences, try whether we cannot, by a resolution of their construction, discover what we want.

EXAMPLE.

“ I wish you to believe *THAT* I would not wilfully hurt a fly.”

RESOLUTION.

“ I would not wilfully hurt a fly ; I wish you to believe *THAT* [assertion].”

EXAMPLE.

“ She knowing *THAT* Crooke had been indicted for forgery, did so and so.”

RESOLUTION.

“ Crooke had been indicted for forgery; she, knowing *THAT* [fact], did so and so *.”

EXAMPLE.

“ You say *THAT* the same arm which, when contracted, can lift—; when extended to its utmost reach, will not be able to raise—. You mean *THAT* we should never forget our situation, and *THAT* we should be prudently contented to do good within our own sphere, where it can have an effect: and *THAT* we should not be misled even by a virtuous benevolence and public spirit, to waste ourselves in fruitless efforts beyond our power of influence.”

RESOLUTION.

“ The same arm which, when contracted, can lift—; when extended to its utmost reach, will not be able to raise—: you say *THAT*. We should never forget our situation; you mean *THAT*: and we should be contented to do good within our own sphere where it can have an effect; you mean *THAT*: and we should not be misled even by a virtuous benevolence and public spirit to waste ourselves in fruitless efforts beyond our power of influence; you mean *THAT*.”

* King v. Lawley. Strange's Reports. Easter T. 4 Geo. II.

EXAMPLE.

“They who have well considered *THAT* kingdoms rise or fall, and *THAT* their inhabitants are happy or miserable, not so much from any local or accidental advantages or disadvantages; but accordingly as they are well or ill governed; may best determine how far a virtuous mind can be neutral in politics.”

RESOLUTION.

“Kingdoms rise or fall, not so much from any local or accidental advantages or disadvantages, but accordingly as they are well or ill governed; they who have well considered *THAT* [maxim], may best determine how far a virtuous mind can be neutral in politics. And the inhabitants of kingdoms are happy or miserable, not so much from any local or accidental advantages or disadvantages, but accordingly as they are well or ill governed; they who have considered *THAT*, may best determine how far a virtuous mind can be neutral in politics *.”

* “Le despotisme ecrase de son sceptre de fer le plus beau pays du monde: Il semble que les malheurs des hommes croissent en proportion des efforts que la nature fait pour les rendre heureux.”—*Savary*.

“Dans ce paradis terrestre, au milieu de tant de richesses, qui croiroit que le *Siamois* est peut-être le plus miserable des peuples? Le gouvernement de *Siam* est despotique: le souverain jouit seul du droit de la liberté naturelle à tous les hommes.

EXAMPLE.

“Thieves rise by night *THAT* they may cut men’s throats.”

RESOLUTION.

“Thieves may cut men’s throats (*for*) *THAT* (*purpose*) they rise by night.”

After the same manner, I imagine, may all sentences be resolved (in all languages) where the *Conjunction*

Ses sujets sont ses esclaves ; chacun d’eux lui doit six mois de service personnel chaque année, sans aucun salaire et même sans nourriture. Il leur accorde les six autres pour se procurer de quoi vivre.” [Happy, happy England, if ever thy miserable inhabitants shall, in respect of taxation, be elevated to the condition of the *Siamois* ; when thy Taskmasters shall be contented with half the produce of thy industry !] “Sous un tel gouvernement il n’y a point de loi qui protege les particuliers contre la violence, et qui leur assure aucune propriété. Tout depend des fantaisies d’un prince abruti par toute sorte d’excès, et surtout par ceux du pouvoir ; qui passe ses jours enfermé dans un serail, ignorant tout ce qui se fait hors de son palais, et sur tout les malheurs de ses peuples. Cependant ceux-ci sont livrés à la cupidité des grands, qui sont les premiers esclaves, et approchent seuls à des jours marqués, mais toujours en tremblant, de la personne du despote, qu’ils adorent comme une divinité—sujette à des caprices dangereux.”

Voyages d’un Philosophe [*Mons. Poivre*]. Londres, 1769.

The above heart-rending reflections which Savary makes at the sight of Egypt, and Mons. Poivre at the condition of Siam, might serve as other *examples* for the *Conjunction* in question :

THAT (or its equivalent) is employed : and by such resolution it will always be discovered to have merely the same force and signification, and to be in fact nothing else but the very same word which in other places is called an *Article* or a *Pronoun*.

B.

For any thing that immediately occurs to me, this may perhaps be the case in English, where *THAT* is the only Conjunction of the same signification which we employ in this manner. But your last example makes me believe that this method of resolution will

but I give them for the sake of their matter. And I think myself at least as well justified (I do not expect to be as well rewarded) as our late Poet Laureat ; who, upon the following passage of Milton's *Comus*,

“ And sits as safe as in a Senate house,”

adds this flagitious note :

“ Not many years after this was written, MILTON'S FRIENDS shewed that the safety of a Senate house was not inviolable. But when the people turn Legislators, what place is safe against the tumults of innovation, and the insults of disobedience ? ”

I believe our late Laureat meant not so much to cavil at Milton's expression, as to seize an impertinent opportunity of recommending himself to the *powers which be*, by a cowardly insult on the dead and persecuted author's memory, and on the aged, defenceless constitution of his country.

A critic who should really be displeased at Milton's expression, would rather shew its impropriety by an event which had

not take place in those languages which have different Conjunctions for this same purpose. And if so, I suspect that your whole reasoning on this subject may be without foundation. For how can you resolve the original of your last example; where (unfortunately for your notion) *UT* is employed, and not the neuter *Article QUOD*?

“*Ut jugulent homines surgunt de nocte latrones.*”

I suppose you will not say that *UT* is the Latin neuter Article. For even Sanctius, who struggled so hard to withdraw *QUOD* from amongst the Conjunctions, yet still left *UT* amongst them without molestation*.

happened *before* it was used, than by an event which the poet could not at that time foresee. Such a critic adverting to the 5th of November, 1605, and to the 4th of January, 1641, might more truly say—“Not many years both *before and after* this was written, *WARTON'S FRIENDS* shewed that the safety of a Senate house was not inviolable.”

With equal impertinence and malignity (pages 496, 538.) has he raked up the ashes of Queen Caroline and Queen Elizabeth; whose private characters and inoffensive amusements were as little connected with Milton's poems, as this animadversion on Warton is with the subject I am now treating.

Perhaps, after all, the concluding line of Milton's epitaph,

“*Rege sub augusto fas sit laudare Catonem,*”

is artfully made by Mr. Warton the concluding line also of his Notes; in order to account for his present virulence, and to soften the resentment of his readers, at the expence of his patron.

* It is not at all extraordinary that *UT* and *QUOD* should be indifferently used for the same conjunctive purpose: for as *UT*

H.

You are not to expect from me that I should, in this place, account etymologically for the different words which some languages (for there are others beside the

(originally written UTI) is nothing but *ὅτι*: So is QUOD (anciently written QUODDE) merely *Καὶ ὅτι*.

“*Quodde* tuas laudes culpas, nil proficis hilum.”—*Lucilius*.

(See Note in Havercamp’s and Creech’s *Lucretius*; where QUODDE is mistakenly derived from *οὔτιδε*.) QU, in Latin, being sounded (not as the English but as the French pronounce QU, that is) as the Greek *K*; *Καὶ* (by a change of the character, not of the sound) became the Latin *Que* (used only enclitically indeed in modern Latin). Hence *Καὶ ὅτι* became in Latin *Qu’otti*—*Quoddi*—*Quodde*—*Quod*. Of which if Sanctius had been aware, he would not have attempted a distinction between UT and QUOD: since the two words, though differently corrupted, are in substance and origin the same.

The perpetual change of T into D, and *vice versa*, is so very familiar to all who have ever paid the smallest attention to Language, that I should not think it worth while to notice it in the present instance; if all the etymological canonists, whom I have seen, had not been remarkably inattentive to the *organical* causes of those literal changes of which they treat.

Skinner (who was a Physician) in his *Prolegomena Etymologica*, speaking of the frequent transmutation of s into z, says very truly—“*Sunt sane literæ sono fere eædem.*”

But in what does that *fere* consist? For s is not nearer in sound to z, than p is to b, or than t is to d, or than f is to v, or than k is to g, or than th (θ) in *Thing*, is to th (ð) in *That*, or than sh is to the French j.

Latin) may sometimes borrow and employ in this manner instead of their own common Article. But if you should hereafter exact it, I shall not refuse the undertaking : although it is not the easiest part of Etymology : for *Abbreviation and Corruption are always bu-*

(N.B. TH and SH are simple consonants, and should be marked by single letters. J, as the English pronounce it, is a double consonant ; and should have two characters.)

For these seven couple of simple consonants, viz.

With the Compression	B	—	P	Without the Compression
	G	—	K	
	D	—	T	
	Z	—	S	
	Ð	—	θ	
	V	—	F	
	J	—	SH	

differ each from its partner, by no variation whatever of articulation ; but singly by a certain unnoticed and almost imperceptible motion or compression of or near the Larynx ; which causes what Wilkins calls “ *some kind of murmur*.” This compression the Welch never use. So that when a Welchman, instead of

“ I vow, by God, Ðat Jenkin iz a Wizzard,”

pronounces it thus,

“ I fow, py Cot, θat Shenkin iss a Wissart ;”

he articulates in every other respect exactly as we do ; but omits the compression nine times in this sentence. And for failing in this one point only, changes seven of our consonants : for we owe seven additional letters (i. e. seven additional sounds in our language) solely to the addition of this one compression to seven different articulations.

sist with the words which are most frequently in use. Letters, like soldiers, being very apt to desert and drop off in a long march, and especially if their passage happens to lie near the confines of an enemy's country*. Yet I doubt not that, with this clue, you will yourself be able, upon inquiry, to account as easily (and in the same manner) for the use of all the others, as I know you can for *UT*; which is merely the Greek neuter Article *ὅτι* †, adopted for this conjunctive purpose by the Latins, and by them originally written *UTI*: the *o* being changed into *u*, from that propensity which both the ancient Romans had ‡, and the modern

* “ Nous avons déjà dit, que l'alteration du dérivé augmentoit à mesure que le temps l'éloignoit du primitif; et nous avons ajouté —*toutes choses d'ailleurs égales*,—parceque la quantité de cette alteration dépend aussi du cours que ce mot a dans le public. Il s'use, pour ainsi dire, en passant dans un plus grand nombre de bouches, sur tout dans la bouche du peuple: et la rapidité de cette circulation equivaut à une plus longue durée. Les noms des Saints et les noms de baptême les plus communs, en sont un exemple. Les mots qui reviennent le plus souvent dans les langues, tels que les verbes *être, faire, vouloir, aller*, et tous ceux qui servent à lier les autres mots dans le discours, sont sujets à de plus grandes alterations. Ce sont ceux qui ont le plus besoin d'être fixes par la langue écrite.”

Encyclopedie (Etymologie) par M. De Brosses.

† “*UTI est mutata ὅτι.*”

J. C. Scaliger de Causis L. L. cap. 173.

‡ So in the antient form of self-devotion.

“*VTEI. EGO. AXIM. PRAI. ME. FORMIDINEM. METOM.*

Italians still have*, upon many occasions, to pronounce even their own o like an u. Of which I need not produce any instances †.

The Resolution therefore of the original will be like that of the translation ;

“ Latrones jugulent homines (*di*) *ut* surgunt de nocte.”

B.

You have extricated yourself pretty well out of this scrape with *ut*. And perhaps have done prudently, to decline the same sort of explanation in those other languages which, as well as the Latin, have likewise

QUE. OMNIOM. DIRAS. SIC. VTEI. VERBEIS. NONCOPASO.
ITA. PRO. REPOPPLICA. POPOLI. ROMANI. QUIRITIOM.
VITAM. SALUTEM. QUE. MEAM. LEGIONES. AUXSILIA.
QUE. HOSTIOM. MEOM. DIVEIS. MANEBOUS. TELLOURI.
QUE. DEVOVEO.”

So in the laws of Numa, and in the twelve tables, and in all antient inscriptions, O is perpetually found where the modern Latin uses U. And it is but reasonable to suppose, that the pronunciation preceded the change of the orthography.

* “Quant à la voyelle U pour ce qu’ils (les Italiens) l’aiment fort, ainsi que nous cognoissons par ces mots *Ufficio, Ubrigato*, &c. je pense bien qu’ils la respectent plus que les autres.”

Henri Estiene, de la Precell. de la L. F.

† “L’O a stretta amicizia coll’ v, usandosi in molte voci scambievolmente.”—*Menage. Cambiamenti delle Lettere*, page 16.

Menage quotes Quinctilian, Festus, Velius Longus, Victo-

a double Conjunction for this purpose, not quite so easily accounted for, because not ready derived to your hands. But I have not yet done with the English: for though your method of resolution will answer with most sentences, yet I doubt much whether it will with all. I think there is one usage of the conjunction *THAT* which it will not explain.

H.

Produce an instance.

B.

The instances are common enough. But I chuse to take one from your favourite *sad Shepherd*: in

rnus, Cassiodorus, Servius, Priscian, Virgil, Jul. Cæs. Scaliger.

“La *v* par che prevalesse ne’ primi tempi e piu remoti, quando i Latini, memori della Eolica origine, o imitando gli Umbri e gli Etruschi, *literam v pro o efferebant*¹: e pronunziavano *Funtes, Frundes, Acherunte, Humones*, e simili². Quindi Ovidio, avendo detto che una volta il nome di *Orione* era *Urion*, soggiugne—*perdidit antiquum litera prima sonum*³. Ne’ tempi posteriori si andò all’ altro estremo; e all’ antica lettera fu sostituita quasi sempre la *O*, come vedesi in *Novios Plautios*, e in altre voci della tavola seconda. Prisciano ne dà per ragione: *quia multis Italiae populis v in usu non erat, sed e contrario utebantur O*⁴: dicendosi verbigrazia, *Colpa, Exsoles*, per *Culpa, Exules*, &c.⁵”

Lanzi Saggio di Lingua Etrusca, tom. i. pag. 124.

¹ Fest. vid. Orcus.

² Quinct. 1. 4.

³ Fast. v.

⁴ Pag. 554.

⁵ Cassiod. 2284.

hopes that the difficulty it may cause you will abate something of your extreme partiality for that piece. Which, though it be

—————“such wool
As from mere English flocks his Muse could pull,”
you have always contended obstinately, with its author, is

—————“a Fleece
To match or those of Sicily or Greece.”

EXAMPLE.

“I wonder he can move! that he’s not fix’d!
IF *THAT* his feelings be the same with mine.”

So again in Shakespeare *,

—————“IF *THAT* the king
Have any way your good deserts forgot,
He bids you name your griefs.”—————

How will you bring out the *Article* *THAT*, when two Conjunctions (for I must still call *THAT* a Conjunction, till all my scruples are satisfied) come in this manner together?

* *First Part of Henry IV.* act 4. scene 5.



ADVERTISEMENT.

I PRESUME my readers to be acquainted with French, Latin, Italian and Greek ; which are unfortunately the usual boundaries of an English scholar's acquisition. On this supposition, a friend of mine lamented that, in my Letter to Mr. Dunning, I had not confined myself to the common English character for the Anglo-Saxon and Gothic derivations.

In the present publication I should undoubtedly have conformed to his wishes, if I had not imagined that, by inserting the Anglo-Saxon and Gothic characters in this place, I might possibly allure some of my readers to familiarize themselves with those characters, by an application of them to the few words of those languages which are here introduced : and thus lead the way to their better acquaintance with the parent language, which ought long ago to have made a part of the education of our youth. And I flatter myself that one of the consequences of my present inquiry will be, to facilitate and abridge the tedious and mistaken method of instruction which has too long continued in our seminaries : the time which is at present

allotted to Latin and Greek, being amply sufficient for the acquirement also of French, Italian, Anglo-Saxon, Dutch, German, Danish and Swedish. Which will not seem at all extraordinary, when it is considered that the five last mentioned (together with the English) are little more than different dialects of one and the same language. And though this was by no means the leading motive, nor is the present object of my inquiry; yet I think it of considerable importance: although I do not hold the acquisition of languages in so very great estimation as the Emperor Charles the Vth did; who, as Brantome tells us, “disoit et repetoit souvent, quand il tomboit sur la beauté des langues, (selon l’opinion des Turcs)—qu’autant de langues que l’homme sçait parler, autant de fois est-il homme.”

Anglo-Saxon.

Æ	a	a
B	b	b
E	c	k
D	ð	d
E	e	e
F	f	f
G	g	g
H	h	h
*	*	*
I	i	i
*	*	*
K	k	k
L	l	l
M	m	m
N	n	n
O	o	o
P	p	p
*	*	*
R	r	r
S	s	s
T	t	t
Ð þ	ð þ	th
U	u	u
ƿ	p	w
X	x	x
Y	y	y
Z	z	z

Mæso-Gothic.

Λ	a
Β	b
*	*
Δ	d
Ε	e
Ɔ	f
Γ	g
h	h
Θ	hw
I	i
Ɔ	j and y
Κ	k
Λ	l
M	m
N	n
Ɔ	o
Π	p
Ϝ	cw
Κ	r
S	s
T	t
Φ	th
η	u
Ϝ	w
X	ch
*	*
Z	z



ΕΠΕΑ ΠΤΕΡΟΕΝΤΑ,

&c.

CHAPTER VII.

OF CONJUNCTIONS.

H.

I WAS afraid of some such instances as these, when I wished to postpone the whole consideration of this subject till after we had discussed the other received Parts of Speech. Because, in order to explain it, I must forestall something of what I had to say concerning *Conjunctions*. However, since the question is started, perhaps it may be as well to give it here.

The truth of the matter is, that IF is merely a *Verb*. It is merely the Imperative of the Gothic and Anglo-Saxon verb **FIȝAN**, *Fiȝan*. And in those languages, as well as in the English formerly, this supposed *Conjunction* was pronounced and written as the common Imperative, purely **FIȝ**, *Fiȝ*, *Gif*. Thus

—————“ My largesse
Hath lotted her to be your brother's mistresse
GIF shee can be reclaim'd ; GIF not, his prey *.”

* *Sad Shepherd*, act 2. scene 1.

And accordingly our corrupted *IF* has always the signification of the English Imperative *Give*; and no other. So that the resolution of the construction in the instances you have produced, will be as before in the others.

RESOLUTION.

“ His feelings be the same with mine, *GIVE THAT*, I wonder he can move,” &c.

“ The King may have forgotten your good deserts, *GIVE THAT* in any way, he bids you name your griefs.”

And here, as an additional proof, we may observe, that whenever the *Datum*, upon which any conclusion depends, is a sentence, the Article *THAT*, if not expressed, is always understood, and may be inserted after *IF*. As in the instance I have produced above, the Poet might have said,

“ *Gif that* she can be reclaimed,” &c.

For the resolution is—“ She can be reclaimed, *Give that*; my largesse hath lotted her to be your brother’s mistresse. She cannot be reclaimed, *Give that*; my largesse hath lotted her to be your brother’s prey.”

But the Article *THAT* is not understood, and cannot be inserted after *IF*, where the *Datum* is not a sentence, but some Noun governed by the Verb *IF* or *GIVE*. As,—

EXAMPLE.

“ How will the weather dispose of you to-morrow ?

IF fair, it will send me abroad ; IF foul, it will keep me at home."

Here we cannot say—" IF THAT fair it will send me abroad ; IF THAT foul it will keep me at home."—Because in this case the verb IF governs the Noun ; and the resolved construction is,

" GIVE fair weather, it will send me abroad ; GIVE foul weather, it will keep me at home."

But make the *Datum* a sentence, As—" IF it is fair weather, it will send me abroad ; IF it is foul weather, it will keep me at home :"

And then the article THAT is understood, and may be inserted after IF ; As—" IF THAT it is fair weather, it will send me abroad ; IF THAT it is foul weather, it will keep me at home."

The resolution then being,

" It is fair weather, GIVE THAT ; it will send me abroad ; It is foul weather, GIVE THAT ; it will keep me at home."

And this you will find to hold universally, not only with IF ; but with many other supposed *Conjunctions*, such as, *But that, Unless that, Though that, Lest that*, &c. (which are really *Verbs*) put in this manner before the *Article* THAT.

B.

One word more to clear up a difficulty which oc-

curs to me concerning your account of IF, and I have done.

We have in English another word which (though now rather obsolete) used frequently to supply the place of IF. As—"AN you had any eye behind you; you might see more detraction at your heels, than fortunes before you *."

In this and in all similar instances, what is AN? For I can by no means agree with the account which Dr. S. Johnson gives of it in his Dictionary: and I do not know that any other person has ever attempted to explain it.

H.

How does he account for it?

B.

He says,—“AN is sometimes in old authors a contraction of *And if*.” Of which he gives a very unlucky instance from Shakespeare†; where both AN and IF are used in the same line.

—————“He cannot flatter, He!
An honest mind and plain: he must speak Truth:
AN they will take it,—So. IF not; He’s plain.”

* *Twelfth Night*, act 2. scene 8.

† *Lear*, act 2. scene 6.

Where, if **AN** was a contraction of **AND IF** ; **AN** and **IF** should rather change places.

H.

I can no more agree with Dr. S. Johnson than you do. A part of one word only, employed to shew that another word is compounded with it, would indeed be a curious method of *con-traction*. Though even this account of it would serve my purpose. But the truth will serve it better : and therefore I thank you for your difficulty. It is a fresh proof, and a very strong one in my favour. **AN** is also a *Verb*, and may very well supply the place of **IF** ; it being nothing else but the Imperative of the Anglo-Saxon verb **Anan**, which likewise means to *Give*, or to *Grant*.

B.

It seems indeed to be so. But, if so, how can it ever be made to signify **AS IF** ? For which also, as well as for *And if*, Johnson says **AN** is a *con-traction* *.

H.

It never signifies *As if* : nor is ever a contraction of them.

* This arbitrary method of *contraction* is very useful to an idle or ignorant expositor. It will suit any thing. S. Johnson also says—" **AN'T**, a contraction for *And it* ; or rather *And if it* ; as—*An't please you—that is, And if it please you.*" It is merely—**AN** *it please you*.

B.

Johnson however advances Addison's authority for it.—“ My next pretty correspondent, like Shakespeare's Lion in Pyramus and Thisbe, roars **AN** it were any nightingale.”

H.

If Addison had so written, I should answer roundly, that he had written false English. But he never did so write. He only quoted it in mirth and ridicule, as the author wrote it. And Johnson, an Editor of Shakespeare, ought to have known and observed it. And then, instead of Addison's or even Shakespeare's authority, from whom the expression is borrowed ; he should have quoted *Bottom's*, the Weaver : whose language corresponds with the character Shakespeare has given him,—

“ *The shallow'st thickskull of that barren sort, viz.
A crew of Patches, rude Mechanicals,
That work for Bread upon Athenian Stalls*.*”

“ I will aggravate my voice so (says Bottom) that I will roar you as gently as any sucking Dove : I will roar you **AN** 'twere any nightingale†.”

If Johnson is satisfied with such authority as this,

* *Midsummer Night's Dream*, act 3. scene 2.

† *Ibid.* act 1. scene 2.

for the different signification and propriety of English words, he will find enough of it amongst the clowns in all our comedies; and *Master Bottom* in particular in this very sentence will furnish him with many new meanings. But, I believe, Johnson will not find *AN* used for *As if*, either seriously or clownishly, in any other part of Addison or Shakespeare; except in this speech of *Bottom*, and in another of *Hostess Quickly*—“He made a finer end, and went away *AN* it had been any *Christom* child*.”

B.

In English then, it seems, these two words which have been called *conditional* Conjunctions (and whose *force* and *manner* of signification, as well as of all the others, we are directed by Mr. Locke to search after in “the several views, postures, stands, turns, limitations, and exceptions, and several other thoughts of the mind, for which we have *either none or very deficient names*”) are, according to you, merely the original Imperatives of the *verbs* to *Give* or to *Grant*.

Now let me understand you. I do not mean to divert you into an etymological explanation of each particular word of other languages, or even of the English, and so to change our conversation from a philosophical inquiry concerning the nature of Language in general,

* *Henry V.* act 2. scene 3.

into the particular business of a polyglot Lexicon. But, as you have said that your principles will apply universally, I desire to know whether you mean that the *conditional conjunctions* of all other languages are likewise to be found, like IF and AN, in the original Imperatives of some of their own or derived *verbs*, meaning to *Give*?

H.

No. If that was my opinion, I know you are ready instantly to confute it by the Conditionals of the Greek and Latin and Irish, the French, Italian, Spanish, Portuguese and many other Languages. But I mean, that those words which are called *conditional conjunctions*, are to be accounted for in ALL languages in the same manner as I have accounted for IF and AN. Not indeed that they must all mean precisely as these two do, —*Give* and *Grant*; but some word equivalent: Such as,—*Be it, Suppose, Allow, Permit, Put, Suffer, &c.* Which meaning is to be sought for from the particular etymology of each respective language, not from some *un-named* and *un-known* “Turns, Stands, Postures, &c. of the mind.” In short, to put this matter out of doubt, I mean to discard all supposed mystery, not only about these *Conditionals*, but about all those words also which Mr. Harris and others distinguish from Prepositions, and call *Conjunctions* of Sentences. I deny them to be a separate sort of words or Part of Speech by themselves. For they have not a separate *manner of signi-*

fication: although they are not *devoid* of signification. And the particular signification of each must be sought for from amongst the other parts of Speech, by the help of the particular etymology of each respective language. By such means alone can we clear away the obscurity and errors in which Grammarians and Philosophers have been involved by the corruption of some common words, and the useful Abbreviations of Construction. And at the same time we shall get rid of that farrago of useless distinctions into *Conjunctive, Adjunctive, Disjunctive, Subdisjunctive, Copulative, Negative copulative**; *Continuative, Subcontinuative, Positive, Suppositive, Casual, Collective, Effective, Approbative, Discretive, Ablative, Presumptive, Abnegative, Compleitive, Augmentative, Alternative, Hypothetical, Extensive, Periodical, Motival, Conclusive, Explicative, Transitive, Interrogative, Comparative, Diminutive, Preventive, Adequate Preventive, Adversative, Conditional, Suspensive, Illative, Conductive, Declarative, &c. &c. &c.* which explain nothing; and (as most other technical terms are abused) serve only to throw a veil over the ignorance of those who employ them†.

* “*Non, Non, non minus disjungit, quam Nec, Nec. Quamquam neutrum ego Disjunctivum appello, sed copulativum potius negativum.*”

Aristarchus Anti-Bentleianus. Pars secunda. Pæg. 12.

† Technical terms are not invariably abused to cover the ignorance only of those who employ them. In matters of law, po-

B.

You mean, then, by what you have said, flatly to contradict Mr. Harris's definition of a *Conjunction*; which he says, is—"a Part of Speech devoid of signification itself, but so formed as to help signification, by making two or more significant sentences to be one significant sentence."

H.

I have the less scruple to do that, because Mr. Harris makes no scruple to contradict himself. For he afterwards acknowledges that *some* of them—"have a kind of obscure signification when taken alone; and appear in Grammar, like Zoophytes* in nature, a kind of middle Beings of amphibious character; which, by sharing the attributes of the higher and the lower, conduce to link the whole together."

Now I suppose it is impossible to convey a *Nothing*

liticks, and Government, they are more frequently abused in attempting to impose upon the ignorance of *others*; and to cover the injustice and knavery of those who employ them.

* These *Zoophytes* have made a wonderful impression on Lord Monboddo. I believe (for I surely have not counted them) that he has used the allusion at least twenty times in his *Progress of Language*; and seems to be always hunting after extremes merely for the sake of introducing them. But they have been so often placed between two stools, that it is no wonder they should at last come to the ground.

in a more ingenious manner. How much superior is this to the oracular Saw of another learned author on Language (typified by Shakespeare in *Sir Topaz**) who, amongst much other intelligence of equal importance, tells us with a very solemn face, and ascribes it to Plato, that—"Every man that opines, must opine something: the subject of opinion therefore is not nothing." But the fairest way to Lord Monboddos is to give you the whole passage.

"It was not therefore without reason that Plato said that the subject of opinion was neither the *το ον*, or the thing itself, nor was it the *το μη ον*, or nothing; but something betwixt these two. This may appear at first sight a little mysterious, and difficult to be understood; but, like other things of that kind in Plato, when examined to the bottom, it has a very clear meaning, and ex-

* "As the old Hermit of Prague, that never saw pen and ink, very wittily said to a niece of king Gorboduc,—*That that is, is: So I being Master Parson, am Master Parson. For what is that, but that? And is, but is?*"

Twelfth Night, act 4. scene 3.

John Lily's *Sir Tophas monboddizes* in the same manner.

"*Sir Tophas.* Doest thou not know what a poet is?

Epiton. No.

Sir Tophas. Why, foole, a poet is as much as one should say—a poet."

Endimion, act 1. scene 3.

plains the nature of opinion *very well**: FOR, as he says, Every man that opines, must opine something; the subject of opinion therefore is not nothing. At the same time it is not the thing itself, but something betwixt the two †." His Lordship, you see, has explained it

* *Lucinde*. Qu'est-ce que c'est que ce galimatias?

Frontin. Ce galimatias! Vous n'y comprenez donc rien?

Lucinde. Non, en verité.

Frontin. Ma foi, ni moi non plus: je vais pourtant vous l'expliquer si vous voulez.

Lucinde. Comment m'expliquer ce que tu ne comprends pas?

Frontin. Oh! Dame, j'ai fait mes études, moi.

L'Amant de lui-meme. (*Rousseau*,) scene 13.

† *Origin and Progress of Language*, vol. 1. p. 100. "Il possede l'antiquité, comme on le peut voir par les belles remarques qu'il a faites. Sans lui nous ne sçaurions pas que dans la ville d'Athènes les enfans pleuroient quand on leur donnoit le fouet.—Nous devons cette decouverte à sa profonde erudition."

But his lordship's philosophical writings are full of information, explanations and observations of equal importance. Vol. 1. p. 136, he informs us, that—*Porphyry, the greatest philosopher as well as best writer of his age*, "relates that crows and magpies and parrots were taught in his time not only to imitate human speech, but to attend to what was told them and to remember it; and many of them, says he, have learned to inform against those whom they saw doing any mischief in the house.—And he himself tamed a partridge that he found somewhere about Carthage to such a degree, that it not only played and fondled with him, but answered him when he spoke to it in a voice different from that in which the partridges call one another: but

very clearly ; and no doubt must have sweated much to get thus to the bottom.

But Mr. Harris has the advantage of a Simile over this gentleman : and though Similes appear with most beauty and propriety in works of imagination, they are frequently found most useful to the authors of philoso-

was so well bred, that it never made this noise but when it was spoken to. And he maintains, that all animals who have sense and memory are capable of reason : and this is not only his opinion, but that of the Pythagoreans, *the greatest philosophers in my opinion that ever existed*, next to the masters of their master, I mean the Egyptian priests. And besides the Pythagoreans, Plato, Aristotle, Empedocles, and Democritus, were of the same opinion. *One thing cannot be denied*, that their natures may be very much improved by use and instruction, by which they may be made to do things that are really wonderful and far exceeding their natural power of instinct.”—So far we are obliged to *the greatest of all philosophers that ever existed*. And thus far the judgment of the extract can alone be called in question. Now for the further confirmation of this doctrine by their illustrious disciple.—“There is a man in England at present, who has practised more upon them and with greater success than any body living :”—(I suspect his Lordship means the owner of the learned Pig)—“and he says, *as I am informed*,”—(Ay, Right, my lord, Be cautious how you take an assertion so important as this, upon your own authority ! Well, He says ? What ?)—“That, *if they lived long enough*, and pains *sufficient* were taken upon them,”—(Well, what then ?)—“*it is impossible to say to what lengths some of them might be carried*.”

Now if this, and such stuff as this, be Philosophy ; and that too, of the greatest philosophers that ever existed ; I do most

phical treatises: and have often helped them out at many a dead lift, by giving them an appearance of saying something, when indeed they had nothing to say: For Similes are in truth the bladders upon which they float; and the Grammarian sinks at once if he attempts to swim without them.

As a proof of which, let us only examine the present instance; and, dismissing the *Zoophytes*, see what intelligence we can draw from Mr. Harris concerning the nature of *Conjunctions*.

First he defines a *Word* to be a “*sound significant**.” Then he defines *Conjunctions* to be words (i. e. *sounds significant*) “*devoid of signification*.”—Afterwards he allows that they have—“*a kind of signification*.”

But this kind of signification is—“*obscure*,” (i. e. a signification unknown): something I suppose (as Chillingworth couples them) like a *secret Tradition*, or a *silent Thunder*: for it amounts to the same thing as a *signification* which does *not signify*: an obscure or un-

humbly intreat your Lordship, if you still continue obstinate to discard Mr. Locke, that I may have my *Tom Thumb* again. For this philosophy gives to my mind as much disgust, though not so much indignation, as your friend and admirer Lord Mansfield’s
LAW.

* And (page 329) he defines a word to be “a voice articulate, significant by compact.”

known signification being no signification at all. But, not contented with these inconsistencies, which to a less earned man would seem sufficient of all conscience, Mr. Harris goes further, and adds, that they are a—*'kind of middle beings'*—(he must mean between signification and no signification)—*"sharing the Attributes of both"*—(i. e. of signification and no signification) and—*"conduce to link them both"*—(i. e. signification and no signification) *"together."*

It would have helped us a little, if Mr. Harris had here told us what that *middle state* is, between signification and no signification*! What are the *attributes*

* If common reason alone was not sufficient to keep Mr. Harris and Lord Monboddo from this middle state between the *το ον* and the *το μη ον*, and between signification and no signification; they should at least have listened to what they are better acquainted with, *Authority*.

“Ὅσα δε των εναντιων τοιαυτα εστιν, ὥστε εν εις πεφυκε γινεσθαι, η σον κατηγορεται, αναγκαιον αυτων διατερον υπαρχειν;—τουτων ουδεν εστιν ανα μεσον.”—*Aristot. Categ.*

“Inter affirmationem et negationem nullum medium existit.”

J. C. Scaliger, lib. 5. cap. 114.

[“When a man is conscious that he does no good himself, the next thing is to cause others to do some. I may claim some merit this way, in hastening this testimonial from your friends above-writing: their love to you indeed wants no spur, their ink wants no pen, their pen wants no hand, their hand wants no heart, and so forth, after the *manner of Rabelais*; which is

of no signification ! And how signification and no signification can be *linked* together !

Now all this may, for aught I know, be “ read and admired as long as there is any taste for *fine writing* in Britain*.” But with such unlearned and vulgar

betwixt some meaning and no meaning ; and yet it may be said, when present thought and opportunity is wanting, their pens want ink, their hands want pens, their hearts want hands, &c. till time, place, and conveniency concur to set them a-writing, as at present, a sociable meeting, a good dinner, warm fire, and an easy situation do, to the joint labour and pleasure of this epistle. —Humble Servant, A. POPE.” *Parnell's Works.*]

* “ The truly philosophical language of my worthy and learned friend Mr. Harris, the author of *Hermes*, a work that will be read and admired as long as there is any taste for philosophy and fine writing in Britain.”

Orig. and Prog. of Language, vol. 1. p. 8.

“ But I can hardly have the same indulgence for the philosopher, especially one who *pretended*, like Mr. Locke, to be so attentive an observer of what passed in his own mind, and has written a whole book upon the subject.—If Mr. Locke would have taken the trouble to study what had been discovered in this matter by the antients, and had not resolved to have the merit of inventing himself a whole system of philosophy, he would have known that every material object is composed of *matter* and *form*.”—*Id.* vol. 1. p. 38.

“ Mr. Locke wrote at a time when the old philosophy, I mean the scholastic philosophy, was generally run down and despised, but no other come in its place. In that situation, being natu—

philosophers as Mr. Locke and his disciples, who seek not *Taste* and *elegance*, but truth and common sense in philosophical subjects, I believe it will never pass as a “*perfect Example of Analysis* ;” nor bear away the palm for “*acuteness of investigation and perspicuity of application*.” For, separated from the *Fine Writing*, (which however I can no where find in the book) thus is the *Conjunction* explained by Mr. Harris.—A sound significant devoid of signification,

Having at the same time a kind of *obscure* signification ;

And yet having neither signification nor no signification ;

But a *middle something* between signification and no signification,

Sharing the attributes both of signification and no signification ;

And linking signification and no signification together.

If others, of a more elegant *Taste* for *Fine Writing*, are able to receive either pleasure or instruction from

rally an acute man, and not a bad writer, it was no wonder that his *Essay* met with great applause, and was thought to contain wonderful discoveries. And I must allow that I think it was difficult for any man, without the assistance of books, or of the conversation of men more learned than himself, to go further in the philosophy of mind than he has done. But now that

such *truly philosophical language**, I shall neither dispute with them nor envy them : But can only deplore the dullness of my own apprehension, who, notwithstanding the great authors quoted in Mr. Harris's treatise, and the great authors who recommend it, cannot help considering this "perfect example of analysis," as—An improved compilation of almost all the errors which Grammarians have been accumulating from the

Mr. Harris has opened to us the treasures of Greek philosophy, to consider Mr. Locke still as a standard book of philosophy, would be, to use an ancient comparison, continuing to feed on *acorns* after *corn* was discovered."—*Or. and Pr. of Lang.* vol. i. p. 53.

"It was the misfortune of us in the western parts of Europe, that after we had learned Greek, and got some taste of the Greek philosophy, we immediately set up as masters ourselves, and would needs be inventors in philosophy, instead of humble scholars of the ancient masters. In this way Descartes philosophized in France, Mr. Hobbes and Mr. Locke in England, and many since their time of less note. I would fain hope, if the indolence and dissipation that prevail so generally in this age would allow me to think so well of it, that Mr. Harris would put a stop to this method of philosophizing without the assistance of the ancients, and revive the genuine Greek philosophy among us."—*Id.* vol. 1. page 54.

- * "Clarum ob obscuram linguam magis inter inanes
Quamde graves inter Graios, qui vera requirunt.
Omnia enim stolidi magis admirantur amantque
Inversis quæ sub verbis latitantia cernunt :
Veraque constituunt, quæ belle tangere possunt
Aures, et lepido quæ sunt fucata sonore."

Lucretius, lib. 1. 640.

time of Aristotle down to our present days, of technical and learned affectation*.

B.

I am afraid, my good friend, you still carry with you your old humour in politics, though your subjects now different. You speak too sharply for Philosophy. Come, Confess the truth. Are not you against *Authority*, because Authority is against you? And does not your spleen to Mr. Harris arise principally from his having taken care to fortify his opinions in a manner in which, from your singularity, you cannot?

H.

I hope you know my disposition better. And I am persuaded that I owe your long and steady friendship to me, to the conviction which an early experience in private life afforded you, that—*Neminem libenter no-*

* I must however do Mr. Harris and Dr. Lowth the justice to acknowledge, that the *Hermes* of the former has been received with universal approbation both at home and abroad; and has been quoted as undeniable authority on the subject by the learned of all countries. For which however I can easily account; not by supposing that its doctrine gave any more satisfaction to their minds who quoted it than to mine; but because, as Judges shelter their knavery by *precedents*, so do scholars their ignorance by *authority*: and when they cannot reason, it is safer and less disgraceful to repeat that nonsense at second hand, which they would be ashamed to give originally as their own.

minem, nisi ut laudem ; sed nec peccata reprehenderem, nisi ut aliis prodessem.—Indeed you have borne your testimony for me in very trying situations, where few besides yourself would have ventured so much honesty. At the same time, I confess, I should disdain to handle any useful truth daintily, as if I feared lest it should sting me ; and to employ a philosophical inquiry as a vehicle for interested or cowardly adulation.

I protest to you, my notions of Language were formed before I could account etymologically for any one of the words in question, and before I was in the least acquainted with the opinions of others. I addressed myself to an inquiry into their opinions with all the diffidence of conscious ignorance ; and, so far from spurning authority, was disposed to admit of half an argument from a great name. So that it is not my fault, if I am forced to carry instead of following the lantern : but at all events it is better than walking in total darkness.

And yet, though I believe I differ from all the accounts which have hitherto been given of Language, I am not so much without authority as you may imagine. Mr. Harris himself and all the Grammarians whom he has, and whom (though using their words) he has not quoted, are my authorities. Their own doubts, their difficulties, their dissatisfaction, their contradictions, their obscurity on all these points are

ay authorities against them*: for their system and heir difficulties vanish together. Indeed unless, with Mr. Harris, I had been repeating what others have written, it is impossible I should quote any direct authorities for my own manner of explanation. But let

* “ Profecto in Grammaticorum prope omnium commentis, juss *αγροισι* immensum extollunt, pene *ουδεν υγιες*; cum paginae ingulae saepe plures contineant errores, quam Sicinius ille Dentatus vulnera toto habuit corpore.”

G. J. Vossii *Aristarchus*, lib. 3. cap. 2.

LXXIV. “ Capienda etiam sunt signa ex incrementis et progressibus philosophiarum et scientiarum. Quæ enim in natura fundata sunt, crescunt et augentur: quæ autem in opinione, variantur; non augentur. Itaque si istæ doctrinæ plane, instar plantæ, a stirpibus suis revulsæ non essent, sed utero naturæ adhererent, atque ab eadem alerentur, id minime eventurum fuisset quod per annos bis mille jam fieri videmus: nempe, ut scientiæ suis hæreant vestigiis, et in eodem fere statu maneant, neque augmentum aliquod memorabile sumpserint.”

LXXV. “ Etiam aliud signum capiendum est (si modo *signi* appellatio huic competat; cum potius *testimonium* sit, atque adeo testimoniorum omnium validissimum) hoc est, propria confessio auctorum quos homines nunc sequuntur. Nam et illi, qui tanta fiducia de rebus pronunciant, tamen per intervalla cum ad se redeunt, ad querimonias de *naturæ subtilitate, rerum obscuritate*, humani ingenii infirmitate se convertunt. Hoc vero si simpliciter fieret, alios fortasse qui sunt timidiore ab ulteriori inquisitione detertere, alios vero qui sunt ingenio alacriori et magis fidenti ad ulteriorem progressum acuere et incitare possit. Verum non satis illis est de se confiteri, sed quicquid sibi ipsis aut magistris suis incognitum aut intactum fuerit, id extra terminos possibilis ponunt: et tanquam ex arte, cognitu aut factu

us hear Wilkins, whose industry deserved to have been better employed, and his perseverance better rewarded with discovery; let us hear what he says.

—"According to the true philosophy of speech, I cannot conceive this kind of words" (he speaks of Adverbs and Conjunctions) "to be properly a distinct part of speech, as they are commonly called. But until they can be distributed into their proper places, I have so far complied with the Grammars of instituted languages, as to place them here together."—And again,

"For the accurate effecting of this [i. e. a *real character*] it would be necessary that the theory itself [i. e. *of language*] upon which such a design were to be founded, should be exactly suited to the nature of things. But upon supposal that this theory [viz. *of language*] is defective, either as to the fulness or the order of it; this must needs add much perplexity to any such attempt, and render it imperfect. And that this is the case with that common theory already received, need not much be doubted."

impossibile pronunciant: Summa superbia et invidia suorum inventorum infirmitatem, in naturæ ipsius calumniam et aliorum omnium desperationem vertentes. Hinc schola Academiæ novæ, quæ *Acatalepsiam* ex professo tenuit, et homines ad sempiternas tenebras damnavit."—*Novum Organum*.

It appears evidently therefore that Wilkins (to whom Mr. Locke was much indebted) was well convinced that all the accounts hitherto given of Language were erroneous. And in fact, the languages which are commonly used throughout the world, are much more simple and easy, convenient and philosophical, than Wilkins's scheme for a *real character*; or than any other scheme that has been at any other time imagined or proposed for the purpose.

Mr. Locke's dissatisfaction with all the accounts which he had seen, is too well known to need repetition.

Sanctius rescued QUOD particularly from the number of these mysterious Conjunctions, though he left UT amongst them.

And Servius, Scioppius, G. J. Vossius, Perizonius, and others, have explained and displaced many other supposed Adverbs and Conjunctions.

Skinner (though I knew it not previously) had accounted for IF before me, and in the same manner; which, though so palpable, *Lye* confirms and compliments. Even S. Johnson, though mistakenly, has attempted AND; and would find no difficulty with THEREFORE.

In short, there is not such a thing as a *Conjunction*

in *Any* Language, which may not, by a skilful Herald, be traced home to its own family and origin ; without having recourse to contradiction and mystery with Mr. Harris : or, with Mr. Locke, cleaving open the head of man, to give it such a birth as Minerva's from the brain of Jupiter.

B.

Call you this authority in your favour,—when the full stream and current sets the other way, and only some little brook or rivulet runs with you ? You know very well that all the authorities which you have alleged, except Wilkins, are upon the whole against you. For though they have explained the meaning, and traced the derivation of many Adverbs and Conjunctions ; yet (except Sanctius in the particular instance of QUOD,—whose conjunctive use in Latin he too strenuously denies) they all acknowledge them still to be *Adverbs* or *Conjunctions*. It is true, they distinguish them by the title of *reperta* or *usurpata*. But they at the same time acknowledge (indeed the very distinction itself is an acknowledgment) that there are others which are *real, primigenia, nativa, pura*.'

H.

True. Because there are some, of whose origin they were totally ignorant. But has any Philosopher or Grammarian ever yet told us what a *real, original, native, pure* Adverb or Conjunction is ? or which of these

Conjunctions of Sentences are so? Whenever that is done, in *any* language, I may venture to promise you that I will show those likewise to be *repertas* and *usurpatas*, as well as the rest. And till then I shall take no more trouble about them. I shall only add, that though *Abbreviation and corruption are always busiest with the words which are most frequently in use*; yet *the words most frequently used are least liable to be totally laid aside*. And therefore they are often retained, —(I mean that branch of them which is most frequently used)—when most of the other words (and even the other branches of these retained words) are, by various changes and accidents, quite lost to a Language. HENCE the difficulty of accounting for them. And HENCE (because only one branch of each of these *declinable* words is retained in a language) arises the notion of their being *indeclinable*; and a separate sort of words, or Part of Speech by themselves. But that they are not *indeclinable*, is sufficiently evident by what I have already said. For *Upr*, *An*, &c. certainly could not be called *indeclinable*, when all the other branches of those *Verbs*, of which they are the regular Imperatives, were likewise in use. And that the words *IF*, *AN*, &c. (which still retain their original signification, and are used in the very same manner and for the same purpose as formerly) should now be called *indeclinable*, proceeds merely from the ignorance of those who could not account for them; and who therefore, with Mr. Harris, were driven to say that they have neither *mean-*

ing nor *inflection*: whilst notwithstanding they were still forced to acknowledge (either directly, or by giving them different titles of *conditional*, *adversative*, &c.) that they have a “*kind of obscure meaning**.”

How much more candid and ingenuous would it have been, to have owned fairly that they did not understand the nature of these *Conjunctions*; and, instead of wrapping it up in mystery, to have exhorted and encouraged others to a further search!

B.

You are not the first person who has been misled by a fanciful etymology. Take heed that your derivations be not of the same ridiculous cast with theirs who deduced *Constantinople* from *Constantine the noble*,—*Breeches* from *bear-riches*,—*Donna* from *dono*,—*Honour* from *hon* and *aurum*,—and *King Pepin* from *ὁσπερ*†.

* “Et quelle idée est excitée dans l’esprit en entendant prononcer les particules ET, AUSSI? On voit bien que ces mots signifient une espèce de connexion; mais quelque peine qu’on se donnât à decrirer cette connexion, on se serviroit d’autant d’autres mots, dont la signification seroit aussi difficile à expliquer: et voulant expliquer la signification de la particule ET, je me servirois plusieurs fois de cette même particule.”

Lettres à une Princesse d’Allemagne, by Euler, letter 101.

† “Then this Constantyne removed the emperyall see unto his cytye of *Constantyne the noble*: and there for the more partye

H.

If I have been misled, it most certainly is not by Etymology: of which I confess myself to have been shamefully ignorant at the time when these my notions of language were first formed. Though even that pre-

cepte his emperyall honoure; and other emperours in lyke wyse after hym. By reason whereof the emperours were longe after called emperours of *Constantyne noble*."

Fabian's Chronicle, chap. 69.

* *Hed.* But why *Breeches* now?

Pha. Breeches, quasi *bear-riches*; when a gallant bears all his riches in his breeches."

B. Jonson, Cynthia's Revels, act 4. scene 3.

* Placano i *Doni* il ciel; placan l' inferno.

E pur non son le *Donne*

Men avaro che il cielo,

Piu crude che l' inferno.

- Il *Don*, credimi, il *Dono*

Gran ministro d' amore, anzi tiranno

Egli è, che a suo voler impetra e spetra.

Non sai tu cio ch' Elpino,

Il saggio Elpino dicea?

Che fin colà nella primiera etade,

Quand' anco semplicità

Non sapean favellare

Che d' un linguaggio sol la lingua e 'l core,

Allor le amanti *Donne* altra canzona

Non s' udivan cantar che—*Dona, Dona*.

Quindi l' *enne* addoppiando

Perchè non basta un *Don*,—DONNA fu detta."

Guidobaldo de' Bonarelli.

vious ignorance is *now* a circumstance which confirms me much in my opinion concerning these Conjunctions: For I knew not even the *character* of the language from which my particular proofs of the *English* conjunctions were to be drawn. And (notwithstanding Lord Monboddo's discouraging Sneer*) it was general reasoning *a priori*, that led me to the particular instances; not particular instances to the general reasoning. This Etymology, against whose fascination

"On connoit le jeu de mots d'*Owen*, assez mauvais, mais qui renferme un grand sens:

Divitias et opes, HON lingua Hebræa vocavit:

Gallica gens, AURUM-OR; indeque venit HONOR."

Mirabeau, Essai sur le Despotisme

"Οσπερ—ἡπερ—ἔπερ—Diaper—Napkin—Nipkin—

Pipkin—Pippin-king—King Pepin."

I forget my merry author of this etymology; but it is altogether as plausible as even *Menage's* derivation of CHEZ from *Apud*.

* "Now as I am not able from Theory merely, and *a priori* to form the idea of a perfect language, I have been obliged to seek for it in the study of the Greek.—What men of *superior Genius* may do in such speculations, I cannot tell; but I know well that *ordinary* men, without the study of some model of the kind, would be as unable to conceive the idea of a perfect language, as to form a high taste in other arts, such as sculpture and painting, without having seen the best works of those kinds that are to be found.—It would be doing injustice to *those superior minds who have in themselves the standard of perfection in all the Arts*, to judge of them by myself; but I am confident that *my idea* of perfection in language would have been ridicu-

you would have me guard myself, did not occur to me till many years after my system was settled : and it occurred to me suddenly, in this manner ;—" If my reasoning concerning these conjunctions is well founded, there must then be in the original language from which the English (and so of all other languages) is derived, literally *such* and *such* words bearing precisely *such* and *such* significations."—I was the more pleased with this suggestion, because I was entirely ignorant even of the Anglo-Saxon and Gothic characters : and

lously imperfect, if I had known no other language than the modern languages of Europe."

Origin and Progress of Language, vol. 2. page 183.

Read this, *Mr. Burgess*, and then complain of illiberality to Lord Monboddo : who places himself *ansatus in cathedra*, and thus treats all other men in advance. Whoever, after his lordship, shall dare to reason on this subject *a priori*, must assume then, it seems,—to have in his own superior mind the standard of perfection in *All* the Arts !—Do you, *Mr. Burgess*, acquiesce to this condition ? If it were possible (which I am very far from believing) that the same sentiments should pervade any considerable part of the very learned and respectable body to which you belong ; I should be sorrowfully compelled to join in the exclamation,—*O ! aurita Arcadiæ pecora ! qui, Romæ, hujus cuculi vocem veluti lusciniolæ melos, in aures admittere sustinetis !* And perhaps *Mr. Burgess* himself may have reason hereafter to regret, that (with all his real or pretended admiration of Lord Monboddo's writings) he neglected to avail himself of the only useful lesson to be drawn from them : viz. To be at least as well bred as *Porphyry's partridge* ; and to have forborne his noise, until he was himself spoken to.

the experiment presented to me a mean, either of disabusing myself from error (which I greatly feared); or of obtaining a confirmation sufficiently strong to encourage me to believe (what every man knowing any thing of human nature will always be very backward in believing of himself), that I had really made a discovery. For, if upon trial I should find in an unknown language precisely those very words both in sound, and signification, and application, which in my perfect ignorance I had foretold; what must I conclude, but either that some Dæmon had maliciously inspired me with the spirit of true prophecy in order the more deeply to deceive me; or that my reasoning on the nature of language was not fantastical. The event was beyond my expectation: for I instantly found, upon trial, all my predictions verified. This has made me presumptuous enough to assert it universally. Besides that I have since traced these supposed unmeaning, indeclinable Conjunctions with the same success in many other languages besides the English. And because I know that the generality of minds receive conviction more easily from a number of particular instances, than from the surer but more abstracted arguments of general proof; if a multiplicity of uncommon avocations and engagements (arising from a very peculiar situation) had not prevented me, I should long before this have found time enough from my other pursuits and from my enjoyments (amongst which idleness is not the smallest) to have shown clearly and satisfactorily the origin and

precise meaning of each of these pretended unmeaning, indeclinable Conjunctions, at least in all the dead and living languages of Europe.

B.

Men talk very safely of what they *may do*, and what they *might have done*. But, though present professions usually outweigh past proofs with the people, they have never yet passed current with philosophers. If therefore you would bring me over to your opinion, and embolden me to quit the beaten path with you, you must go much beyond the example of Henry Stephens, which was considered by Mer. Casaubon as the *ne plus ultra* on this subject*, and must do what Wilkins required before he would venture to differ from the Grammars of instituted languages: that is, you must distribute all our *English* Conjunctions at least into their proper places. And if it should seem unreasonable in me thus to impose upon you a task which—“no man, however learned or sagacious, has yet been able to perform†;”—you must thank yourself for it,

* “Henricus Stephanus (author immortalis operis, quod Thesaurus Linguae Græcæ indigitavit) ita omnes orationis particulas (*quarum quanto in omni lingua difficilior, tanto utilior observatio*), omnes idiotismos excussit, eruit, explicavit, similia cum similibus comparavit, ut exemplum quidem in hoc genere aliis ad imitandum reliquerit absolutissimum; sed quod pauci sint assecuturi.”—*Mer. Cas. de Lingua Saxonica*.

† “The Particles are, among all nations, applied with so great latitude, that they are not easily reducible under any re-

and the peremptory roundness of your assertion. Besides, I do really think that after you have professed so much of all the languages of Europe, I may fairly expect you to perform a little in your own.

H.

If it must be so, thus then : I say that

IF	are the Imperatives	Lip	of their respective Verbs	Lipān	To Give.
AN		An		Anan	To Grant.
UNLESS		Onley		Onleyan	To Dismiss.
EKE		Eac		Eacan	To Add.
YET		Let		Letan	To Get.
STILL		Stell		Stellan	To Put.
ELSE		Aley		Aleyan	To Dismiss.
THO'		Ḍaṛ		Ḍaṛian	} To Allow.
or		or		or	
THOUGH		Ḍaṛiḡ		Ḍaṛiḡan	} To Boot.
BŪT		Bot		Botan	
BŪT		Be-utan		Beon-utan	To Be-out.
WITHOUT		Ṗṽṇḍ-utan		Ṗṽṇḍan-utan	To Be-out.
AND		An-ad		Anan-ad	{ <i>Dare congeriem.</i>

gular scheme of explication : this difficulty is not less, nor perhaps greater, in English than in other languages. I have laboured them with diligence, I hope with success : such at least as can be expected in a task which no man, however learned or sagacious, has yet been able to perform."

Preface to S. Johnson's Dictionary.

LEST is the past participle **Lered** of **Leran**, To Dismiss.

SINCE $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Siððan} \\ \text{Sýne} \\ \text{Seand-er} \\ \text{Siððe} \\ \text{or} \\ \text{Sin-er} \end{array} \right\}$ is the participle of **Seon**, To See.

THAT is the Article or Pronoun **Ðat**.

These, I apprehend, are the only Conjunctions in our language which can cause any difficulty ; and it would be impertinent in me to explain such as—**BE** so^(a). **BE** IT. **ALBEIT**^(b). **ALBEIT** so^(c). **SET**^(d).

(^a) “ Set forth (quod she) and tell me how.

Shew me thy sekenes euery dele.

Madame, that can I do wele :

BE so my lyfe therto woll laste.”

Gower, lib. 1. fol. 8. pag. 2. col. 1.

“ For these craftes (as I finde)

A man maie do by waie of kinde :

BE so it be to good entent.”

Gower, lib. 5. fol. 134. pag. 2. col. 1.

“ For suche men that ben vilayns

The lawe in suche a wise ordeineth,

That what man to the lawe pleyneth,

BE so the judge stande upright,

He shall be serued of his right.”

Gower, lib. 7. fol. 159. pag. 1. col. 1.

NOTWITHSTANDING. NEVERTHELESS. SAVE *that*^(*).
SAVING *that*. EXCEPT *that*. EXCEPTING *that*. BA-

“ The mast to-brake, the sayle to-roofe,
The ship upon the wawes droofe,
Till that thei see the londes coste.
Tho made a vowe the leste and moste
BE SO thei mighten come alonde.”

Gower, lib. 8. fol. 177. pag. 1. col. 2.

(b) “ Saturne anon, to stynten stryfe and drede,
AL BE IT that it be agayne his kynde,
Of all this strife he can remedy fynde.”

Chaucer, *Knyghtes Tale*, fol. 8. pag. 2. col. 1.

“ The quhilk Juno nowthir lang dayis nor zeris,
Nor nane diuynes sacrifice may appeis ;
Sche restis neuir, nor may sche leif at eis,
ALBEIT the power and charge of Jupiter
Resistis sche wat, and fatis war hir contrare.”

Douglas, 5th booke, pag. 154.

“ Freynd serly not, na cause is to compleyne,
ALBEIT thy wit grete god may not atteyne.”

Douglas, *Prol.* to 10th booke, pag. 309.

(c) “ Another remedy is that a man eschewe the companye
of hem by whiche he douteth to be tempted : for ALBEIT SO
that the dede is wythstonde, yet is there greate temptacyon.”

Chaucer, *Persons Tale*, fol. 115. pag. 2. col. 2.

“ AL BE IT SO that of your pride and high presumpcion and
folye, ye haue misborne you, yet for as mikell as I se and beholde
your greate humilyte, it constrayneth me to do you grace and
mercy.”—*Tale of Chaucer*, fol. 83. pag. 1. col. 1.

(d) “ Bot sen I am compellid the to translait,
And not onlie of my curage, God wate,

TING *that*. IF CASE(^f). IN CASE(^g). PUT CASE(^h).
 SET CASE(ⁱ). I POSE(^k). BECAUSE. TO WIT. FOR-

Durst I interprise sic outrageous folie,
 Quhare I offend, the lesse reprefe serf I,
 And that ȝe knaw at quhais instance I tuke
 For to translate this maist excellent buke,
 I mene Virgillis volum maist excellent,
 SET this my werk full febill be of rent."

Douglas, Preface, page 4.

" Sic plesand wordes carpand, he has forth brocht,
 SETT his mynd troublit mony greuous thocht."

Douglas, 1st booke, pag. 19.

" Betwix gude hope and drede in doute they stude,
 Quhither thay war lewand, or tholit extreme dede al,
 Thay ansuerit not, SET thay oft plene and cal."

Douglas, 1st booke, pag. 19.

" And SET it be not louable nor semely thocht
 To punys ane woman, but schamefull hir to sla,
 Na victory, but lak following alsa,
 ȝit nethes I aucht louit to be,
 Vengeaunce to take on hir deseruis to de."

Douglas, 2d booke, pag. 58.

" Virgill is full of sentence ouer all quhare,
 His hie knowlege he schawis, that euery sorte
 Of his clausis comprehend sic sentence,
 Thare bene thereof, SET thou think this but sporte,
 Made grete ragmentis of hie intelligence."

Douglas, Prol. to 6th booke, pag. 158.

" To name the God, that war ane manifest lee,
 Is but ane God, makar of euery thing :
 SET thou to Vulcane haue ful grete resembling."

Douglas, Prol. to 6th booke, pag. 161.

SEEING *that* (¹). FORESEEN *that* (^m). PROVIDED *that*.
BEING *that*. &c. Which are evident at first sight.

"Thare suld na knicht rede but ane knichtly tale.
Quhat forcis him the bussart on the brere?
SET wele him semes the falcone heroner."

Douglas, Prol. to 9th booke, pag. 271.

"Turnus, behald on cais reuoluit the day,
And of his fre wyl sendis the perfoy
Sic auantage and oportunitie,
And SET thou wald haif askit it, quod sche,
There was neuer ane of al the goddis ding
Quhilk durst have the promittit sic ane thing."

Douglas, 9th booke, pag. 273.

"SET our nature God has to him unyte,
His godhede incommixt remanis perfite."

Douglas, Prol. to 10th booke, pag. 308.

"Angellis, scheiphardis, and kingis thy godhede kend,
SET thou in crib betuix twa beistis was laid."

Douglas, Prol. to 10th booke, pag. 310.

"Drances, forsoith, quod he, euer has thou bene
Large and to mekil of speche, as weil is sene,
Bot not with wourdis suld the court be fyllyt,
SET thou be grete tharin, and ful euill wyllit."

Douglas, 11th booke, pag. 376

"I put the cais SET the Etholianis
List not to cum in our help nor supple;
zit than the bald Messapus wele wylle."

Douglas, 11th booke, pag. 37

"With stout curage agane him wend I will,
Thocht he in proues pas the grete Achill,
Or SET in cais sic armour he weris as he
Wrocht be the handis of God Vulcanus sle."

Douglas, 11th booke, pag.

B.

Well. Whether you are right or wrong in your conjectures concerning Conjunctions, I acknowledge

" Bot Juno tho down from the hicht, I wys,
Of the mountane that Albane clepyt is
Now in our dayis (SET then this hillis down
Had nouthur name, honour, nor renowne)
Scho did behald amynd the feildis plane."

Douglas, 12th booke, pag. 411.

" For SET we preis us fast to speike out braid,
Ne voce, nor wourdis followis nocht is said."

Douglas, 12th booke, pag. 446.

" And SET that empty be my brane and dull,
I haue translatit ane volume wonderfull."

Douglas, 13th booke, pag. 483.

" Fra tyme I thareto set my pen to wryte,
It was compilyt in aughtene monethis space :
SET I feil syth sic twa monethis in fere
Wrote neuir ane wourd, nor micht the volume stere."

Douglas, pag. 484.

(*) " SAUFE onely that I crie and bidde,
I am in tristesse all amidde."

Gower, lib. 4. fol. 82. pag. 2. col. 1.

" Almoste ryght in the same wise the phisiciens answerd,
SAUE that they sayden a fewe wordes more."

Tale of Chaucer, fol. 74. pag. 1. col. 2.

" Tyl she gan asken him howe Hector ferde
That was the townes wal, and Grekes yerde.
Ful wel I thanke it God, sayde Pandarus,
SAUE in his arme he hath a lytle wounde."

Chaucer, 2d booke of Troylus, fol. 164. pag. 1. col. 1.

that this is coming to the point: and is fairer than shuffling them over unnoticed, as the greater part of grammarians have done; or than repeating after others, that they are not themselves any parts of language, but

“ Behynd thame for uptaking quhare it lay
 Mony bricht armoure, rychely dycht thay left,
 SAUF that Eurialus with him tursit away
 The riall trapouris, and mychty patrellis gay.”

Douglas, 9th booke, pag. 288.

“ Bot al this time I bid na mare, I wys,
 SAIF that this wensche, this vengeabil pest or traik,
 Be bet doun dede by my wound and scharp straik,”

Douglas, 11th booke, pag. 393.

“ All the air a solemn stillness holds;
 SAVE that from yonder ivy-mantled bower
 The moping owl does to the moon complain.”

Gray's Elegy.

(f) “ I do not like these paper-squibs, good master, they may undo your store—I mean of credit, and fire your arsenal; IF CASE you do not in time make good those outer works, your pockets.”—*B. Jonson, Staple of News*, act 1. scene 3.

Chaucer also uses IF CASE.

(g) “ The dignite of king John wold have destroyed al Englande, therfore mokel wisdom and goodnes both, nedeth in a person, the malyce in dignite slyly to bridell, and with a good byt of arest to withdraw, IN CASE it wold prounce otherwise than it shuld.”

Chaucer, Testament of Loue, 2d boke, fol. 317. p. 2. col. 1.

“ Forsoith, IN CAIS the auenture of battal
 Had bene doutsum; wald God it war assale.”

Douglas, 4th booke, pag. 121.

nly such *accessaries* as *salt* is to meat, or *water* to read; or that they are the mere *edging* or *sauce* of unguage; or that they are like the *handles* to cups, or *lumes* to helmets, or *binding* to books, or *harness* for

- (^b) " And PUT THE CAIS that I may not optene
From Latyne land thaim to expell all clene,
git at leist thare may fall stop or delay
In sa grete materis for ane gere or tway."

Douglas, 7th booke, pag. 217.

PUT CASE, though now out of fashion, was frequently used by Chillingworth and other good authors.

" PUT THE CASE the Pope, for a reward of your service one him in writing this book, had given you the honour and means of a cardinal, would you not have professed, that you ave not merited such a reward?"

Chillingworth, chap. 4. pag. 211. § 36.

- (ⁱ) " He is worthy to lose his priuylege, that misuseth the right and power that is giuen hym. And I SETTE CASE ye might enioyne hem that payne by right and lawe, whiche I rowe ye may not do: I saye ye might not put it to execution."

Tale of Chaucer, fol. 82. pag. 2. col. 2.

" Yet SETTE I CASE ye haue lycence for to venge you, I aye that there ben full many thinges that shall restrayne you of vengeaunce takyng."—*Ibid.* fol. 79. pag. 2. col. 1.

- (^k) " Auauntour and a lyer, al is one,
As thus. I POSE a woman graunt me
Her loue, and sayth that other wol she none,
And I am sworne to holden it secre,
And after I tel it two or thre;
I wys I am auauntour at the leest
And lyer eke, for I breke my beheest."

Chaucer, 3d boke of *Troilus*, fol. 174. pag. 1. col. 2.

horses; or that they are *pegs* and *nails* and *nerves* and *joints*, and *ligaments* and *glue*, and *pitch* and *lime*, and *mortar*, and so forth*. In which kind of pretty similies

“Sone after this, she to him gan rowne,
And asked him if Troylus were there:
He swore her nay, for he was out of towne,
And sayd, Nece: I POSE that he were there
You durst neuer haue the more feere.”

Chaucer, 3d booke of *Troylus*, fol. 175. pag. 2. col. 1.—

(^l) “It may be ordered that ii or iii of our owne shippes do—
see the sayde Frenche soldiers wafted to the coast of France =
FORSEING that our sayd shippes entre no hauen there.”

*Queen Elizabeth to Sir W. Cecil and Dr. Wotton, Lodge's
Illustrations*, vol. 1. pag. 339.

(^m) “Whan he made any ordinary judges, advocates or proc-
tours, he caused them to be openly named, requiryng the peo-
ple and gyvyng them courage, if there were cause to accuse
them, to prove the cryme by open wytnesse: FORESENE if
they dyd not sufficiently prove it, and that it semed to be ma-
licious detraction, the accusour shulde forthwith be beheaded.”

Sir T. Elliott, Image of Governaunce, chap. 17.

* “Pour quoy est-ce que Platon dit, que l'oraison est tem-
perée de *noms* et de *verbes*?—Mais advisons que nous ne pre-
nions autrement les paroles de Platon que comme il les a dittes:
car il a dit que l'oraison estoit temperée *De* ces deux parties,
non *Par* ces deux parties; que nous ne faisons la faulte que
feroit celuy qui calomnieroit un autre pour avoir dit, que un
oignement seroit composé de cire et de galbanum, alleguant
qu'il auroit obmis à dire le feu et le vase, sans lesquels on ne
sçauroit mesler lesdites drogues: aussi semblablement si nous
le reprenions pour autant qu'il auroit obmis à dire les conjon-
ctions, les prepositions, et autres telles parties. Car le parler et

Philosophers and Grammarians seem to have vied with one another ; and have often endeavoured to amuse their readers and cover their own ignorance, by very

l'oraison n'est composé *De* ces parties là, mais *Par* icelles, et non sans elles. Car comme celuy qui prononceroit *battre*, ou *estre battu* ; ou d'ailleurs *Socrates* et *Pythagoras*, encore donneroient-il aucunement à entendre et à penser quelque chose : mais celuy qui profereroit *Car* ou *De* simplement et seulement, on ne pourroit imaginer qu'il entendist aucune chose ny aucun corps, ains s'il n'y a quelques autres paroles qui soient proferées quant et quant, elles ressembleront à des sons et des bruits vains sans aucune signification ; d'autant que ny à par elles ny avec d'autres semblables, elles ne peuvent rien signifier. Mais à fin que nous conjoignons ou meslions et assemblions tout en un, nous y adjoustons des prepositions, conjonctions, et articles, voulans en faire un corps de tout.—Comment donc pourra dire quelqu'un, ces parties-là ne servent-elles de rien à l'oraison ? Quant à moy, je tiens qu'elles y servent autant comme le *Sel* à la viande, et l'*eau* à faire le Pain. Evenus souloit dire que le *Feu* estoit la meilleure *Saulse* du Monde ; aussi sont ces Parties l'assaisonnement de nostre langage, ne plus ne moins que le feu et le Sel des breuvages et viandes, dont nous ne nous sçaurions passer ; excepté que nostre parler n'en a pas toujours necessairement à faire ; comme l'on peut dire du langage des Romains, duquel aujourd'huy tout le monde presque use ; car il a osté presque toutes les prepositions excepté bien peu ; et quant aux articles que l'on appelle, il n'en reçoit pas un tout seul, ains use de noms sans *bordure*, par maniere de dire ; et ne s'en fault pas esmerveiller, attendu qu'*Homere* à peu de noms prepose des articles, comme si c'étoient *anses* à des vases qui en eussent besoin, ou des *pennaches* sur des morions.—Or que les Dialecticiens aient plus besoin de conjonctions, que nuls autres hommes de lettres, pour la liaison et tissure de leurs propositions, ou

learnedly disputing the propriety of the similitude, instead of explaining the nature of the Conjunction.

But, pray, have you any authority for the derivation of these words? Are not all former etymologists against you?

H.

Except in IF, and BUT (in one of its meanings), I believe they are all against me. But I am persuaded that all future etymologists, and perhaps some philosophers, will acknowledge their obligation to me. For these troublesome conjunctions, which have hitherto caused them so much mistaken and unsatisfactory labour, shall save them many an error and many a weary step in future. They shall no more expose themselves by unnatural forced conceits to derive the English and all

les disjonctions d'icelles, ne plus ne moins que les cochers ont besoin d'*attelages* pour atteler de front leur chevaux; ou comme Ulysses avoit besoin d'*ozier* en la caverne de Cyclops pour lier ses moutons; cela n'argue ni ne preuve pas que la conjonction soit autrement partie d'oraison, mais bien un outil propre à rejoindre selon qu'elle en porte nom, et a contenir et assembler non pas toutes choses, ains seulement celles qui ne sont pas simplement dites: si l'on ne vouloit dire que la *Chorde* ou *courroye* dont une balle seroit liée fust partie de la balle: ou la *colle* d'un papier ou d'un livre qui est collé; et les données et distributions des deniers partie du gouvernement: comme Demades disoit que les deniers que l'on distribuoit manuellement par teste à chaque citoyen d'Athenes, pour veoir les jeux, estoient la colle du gouvernement de l'estat populaire. Et quelle est la

ther languages from the Greek, or the Hebrew ; or some imaginary primæval tongue. The Particles of every language shall teach them whither to direct and where to stop their inquiries : for wherever the evident meaning and origin of the Particles of any language can be found, *there* is the certain source of the whole.

B.

Without a moment's reflection, every one must perceive that this assertion is too general and comprehensive. The mixture which is found in all cultivated languages ; the perpetual accession of new words from imitation as well as from improvement, and the introduction of new Arts and Habits, especially in learned nations ; and from other circumstances ; forbid the deduction of the *whole* of a language from any one single source.

conjonction qui face de plusieurs propositions une, en les couvant et liant ensemble, comme le marbre fait le fer quand on le joint avec lui par le feu ; mais pour cela le marbre n'est pas pourtant, ny ne l'appelle lon pas partie de fer ; combien que ces choses-là qui entrent en une composition et qui sont fondues avec les drogues que l'on mesle, ont accoustumé de faire et de souffrir ne sçay quoi de commun, composé de tous les ingrediens.—Quant aux prepositions on les peult accompagner aux *ennaches* ou autres Ornaments que lon met au dessus les habillemens de Testes, ou bien aux *bases* et *soubassement* que lon met au dessous des Statues ; pour ce qu'elles ne sont pas tant parties d'oraison, comme alentour des parties."

Plutarch, Platonic Questions.—9th. Amyot.

H.

Most certainly. And therefore when I say the *whole*, I must beg to be understood with those exceptions. And, that I may not seem to contradict myself when we shall hereafter come to treat of them, I beg you likewise to remember, that I by no means include in my assertion, the *Abbreviations* of language : for they are always *improvements* superadded by language in its progress ; and are often borrowed from some other more cultivated languages. Whereas the original Mother-tongue is always rude and tedious, without those advantages of *Abbreviation*. And were he once more in being, I should not at all doubt of being able to convince even Junius himself (who with many others could so far mistake the course and progress of speech, as to derive an uncultivated from a cultivated language) that, instead of referring the Anglo-Saxon to his favourite Greek as its original, he must seek out (and I suppose he would easily find) a Parent for the latter.

But, I beg pardon, this is rather digressing from my purpose. I have nothing to do with the learning of mere curiosity* : nor am any further concerned with

* “ Il y a un point, passé lequel les recherches ne sont plus que pour la curiosité. Ces vérités ingénieuses et inutiles ressemblent à des étoiles qui, placées trop loin de nous, ne nous donnent point de clarté.”

Voltaire, Sur la Société Royale et sur les Academies.

etymology, than as it may serve to get rid of the false philosophy received concerning language and the human understanding. If you please, therefore, I will return to the Conjunctions I have derived; and, if you think it worth the while, we will examine the conjectures of other persons concerning them; and see whether I have not something better than the authorities you ask after in my favour.

B.

I should be glad you would do so.

10

10

ΕΠΕΑ ΠΤΕΡΟΕΝΤΑ,

&c.

CHAPTER VIII.

ETYMOLOGY OF THE ENGLISH CONJUNCTIONS.

I F.

H.

[F and AN may be used mutually and indifferently to supply each other's place.

Besides having Skinner's authority for IF, I suppose that the meaning and derivation of this *principal* supporter of the *Tripod of Truth**, are so very clear, sim-

* See *Plutarch Περι του EI του εν Δελφοις*.

Εν δε Διαλεκτικῇ δὴ πού μεγιστήν ἔχει δυνάμιν ὁ συναπτικός οὗτος συνδεσμός, ἅτε δὴ τὸ λογικώτατον σχηματίζων αξίωμα.—Τὸ γὰρ τεχνικὸν καὶ λογικόν, ὥσπερ εἰρηται, γνώσις ἀκολουθίας, τὴν δὲ προσληψὶν ἢ αἰσθῆσις τῶν λόγων διδάσκειν. ὅθεν εἰ καὶ αἰσχροὶ εἴπειν, οὐκ ἀποτρέψομαι τοῦτο εἶναι τὸν τῆς ἀληθείας τρίποδα τὸν λόγον, ὃν τὴν τοῦ λεγόντος πρὸς τὸ προηγούμενον ἀκολουθίαν δεμένος, εἰτα προσλαβὼν τὴν ὑπαρξίν, ἐπαγεί το συμπέρασμα τῆς ἀποδείξεως. Τὸν οὖν Πυθίον εἰ δὴ μουσικὴ τε ἤδεται, καὶ κυκνῶν φωναὶς καὶ κιθάρης ψοφοίς, τί θαυμάστον ἔστι Διαλεκτικῆς φιλία τοῦτο ἀσπαζέσθαι τοῦ λόγου τὸ μέρος καὶ ἀγαπᾶν, ὧς μάλιστα καὶ πλείστῳ προσχρωμένους ὅρα τοὺς φιλοσοφούς.

ple, and universally allowed, as to need no further discourses about them.

Skinner says – “IF (in agro Linc. *Gif*) ab A.S. *Ūp*, si. Hoc a verbo *Ūpan*, *dare*, q. d. Dato.”

Lye, in his edition of Junius, says—“Haud inscite Skinnerus, qui deduxit ab A.S. *Ūpan*, *dare*, q. d. Dato.”

GIF is to be found not only, as Skinner says, in Lincolnshire, but in all our old writers. G. Douglas almost always uses *Gif*: once or twice only he has used *If*; once he uses *GEWE*, and once *GIFFIS*, and sometimes *IN CASE* and *IN CAIS* for *GIF*.

“*GIF* luf be vertew, than is it leful thing;
GIF it be vice, it is your undoing.”

Douglas, Prol. to 4th boke, at pag. 9—

“Thocht sum wald swere, that I the text haue waryit,
 Or that I haue this volume quite myscharyit,
 Or threpe planelie, I come neuer nere hand it,
 Or that the werk is werst that euer I fand it,
 Or git *GEWE* Virgil stude wele before,
 As now war tyme to schift the werst ouer skore.”

Douglas, Preface, pag. 1.

“Be not ouer studyous to spy ane mote in myn E,
 That in your awin ane ferrye bot can not se,
 And do to me, as ge wald be done to;
 Now hark schirris, thare is na mare ado:
 Quha list attend, *GYFFIS* audience and draw nere*.”

Douglas, Preface, pag. 12.

* [In this instance, however, it is plain that *GIFFIS* is *not* used conjunctively.—ED.]

Chaucer commonly uses **IF**; but sometimes **YEUE**, **ȝ** and **ȝF**.

"Lo here the letters selid of thys thyng
That I mote beare in all the haste I may;
YEUE ye woll ought unto your sonne the kyng,
I am your seruauant bothe nyght and day."

Chaucer, Man of Lawes tale, fol. 22. pag. 1. col. 2.

"And therefore he of full auisement
Nolde neuer write in non of his sermons
Of suche unkynde abhominacions,
Ne I ne wol non reherce, **ȝEF** that I may."

Chaucer, Man of Lawes prologue, fol. 18. pag. 2. col. 1.

"She was so charytable and so pytous
She wolde wepe **ȝF** that she sawe a mous
Caught in a trappe, if it were deed or bledde."

Prol. to Canterbury Tales. Prioress.

And it is to be observed that in Chaucer and in other writers, the verb to **GIVE** suffers the same variations in the manner of writing and pronouncing it, whether used *conjunctively* or otherwise: as does also the *Noun* derived from it.

"And after on the daunce went
Largesse, that set al her entent
For to ben honorable and free,
Of Alexanders kynne was she,
Her most joye was ywis
Whan that she **ȝAFE**, and sayd: Haue this.
Not Auarice the foule caytyfe
Was halfe to grype so ententyfe
As Largesse is to **ȝEUE** and spende,
And God alway ynowe her sende,

So that the more she YAUE awaye
 The more ywis she had alwaye :
 Great loos hath Largesse, and great prise,
 For both wyse folke and unwyse
 Were wholly to her bandon brought,
 So wel with YEFTES hath she wrought."

Chaucer, Romaunt of the Rose, fol. 125. p. 2. c. 1.

" A wyfe is Goddes YEFTE verely ;
 Al other maner YEFTES hardely
 As londes, rentes, pasture, or commune,
 Or mouables, all ben YEFTES of fortune
 That passen, as a shadowe on a wall ;
 But dred nat, YF playnly speke I shall,
 A wyfe wol laste and in thyn house endure
 Wel lenger than the lyst paraurenture."

Chaucer, Marchauntes tale, fol. 28. pag. 2. col. 2.

" FORGIFF me, Virgill, GIF I thee offend."

Douglas, Preface, pag. 11.

" GIF us thy ansueir, quharon we sal depend."

Douglas, 3d booke, pag. 70.

" And suffir Tyrianis, and all Liby land
 Be GIF in dowry to thy son in hand."

Douglas, 4th booke, pag. 103.

" In the mene tyme, of the nycht wache the cure
 We GIF Messapus."

Douglas, 9th booke, pag. 280.

In Henry the VIIth's will, dated 1509, you will also find YEVE used where we now employ GIVE ; and in the time of Queen Elizabeth it was written in the same manner.

" YEOVEN under our signet."

Lodge's Illustrations. The Queen to Sir W. Cecil and Dr. Wotton, vol. 1. pag. 343.

‘ Y **EVEN** under our seale of our order, the first day of April
 16, the eight year of our reign.”

*Lodge's Illustrations. Quene Elizabeth to the Erle of
 Shrewsbury, vol. 1. pag. 362.*

GIN * is often used in our Northern counties and by
 the Scotch, as we use **IF** or **AN** : which they do with
 equal propriety and as little corruption : for **GIN** is no
 other than the participle *Given, Gi'en, Gi'n*. (As they
 do use *Gie* for *Give*, and *Gien* for *Given*, when they
 are not used *conjunctively*.) And *Hoc dato* is of equal
 conjunctive value in a sentence with *Da hoc*.

“ Then wi' his spear he turn'd hir owre,

O **GIN** hir face was wan !

He turn'd her owre and owre again,

O **GIN** hir skin was whyte.”

Percy's Reliques, vol. i. Edom o' Gordon.

Even our Londoners often pronounce *Give* and *Given*
 in the same manner : As,

“ *Gi'* me your hand.”

“ I have *Gin* it him well.”

So Wycherly, *Love in a Wood*, act 5.

“ If my daughter there should have done so, I wou'd not
 have *gi'n* her a groat.”

A N.

I do not know that **AN** has been attempted by any
 one, except S. Johnson : and, from the judicious di-

* Ray says—“ *Gin, Gif*, in the old Saxon is *Gif*; from
 whence the word *If* is made *per aphæresin literæ* G. *Gif*, from
 the verb *Gifan*, dare; and is as much as *Dato*.”

stinction he has made between Junius and Skinner*, I am persuaded that he will be the first person to relinquish his own conjecture† : especially when he notices his own self-contradiction : for after having (under the article AN) told us that “ AN is a contraction of *And if* ;” and given the following instance,

—————“ Well I know

The clerk will ne’er wear hair on’s face that had it.

———He will AN’ IF he live to be a man——”

he very truly (under the article AND) says——“ In *And if*, the *And* is *redundant* ; and is omitted by all later writers. As

—————“ I pray thee, Launce,

AN’ IF thou seest my boy, bid him make haste.”

The author of *Criticisms on the Diversions of Pur-*

* “ Junius appears to have excelled in extent of learning, and Skinner in rectitude of understanding. Junius was accurately skilled in all the northern languages ; Skinner probably examined the antient and remoter dialects only by occasional inspection into dictionaries : But the learning of Junius is often of no other use than to shew him a track by which he may deviate from his purpose ; to which Skinner always presses forward by the shortest way. Skinner is often ignorant, but never ridiculous : Junius is always full of knowledge ; but his variety distracts his judgment, and his learning is very frequently disgraced by his absurdities.”—*Preface to Dictionary.*

† Immediately after the publication of my letter to Mr. Dunning, I was informed by Mr. S. (an intimate friend of Dr. Johnson) that I was not mistaken in this opinion ; Dr. Johnson having declared, that if he lived to give a new edition of his Dictionary, he should certainly adopt my derivations.

"*," who publishes under the feigned name of **CAS-
NDER**, (I suppose, because he was born in the island
Cadson, in Dutch Flanders) and who is a Teacher
d Preacher in the City of Norwich, thus elegantly
uses his readers. Pages 36, 37, 38.

"I have known a public speaker who would now
d then take a survey of his audience, and call out
he espied any drooping noddles or falling jaws)—
rethren, I will tell you a story.—As I think this an
cellent method of rousing the attention of a reader
hearer, for ever inclined to grow drowsy when the
bject is so, I shall not scruple to make use of it upon
is occasion.

"It is well known that the Boors in Friesland, one
f the United Provinces, have so far retained ancient
ustoms, as to be, in dress, language, and manners,
actly the same people which they were five hundred
ears ago ; a circumstance that induced Junius the son
o pay them a visit, and to pass a few months among
hem. In a tour I made to that country some years
go, I was at a gentleman's house, from which I made
requent excursions into the inner part of the province.
n one of these I was obliged to take the first shelter-
ng place in my way, being overtaken by a violent
hower. It was a farm house, where I saw several

* [The late Rev. John Bruckner, for many years the much
esteemed minister of the Dutch and Walloon or French churches
in Norwich.—ED.]

children : and *I shall never forget* the speech which one of them, an overgrown babe, made to his mother. He was standing at her breast ; and after he had done with one, I heard him say to her,—*Trientjen, yan my t'oor.*—i. e. Kate, give me t'other.—*I little thought at the time*, I should have so good an opportunity of making use of the story as I have at present."

This story of the babe, he says, is certainly in my favour. I think it is decisively.

But the Critic proceeds—" But we should not fancy that words exist, or must have existed, because, having adopted a certain method of finding out origins, we cannot possibly do without them. I have been looking out with some anxiety for the Anglo-Saxon verb *Anan*, but can get very little information about it. I find, indeed, in King Alfred's Will the following article :—*ÆEþyr ꝥ ic an Eaðþaþe minum elþpa ƿuna.*—First I give to Edward my eldest son,—And from the expression *Ic an*, it should seem as if there really existed such a verb in the Anglo-Saxon as *Anan*. But as this is the only sign of life it has given, as one may say, for these thousand years, I am inclined to look upon that sign as being rather equivocal, and suspect that the true reading of the Will is, not *Ic an*, but *Ic un*, from *Unnan*, *cedere*, *concedere*; this last verb being common in the Anglo-Saxon, and nothing more easy than to mistake an *u* for an *a*, in that language, as well as in English. However, as I have not seen hitherto

manuscript, on whose authority I can ground the truth of my conjecture, I do not give it you as anything certain; and if you persist in giving the preference to the old reading, the story of the babe is certainly in your favour; for there is as little difference between *An* and *Yan*, as between *Un* and *An*. With it will remain a matter of doubt, whether there ever existed such a verb as *Anan*, the same in signification, and yet different in origin, with *Giran*. It is by no means probable, that a people, who had hardly a conveyance for one idea in a thousand, should have procured two such noble conveyances for one single idea. This is a piece of luxury, which even the most civilized nations seldom allow themselves*.”

To this I answer, that *Anan*, *Annan*, and *Unnan*, are all one and the same word differently spelled (as almost all the Anglo-Saxon and old English words are) because differently pronounced.

But “he has been looking for *Anan*, he says, with some anxiety, and can get very little information about it.” If he looks so carelessly when he is anxious, we may pretty well guess with how much accuracy he looks upon other occasions. I will relieve his anxiety. I

* *Reprehensor audaculus verborum*—qui perpauca eademque a vulgo protrita legerat, habebatque nonnullas disciplinæ grammaticæ inauditunculas, partim rudes inchoatasque, partim non probas; easque quasi pulverem ob oculos, quum adortus quemque fuerat, adspergebat;—neque rationem verbum hoc, inquit, neque auctoritatem habet.

know he has Lye's collection of Anglo-Saxon words before him ; (for he quotes it in his 66th page) let him put on his spectacles and open the book : he will there find *Anan*, and *Annan*, with references to places where they are used. And if, after that, he should still continue anxious, I will furnish him with more.

“Nothing, he says, is more easy than to mistake an *u* for an *a*, in that language, as well as in the English.” —It is not so easy to mistake the Anglo-Saxon character *U* for *Ä*, or *u* for *a* ; as it is to mistake the *written* English character *u* for *a*.

It is not true that any people are now, or ever were, in the condition he represents the Anglo-Saxons ; viz. of having “hardly a conveyance for one idea in a thousand ;” unless he means to include in his expression, of *one idea*, each man's particular perception. No. Cheer up, *Cassander* : your lot is not peculiar to yourself : for the people who have the poorest and scantiest language, have yet always many more words than ideas. And I leave the reader to judge whether to have two words for one idea, be “a piece of luxury which even the most civilized nation seldom allows itself.”

UNLESS.

Skinner says—“*Unless*, nisi, præter, præterquam, q. d. *One-less*, i. e. uno dempto seu excepto : vel potius ab *Onleran*, dimittere, liberare, q. d. *Hoc dimisso*.”

It is extraordinary, after his judicious derivation of that Skinner should have been at a loss about that UNLESS; especially as he had it in a manner before him: For Onley, *dimitte*, was surely more obvious and mediate than Onleyed, *dimisso*.—As for *One-less*, *uno dempto seu excepto*, it is too poor to deserve notice.

So low down as in the reign of Queen Elizabeth, this conjunction was sometimes written *Oneles* and *nelesse*. And this way of spelling it, which should rather have directed Skinner to its true etymology, might perhaps contribute to mislead him to the childish conjecture of *One less*, *uno dempto*.—But in other places it is written purely ONLES: and sometimes ONLESSE.

Thus, in the *Trial of Sir John Oldcastle*, An. 1413, “It was not possible for them to make whole Christes cotes without seme, ONLESSE certeyn great men were brought out of the way.”

So Thomas Lupset, in the early part of Henry the VIIIth's reign;

“But alway, sister, remembre that charitie is not perfect ONLES that it be burninge.”—*Treatise of Charitie*, pag. 8.

“This petition cannot take effect ONLES man be made like an angel.”—*Ibid.* pag. 66.

“Fayth cannot be perfect, ONLES there be good workes.”

A compendious Treatise teachynge the Waye of Dyinge well, pag. 160.

"The more shamfully that men for the most parte feare to die, the greater profe there is, that such extreme poyntes of feare against all shame shuld not in so many dayly appere, whan death approacheth, ONLES bi natur some just feare were of the same."

Ibid. pag. 166.

In other places Lupset spells it ONELES and ONLESSE.

So in *The Image of Governance by Sir T. Elliott*, 1541,

"Men do feare to approche unto their soverayne Lorde, ONELES they be called."

"This noble empire is lyke to falle into extreme ruynes and perpetuall infamy, ONELESSE your moste excellent wysdomes wyll diligently and constantly prepare yourselves to the certayne remedy."

So in—*A Necessary Doctrine and Erudition for any Christen Man, set furthe by the Kynges Majestie of Englande.* 1543.

"ONLES ye beleve, ye shall not understande."

"No man shall be crowned, ONLES he lawfully fight."

"Neyther is it possible for any man, ONELESSE this holy spirite shall first illumine his hart."

"True honour shall be gyven to none, ONELES he be worthy."

"Who can have true penance, ONLES he beleve stedfastly that God is?"

"Who so ever doth forsake his lawful wyfe, ONELES it be for adultery, commytteth adulterye in so doynge."

"They be bound so to do, ONLES they se reasonable cause the contrary."

"The soule waxeth feble, ONLESSE the same be cherished."

"In vayne, ONLESSE there were some facultie."

"It cannot begynne, ONELESSE by the grace of God."

So in the "*Supplication to King Henry VIII.*" by Iarnes.

"I shall come to the counsell when soever I bee called, ONLES I be lawfully let."

So in the "*Declaration against Joye*" by Gardiner, Bishop of Winchester.

"No man commeth to me, ONLESSE my father draweth hym."

"Can any man further repleye to this carpenter, ONLES a man wolde saye, that the carpenter was also after the thefe hymself?"

"For ye fondely *improve** a conclusion which myght stande

* To *improve* (i. e. to censure, to impeach, to blame, to reprove): A word perpetually used by the authors about Shakespeare's time, and especially in religious controversy.—"Whereas he hath spoken it by his own mouth, that it is not good for man to be alone, they have *improved* that doctrine and taughte the contrarye."—*The Actes of English Votaries by Ihan Bale. Dedicated to Edward the 6th.* 1550.

"A wonderful thyng, that this shoulde be cryed lawful in their cathedrall church with ryngyng, syngyng, and sensyng, and in their yelde halle condemned for felony and treason. Ther did they worshyp it in their scarlet gownes with cappe in hande, and

and be true, with your fonde paradox of only fayth justifieth, **ONLESSE** in teaching ye wyl so handel the matter, as, &c.

“ We cannot love God, **ONLES** he prepareth our harte and geve us that grace ; no more can we beleve God, **ONLESSE** he giveth us the gift of belefe.”

“ In every kynde the female is commonly barren, **ONLESSE** it conceyveth of the male ; so is concupyscence barren and voyde of synne, **ONLESSE** it conceive of man the agreymen^t of his free wyll.”

“ We may not properly saye we apprehend justification by fayth, **ONLESSE** we wolde call the promisse of God, &c.”

“ Such other pevishe wordes as men be encombred to heare, **ONLES** they wolde make Goddes worde the matter of the Devylles strife.”

“ Who can wake out of synne, **WITHOUT** God call him ; and

here they *improved* it with scornes and with mockes, grennyng upon her lyke termagauntes in a playe.”

Actes of English Votaries.

The word is taken by us from the French, who used it and still continue to use it in the same meaning.—“ Elles croient que le corps et le sang sont vraiment distribués à ceux qui mangent ; et *improuvent* ceux qui enseignent le contraire.”

Bossuet des Variat. des Eglises Prot.

“ Ils sont indignes de jamais comprendre ces sortes de beautés, et sont condamnez au malheur de les *improuver*, et d’être *improvez* aussi des gens d’esprit.”

Lettres de Bussy Rabutin, tom. 4, pag. 278.

“ La bourgeoisie de Geneve a droit de faire des representations dans toutes les occasions où elle croit les loix lésées, et où elle *improuve* la conduite de ses magistrats.”

Rousseau, vol. 2, pag. 440.

ONLESSE God hath given eares to heare this voyce of God. How many man beyng lame with synne, able to take up his couche and walke, ONLESSE God sayeth, &c."

So in the "*Answere to Fekenham touchinge the Othe of the Supremacy*," by Horne, Bishop of Winchester.

"I coulde not choose, ONELES I woulde shawe myselve vermuch unkinde unto my native countrey, but take penne in hande and shape him a ful and plaine answeare, without any curiositie."

"The election of the pope made by the clergie and people in those daies, was but a vaine thing, ONLES the emperour or his lieutenant had confirmed the same."

"The pope would not consecrate the elect bishop, ONLES he had first licence therto of the emperour."

"Je ne pouvois en effet me dissimuler qu'en *improuvant* les travaux qu'on venoit de faire; ceux qui les avoient ordonnés en rejetteroient le blame sur les deux architectes."

Memoires du Baron de Tott, tom. 2, pag. 123.

"Arrêtons-nous sur les inculpations faites à Roland dans cette acte d'accusation, qui sera la honte du siecle et du peuple qui a pu, ou l'approuver, ou ne pas hautement l'*improuver*."

Observations par Amar.

The expression in Hamlet (act 1, sc. 1.)—"Of *unimproved* mettle hot and full"—ought not to have given Shakespeare's commentators any trouble: for *unimproved* means *unimpeached*; though Warburton thinks it means "*unrefined*;" Edwards, "*unproved*;" and Johnson (with the approbation of Malone) "*not regulated nor guided by knowledge or experience*:" and in his Dictionary he explains it to be "*not taught, not meliorated by instruction*."

“ No prince, no not the emperour himselfe should be present in the councell with the cleargie, ONLES it were when the principall pointes of faith were treated of.”

“ He sweareth the Romaines that they shall never after be present at the election of any pope, ONLES they be compelled thereunto by the emperour.”

“ Who maketh no mencion of any priest there present, as you untruely report, ONLES ye will thinke he meant the order, whan he named the faction of the Pharisees.”

“ So that none should be consecrate, ONLESSE he were commended and investured bishop of the kinge.”

“ And further to commaunde the newe electe pope to forsake that dignitie unlawfully come by, ONLESSE they woulde make a reasonable satisfaction.”

“ That the pope mighte sende into his dominions no legate, ONLESSE the kinge shoulde sende for him.”

“ What man, ONLESSE he be not well in his wittes, will say that, &c.”

“ To exercise this kinde of jurisdiction, neither kinges nor civill magistrates may take uppon him, ONLESSE he be lawfully called.”

“ That from hencefoorth none shoulde be pope, ONELESSE he were created by the consent of the emperour.”

“ Ye cannot finde so muche as the bare title of one of them, ONELESSE it be of a bishoppe.”

So in the “ *Whetstone of Witte*,” by Robert Recorde, 1557.

“ I see moare menne to acknowledge the benefite of number, then I can espie willyng to studie to attaine the benefites of it. Many praise it, but fewe dooe greatly practise it; ONLESSE it bee for the vulgare practice concernyng Merchaundes trade.”

"Yet is it not accepted as a like flatte, **ONLES** it be referred
; some other square number."

I believe that William Tyndall, our immortal and
matchless translator of the Bible, was one of the first
who wrote this word with an u; and, by the import-
ance and merit of his works, gave course to this cor-
ruption in the language*.

"The scripture was geven, that we may applye the medicine
of the scripture, every man to his own sores, **UNLESSE** then we
intend to be idle disputers and braulers about vaine wordes, ever
gnawynge upon the bitter barke without, and never attayning
into the sweete pith within, &c." *Prol. before the 5 b. of
Moses.*

"My thoughts have no veines, and yet **UNLES** they be let
blood I shall perish."—*Endimion. By John Lilly, act 1. sc. 1.*

"His frendes thought his learning theire sufficient (**UNLES**
he should proceed Doctor and professe some one studie or sci-
ence.")

Lord Burley's Life in Peck's Desiderata-Curiosa, vol. 1. pag. 4.

* Shakespeare, in Othello, act 2, sc. 13, writes,

—————"What's the matter,
That you *Unlace* your reputation thus,
And spend your rich opinion for the name
Of a night brawler?"

In a note on this passage S. Johnson says—"Slacken or
loosen. Put in danger of dropping; or, perhaps, strip of its
ornaments." And in his Dictionary he says,—“To make loose;
to put in danger of being lost.—Not in use.” But he gives
no reason whatever for this interpretation. I believe that *Un-
lace* in this passage means—"You **UNLESS** or **ONLES** your re-
putation," from the same verb *Onlejan*.

"No man's cattell shall be questioned as the companies, UNLES such as have been entrusted with them or have disposed of them without order."

Articles signed and sealed by the Commissioners of the Councill of State for the Commonwealth of England the twelveth day of March. 1651.

I do not know that Onler is employed *conjunctively* by the Anglo-Saxon writers, as we use *Unless*; (though I have no doubt that it was so used in discourse;) but instead of it, they frequently employ nȳmðe or nemðe: (which is evidently the Imperative nȳm or nem of nȳman or neman, to which is subjoined ðe, i. e. *That**) And nȳmðe—*Take away that*,—may very well supply the place of—Onler (ðe expressed or understood)—*Dismiss that*.

LES, the Imperative of Leȳan (which has the same meaning as Onleȳan), is likewise used sometimes by old writers instead of UNLESS.

"And thus I am constrenit, als nere as I may,
To hald his verse, and go nane uthir way;
LES sum historie, subtell worde, or ryme,
Causis me mak degressioun sum tyme."

G. Douglas. Preface.

—————"Gif he
Commyttis any tressoun, suld he not de;
LES than his prince of grete humanite
Perdoun his fault for his long trew service."

G. D. Prol. to 10th book.

* It is too singular to be left unnoticed, that the ancient Romans used *Nemut*, instead of *Nisi*. For which Festus cites Cato *de Potestate Trib.*; but the passage is lost.

“ Sterff the behuffis, **LES** than thou war unkynd
As for to leif thy brothir desolate.”

G. D. *Ænead*, 10th book.

In the same manner it is used throughout Ben Jonson.

“ **LESS** learn'd Trebatius Censure disagree.”—*Poetaster*.

“ First hear me—Not a syllable, **LESS** you take.”

Alchymist, act 3. scene 5.

“ There for ever to remain

LESS they could the knot unstrain.”—*Masque*.

“ To tell you true, 'tis too good for you,

LESS you had grace to follow it.”—*Barthol. Fair*.

“ But will not bide there, **LESS** yourself do bring him.”

*Sad Shepherd**.

“ You must no more aim at those easie accesses,

LESS you can do't in air.”

Beaumont and Fletcher. Beggars Bush, act 5, sc. 2.

* It is this same Imperative **LES**, placed at the end of nouns and coalescing with them, which has given to our language such adjectives as *hopeless, restless, deathless, motionless*, &c. i. e. *Dismiss* hope, rest, death, motion, &c.

The two following lines of Chaucer in the *Reve's Tale*, in Wylliam Thynne's edition,

“ And when the horse was *lose*, he gan to gon
Towarde the fen, there wylde mares rynne”—

are thus printed in Mr. Tyrwhit's edition,

“ And whan the hors was *laus*, he gan to gon
Toward the fen, ther wilde mares renne.”

I am to suppose that Mr. Tyrwhit is justified for this reading

You will please to observe that all the languages which have a correspondent conjunction to *Unless*, as well as the manner in which its place is supplied in the languages which have not a conjunction correspondent to it, all strongly justify my derivation. The Greek *Ἐμὴν*. The Latin *Nisi*. The Italian *Se non*. The Spanish *Sino*. The French *Si non*. All mean *Be it*

by *some* manuscript; and that it was not altered by himself merely for the sake of introducing "*Laus*, Island. and the *Consuetud. de Beverley*," into his Glossary.

"*LAUS* (says Mr. Tyrwhit) adj. Sax. *Loose*. 4062. *Laus*, Island. *Solutus*. This is the true original of that termination of adjectives so frequent in our language, in *les* or *less*. *Consuetud. Beverley*. M.S. Harl. 560.—Hujus sacrilegii emenda non erat determinata, sed dicebatur ab Anglis *Botalaus*, i. e. sine emenda.—So Chaucer uses *Boteles*, and other words of the same form; as *Detteles*, *Drinkeles*, *Gilteles*, &c."

I think, however, there will be very little doubt concerning this derivation, when it is observed that we say indifferently either *steep-less*, or *without-sleep*, &c. i. e. *Dismiss* sleep or *Be-out* sleep, &c. And had not these words *les* and *without* been thus convertible, Shakespeare would have lost a pun.—"Thrice have I sent him (says Glendower) weather-beaten home, and *bootless* back." "Home *without boots* (replies Hotspur) and in foul weather too! How scapes he agues in the Devil's name?" So, for those words where we have not by habit made the coalescence, as the Danish *Folkeløs* and *Hæløs*, &c. we say in English *Without* people, *Without* a tail, &c. But any one may, if he pleases, add the termination *less* to any noun: and though it should be unusual, and heard for the first time, it will be perfectly understood. Between Wimborn-minster and Cranbourn in Dor-

not. And in the same manner do we sometimes supply its place in English either by *But*, *Without*, *Be it not*, *But if*, &c.

“Without profane tongues thou canst never rise,
Nor be upholden, *Be it not* with lies.”

M. Drayton. Leg. of R. D. of Normandy.

“That never was there garden of such pryse,
BUT YF it were the very paradyse.”

Frankeleyn's Tale.

setshire, there is a wood called Harley: and the people in that country have a saying perfectly intelligible to every English ear.—“When Harley is *hare-less*, Cranbourn *whore-less* and Wimborn *poor-less*, the world will be at an end.” And it is observable that in all the northern languages, the termination of this adjective in each language varies just as the correspondent verb, whose imperative it is, varies in that language.

	Termination.	Infin. of the Verb.
Goth.	ΛΛNS	ΛΛNSGAN
A.S.	Lear	Leorjan
Dutch	Loos	Lossen
German	Los	Lösen
Danish	Lös	Löser
Swedish	Lös	Lösa.

I must be permitted here to say, that I sincerely lament the principle on which Mr. Tyrwhit proceeded in his edition of Chaucer's tales. Had he given invariably the text of that manuscript which he judged to be the oldest, and thrown to the bottom the variorum readings with their authority; the obligation of his readers (at least of such as myself) would indeed have been very great to him: and his industry, care, and fidelity would then have been much more useful to inquirers, than any skill which he has shown in etymology or the northern languages, were it even much greater than it appears to me to have been.

“ That knight he is a foul Paynim,
 And large of limb and bone ;
 And *But if* heaven may be thy speede,
 Thy life it is but gone.”

Sir Cauline. Percy's Reliques.

Though it certainly is not worth the while, I am tempted here to observe the gross mistake Mr. Harris has made in the *Force* of this word ; which he calls an “ *Adequate Preventive*.”

His example is—

“ Troy will be taken, UNLESS the Palladium be preserved.”

“ That is (says Mr. Harris) This alone is sufficient to preserve it.”—According to the oracle, so indeed it might be ; but the word UNLESS has no such force.

Let us try another instance.

“ England will be enslaved UNLESS the House of Commons continues a part of the Legislature.”

Now, I ask, is this alone sufficient to preserve it ? We who live in these times, know but too well that this very house may be made the instrument of a tyranny as odious and (*perhaps*) more lasting than that of the Stuarts. I am afraid Mr. Harris's *adequate Preventive* will not save us. For, though it is most cruel and unnatural ; yet we know by woful experience that the Kid may be seethed in the mother's milk, which providence appointed for its nourishment ; and the

liberties of this country be destroyed by that very part of the Legislature, which was most especially appointed for their security.

An instance has been already given where *IF* is used as a preposition. In the following passage of Dryden, *UNLESS* is also used as a preposition ;

"The commendation of Adversaries is the greatest triumph of a writer ; because it never comes *UNLESS* extorted."

E K E.

Junius says,—"*EAK*, etiam. Goth. *Ānk*. A.S. *Ēac*. Al. *Auch*. D. *Og*. B. *Ook*. *Viderentur esse ex inverso καὶ* ; sed rectius petas ex proxime sequenti *ĀnkĀn* (Isl. *Auka*). A.S. *Ēacan*. *Ēcan*. *Ican*. Al. *Auchon*. D. *Oge*. B. *Oecken*. *Ēacan* vero, vel *Auchon*, sunt ab *αυξεν* vel *αεξεν*, addere, adjicere. augere."

Skinner says—" *EKE*. ab A.S. *Ēac*. *Ēeac*. Belg. *Oock*. Teut. *Auch*. Fr.Th. *Ouch*. Dan. *Oc*. etiam."

Skinner then proceeds to the verb,

"To *EKE*, ab A.S. *Ēacan*. *Ēeican*. *Ican*. augere, adjicere. Fr. Jun. suo more, deflectit. a Gr. *αυξεν*. *Mallem* ab *Ēac*, iterum, quod vide : quod enim augetur, secundum partes suas quasi iteratur et de novo fit."

In this place Skinner does not seem to enjoy his usual superiority of judgment over Junius. And it is

very strange that he should chuse here to derive the verb *Eacan* from the conjunction *Eac* (that is, from its own imperative); rather than the conjunction (that is, the imperative) from the verb. His judgment was more awake when he derived *IF* or *GIF* from *Upan*, and not *Upan* from *Uf*; which yet, according to his present method, he should have done.

Perhaps it may be worth remarking, as an additional proof of the nature of this conjunction; that in each language, where this imperative is used conjunctively, the conjunction varies just as the verb does.

In Danish the conjunction is *og*, and the verb *öger*.

In Swedish the conjunction is *och*, and the verb *öka*.

In Dutch the conjunction is *ook*, from the verb *oecken*.

In German the conjunction is *auch*, from the verb *auchon*.

In Gothic the conjunction is **Ank**, and the verb **Ankan**.

As in English the conjunction is *Eke* or *Eak*, from the verb *Eacan*.

YET. STILL.

I put the conjunctions *YET* and *STILL* here together; because (like *If* and *An*) they may be used mutually for each other without any alteration in the meaning of the sentences: a circumstance which (though not so obviously as in these instances) happens likewise to

some other of the conjunctions ; and which is not unworthy of consideration.

According to my derivation of them both, this mutual interchange will not seem at all extraordinary : for *yet* (which is nothing but the imperative *Get* or *Lyte*, of *Getan* or *Lytan*, *obtinere*) and *still* (which is only the imperative *Stell* or *Steall*, of *Stellan* or *Steallian**, *ponere*) may very well supply each other's place, and be indifferently used for the same purpose.

ALGATE and even *ALGATES*, when used adversatively by Chaucer, I suppose, though so spelled, to mean no other than *All-get*†.

"For *ALBEIT* tarieng be noyful, *ALGATE* it is not to be reproved in *yeuyng*e of iugement, ne in vengeaunce takyng."

Tale of Chaucer, fol. 74. pag. 2. col. 1.

"A great waue of the see cometh somtyme with so great a vyolence, that it drowneth the shyppe : and the same harme dothe somtyme the small dropes of water that entreth through a lytell creueys, in to the tymbre and in to the botome of the shyppe, *yf* men be so negligente that they discharge hem not by tymes. And therfore all though there be a difference be-

* Though this verb is no longer current in English, except as a Conjunction, yet it keeps its ground in the collateral languages.

In German and Dutch it is *Stellen*

In the Swedish *Ställa*

And in the Danish *Stiller*.

† Skinner says, "*ALGATES*, semper, omnino, nihilominus, ab *All & Gate*, via, q. d. omnibus viis : " which explanation seems best to accord with the sense of various passages in which the word occurs.—EDIT.

twixt these two causes of drowning, *ALGATES* the shyppe is drowned."

The verb *To get* is sometimes spelled by Chaucer *geate*.

But I will repeat to you the derivations which others have given, and leave you to chuse between us.

Mer. Casaubon says—" *Est*, adhuc, Yet."

Junius says—" *YET*, adhuc. A.S. *Lyȝt*. Cymræis *etwa*, *etto*, significat, adhuc, etiam, iterum; ex *est* vel *avbŷ*."

Skinner says—" *YET*, ab A.S. *Let*, *Ġeta*, adhuc, modo. Teut. *Jetzt*, jam, mox."

Again he says—" *STILL*, assidue, indesinenter, incessanter. Nescio an ab A.S. *Till*, addito tantum sibilo; vel a nostro *et*, credo, etiam A.S. *As*, ut, sicut, (licet apud Somnerum non occurrat) et eodem *Til*, usque, q. d. usque, eodem modo.

ELSE.

This word *ELSE*, formerly written *Alles*, *Alys*, *Alyse*, *Elles*, *Ellus*, *Ellis*, *Ells*, *Els*, and now *Else*; is, as I have said, no other than *Aler* or *Alȝr*, the imperative of *Aleran* or *Alȝran*, dimittere.

Mr. Warton, in his *History of English Poetry*, vol. 1, page 191 (without any authority, and in spite of the context, which evidently demands *Else*, and will not

admit of *Also*) has explained ALLES in the following passage by *Also*.

“ The Soudan ther he satte in halle ;
 He sent his messagers faste with alle,
 To hire fader the kyng.
 And seyde, hou so hit ever bi falle,
 That mayde he wolde clothe in palle
 And spousen hire with his ryng.
 And ALLES* I swere withouten fayle
 I chull hire winnen in pleye* battayle
 With mony an heih lordyng.”

The meaning of which is evidently,—“ Give me your daughter, ELSE I will take her by force.”

It would have been nonsense to say,—“ Give me your daughter, ALSO I will take her by force.”

“ To hasten loue is thyng in veine,
 Whan that fortune is there ageine.
 To take where a man hath leue
 Good is : and ELLES he mote leue.”

Gower, lib. 2. fol. 57. pag. 1. col. 1.

“ Withouten noyse or clatterying of belles
 Te Deum was our songe, and nothyng ELLES.”

Chaucer, *Sompners Tale*, fol. 43. pag. 1. col. 1.

“ Eschame young virgins, and fair damycellis,
 Furth of wedlok for to disteyne your kellis ;
 Traist not all talis that wantoun wowaris tellis,
 gou to defloure purposyng, and not ELLIS.”

Douglas, *Prol.* to 4th boke, pag. 97.

“ And, bycause the derthe of things be suche as the soldyors be not able to lyue of theyr accustomed wages, which is, by the

* elles ;—pleyn : Ritson's collection.—EDIT.

day, six pence the foteman, and nine pence th' horsman; ther for we beseche your lordships to be meanes to the Queene's majestie, that order may be taken, eyther for th' encrease of theyr wages by the day, the foteman to eightpence, and th' horsman to twelve pence, or ELLS to allow that at the pay daise they may, by their capteins or otherwise, haue some rewarde to counteruail the like somme."

The Council in the North to the Privy Council, 4th of Sept. 1557. Lodge's Illustrations.

N.B. "Wheat at this time was sold for four marks per quarter. Within one month after the harvest the price fell to *five shillings*."

"And eury man for his partie
A kyngdome hath to iustifie,
That is to sein his owne dome.
If he misrule that kyngdome,
He leseth him selfe, that is more,
Than if he loste ship and ore,
And all the worldes good with alle.
For what man that in speciall
Hath not him selfe, he hath not ELS,
No more the perles than the shels,
All is to him of o value."

Gower, lib. 8. fol. 185. pag. 2. col. 2.

"Nede has no pere,
Him behoueth serue himselfe that has no swayn,
Or ELS he is a fole, as clerkes sayn."

Chaucer, Reues Tale, fol. 16. pag. 1. col. 2.

Junius says—"ELSE, aliter, alias, alioqui. A.S. Eller. Al. Alles. D. *Ellers*."

Skinner says—"ELSE, ab A.S. Eller, alias, alioquin. Minshew et Dr. Thomas Hickes putant esse contrac-

tum a Lat. *Alias*, vel. Gr. ἄλλως, nec sine verisimilitudine."

S. Johnson says—"ELSE, Pronoun, (Eller, Saxon) *other, one besides*. It is applied both to persons and things."

He says again—"ELSE, Adverb. 1. Otherwise. 2. Besides ; except that mentioned."

THOUGH.

THO', THOUGH, THAH* (or, as our country-folks more purely pronounce it, THAF, THAF, and THOF) is the imperative Ðaf or Ðafiz of the verb Ðafian or Ðafizgan ; to allow, permit, grant, yield, assent : And Ðafiz becomes *Thah, Though, Thoug* (and *Thoch*, as G. Douglas and other Scotch authors write it) by a transition of the same sort, and at least as easy, as that of *Hawk*

* See a ballad written about the year 1264, in the reign of Henry the third ;

" Richard THAH thou be ever trichard,
Tricthen shalt thou never more."

Percy's Reliques, vol. 2. p. 2.

See also another ballad written in the year 1307, on the death of Edward the first.

" THAH mi tonge were mad of stel,
Ant min herte yzote of bras,
The godness myht y never telle
That with kyng Edward was."

Percy's Reliques, vol. 2. p. 10.

from *Đapuc*. And it is remarkable, that as there were originally two ways of writing the verb, either with the guttural G (*Đaprgan*) or without it (*Đaprian*): so there still continues the same difference in writing and pronouncing the remaining imperative of this same verb, with the guttural G (*Though*), or without it (*Tho*). In English the difference is only in the characters; but the Scotch retain in their pronunciation, the guttural termination.

In the earlier Anglo-Saxon the verb is written *geðarigan*. In a charter of William the conqueror it is written—*ic nelle geðaprian*. And in a charter of Henry the first it is also written—*ic nelle geðaprian*. But a charter of Henry the second has it—*ic nelle geðauian*.

See the *Preface to Hickes's Thesaurus*, pag. 15, 16.

So that we thus have a sort of proof, at what time the *þ* was dropped from the pronunciation of *ðaprian*; (namely, about the reign of Henry the second;) and in what manner *THAFIG* became *THAF*, and *THAF* became *THAU* or *THO*'.

I reckon it not a small confirmation of this etymology, that our antient writers often used *All be. All be it. All had. All should. All were. All give. How be it. Set. Suppose, &c.* instead of *Although*.

“ But *AL BE* that he was a philosopfre,
Yet had he but lytel golde in cofre.”

Chaucer, Prol. to Canterb. Tales.

"Ye wote your selfe, she may not wedde two
 At ones, though ye fyghten euer mo;
 But one of you, ALL BE him lothe or lefe,
 He mote go pype in an yue lefe."

Knyghtes Tale, fol. 5. pag. 2. col. 2.

"ALBEIT originally the King's Bench be restrained by this
 Act to hold plea of any real action, yet by a mean it may; as
 when removed thither, &c."—*Lord Coke*.

"—I shal *yeuen* her sufficient answer,
 And all women after for her sake,
 That though they ben in any gylte itake,
 With face bolde they shullen hem selue excuse,
 And bere hem down that wold hem accuse;
 For lacke of answer, non of hem shull dyen;
 ALL HAD he sey a thyng with both his eyen,
 Yet shuld we women so visage it hardely,
 And wepe and swere and chyde subtelly,
 That ye shal ben as leude as gees."

Chaucer, Marchauntes Tale, fol. 33. pag. 1. col. 2.

"But rede that boweth down for euery blaste
 Ful lyghtly cesse wynde, it wol aryse;
 But so nyl not an oke, whan it is caste
 It nedeth me nought longe the forvyse,
 Men shal reioysen of a great emprise
 Atcheued wel, and stant withouten dout,
 AL HAUE men ben the lenger there about."

2d boke of *Troylus*, fol. 170. pag. 2. col. 1.

"For I wol speke, and tel it the
 AL SHULDE I dye."

Romaunt of the Rose, fol. 152. pag. 2. col. 1.

"And I so loued him for his obeysaunce
 And for the trouthe that I demed in his hert,
 That if so were, that any thyng him smert

AL WERE it neuer so lyte, and I it wyst,
Methought I felt deth at my hert twist."

Squiers Tale, fol. 27. pag. 2. col. 1.

" ALLGYF England and Fraunce were thorow saught."

Skelton.

" The Moor, HOWBEIT that I endure him not,
Is of a constant, loving, noble nature."

Othello, act 2. sc. 1.

" No wonder was, SUPPOSE in mynde that he
Toke her fygure so soone, and Lo now why
The ydol of a thyng in case may be
So depe enprynted in the fantasy
That it deludeth the wyttes outwardly."

Complaynt of Creseyde, fol. 204. pag. 1. col. 2.

" In sere placis throw the ciete with thys
The murmour rais ay mare and mare, I wys,
And clearar wax the rumour, and the dyn,
So that, SUPPOIS* Anchises my faderis In
With treis about stude secrete by the way,
So bustuous grew the noyis and furious fray
And ratling of thare armoure on the strete,
Affrayit I glisnit of slepe, and sterte on fete."

Douglas, boke 2. pag. 49.

" Eurill (as said is) has this iouell hint,
About his sydis it brasin, or he stynt;
Bot all for nocht, SUPPOIS the gold dyd glete."

Douglas, boke 9. pag. 289.

" That sche might haue the copies of the pretendit writingis
giuen in, quhilkis they haue diuerse tymes requirit of the Quene's

* ————" QUANQUAM secreta parentis
Anchisæ domus." ———

maiestie and hir counsel, SUPPOIS thay haue not as zit obtenit the samin.”—*Mary Queen of Scots.*

N.B. In the year 1788 I saw the same use of SUPPOSE for THOUGH, in a letter written by a Scotch officer at Guernsey, to my most lamented and dear friend the late Lieutenant General James Murray. The letter in other respects was in very good and common English.

“I feel exceedingly for Lord W. M. SUPPOSE I have not the honour of being personally acquainted with him.”

I believe that the use of this word SUPPOSE for THOUGH is still common in Scotland.

The German uses *Doch* ; the Dutch *Doch* and *Dog* ; the Danish *Dog* and *Endog* ; and the Swedish *Dock* ; as we use *Though* : all from the same root. The Danish employs *Skönt* and *Endskiönt* ; and the Swedish *Än-skönt*, for *Though* : from the Danish verb *Skönner* ; and the Swedish verb *Skiönja*, both of which mean, to *perceive, discern, imagine, conceive, suppose, understand.*

As the Latin *Si* (*if*) means *Be it* : and *Nisi* and *Sine* (*unless* and *without*) mean *Be not* : so *Etsi* (*although*) means *And be it**. The other Latin Conjunctions which

* It may not be quite needless to observe, that our conjunctions IF and THOUGH may very frequently supply each other's place, as—“THOUGH an host of men rise up against me, yet shall not my heart be afraid ;” or, “IF an host of men, &c.” So “THOUGH all men should forsake you, yet will not I ;” or, “IF all men should forsake you, &c.”

are used for *Although*, (as, *Quam-vis*, *Licet*, *Quantum vis*, *Quam-libet*) are so uncorrupted as to need no explanation.

Skinner barely says—"THOUGH, ab A.S. *Deah*. Belg. *Doch*. Belg. & Teut. *Doch*. *etsi*, *quamvis**."

BUT.

It was this word, BUT, which Mr. Locke had chiefly in view, when he spoke of Conjunctions as marking some "Stands, Turns, Limitations, and Exceptions of the mind." And it was the corrupt use of this *One* word (BUT) in modern English, for *Two* words (BOTH and BUT) originally (in the Anglo-Saxon) very different in signification, though (by repeated abbreviation and corruption) approaching in sound, which chiefly misled him.

"BUT (says Mr. Locke) is a Particle, none more

* Though this word is called a conjunction of sentences, it is constantly used (especially by children and in low discourse) not only at the beginning, and between, but at the end of sentences.

"*Pro*. Why do you maintain your poet's quarrel so with velvet and good clothes? We have seen him in indifferent clothes e're now himself.

"*Boy*. And may again. But his clothes shall never be the best thing about him, THOUGH. 'He will have somewhat beside, either of humane letters or severe honesty, shall speak him a man, though he went naked."

familiar in our language ; and he that says it is a *discretive* Conjunction, and that it answers *SED* in Latin, or *MAIS* in French *, thinks he has sufficiently explained it. But it seems to me to intimate several relations the mind gives to the several propositions or parts of them, which it joins by this monosyllable.

“ First,—*BUT to say no more :*

“ Here it intimates a stop of the mind, in the course it was going, before it came to the end of it.

“ Secondly,—*I saw BUT two plants.*

“ Here it shews, that the mind limits the sense to what is expressed, with a negation of all other.

“ Thirdly,—*You pray ; BUT it is not that God would bring you to the true religion :*

“ Fourthly,—*BUT that he would confirm you in your own.*

“ The first of these BUTS intimates a supposition in the mind of something otherwise than it should be : the latter shews that the mind makes a direct opposition between that and what goes before it.

* It does not answer to *Sed* in Latin, or *Mais* in French ; except only where it is used for *But*. Nor will any *one* word in any Language answer to our English BUT : because a similar corruption in the same instance has not happened in any other language.

“Fifthly,—*All animals have sense, BUT a dog is an animal.*

“Here it signifies little more, but that the latter proposition is joined to the former, as the Minor of a Syllogism.

“To these, I doubt not, might be added a great many other significations of this particle, *if it were my business to examine it in its full latitude*, and consider it in all the places it is to be found; which if one should do, I doubt whether in all those manners it is made use of, it would deserve the title of DISCRETIVE which Grammarians give to it.

“But *I intend not * here a full explication of this sort of signs.* The instances I have given in this one, may give occasion to reflect upon their use and force in language, and lead us into the contemplation of *several actions of our minds* in discoursing, which it has *found a way* to intimate to others by *these Particles*, some whereof constantly, and others in certain constructions, have the sense of a whole sentence contained in them.”

* “*Essentiam finemque conjunctionum satis apte explicatum puto: nunc earum originem materiamque videamus. Neque vero Sigillatim percurrere omnes in Animo est.*”

J. C. Scaliger.

The constant excuse of them all, whether Grammatists, Grammarians or Philosophers; though they dare not hazard the assertion, yet they would all have us understand that they can do it; but *non in animo est.* And it has never been done.

Now all these difficulties are **very easily** to be removed without any effort of the understanding : and for that very reason I do not much wonder that Mr. Locke missed the explanation : for he dug too deep for it. But that the Etymologists (who only just turn up the surface) should miss it, does indeed astonish me. It seems to me impossible, that any man who reads only the most common of our old English authors should fail to observe it.

Gawin Douglas, notwithstanding he frequently confounds the two words, and uses them often improperly, does yet (without being himself aware of the distinction, and from the mere force of customary speech) abound with so many instances, and so contrasted, as to awaken, one should think, the most inattentive reader.

"**BOT** thy werke shall endure in laude and glorie,
BUT spot or falt condigne eterne memorie."

Preface, pag. 3.

"*Thoch* Wylliams Caxtoun had no compatioun
 Of Virgill in that buk he preyt in prois,
 Clepand it Virgill in Eneados,
 Quhilk that he sayis of Frensch he did translait,
 It has nathing ado therwith, God wate,
 Nor na mare like than the Deuil and sanct Austin.
 Haue he na thank tharfore, **BOT** lois his pyne;
 So schamefully the storie did peruerte,
 I reid his werk with harmes at my hert,
 That sic ane buk, **BUT** sentence or ingyne,
 Suld be intitult eftir the poete diuine."

Preface, pag. 5.

"I schrink not anys correkkit for to be,
 With ony wycht groundit on charite,
 And glaidlie wald I baith inquire and lere,
 And to ilk cunnand wicht la to myne ere ;
 BOT laith me war, BUT uthar offences or cryme,
 Ane rural body suld intertrik my ryme."

Preface, pag. 11.

"BOT gif this ilk statew standis here wrocht,
 War with your handis into the ciete brocht,
 Than schew he that the peopil of Asia
 BUT ony obstakill in fell battel suld ga."

Booke 2. pag. 45.

"This chance is not BUT Goddis willis went,
 Nor it is not leful thyng, quod sche,
 Fra hyne Creusa thou turs away wyth the,
 Nor the hie gouvrenoure of the heuin aboue is
 Will suffer it so to be, BOT the behuffis
 From hens to wend full fer into exile,
 And ouer the braid sey sayl furth mony a myle,
 Or thou cum to the land Hisperia,
 Quhare with soft coursis Tybris of Lydia
 Rynniss throw the riche feildis of pepill stout ;
 Thare is gret substance ordanit the BUT dout."

Booke 2. pag. 64.

"Vpoun sic wise vncertanlie we went
 Thre dayes wilsum throw the mysty streme,
 And als mony nyghtes BUT sterneys leme,
 That quhidder was day or nycht vneth wist we.
 BOT at the last on the ferd day we se
 On fer the land appere, and hillis ryse
 The smoky vapoure up casting on thare gyse.
 Doun fallis salis, the aris sone we span
 BUT mare abaid."

Booke 3. pag. 74.

——“ BOT gif the faits, BUT pleid,
At my plesure suffer it me life to leid,
At my fre wil my workis to modify.”

Booke 4. pag. 111.

“ BOT sen Apollo depit Gryneus
Grete Italie to seik commandis us,
To Italie eik oraclis of Licia
Admonist us BUT mare delay to ga
Thare is my lust now and delyte at hand.”

Booke 4. pag. 111.

“ Thou wyth thyr harmes ouerchargit me also,
Quhen I fell fyrst into this rage, quod sche,
BOT so to do my teris constrenyt the.
Was it not lefull, allace, BUT cumpany,
To me BUT cryme allane in chalmer to ly?”

Booke 4. pag. 119.

“ Ane great eddir slidand can furth thraw,
Eneas of the sycht abasit sum deile,
BOT sche at the last with lang fard fare and wele
Crepis amang the veschell and coupis all,
The drink, and eik the offerandis grete and small,
Snokis and likis, syne ful the altaris left,
And BUT mare harme in the graif enterit eft.”

Booke 5. pag. 130.

“ Thare hartis on flocht, smytin with shame sum dele,
BOT glaid and ioly in hope for to do wele,
Rasis in thare breistis desyre of hie renowne :
Syne BUT delay at the first trumpis sounne
From thare marchis attanis furth thay sprent.”

Booke 5. pag. 132.

“ Ane uthir mache to him was socht and sperit ;
BOT thare was nane of all the rout that sterit,
Na durst presume mete that man on the land,
With mais or burdoun, to debate hand for hand.

Ioly and glaid therof baith all and sum,
 Into bargane wenyng for to ouercum,
 Before Eneas feite stude, **BUT** delay."

Booke 5. pag. 1

" The tothir answerd, Nowthir for drede nor boist,
 The luf of wourschip nor honoure went away is
BOT certainly the dasit blude now on dayis
 Waxis dolf and dull throw myne unweildy age,
 The cald body has mynyst my curage :
BOT war I now as umquhile it has bene
 ging as gone wantoun woistare so strang thay wene,
 ge had I now sic goutheid, traistis me,
BUT ony price I suld all reddy be :
 Na lusty bul me till induce suld nede,
 For nouthir I suld haue crauit wage nor mede.
 Quhen this was said he has **BUT** mare abade
 Tua kempis burdouns brocht, and before thaym laid."

Booke 5. pag. 1

" And fyrst to hym ran Acestes the kyng,
 And for compassioun has uphynt in feild
 His freynd Entellus unto him euin eild.
BOT nowthir astonist nor abasit hereon,
 Mare egirly the vailgeant campion
 Agane to bargane went als hate as fyre :
 And ardently with furie and inekle boist
 Gan Dares cache, and driue ouer al the coist :
 Now with the richt hand, now with the left hand he
 Doublis dyntis, and **BUT** abade lete fle ;
 The prince Eneas than seand this dout,
 No langar suffir wald sic wraith procede,
 Nor feirs Entellus mude thus rage and sprede.
BOT of the bargane maid end, **BUT** delay."

Booke 5. pag. 1.

" In nowmer war they **BUT** ane few mence,
BOT thay war quyk, and valgeant in melle."

Booke 5. pag. 1:

" Blyn not, blyn not, thou grete Troian Enee,
Of thy bedis nor prayeris, quod sche :
For BOT thou do, thir grete durris, BUT dred,
And grislie zettis sall neuer warp on bred."

Booke 6. pag. 164.

" On siclike wise as thare thay did with me,
Grete goddis mot the Grekis recompens,
Gif I may thig ane uengeance BUT offens.
BOT say me this agane, freind, all togidder,
Quhat auenture has brocht the leuand hidder?"

Booke 6. pag. 182.

" How grete apperance is in him ; BUT dout,
Tyll be of proues and ane vailgeant knycht :
BOT ane blak sop of myst als dirk as nycht
Wyth drery schaddow bylappis his hede."

Booke 6. pag. 197.

" Nor mys-knew not the condiciouns of us
Latyne pepyll and folkis of Saturnus,
Unconstrenyt, not be law bound thertyll,
BOT be our inclinacioun and fre wyll
Iustè and equale, and BUT offensis ay,
And reulit eftir the auld goddis way."

Booke 7. pag. 212.

" BOT sen that Virgil standis BUT compare."

Prol. to Booke 9. pag. 272.

" Quidder gif the goddis, or sum spretis silly
Mouis in our myndis this ardent thochtful fire,
Or gif that euery mannis schrewit desyre
Be as his god and genius in that place,
I wat neuer how it standis, BOT this lang space
My mynd mouis to me, here as I stand,
Batel or sum grete thyng to tak on hand :
I know not to quhat purpois it is drest,
BOT be na way may I tak eis nor rest.

Behaldis thou not so surelie BUT affray
gone Rutulianis haldis thaym glaid and gay."

Booke 9. pag. 281.

" His feris lukis about on euery side,
To se quharfra the groundin dart did glide.
BOT lo, as thay thus wounderit in effray,
This ilk Nisus, wourthin proude and gay,
And baldare of his chance sa with him gone,
Ane uthir takill assayit he anone:
And with ane sound smate Tagus BUT remede."

Booke 9. pag. 291.

" Agane Eneas can Tarquitus dres,
And to recounter Enée inflamyt in tene,
Kest hym self in; BOT the tothir BUT fere
Bure at hym mychtely wyth ane lang spere."

Booke 10. pag. 337.

" Sic wourdis vane and unsemelie of sound
Furth warpis wyde this Liger fulichelie:
BOT the Troiane baroun unabasitlie
Na wourdis preisis to render him agane;
BOT at his fa let fle ane dart or flane,
That hit Lucagus quhilk fra he felt the dynt,
The schaft hinging in to his schield, BUT stynt
Bad driue his hors and chare al fordwert streicht."

Booke 10. pag. 338.

" BOT quhat awalis bargane or strang melle,
Syne geild the to thay fa, BUT ony why."

Prol. to Booke 11. pag. 356.

" Than of his speich so wounderit war thay
Kepit thare silence, and wist not what to say,
BOT athir towart uthir turnis BUT mare,
And can behald his fallow in ane stare."

Booke 11. pag. 364.

—————" Lat neur demyt be
The bustuousnes of ony man dant the,

BOT that thy dochter, O thou fader gude,
 Unto gone wourthy prince of gentill blude
 Be geuin to be thy son in law, I wys,
 As he that wourthy sic ane wedlok is;
 And knyt up pece BUT mare disseuerance,
 With all eternall band of alliaunce."

Booke 11. pag. 374.

"Turnus and thy cheif ciete haue I saue,
 Sa lang as that the fatis sufferit me,
 And quhil werde sisteris sa tholit to be:
 BOT now I se that young man haist BUT fale
 To mache in feild wyth fatis inequale."

Booke 12. pag. 412.

"On euery syde he has cassin his E;
 And at the last behaldis the ciete,
 Saikles of batal, fre of all sic stryffe,
 BUT pane or trauel, at quiet man and wyffe.
 Than of ane greter bargane in his entent
 All suddanly the figure dyd emprent.
 And on ane litill mote ascendit in hie,
 Quhare sone forgadderit all the Troyane army,
 And thyck about hym flokkand can BUT baid,
 BOT nowthir scheild nor wappinnis doun thay laid."

Booke 12. pag. 430.

—— "Ha! How,
 Sa grete ane storme or spate of felloun ire,
 Under thy breist thou rollis hait as fyre?
 BOT wrik as I the byd, and do away
 That wraith consaut BUT ony caus, I pray."

Booke 12. pag. 442.

The Glossarist of Douglas contents himself with explaining BOT by BUT.

The Glossarist to Urry's Edition of Chaucer says,—
 “BOT for BUT is a form of speech *frequently* used in Chaucer to denote the greater certainty of a thing.”—
 This is a most inexcusable assertion ; for I believe the place cited in the Glossary is the only instance (in this edition of Chaucer) where BOT is used ; and there is not the smallest shadow of reason for forming even a conjecture in favour of this unsatisfactory assertion : unsatisfactory, even if the fact had been so ; because it contains no explanation : for why should BOT denote greater certainty ?

And here it may be proper to observe, that Gawin Douglas's language (where BOT is very frequently found) though written about a century after, must yet be esteemed more ancient than Chaucer's : even as at this day the present English speech in Scotland is, in many respects, more ancient than that spoken in England so far back as the reign of Queen Elizabeth*. So Mer. Casaubon (*De vet. ling. Ang.*) says of his time —“*Scotica lingua Anglicâ hodiernâ purior.*”—Where by *purior*, he means nearer to the Anglo-Saxon.

So G. Hickes, in his Anglo-Saxon Grammar, (Ch. 3.) says—“*Scoti in multis Saxonizantes.*”

* This will not seem at all extraordinary, if you reason directly contrary to Lord Monboddo on this subject ; by doing which you will generally be right, as well in this as in almost every thing else which he has advanced.

But, to return to Mr. Locke, whom (as B. Jonson says of Shakespeare) "I reverence on this side of idolatry;" in the *five* instances which he has given for *five* different meanings of the word BUT, there are indeed only two different meanings*: nor could he, as he imagined he could, have added any other significations of this particle, but what are to be found in BOT and BUT as I have explained them†.

BUT, in the *first, third, fourth, and fifth* instances, is corruptly put for BOT, the imperative of Botan :

* " You must answer, that she was brought very near the fire, and as good as thrown in ; or else that she was provoked to it by a divine inspiration. BUT, BUT that another divine inspiration moved the beholders to believe that she did therein a noble act, this act of her's might have been calumniated," &c.

Donne's Biathanatos, part 2. distinct. 5. sect. 8.

In the above passage, which is exceedingly awkward, BUT is used in both it's meanings close to each other : and the impropriety of the corruption appears therefore in it's most offensive point of view. A careful author would avoid this, by placing these two BUTS at a distance from each other in the sentence, or by changing one of them for some other equivalent word. Whereas had the corruption not taken place, he might without any inelegance (in this respect) have kept the construction of the sentence as it now stands : for nothing would have offended us, had it run thus—" BOT, *butan* that another divine inspiration moved the beholders," &c.

† S. Johnson in his Dictionary has numbered up *eighteen* different significations (as he imagines) of BUT: which however are all reducible to BOT and *Be-utan*.

In the *second* instance only it is put for Bute, or Butan, or Be-utan*.

In the *first* instance,—“*To say no more,*” is a mere

* “I saw BUT two plants.”

Not or *Ne* is here left out and understood, which used formerly to be inserted, as it frequently is still.

So Chaucer,

“Tel forth your tale, spareth for no man,
And teche us yong men of your practike.
Gladly (quod she) if it may you lyke.
But that I pray to all this company,
If that I speke after my fantasy,
As taketh not a grefe of that I say,
For myn entent is NOT BUT to play.”

Wife of Bathes Prologue.

“I ne usurpe not to haue founden this werke of my labour or of myne engyn, I NAM BUT a leude compylatour of the laboure of olde astrologiens, and haue it translated in myn englysshe.”—*Introduction to Conclusyons of the Astrolabye.*

“Forsake I wol at home myn herytage,
And as I sayd, ben of your courte a page,
If that ye vouchesafe that in this place
Ye graunte me to haue suche a grace
That I may haue NAT BUT my meate and drinke,
And for my sustynauce yet wol I swynke.”

“Yet were it better I were your wyfe,
Sithe ye ben as gentyl borne as I
And haue a realme NAT BUT faste by.”

Ariadne, fol. 217. pag. 1. col. 1. and 2.

We should now say—*my intent is BUT to play.*—*I am BUT a compiler, &c.*

This omission of the negation before BUT, though now very

parenthesis : and Mr. Locke has unwarily attributed to BUT, the meaning contained in the parenthesis : for suppose the instance had been this,—“ BUT *to proceed.*” — Or this,—“ BUT, *to go fairly through this matter.*”— Or this,—“ BUT, *not to stop.*”

common, is one of the most blameable and corrupt abbreviations of construction which is used in our language ; and could never have obtained, but through the utter ignorance of the meaning of the word BUT. “ There is not (says Chillingworth) so much strength required in the edifice as in the foundation : and if BUT wise men have the ordering of the building, they will make it much a surer thing, that the foundation shall not fail the building, than that the building shall not fall from the foundation. And though the building be to be of brick or stone, and perhaps of wood ; yet it may be possibly they will have a rock for their foundation ; whose stability is a much more indubitable thing, than the adherence of the structure to it.”

It should be written—“ If *none* but wise men.”—But the error in the construction of this sentence, will not excuse the present minister, if he neglects the matter of it. The blessings or execrations of all posterity for ever upon the name of PITT, (*pledged as he is*) will depend intirely upon his conduct in this particular.

The reader of this edition is requested to observe, that the above note is not inserted après coup ; but was published in the first edition of this volume in 1786 ; when I was in possession of the following solemn, public engagement from Mr. Pitt, made to the Westminster DELEGATES in 1782.

“ Sir,

“ I am extremely sorry that I was not at home when you and the other gentlemen from the Westminster Committee did me the honor to call. May I beg the favor of you to express that I am truly happy to find that the motion of Tuesday last has the approbation of such zealous friends to the public, and

Does BUT in any of these instances intimate a stop of the mind in the course it was going? The truth is, that BUT itself is the furthest of any word in the language from "*intimating a stop.*" On the contrary it always intimates something MORE*, something to fol-

to assure the Committee that my exertions shall never be wanting in support of a measure, which I agree with them in thinking essentially necessary to the independence of Parliament, and to the liberty of the people.

I have the honor to be, with great respect and esteem,
Sir, your most obedient and

most humble Servant

Lincoln's-Inn,
May 10.

W. PITT."

Although I had long known the old detestable maxim of political adventurers, (for Philip was no other)—"To amuse boys with playthings and men with oaths"—yet, I am not ashamed to confess, I, at that time, placed the firmest reliance on his engagement: and in consequence of my full faith and trust, gave to him and to his administration, most especially when it tottered and seemed overthrown (at the time of the Regency Bill in 1788) a support so zealous and effectual, as to draw repeatedly from himself and his friends the warmest acknowledgments.

This letter was produced by me upon my trial at the Old Bailey in the year 1794: when fidelity to the sentiments it contains was seriously and unblushingly imputed to me as High Treason. The original of this letter Mr. Pitt, upon his oath, to my astonishment acknowledged to be in his own handwriting; although every trace of DELEGATION was totally effaced from his memory.

* In the French, Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, and several other dead and living languages, the very word MORE is used for this conjunction BUT.

The French anciently used MAIS, not only as they now do

low : (as indeed it does in this very instance of Mr. Locke's; though we know not what that something is, because the sentence is not completed.) And there-

for the conjunction **MAIS**; but also as they now use *plus* or *d'avantage*.—

Y puis-je *Mais*?

Je n'en puis *Mais*,

are still in use among the vulgar people; in both which expressions it means *more*. So Henry Estienne uses it;

“ Sont si bien accoustumez à ceste syncope, ou plutost apocope, qu'ils en font quelquesfois autant aux dissyllabes, qui n'en peuvent **MAIS**.”

H. E. de la Precellence du Langage François, p. 18.

“ **MAIS** vient de *magis* (j'entens *mais* pour *d'avantage*.)”

Id. p. 131.

“ Helas! il n'en pouvoit **MAIS**, le pauvre prince, ni mort, ny vivant.”—*Brantome*.

“ Enfin après cent tours aiant de la maniere

Sur ce qui n'en peut **MAIS** dechargé sa colere.”

Moliere, Ecole des Femmes, a. 4. sc. 6.

In the same manner the Italians;

“ Io t' ho atato, quanto ho potuto: sì ch' io non so, ch' io mi ti possa piu atare: E però qui non ha **MA** che uno compenso. Comincia a piangere, e io piangeroe con teco insieme.”

Cento Novelle. Nov. 35.

“ Fue un signore, ch' avea uno giullare in sua corte, e questo giullare l' adorava sicome un suo Iddio. Un altro giullare vendendo questo, si gliene disse male, e disse: Or cui chiami tu Iddio? Elli non é **MA** che uno.”—*Cento Novelle. Nov. 18.*

In the same manner also the Spanish language employs **MAS** both for *But* and *More*.

“ Es la verdad la que **MAS** importa à los principes, y la que menos se halla en los palacios.”—*Saavedra. Corona Gothica.*

“ Obra de **MAS** novedad, y **MAS** estudio.”—*Id.*

fore whenever any one in discourse finishes his words with BUT, the question always follows—BUT *what*?

So that Shakespeare speaks most truly as well as poetically, when he gives an account of BUT, very different from this of Mr. Locke :

“ *Mess.* Madam, he ’s well.

Cleo. Well said.

Mess. And friends with Cæsar.

Cleo. Thou art an honest man.

Mess. Cæsar and he are greater friends than ever.

Cleo. Make thee a fortune from me.

Mess. BUT—YET—Madam,—

Cleo. I do not like BUT—YET.—It does allay
The good precedent. Fie upon BUT,—YET.—
BUT—YET—is as a jaylour, to bring forth
Some monstrous malefactor.”

Anthony and Cleopatra, act 2. sc. 5.

where you may observe that YET (tho’ used elegantly here, to mark more strongly the hesitation of the speaker) is merely superfluous to the sense ; as it is always when used after BOT : for either BOT or YET alone has the very same effect, and will always be found (especially BOT) to *allay* equally the *Good* or the *Bad**

* “ *Speed.* Item, She hath more hairs than wit, and more faults than hairs ; BUT more wealth than faults.

Laun. Stop there. She was mine, and not mine, twice or thrice in that article. Rehearse that once more.

Speed. Item, She hath more hair than wit.

Laun. What ’s next ?

Speed. And more faults than hairs.

precedent; by something MORE* that follows. For *Botan* means—to BOOT†, i.e. to superadd‡, to supply,

Laun. That's monstrous! O that that were out!

Speed. BUT more wealth than faults.

Laun. Why that word makes the faults gracious."

Here the word BUT allays the *Bad* precedent; for which, without any shifting of its own intrinsic signification, it is as well qualified as to allay the *Good*.

* So Tasso,

—————" *Am.* Oh, che mi dici ?

Silvia m'attende, ignuda, e sola? *Tir.* Sola,

Se non quanto v'è *Dafne*, ch'è per noi.

Am. Ignuda ella m'aspetta? *Tir.* Ignuda: MA—

Am. Oimè, *che* MA? Tu taci, tu m'uccidi."

Aminta, att. 2. sc. 3.

where the difference of the construction in the English and the Italian is worth observing; and the reason evident, why in the question consequent to the conjunction, *what* is placed *after* the one, but *before* the other.

Boot what? }
i. e.
But what? }

{ *What more?*
i. e.
{ *Che ma?*

† S. Johnson and others have mistaken the expression—*To Boot*—(which still remains in our language) for a substantive; which is indeed the Infinitive of the same verb, of which the conjunction is the Imperative. As the Dutch also still retain *Boeten* in their language, with the same meaning.

‡ "Perhaps it may be thought improper for me to address you on this subject. BUT a moment, my Lords, and it will evidently appear, that you are equally blameable for an omission of duty here also."

This may be supposed an abbreviation of construction, for "BUT indulge me with a moment, my Lords, and it will," &c. But there is no occasion for such a supposition.

to substitute, to atone for, to compensate with, to remedy with, to make amends with, to add something MORE in order to make up a deficiency in something else.

So likewise in the *third* and *fourth* instances (taken from Chillingworth)*. Mr. Locke has attributed to BUT a meaning which can only be collected from the words which follow it.

But Mr. Locke says,—“ IF it were his business to

* Knott had said,—“ How can it be in us a fundamental error to say, the Scripture alone is not judge of controversies, SEEING (notwithstanding this our belief) we use for interpreting of Scripture all the means which they prescribe; as prayer, conferring of places, consulting the originals,” &c.

To which Chillingworth replies,

“ You pray, BUT it is not that God would bring you to the true religion, BUT that he would confirm you in your own. You confer places, BUT it is, that you may confirm or colour over with plausible disguises your erroneous doctrines; not that you may judge of them and forsake them, if there be reason for it. You consult the originals, BUT you regard them not when they make against your doctrine or translation.”

In all these places, BUT (i. e. BOT, or, as we now pronounce the verb, BOOT) only directs something to be added or supplied, in order to make up some deficiency in Knott's expressions of “ prayer, conferring of places,” &c. And so far indeed as an omission of something is improper, BUT (by ordering it's insertion) may be said “ to intimate a supposition in the mind of the speaker, of something otherwise than it should be.” But that intimation is only, as you see, by consequence; and not by the intrinsic signification of the word BUT.

examine it (BUT) in its full latitude.”—And that he “*intends not here* a full explication of this sort of signs.” And yet he adds, that—“ the instances he has given in this one (BUT) may lead us into the contemplation of several *actions of our minds* in discoursing, which it has *found a way* to intimate to others by these particles.” And these, it must be remembered, are *Actions*, or as he before termed them THOUGHTS of our minds, for which he has said, we have “ either *none or very deficient names*.”

Now if it had been so, (which in truth it is not) it was surely for that reason, most especially the business of an Essay on Human *Understanding*, to examine these Signs in their *full latitude* : and to give a *full explication* of them. Instead of which, neither *Here*, nor *elsewhere*, has Mr. Locke given *Any* explication whatever.

Though I have said much, I shall also omit much which might be added in support of this double etymology of BUT : nor should I have dwelt so long upon it, but in compliment to Mr. Locke ; whose opinions in any matter are not slightly to be rejected, nor can they be modestly controverted without very strong arguments.

None of the etymologists have been aware of this corrupt use of *one* word for *two**.

* Nor have etymologists been any more aware of the meaning or true derivation of the words corresponding with BUT in

Minshew, keeping only one half of our modern BUT

other languages. Vossius derives the Latin conjunction AT from *atap*; and AST from AT, "inserto s." (But how or why s happens to be inserted, he does not say.) Now to what purpose is such sort of etymology? Suppose it was derived from this doubtful word *atap*; what intelligence does this give us? Why not as well stop at the Latin word AT, as at the Greek word *atap*? Is it not such sort of trifling etymology (for I will not give even that name to what is said by Scaliger and Nunnesius concerning SED) which has brought all etymological inquiry into disgrace?

Vossius is indeed a great authority; but, when he has nothing to justify an useless conjecture but a similarity of sound, we ought not to be afraid of opposing an appearance of Reason to him.

It is contrary to the customary progress of corruption in words to derive AST from AT. Words do not gain but lose letters in their progress; nor has unaccountable accident any share in their corruption; there is always a good reason to be given for every change they receive: and, by a good reason, I do not mean those cabalistical words Metathesis, Epenthesis, &c. by which etymologists work such miracles; but at least a probable or anatomical reason for those not arbitrary operations.

Adsit, Adst, Ast, At.—This conjecture is not a little strengthened both by the antient method of writing this conjunction, and by the reason which Scaliger gives for it.—"AT fuit AD; *accessionem enim dicit.*"—*De C. L. L.* cap. 173.

I am not at all afraid of being ridiculed for the above derivation, by any one who will give himself the trouble to trace the words (corresponding with BUT) of any language to their source: though they should not all be quite so obvious as the French *Mais*, the Italian *Ma*, the Spanish *Mas*, or the Dutch *Maar*.

in contemplation, has sought for its derivation in the Latin imperative *Putā*.

Junius confines his explanation to the other half; which he calls its “*primariam significationem*.”

And Skinner, willing to embrace them both, found no better method to reconcile two *contradictory* meanings, than to say hardily that the transition from one* to the other† was—“*LEVI FLEXU!*”

Junius says—“*BUT*, Chaucero T. C. v. 194. *bis positum pro Sine*. *Primus locus est in summo columnæ, —‘BUT temperaunce in tene.’—Alter est in columnæ medio,*

‘His golden carte with firy bemes bright
Foure yoked stedes, full different of hew,
BUT baite or tiring through the spheres drew.’

ubi, tamen perperam, primo BOUT pro BUT reposueram: quod iterum delevi, cum (sub finem ejusdem poematis) incidissem in hunc locum,—

‘*BUT* mete or drinke she dressed her to lie
In a darke corner of the hous alone’—

atque adeo exinde quoque observare cœpi frequentissimam esse hanc particulæ acceptionem. In Æneide quoque Scotica passim occurrunt ‘BUT spot or

* Id est, a direction to leave out something.

† Id est, a direction to superadd something.

falt, 3. 53.—“ BUT *ony indigence,* 4. 20.—‘ BUT *sentence or ingyne,* 5. 41.—‘ *principal poet BUT pere,* 9. 19.—atque ita porro. BUT videtur dictum quasi *Be-ut*, pro quo Angli dicunt WITHOUT : unde quoque, hujus derivationis intuitu, præsens hujus Particulæ acceptio videbitur ostendere hanc esse *primariam ejus significationem.*”

The extreme carelessness and ignorance of Junius in this article is wonderful and beneath a comment.

Skinner says,—“ BUT, ut ubi dicimus *None BUT he*;—ab A.S. *Bute, Butan, præter, nisi, sine*; Hinc, LEVI FLEXU, postea cœpit, loco antiqui Anglo-Saxonici AC, *Sed* designare. *Bute* autem et *Butan* tandem deflecti possunt a præp. *Be, circa*; vel *Beon, esse*, et *Ute* vel *Utan, foris.*”

Mr. Tyrwhit in his Glossary says—“ BUT. prep. *Sax. Without.* Gloss. Ur.—I cannot say that I have myself observed this preposition in Chaucer, but I may have overlooked it. The Saxons used it very frequently; and how long the Scottish writers have laid it aside I am doubtful. It occurs repeatedly in Bp. Douglas.”

Knowing that no Englishman had yet laid this *preposition* aside, I was curious to see how many sentences Mr. Tyrwhit himself had written without the use of this preposition; and I confess I was a little disap-

pointed in not meeting with it till the fourth page of his preface: where he says—" Passages which have nothing to recommend them to credit, *BUT* the single circumstance of having been often repeated."

So in Chaucer throughout—" Hys study was *BUT* lytel on the Byble." But Mr. Tyrwhit was not aware that, in all such instances, *BUT* is as much a *preposition* as any in the language.

WITHOUT.

BUT (as distinguished from *Bot*) and *WITHOUT* have both exactly the same meaning, that is, in modern English, neither more nor less than—*Be-out*.

And they were both originally used indifferently either as *Conjunctions* or *Prepositions*. But later writers having adopted the false notions and distinctions of language maintained by the Greek and Latin Grammarians, have successively endeavoured to make the English language conform more and more to the same rules. Accordingly *WITHOUT*, in approved modern speech*, is now intirely confined to the office of a

* It is however used as a *Conjunction* by Lord Mansfield in Horne's Trial, page 56.

" It cannot be read, *WITHOUT* the Attorney General consents to it."

And yet, if this reverend Earl's authority may be safely quoted for any thing, it must be for *Words*. It is so unsound in matter of law, that it is frequently rejected even by himself.

Preposition ; and BUT is generally though not always used as a *Conjunction*. In the same manner as *Nisi* and *Sine* in Latin are distributed ; which do both likewise mean exactly the same, with no other difference than that, in the former the *negation precedes*, and in the other it *follows* the verb.

Skinner only says,—“ WITHOUT, ab A.S. wiðutan, *Extra*.”

S. Johnson makes it a *Preposition*, an *Adverb*, and a *Conjunction* ; and under the head of a *Conjunction*, says, “ WITHOUT, *Conjunct*. Unless ; if not ; Except—*Not in use*.”

Its true derivation and meaning are the same as those of BUT (from Butan).

It is nothing but the Imperative *pýpðutan*, from the Anglo-Saxon and Gothic verb *peopðan*, *ΨΑΙΚΘΑΝ* ; which in the Anglo-Saxon and English languages is yoked and incorporated with the verb *Beon esse*. And this will account to Mr. Tyrwhit for the remark which he has made, viz. that—“ *By* and *With* are often synonymous*.”

In modern English we have retained only a small

* “ *Without* and *Within*. *Bucan* and *Binnan* : originally, I suppose, *Bi utan* and *Bi innan*. *By* and *With* are often synonymous.” *Glossary*.

portion of it; but our old English authors had not lost the use of any part of this verb *peopðan*, and frequently employed it, instead of *BE*, in every part of the conjugation.

"But I a draught haue of that welle,
In whiche my deth is and my lyfe;
My ioye is tourned in to strife,
That sobre shall I neuer WORTHE."

Gower, lib. 5. fol. 128. pag. 2. col. 2.

"Wo WORTHE the fayre gemme vertulesse,
Wo WORTH that herbe also that doth no bote,
Wo WORTH the beaute that is routhlesse,
Wo WORTH that wight trede eche under fote."

Chaucer, Troylus, boke 3. fol. 165. pag. 1. col. 1.

"The broche of Thebes was of suche kynde,
So ful of rubies and of stones of Inde,
That euery wight that sette on it an eye
He wende anone to WORTHE out of his mynde."

Complaynt of Mars, fol. 343. pag. 2. col. 2.

"In cais thay bark I compt it neuer ane myte,
Quha can not hald thare pece ar fre to flite,
Chide quhill thare hedis riffe, and hals WORTHE hace."

Douglas, Prol. to booke 3. pag. 66.

"Thay WOURTH affrayit of that suddane sycht."

Douglas, booke 8. pag. 244.

"Wo WORTH euer false enuie."

Gower, lib. 8. fol. 181. pag. 1. col. 2.

"Wo WORTH all slowe."

Gower, lib. 8. fol. 188. pag. 2. col. 1.

"Sir Thopas wold out ryde,
He WORTH upon his stede gray,
And in his honde a launce gay,
A long swerde by his syde."

Chaucer, Ryme of Syr Thopas, fol. 172. pag. 2. col. 1.

“ O mother myn, that cleaped were Argyue,
Wo WORTH that day, that thou me bare on lyue.”
Troilus, boke 3. fol. 186. pag. 2. col. 1.

“ Than in my mynd of mony thingis I musit,
And to the goddes of vildernes, as is usit,
Quilk Hamadriades hait, I wourschip maid,
Beseiking this auisioun WORTH happy,
And the orakil prosperite suld signify.”
Douglas, booke 3. pag. 68.

“ Pallas astonist of so hie ane name
As Dardanus, abasit WORTH for schame.”
Douglas, booke 8. pag. 244.

“ His hals WORTH dry of blude.”
Douglas, booke 8. pag. 250.

“ The large ground WORTH grisly unto se.”
Douglas, booke 11. pag. 385.

“ In lesuris and on lewis litill lammes
Full tait and trig socht bletand to thare dammes,
Tydy ky lowis velis, by thaym rynniss,
And snod and slekit WORTH thir beistis skinniss.”
Douglas, *Prol.* to booke 12. pag. 402.

“ Quhat wenys thou, freynd, thy craw be WORTHIN quhite.”
Douglas, *Prol.* to booke 3. pag. 66.

“ And quhen thay bene assemblit all in fere,
Than glaid scho WOURTHIS.”
Douglas, booke 13. pag. 458.

“ Euer as the batel WORTHIS mare cruel,
Be effusion of blude and dyntis fel.”
Douglas, booke 7. pag. 237.

“ Wod wroith he WORTHIS for disdene and dispite.”
Douglas, booke 12. pag. 423.

A N D.

M. Casaubon supposes AND to be derived from the Greek *ετα*, *postea*.

Skinner says—"Nescio an a Lat. *Addere* q.d. *Adde*, interjectâ per Epenthesis N, ut in *Render* a *Reddendo*."

Lye supposes it to be derived from the Greek *ετι*, *adhuc*, *præterea*, *etiam*, *quinetiam*, *insuper*.

I have already given the derivation which, I believe, will alone stand examination.

I shall only remark here, how easily men take upon trust, how willingly they are satisfied with, and how confidently they repeat after others, false explanations of what they do not understand.—Conjunctions, it seems, are to have their denomination and definition from the use to which they are applied: *per accidens*, *essentiam*. Prepositions connect words; but—"the Conjunction connects or joins together sentences; so as out of two to make one sentence. Thus—'You and I and Peter, rode to London*,' is one sentence made up of three," &c.

* "*Petrus et Paulus disputant*: id est, *Petrus disputat et Paulus disputat*."—Sanctii Minerva, lib. 1. cap. 18.

So again, lib. 3. cap. 14.: "*Cicero et filius valent*. Figura

Well! So far matters seem to go on very smoothly.
It is,

“ You rode, I rode, Peter rode.”

But let us now change the instance, and try some others, which are full as common, though not altogether so convenient.

TWO AND TWO are four.

AB AND BC AND CA form a Triangle.

John AND Jane are a handsome couple.

Does AB form a triangle, BC form a triangle? &c.—
Is John a couple? Is Jane a couple?—Are two four?

If the definition of a Conjunction is adhered to, I am afraid that AND, in such instances, will appear to be no more a Conjunction (that is a connector of sentences) than *Though* in the instance I have given under that word: or than *But*, in Mr. Locke's *second* instance: or than *Else*, when called by S. Johnson a Pronoun: or than *Since*, when used for *Sithence* or for *Syne*. In short, I am afraid that the Grammarians will scarcely have an entire Conjunction left: for I apprehend that there is not one of those words which they call Conjunctions, which is not sometimes used (and that very properly) without connecting sentences.

Syllepsis est: ut, *valet Cicero, et valet filius*. Which Perizonius sufficiently confutes, by these instances—‘*Emi librum x drachmis et IV obolis.*’ *Saulus et Paulus sunt fidem.*”

L E S T.

Junius only says—"LEST, *least*, minimus. v. *little*." Under *Least*, he says—"LEAST, *lest*, minimus. Contractum est ex ελαχιστος. v. *little*, parvus." And under *Little*, to which he refers us, there is nothing to the purpose.

Skinner says—"LEST, ab A.S. Læȝ, minus, q. d. *quo minus hoc fiat*."

S. Johnson says,—“LEST, Conj. (from the Adjective *Least*) *That not*.”

This last deduction is a curious one indeed ; and it would puzzle as sagacious a reasoner as S. Johnson to supply the middle steps to his conclusion from *Least* (which always however means *some*) to “*That not*” (which means *none at all*). It seems as if, when he wrote this, he had already in his mind a presentiment of some future occasion in which such reasoning would be convenient. As thus,—“The Mother Country, the seat of government, must necessarily enjoy the greatest share of dignity, power, rights, and privileges: an united or associated kingdom must have in some degree a smaller share; and their colonies the *least* share;”—that is, (according to S. Johnson*) *None of any kind*.

* Johnson's merit ought not to be denied to him; but his Dictionary is the most imperfect and faulty, and the least valu-

It has been proposed by no small authority (Wallis followed by Lowth) to alter the spelling of *LEST* to *Least*; and vice versa. "Multi," says Wallis, "pro *Lest* scribunt *Least* (ut distinguatur a Conjunctione *Lest*, ne, ut non): Verum omnino contra analogiam Grammaticæ. Mallem ego Adjectivum *lest*, Conjunctionem *least* scribere."

"The superlative *Least*," says Lowth, "ought rath-

able of any of his productions; and that share of merit which it possesses, makes it by so much the more hurtful. I rejoice however, that though the least valuable, he found it the most profitable: for I could never read his Preface without shedding a tear. And yet it must be confessed, that his *Grammar* and *History* and *Dictionary* of what *he calls* the English language, are in all respects (except the bulk of the latter) most truly contemptible performances; and a reproach to the learning and industry of a nation, which could receive them with the slightest approbation.

Nearly one third of this Dictionary is as much the language of the Hottentots as of the English; and it would be no difficult matter so to translate any one of the plainest and most popular numbers of the *Spectator* into the language of that Dictionary, that no mere Englishman, though well read in his own language, would be able to comprehend one sentence of it.

It appears to be a work of labour, and yet is in truth one of the most idle performances ever offered to the public: compiled by an author who possessed not one single requisite for the undertaking, and, being a publication of a set of booksellers, owing its success to that very circumstance which alone must make it impossible that it should deserve success.

er to be written without the A ; as Dr. Wallis has long ago observed. The Conjunction of the same sound might be written with the A, for distinction."

S. Johnson judiciously dissents from this proposal, but for no other reason but because he thinks " the profit is not worth the change."

Now though they all concur in the same Etymology, I will venture to affirm that LEST for *Lesed* (as *blest* for *blessed*, &c.) is nothing else but the participle past of *Lejan*, *dimittere* ; and, with the article *That* (either expressed or understood) means no more than *hoc dimisso* or *quo dimisso**.

And, if this explanation and etymology of LEST is right, (of which I have not the smallest doubt,) it furnishes one caution more to learned critics, not to innovate rashly : *Lest*, whilst they attempt to amend a language, as they imagine, in one trifling respect, they mar it in others of more importance ; and by their cor-

* As LES the Imperative of *Lejan* is sometimes used for UNLESS, as has been already shewn under the article *Unless* : so is the same Imperative LES sometimes used instead of the participle LEST.

" I knew it was past four houris of day,
And thocht I wald na langare ly in May ;
LES Phœbus suld me losingere attaynt."

G. Douglass, *Prol. to the 12th book of Eneados.*

rupt alterations and amendments confirm error, and make the truth more difficult to be discovered by those who come after.

Mr. Locke says, and it is agreed on all sides, that—“it is in the right use of these” (*Particles*) “that more particularly consists the clearness and beauty of a good style :” and that, “these words, which are *not truly by themselves the names of any ideas*, are of constant and indispensable use in language ; and do much contribute to men’s well expressing themselves.”

Now this, I am persuaded, would never have been said, had these *Particles* been understood ; for it proceeds from nothing but the difficulty of giving any rule or direction concerning their use ; and that difficulty arises from a mistaken supposition that they are not “*by themselves the names of any ideas* :” and in that case indeed I do not see how any rational rules concerning their use could possibly be given. But I flatter myself that henceforward, the true force and nature of these words being clearly understood, the proper use of them will be so evident, that any rule concerning their use will be totally unnecessary : as it would be thought absurd to inform any one that when he means to direct *an addition*, he should not use a word which directs *to take away*.

I am induced to mention this in this place, from the very improper manner in which *LEST* (more than any

other Conjunction) is often used by our best authors ; those who are most conversant with the learned languages being most likely to make the mistake.—“ You make use of such indirect and crooked arts as these to blast my reputation, and to possess men’s minds with disaffection to my person ; LEST peradventure, they might with some indifference hear reason from me.” *Chillingworth’s Preface to the Author of Charity maintained, &c.*

Here LEST is well used—“ You make use of these arts :”—Why? The reason follows,—“ *Lered that,*” i. e. *Hoc dimisso*—“ men might hear reason from me.—Therefore,—you use these arts.”

Instances of the improper use of LEST may be found in almost every author that ever wrote in our language ; because none of them have been aware of the true meaning of the word ; and have been misled by supposing it to be perfectly correspondent to some Conjunctions in other languages ; which it is not.

Thus *King Henry the Eighth*, in *A Necessary Doctrine, &c. sixte petition*, says,—“ If we suffer the fyrste suggestion unto synne to tarry any whyle in our hartes, it is great peryll LEST that consent and dede wyll folowe shortly after.”

Thus *Ascham*, in his *Scholemaster*, says,—“ If a yong

gentleman will venture himself into the companie of ruffians, it is over great a jeopardie, **LEST** their facions, maners, thoughts, taulke, and dedes will verie sone be over like."

Any tolerable judge of English will immediately perceive something aukward and improper in these sentences; though he cannot tell why. Yet the reason will be very plain to him, when he knows the meaning of these unmeaning particles (as they have been called): for he will then see at once that **LEST** has no business in the sentences; there being nothing *dimisso*, in consequence of which something else would follow: and that, if he would employ **LEST**, the sentences must be arranged otherwise.

As,—“ We must take heed that the first suggestion unto sin, tarry not any while in our hearts, **LEST** that,” &c.

“ A young gentleman should be careful not to venture himself, &c.” **LEST**, &c.”

“ Il est bon quelquefois (says Leibnitz) d'avoir la complaisance d'examiner certaines objections: car, outre que cela peut servir à tirer les gens de leur erreur, il peut arriver que nous en profitons nous-mêmes. Car les paralogismes specieux renferment souvent quelque ouverture utile, et donnent lieu à resoudre quelques

difficultés considerables. C'est pourquoi j'ai toujours aimé des objections ingénieuses contre mes propres sentiments, et je ne les ai jamais examinées sans fruit*."

I shall, in this instance, be more complaisant than Leibnitz; and will descend to examine objections which are neither specious nor ingenious: and the rather because (before their publication) the substance of the *Criticisms on the Diversions of Purley* was, with singular industry and a characteristical affectation, gossiped by the present precious Secretary at War†, in Payne the bookseller's shop; the cannibal commencing with this modest observation, that—"I had found a mare's nest‡."

I shall examine them in this place, because one fourth part of these Criticisms (20 pages out of 79) is.

* *Essais de Theodicée. Discours de la conformité de la foi avec la raison.*

† The Rt. Hon. W. Windham. EDIT.

‡ This malignant and false observation was heard with an appearance of satisfaction which prudence dictated to the hearer; and communicated with that disgust which a liberal royalist always feels at Renegado illiberality. "No, (said my antipolitical communicating friend) I will never descend with him beneath even a Japanese: and I remember what Voltaire remarks of that country;—Le Japon était partagé en plusieurs sectes, quoique sous un roi Pontife. Mais toutes les sectes se réunissaient dans les mêmes principes de Morales. Ceux qui croient la metempsychose, et ceux qui n'y croient pas, s'abstenaient, et s'abstiennent encore aujourd'hui, *de manger la chair des animaux qui rendent service à l'homme.*"

employed in objections to the derivation of **UNLESS**, **ELSE**, and **LEST**: which have all three one meaning (viz. of *Separation*), and are all, as I contend, portions of the same verb *Leran*. i. e. of *On-leran*, *A-leran*, *Leran*.

My Norwich critics (for I shall couple them) blame me,

1. For the obscurity of my *Title-page*. Page 2.*
2. For the matter of my *Introduction*. Page 3.
3. For the place of my *Advertisement*. Page 21.
4. For a very strong propension towards inaccuracy. Page 2.
5. For having "introduced one of the champions for intolerance," by quoting a Roman catholic bishop. Page 4.
6. For the imperfection of my Anglo-Saxon alphabet. Page 22.
7. And finally, For my politics. Page 32.†

* "Vix plane a me impetrare possum, quin exemplum sequar *Petri Francisci Giambullarii*, qui librum suum de linguae Florentinae origine scriptum, a *Johannis Baptistæ Gellii*, viri sibi amicitia et studiis conjunctissimi, cognomine, quem in scribendo socium et consiliarium habuit, Il Gello nuncupari voluit. Perinde quidem et mihi **THWAITESII** nomine librum nostrum inscribendo, si per modestiam ejus liceret, nobis faciendum esset."—*G. Hickes*.

† Mr. Secretary and his secretary will not be surprised that their disapprobation does not move me; when they consider that, as far as corrupt and unbridled power has been able to en-

All these I willingly abandon to their mercy and discretion ; although they have not shewn any symptoms of either.

But I should be sorry if any of my readers were hastily misled by them to believe,

1st. That “ Grammar was one of the *First* arts which probably engaged the attention of the curious.” Pag. 4.

For the contrary is not a matter of conjecture, but of historical fact : and whoever pleases may know at what precise period Grammar, as an art, had its commencement in every nation of Europe.

Or 2dly. That “ The desire which arises in the mind, *next* to that of communicating thought, is certainly to use such signs as will convey the meaning clearly and precisely.” Pag. 19.

For a desire of *communicating thought*, and a desire of *conveying our meaning* clearly and precisely (though expressed by different words), are not two desires, but one desire: for *as far as* our meaning is not conveyed

force the decree, I have, on account of these politics, been, for the last thirty years, robbed of the fair use of life, *interdictus aqua et igni*: and, by what I can prognosticate, I suppose I am still to lay down my life for them. I might have quitted them, as Mr. Secretary has done, and have received the reward of my treachery. But my politics will never be changed, nor be kept back on any occasion : and whilst I have my life, it will neither be embittered by any regret for the past, nor fear for the future.

clearly and precisely, it is not conveyed at all ; *so far* there is no communication of thought.

Or 3dly. That “ This desire of conveying our meaning clearly and precisely naturally leads to the use of abbreviations : and that abbreviations seem to bear a much stronger affinity to the desire of perspicuity than to that of dispatch.” Pag. 20.

For, to satisfy himself that the desire of clearness and perspicuity does not lead to the use of abbreviations, (which are substitutes,) any person needs only to consult the legal instruments of any civilized nation in the world : for in these instruments, perspicuity or clearness is the only object. Now these legal instruments have always been, and always must be, remarkably more tedious and prolix than any other writings, in which the same clearness and precision are not equally important. For abbreviations open a door for doubt ; and, by the use of them, what we gain in time we lose in precision and certainty. In common discourse we save time by using the short substitutes HE and SHE and THEY and IT ; and (with a little care on one side and attention on the other) they answer our purpose very well ; or if a mistake happens, it is easily set right. But this substitution will not be risqued in a legal instrument ; and the drawer thinks himself compelled, for the sake of certainty, to say—HE (the said John A.) to HIM (the said Thomas B.) for THEM (the said William C. and Anne D.) as often as those persons are men-

tioned *. And for the same reason he is compelled to employ many other prolixities of the same kind.

Or 4thly. That "A desire of variety gave birth to Pronouns in language, which otherwise would not have appeared in it." Pag. 20.

For Pronouns prevent variety.

Or 5thly. That "Articles and Pronouns are neither Nouns nor Verbs." Page 26.

For I hope hereafter to satisfy the reader that they are nothing else, and *can be* nothing else.

Or 6thly. That Johnson considered Skinner as so ignorant that his authority ought not to be regarded. Pag. 39.†

For Johnson speaks of him as one whom "he ought not to mention but with the reverence due to his in-

* Abbreviations and substitutes undoubtedly cannot safely be trusted in legal instruments. But it is an unnecessary prolixity and great absurdity which at present prevails, to retain the substitute in these writings at the same time with the principal, for which alone the substitute is ever inserted, and for which it is merely a proxy. HE, SHE, THEY, IT, WHO, WHICH, &c. should have no place in these instruments, but be altogether banished from them. And I know a Solicitor of eminence who, at my suggestion, near twenty years ago, did banish them.

† Skinner, indeed, translates Onlerjan, or rather Alejan, to *dismiss*. "But Skinner is often ignorant," says Dr. Johnson.

structor and benefactor," and to whom he was chiefly indebted for his northern etymologies*.

Or 7thly. That I have myself represented Junius as a "very careless and ignorant" writer. Pag. 51.†

For (under the article AN) I have noticed "the judicious distinction which Johnson has made between Junius and Skinner." And when I had occasion (under the article BUT) to say that he was careless and ignorant concerning that particular word, I mentioned it as "*wonderful*." But thus these critics meanly attempt to mislead their readers: catching at the word *ignorant* (which when applied to a person in a particular instance, means only that he *did not know* that particular thing,) in order fraudulently to fasten an imputation of *general ignorance*.

Or 8thly. That those who have spelled LESS with a single s, were not "civilized people‡:" i. e. (I sup-

* "For the Teutonic etymologies I am commonly indebted to Junius and Skinner, the only names which I have forbore to quote when I copied their books: not that I might appropriate their labours or usurp their honours, but that I might spare a perpetual repetition by one general acknowledgement. These I ought not to mention but with the reverence due to instructors and benefactors."—*Johnson's Preface*.

† "You have here, however, the authority of Junius, who puts down these verbs as being the origin; but I have yours to say, that he was sometimes very careless and ignorant."

Page 51 of the *Criticisms*.

‡ "The orthography of this word, I presume to say, is LESS.

pose) not capable of the accustomed relations of peace and amity.

Or 9thly. That "The blemishes of Johnson's Dictionary are not of the kind *quas incuria fudit*, but the result of too much nicety and exactness." Pag. 46.—But of this in another place : for it is of more consequence than any thing which relates to these Norwich critics.

Or, 10thly. That it requires much practice in the Anglo-Saxon or old English writers, and much attention to the circumstance, to observe "the various spellings of one and the same word in the language*."

For not only are almost all the words spelled differently by different authors ; but even by the same author, in the same book, in the same page, and frequently in the same line.

Or, 11thly. That I "desire to pass my sentiments upon others, as articles of faith." Pag. 76.†

And it should seem as if civilized people had no other way of spelling it."—Page 40.

* "My taste for the Anglo-Saxon has never induced me to attend to the various spellings of one and the same word in the language."—Page 51 of the *Criticisms*.

† This groundless apprehension is not unnatural in *one* of my critics. He startles at his own expression—an article of faith. But fear not me, Cassander. I pay the same regard to a sickly conscience that I do to a sickly appetite : and I have known those

My critics commence with a solemn protestation, that they "aim at nothing but a fair representation of the truth." Pag. v.

Yet twice in the 7th page, and twice in the 8th page, and again in the 25th page of the *Criticisms*, they pretend to quote my words; and falsely, to serve their own purpose, insert a word of their own. My words are—"Abbreviations *employed* for the sake of dispatch." They, five times repeatedly, assert that my words are—"words *necessary* for dispatch."

In their 8th page they twice assert that I "rank *Articles, Prepositions, and Conjunctions*, under the title of *Abbreviations*:" and in their 11th page they assert, that I have made "Abbreviations the principal object of the work" I have published, i. e. of the first edition of this volume.

I hope I have there spoken with sufficient clearness to make it impossible for any attentive reader to fall into such an error; or to suppose that I have hitherto

who, like some honest sectaries, have fainted at the smell of roast beef. No, I shall never wish to impose articles of faith on others, though I am not scared at their imposition upon me. I am a willing conformist to all that is not fatal. I would surely reject poison, i. e. power in the priesthood, and despotism any where; but otherwise I am not dainty; and can feed heartily upon any wholesome food, both in the church and out of it; although it might happen to be coarse and not overpleasing to my palate.

spoken one word about those *Abbreviations* which compose my second class. It is evident however that my Critics made no such mistake, but falsified the matter willfully : for, in their 35th page, they contradict their own previous statement, and acknowledge the fact.—“Conjunctions in your system (say they) are not separate parts of speech, but words belonging to the species either of Nouns or Verbs.”

I hardly think it necessary to inform the reader, that I have hitherto spoken little of the *Noun*, nothing of the *Verb*, and nothing of the *Abbreviations* ; but have chiefly employed myself to get rid of the false doctrine concerning Conjunctions, Prepositions and Adverbs. The method I have taken may perhaps be injudicious : indeed I have been told so : I may perhaps have begun at the wrong end : but I did it not wantonly or carelessly, but after the most mature reflection, and with the view of lessening the difficulties and sparing the labour of those who may chuse to proceed with me in this inquiry. Perhaps, when we come to the close of it, my readers will feel with me (they will hardly feel so forcibly as I do) the justness of the following reflection of Mr. Necker—“Je reviens à mon triste travail. On aura peine, je le crains, à se former une idée de son étendue ; car, *en resultat, tout devient simple* : et l'un des premiers effets de la methode, c'est de cacher les difficultés vaincues : aussi dans les plus grandes

choses comme dans les plus petites, tous ceux qui jouissent de l'ordre n'en connoissent pas le merite*."

In their 13th page, they say, that "It is evident from my words, that, in my opinion, Mr. Locke was no better than in a mist when he wrote his famous Essay."

In their 12th page, they represent me (who have denied any abstract or complex ideas) as affirming—"that, in my opinion, it is the term that gives birth to the abstract idea."

Because I have, in the 255th page of my first edition, observed that "it is contrary to the *customary* progress of corruption in words to gain letters;" and in the 131st page, that "Letters, like soldiers, are very apt to desert and drop off in a long march:"—they twice, in their 41st page, represent me as denying the possibility that any word should ever gain a letter†, or be written by any succeeding author with more letters than by his predecessor.

Because I have, in the 218th page of my first edition, given the corresponding *Terminations* in the other

* Nouveaux Ecclaircissemens sur le Comte Rendu.

† I had given instances in *Unles*, *Whiles*, *Amiddes*, *Amonges*, which afterwards became *Unless*, *Whilst*, *Amidst*, *Amongst*.

northern languages ; which terminations I suppose likewise, as well as LESS (which is not a modern English imperative) to have been originally the imperatives of their verbs ; they, in their 44th page, and again in their 46th page, charge me with “contending” that LOOS (so written) is the *present modern* imperative in Dutch.

In their 55th page, though I call Douglas (in the very place alluded to by them) “one of the most common of our old English authors ;” they would make their readers believe that I produce him “as an Anglo-Saxon writer.”

In the conclusion of their *Criticisms* they say—“Professor Schultens was the *first* philologist who *suspected* Prepositions, Conjunctions, Particles in general to be no more than Nouns or *Verbs*, and *refused* therefore to make separate classes of them, among those that comprehend the Parts of Speech. But he confined himself in the application of this *truth* to the learned *languages*. You are the first who *applied it* to those which are called modern.”

These are the gentlemen who commence with a solemn protestation, that they “aim at nothing but a fair representation of the truth.” And yet, in the above extract, there is not a single proposition that does not convey more than one willful falsehood.

I will here insert the whole which Schultens has said upon the subject.

“SECTION V.

“LXV. Partes orationis Hebræis eædem quæ Græcis, Latinis, omnibus populis. Ad tres classes concinne satis omnes illæ partes revocari solent, Verbum, Nomen, *Particulam*. Ab Arabibus distinctionem hanc hausere primi grammatici Hebræorum. In *Gjarumia* habes, Partes orationis tres sunt, Nomen, et Verbum, et Particula, quæ venit in significationem. Apud Rabbinos similiter Nomen, Actio, id est Verbum, et Vox, sive Particula. Veteres Stoici quatuor classes fecere. Alii plures, alii pauciores adhuc, solo Nomine et Verbo contenti. Optima divisio Theodectis, et Aristotelis, apud Dion. Halic. in *Ονοματα, Ρηματα, Συνδεσμος*. Eam laudat unice Quintil. Nomina, Verba, et Convictiones, reddens: ut nomina exhibeant *materiam*, verba *vim* sermonis, in convictionibus autem *complexus* eorum indicetur. Consulendus de hisce *G. J. Voss*. qui dubium censet utrum Orientales hac in re imitati sint Græcos, an Græci potius secuti sint exemplum Orientalium. Mihi Arabes ex Aristotele hausisse, planissime liquet.”

The above is a mere transcript from Vossius, to whom Schultens very fairly refers us*. He then proceeds to

* “ De numero partium orationis diu est, quod tribus grammaticæ controversantur. Antiquissima eorum est opinio, qui

apply this doctrine in the Hebrew language alone.—

“Idem dixerim de methodo grammaticam texendi secundum has orationis partes. Arabes et Judæi a Verbo incipere solent, quod tanquam radix sit, unde Nomina et Particulæ *propagentur*.

tres faciunt classes. Estque hæc Arabum quoque sententia, quibus hæ classes vocantur Nomen, Verbum, et Particula. Hebræi quoque (qui cum Arabes grammaticam scribere desinerent, artem eam *demum* scribere cœperunt; quod ante annos contigit circiter quadringentos) Hebræi, inquam, hac in re secuti sunt magistros suos Arabes. . . . Imo vero trium classium numerum aliæ etiam Orientis linguæ retinent. Dubium, utrum ea in re Orientales imitati sint antiquos Græcorum: an hi potius secuti sint Orientalium exemplum. Utut est, etiam veteres Græcos tres tantum partes agnovisse, non solum autor est Dionysius: sed etiam Quintilianus testatur, ubi hanc Aristotelis ipsius, ac Theodectis sententiam fuisse docet. Idemque de veteribus Græcis testatur Rabbinus iste qui, &c.

“Atque ex Arabibus grammaticis eandem sequitur *Giarumia* auctor Muhamed Sanhagius. Postea autem antiquissimi Stoicorum quatuor classes fecerunt. Imo nec defuere, qui alias asserendo divisiones ampliorem facerent numerum Partium Orationis. Quorum omnium autor nobis Dionysius Halicarnassensis. Addam et insignem locum Quintiliani,—‘Veteres, quorum fuerunt Aristoteles quoque, atque Theodectes, Verba modo et Nomina et Convictiones tradiderunt. Videlicet, quod in verbis *vim sermonis*, in nominibus *materiam*, in convictionibus autem *complexum* eorum esse judicaverunt.’—Sed ut omnis hæc disputatio melius intelligatur, non abs re erit, si quæ a Dionysio et Prisciano scribuntur accuratius expendamus. Duæ sunt principes partes, Nomen et Verbum: de quibus solis iccirco Aristoteles agit libro *Περὶ ἑρμηνείας*.”

G. J. Vossius *De Arte Gram.* lib. 3. cap. 1.

“ Verba nempe tanquam radices sunt unde Nomina *propagantur*, variis formis, et terminationibus : itemque Particulæ ; sub quibus Pronomina, Adverbia, Præpositiones, Conjunctiones, et Interjectiones continentur. Et harum densa illa sylva a Nominibus ferme *succrevit*, quin ad classem Nominum *maximam partem* referenda.”

“ SECTIO VI.

“ xci. A Nomine pergimus ad Particulas. Eas recte dividunt in separatas et inseparabiles. Minus comoda distinctio cl. Altingii inter particulas declinabiles et indeclinabiles. Ad priores refert pronomina. Ad posteriores adverbia, præpositiones, conjunctiones, et interjectiones : Atqui et pronomina quædam non declinantur, et *bona pars* adverbiorum ac præpositionum patitur declinationem, quippe quæ *maximam partem* sunt Nomina, vel *Substantiva*, vel *Adjectiva*. Hoc si perspexissent primi grammatici, multo felicius naturam, vim, mutationem, et constructionem particularum expedire valuissent.”

“ xcvi. Particulas reliquas, sub quibus adverbia, præpositiones, conjunctiones, et interjectiones comprehensæ, minus rite indeclinabiles vocari, quod re vera declinentur, *præsertim* adverbia et præpositiones ; utpote veri nominis *substantiva* vel *adjectiva*, *maximam partem*. Rectius in separatas et inseparabiles dirimuntur. Separatarum classes distinctius subnotabo : atque sub sin-

gulis specimina quædam exhibebo.—Sic reliqua sunt *originis vel substantiva vel adjectiva*. Horum enucleatio *ampliora exigit spatia*. *Nonnulla infra tangentur*.

“ Apud Latinos quoque conjunctiones *multæ a nominibus oriundæ*, ut *Verum. Vero. Verum Enimvero. Quemadmodum. Quamquam*. Additum et verbum in *Quamlibet. Quolibet. Quovis*. Merum verbum est *Licet*, &c. De adverbii et præpositionibus idem submonitum velim.”

Thus it appears that Schultens, without reasoning at all upon the subject, took the old division of language exactly as he found it ; and, with his predecessors on the Oriental tongues, considered and ranked the *Particles* as a distinct part of speech. But he condemns the subdivision of particles into *declinable* and *indeclinable*, and proposes to divide them into *separate* and *inseparable*.

In my opinion neither of these distributions is blameable in the grammar of a particular language, whose object is only to assist a learner of that language : but the one subdivision is just as *unphilosophical* as the other. If the Particles are all merely Nouns or Verbs, they are equally so whether used separately or not. The term *inseparable*, instead of *not separated*, is likewise justifiable in Schultens, who confined himself to a dead language ; and who did not intend to consider the nature of general speech : for, in a dead language,

authority is every thing ; and those words which cannot be found to have been used separately by those who bequeathed it, are to us (speaking or writing it) not only *not separate* but *inseparable*.

But Schultens nowhere asserts that these particles are ALL nouns or verbs ; nor does he adduce a single argument on the subject. He evidently supposes that there might be particles which were neither nouns nor verbs : for, besides the separate rank which he allows them, his words are always carefully coupled when he speaks of these particles. He confines them to *Nouns, substantiva vel adjectiva* (he never adds *Verba*, which my Critics have modestly slipped in for him) ; but even then he always scrupulously repeats—*bona pars. multæ. maximam partem. ferme. præsertim. originis. oriundæ. propagantur. referenda. specimina quædam. Nonnulla tangentur. Horum enucleatio ampliora exigit spatia.*—In which (so far from being “ the *first* who suspected it”) he carefully and closely adopts the *qualifying* expressions of very many grammarians (especially Latin grammarians) who had used the same long before him. Many of these I have cited, who went much further in the *doctrine* than he has done : for it surely was not my business to sink them ; but to avail myself of their *partial* authority, and to recommend my *general* doctrine by their *partial* hints and suspicions.

But my Critics, who say that Schultens *suspected*, in

five lines further impudently convert this *suspicion* into a *Truth*, which they represent him as having demonstrated, or at least asserted : and with equal effrontery they tell us, he applied it to the dead *languages* ; and that I *applied* his *Truth* to those which are called modern.

It is however of little consequence to the reader from what quarter he may receive a discovered truth ; or (if it be a discovery) whose name it may bear ; nor do I feel the smallest anxiety on the subject. But bear with my infirmity, reader, if it be an infirmity.—The enemies of the *established* civil liberties of my country have hunted me through life, without a single personal charge against me through the whole course of my life ; but barely because I early descried their conspiracy, and foresaw and foretold the coming storm, and have to the utmost of my power *legally* resisted their corrupt, tyrannical and fatal innovations and usurpations : They have destroyed my fortunes : They have illegally barred and interdicted my usefulness to myself, my family, my friends, and my country : They have tortured my body* : They have aimed at my life and honour :—

* The antient legal and mild imprisonment of this country (mild both in manner and duration, compared to what we now see) was always held to be *Torture* and even *civil death*. What would our old, honest, uncorrupted lawyers and judges (to whom and to the law of the land the word CLOSE was in abhorrence) what would they have said to *seven months* of CLOSE custody,

Can you wonder that, whilst one of these critics takes a cowardly advantage (where I could make no defence) to brand me as an *acquitted Felon*, I am unwilling (where I can make a defence) that he should, in conjunction with his anonymous associate, exhibit me as a convicted plagiary and impostor? But no more of these cowardly assassins. I consign them to the lasting contempt they have well earned, and which no future *Title* will ever be able to obliterate from the name of *Windham*.

It may however be useful to examine the objections to my explanation of *UNLESS*, *ELSE*, and *LEST*; which are to be found in pages 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 51, 52, 53, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, of *The Criticisms on the Diversions of Purley*.

Four instances are produced, and only four, in which it is contended that my solution cannot be admitted.

“ I have already observed” (say the Critics, page 53) “ that it [*Alejan*] is not susceptible of the signification you have all along affixed to it as its primary one; but let us suppose it to signify *Dismiss*, and nothing besides; we shall find many phrases in which *ELSE* will

such as I have lately suffered, without a charge, without a legal authority (for their own monstrous law, which arbitrarily suspended the Habeas Corpus, did not authorize *CLOSE* custody), and without even the most flimsy pretence of any occasion for it?

hardly bear to be resolved into *Hoc dismisso**: witness the following, *Nothing else. How else. What else. Where else.*"

To have a proof of the solidity or futility of this objection, we must have complete sentences.

EXAMPLE 1. *Nothing ELSE.*

You shall have a fool's cap for your pains ; and *Nothing ELSE.*

RESOLUTION.

You shall have a fool's cap for your pains ; and *Nothing BUT* a fool's cap.

i. e. *BUT* for *Be-out.*

You shall have a fool's cap for your pains ; and *Nothing EXCEPT* a fool's cap.

You shall have a fool's cap for your pains ; and, *IF NOT* a fool's cap, *Nothing.*

You shall have a fool's cap for your pains ; and, *DISMISS* the fool's cap, *Nothing.*

EXAMPLE 2. *How ELSE.*

If a nation's liberties cannot be secured by a fair

* I have said that *ELSE* is the Imperative of *Alejan*, and means *Dimitte*, but they give what they please as my words.

representation of the people ; *How* ELSE can they be secured ?

RESOLUTION.

If a nation's liberties cannot be secured by a fair representation of the people ; WITHOUT it, *How* can they be secured ? i. e. WITHOUT for *Be-out*.

If a nation's liberties cannot be secured by a fair representation of the people ; EXCEPT by a fair representation of the people, *How* can they be secured ?

If a nation's liberties cannot be secured by a fair representation of the people ; DISMISS it, (i. e. a fair representation of the people,) *How* can they be secured ?

EXAMPLE 3. *What* ELSE.

You have shewn impotence and malice enough ; *What* ELSE have you shewn ?

RESOLUTION.

You have shewn impotence and malice enough ; *What* have you shewn BUT impotence and malice ? Or, *What* BUT them have you shewn ?

You have shewn impotence and malice enough ; EXCEPT them, (i. e. impotence and malice,) *What* have you shewn ?

You have shewn impotence and malice enough ; DISMISS them, *What* have you shewn ?

EXAMPLE 4. *Where ELSE.*

Honour should reside in the breast of a king ; although it might not be found any *Where ELSE.* ¹

RESOLUTION.

Honour should reside in the breast of a king ; although, EXCEPT in the breast of a king, it might not be found any *where.*

Honour should reside in the breast of a king ; although, DISMISS (i. e. *Leave out, Take away, &c.*) the breast of a king, it might not be found any *where.*

Having thus, as I trust, satisfactorily resolved the only instances they have produced as irreconcilable with my etymology ; I will proceed to consider their other objections.

I.

They say—"The Latin, the Italian, the French, make use here [that is, where the English use UNLESS] of the word *Except.*" Pag. 38.

The Latin commonly employs *Ni si.* i. e. *Ne sit*, the negative preceding the verb : the Italian, *Se non*, and the French, *Si ne.* i. e. *Sit non, Sit ne*, the negative following the verb : Instances have been already given of the same conjunctive use of *Be not*, or *Be it not*, in English. The Italians sometimes use *In fuori, Senza*

che; and, if they please, the participle *Eccetto*: the French also sometimes use *Si non que*, *Si ce n'est que*, *A moins que*, *A moins de*; and, if they please, the imperative *Exceptez*, or the participle *Excepté*. And any word or words directing SEPARATION (and none other) in our own, or in any other language, will always be equivalent to UNLESS. And, instead of being an objection, I think this circumstance strongly enforces my etymology.

II.

“ If there be such a verb [as Onle~~ra~~n] in the Anglo-Saxon, it must be the same as Onle~~ra~~n, a compound of On and Le~~ra~~n.” Pag. 39.

Why it should be doubted that there is any such verb as Onle~~ra~~n in the Anglo-Saxon, I cannot imagine; but if any one, beside my Critics, should entertain such a doubt, it may easily be removed by opening Lye's Anglo-Saxon Dictionary; where both Onle~~ra~~n and Onl~~y~~-~~ra~~n will be found, with various references to the places where they are used. But that Onle~~ra~~n should be preferred by the Critics to Onle~~ra~~n, is truly extraordinary; An being the common termination of the Anglo-Saxon Infinitives.

III.

“ Le~~ra~~n in the Anglo-Saxon does not signify to *Dismiss*. Le~~ra~~n in its primary signification means to *unbind*; in its secondary, to *redeem*, to *unload*, to *set at*

liberty. Solvere, redimere, liberare, says the dictionary. In the first sense it answers to the English to *Loosen*, i. e. to *make loose*." Pag. 39.

"It is possible that LES should be the Imperative of Leran; but LESS can have no pretensions to it." Pag. 40.

"No sooner has the imperative of the Anglo-Saxon verb Leran shewn itself with you in one form, than it appears in another. In the very next article to that we are upon here, you suppose it to be, not LES but LEAS. But it will be said, how can Lear be the imperative of Leran?—Certain it is, that the verb Leran is here all of a sudden transformed into Leoran, in consequence of which its alliance with the affix Lear becomes unquestionable. But Leoran signifies *perdere*, and is the same verb with the English to *Lose*." Pag. 41.

If the reader will cast his eye over the following column, he will find that no transformation has been suddenly made by me; and that the alteration of a letter in the spelling of LES, LESS and LEAS, will be no reasonable objection to the etymology.

ΛΛNSGΛN. M. Goth. Imperat. **ΛΛNS.**

Lorɣan

Lorian

Loerian

Leorian.

Leorān Imperat. Lær.

Leran. Imperat. Ler, Lerr, Lerre.

Līran

Lýran

Ā-leoran Imperat. Āler.

Ā-līran

Ā-lýran

ƿop-leoran

ƿop-lýran

On-leoran. Imperat. Onler.

On-lýran.

Under all these shapes this word appears in the Anglo-Saxon language : for I take them all to be one and the same verb, differently pronounced, and therefore differently spelled. And from this Gothic and Anglo-Saxon verb, I imagine, proceed not only the conjunctions, as they are called, *UNLESS*, *ELSE*, and *LEST*, and the privative termination *LESS*, together with *LESS* the adjective, as it is called, and the comparative *LESS*, and the superlative *LEAST* ; but also

To *Lose* *Lost*. A *Loss*.

To *Loose* *Loose*.

To *Un-loose*

To *Loosen*

To *Un-loosen*

To *Lessen*

To *Lease* A *Lease*.

To *Re-lease* A *Release*, A *Lease* and *Release*.
To go a *Leasing**.

And however this word (for they are all one) may be now differently spelled, and differently used and applied in modern English ; the reader will easily perceive that SEPARATION is always invariably signified in every use and application of it †.

I will give a few instances, out of very many, to

* *Leasing*, i. e. *Loosing*, i. e. picking up that which is *Loose* (i. e. *Loosed*) separate (i. e. *separated*) or detached (*détaché*) from the sheaf (^a).

† ——— Clavumque affixus et hærens
Nusquam *A-mittebat*.

Æneis, lib. 5.

He never *sent from* his hand. He never *parted* with. He never *missed* his hold. He never *let go* his hold. He never *lost* his hold. He never *loosed* his hold. He never *let go*.

(^a) SHEAF, (A.S. *ŷceaf*. Dutch *Schoof*), which we call a substantive, is no other than the past participle *ŷceaf* (or *ŷceafod*) from the verb *ŷcuŷian*; which past participle in modern English we write *shove* (or *shoved*). *Sheaf* means, that which is *shov'd* together. N.B. The past participle in the Anglo-Saxon is usually formed by adding *od* (which we now write *ed*) to the præterperfect; but the præterperfect itself is often used (both in Anglo-Saxon and in English) for the past participle, without the termination *od* or *ed*. Now the præterperfect of *ŷcuŷian* is *ŷceaf*.

SHAFT (A.S. *ŷceaf*), which seems to us so different a word from *Sheaf*, is yet no other than the same past participle *ŷceafod*, *ŷceaf*, *ŷceaf*. *Shaft* means that which is *shov'd*.

shew how variously our old English writers spelled and used this same word.

" Pardoun and life to thir teris gif we,
(Quod Priamus) and mercy grantis fre.
And first of all the mannakillis and hard bandis
Chargeit he LOUS of this ilk mannis handis.

———— Bot than the tothir wicht,
Full weil instrukkit of Grekis art and slicht,
LOUSIT and laitlye fred of all his bandis,
Unto the sternis heuit up his handis."

Douglas, booke 2. pag. 43.

" Bewalit thair feris LOSIT on the flude."

booke 1. pag. 19.

" That we thy blud, thy kinrent, and ofspring
Has LOSIT oure schippis."

booke 1. pag. 20.

" The grete LOIS of Anchises regretting sare,
And altogidir gan to wepe and rare."

booke 5. pag. 148.

" For neur syne with ene saw I her eft,
Nor neuer abak, fra sche was LOIST or reft,
Blent I agane."

booke 2. pag. 63.

" His nauy LOIST reparellit I but fale,
And his feris fred from the deith alhale."

booke 4. pag. 112.

" Bewaland gretelye in his mynde pensife,
For that his freynd was fall, and LOIST his life."

booke 5. pag. 157.

" Desist, Drances, be not abasit, I pray,
For thou sall neuer LEIS, schortlie I the say,
Be my wappin nor this rycht hand of myne
Sic any peuishe and cative saule as thine."

booke 11. pag. 377 -

" But yet LESSE thou do worse, take a wyfe :

Bet is to wedde, than brenne in worse wyse."

Dreame of Chaucer, fol. 259. pag. 2. col. 2.

" And on his way than is he forthe yfare

In hope to ben LESSED of his care."

Chaucer, Frankeleyns Tale, fol. 54. pag. 1. col. 1.

" Now let us stynt of Troylus a stounde,

That fareth lyke a man that hurt is sore,

And is som dele of akyng of his wounde

Y LESSED well, but heled no dele more."

Troylus, boke 1. fol. 163. pag. 1. col. 1.

" And gladly LESE his owne right,

To make an other LESE his."

Gower, lib. 2. fol. 28. pag. 2. col. 2.

" Lo wherof sorcerie serueth.

Through sorcerie his loue he chese;

Through sorcerie his life he LESE."

lib. 5. fol. 137. pag. 1. col. 1.

" For unto loues werke on night

Hym lacketh both will and might.

No wondre is in lustie place

Of loue though he LESE grace."

lib. 7. fol. 143. pag. 1. col. 2.

" It fit a man by wey of kynde

To loue, but it is not kinde

A man for loue his wit to LESE."

lib. 7. fol. 167. pag. 1. col. 2.

" Wyne maketh a man to LESE wretchedly

His mynde, and his lymmes euerychone."

Chaucer, Sompners Tale, fol. 44. pag. 1. col. 1.

" There may nothing, so God my soule saue,

Lykyng to you, that may displese me ;

Ne I desire nothyng for to haue,

Ne dred for to LESE, saue onely ye."

Clerke of Oxenfordes Tale, fol. 48. pag. 1. col. 1.

“ Him neded none helpe, if he ne had no money that he myght LESE.” *Boecius*, boke 3. fol. 233. pag. 1. col. 1.

“ Al shulde I dye, I wol her herte seche
I shal no more LESEN but my speche.”

Troylus, boke 5. fol. 194. pag. 2. col. 2.

“ If it so be that thou art myghtye ouer thy selfe, that is to sayne, by tranquillyte of thy soule, than haste thou thyng in thy power, that thou noldest neuer LESEN.”

Boecius, boke 2. fol. 227. pag. 2. col. 2.

“ The maister LESETH his tyme to lere
Whan the disciple wol not here.”

Romaunt of the Rose, fol. 130. pag. 1. col. 2.

“ Ha, how grete harne, and skaith for euermare
That child has caught, throw LESING of his moder.”

Douglas, booke 3. pag. 79.

IV.

“ Skinner, Minshew and Johnson agree in deriving it [ELSE] from the Greek *αλλως* or the Latin *alias*. There is indeed as much reason to suppose that the Greeks and Latins borrowed the word from the Germans, as that these borrowed it from them.—AL and EL may be said to convey the *same idea* as the Greek *αλλως* and the Latin *alias*; and, if so, why should we have recourse to the verb *Älejan* to find their origin?”
Pag. 52.

This is truly curious: ELSE from *αλλως* or *alias*; although there is as much reason to suppose that the Greeks and Latins borrowed the word from the Germans, as that these borrowed it from them.

But AL and EL convey the *same idea* as *αλλως* and *alias*:—What is that idea? This is a question which my Critics never ask themselves; and yet it is the only rational object of etymology. These gentlemen seem to think that *translation is explanation*. Nor have they ever yet ventured to ask themselves what they mean, when they say that any word *comes* from, is *derived* from, *produced* from, *originates* from, or *gives birth* to, any other word. Their ignorance and idleness make them contented with this vague and misapplied metaphorical language: and if we should beg them to consider that words have no *locomotive* faculty, that they do not *flow* like rivers, nor *vegetate* like plants, nor *spiculate* like salts, nor are *generated* like animals; they would say, we quibbled with them; and might perhaps in their fury be tempted to exert against us “a *vigour beyond the law*.” And yet, untill they can get rid of these metaphors from their *minds*, they will not themselves be fit for etymology, nor furnish any etymology fit for reasonable men.

V.

“As there is an equivalent in the French of the word UNLESS, very much resembling it in turn, it is somewhat extraordinary that it should never have occurred to you, that possibly the one is a translation, or at least an imitation of the other. This equivalent is *À moins que*. What word more likely to have *given*

birth to UNLESS ; if we may suppose the latter to be a compound of ON and LESS." Pag. 39.

" You add in a note—' It is the same imperative LES, placed at the end of nouns and coalescing with them, which has given to our language such adjectives as Hopeless, Restless, &c.'—These words have been all along considered as compounds of *Hope*, *Rest*, &c. and the adjective Less, Anglo-Saxon Lear, and Dutch Loos : and this explanation is so *natural*, so clear and satisfactory, that it is inconceivable how a man, who has any notion of neatness and consistency in etymological disquisitions, could ever think of their being compounds of a noun, and the imperative of the verb Lēran. LEAS and Loos are still extant, this in the Dutch, and that in the Anglo-Saxon language : and both *answer* to the Latin *solutus* in this phrase *solutus cura*.

—" Multa adjectiva formantur ex substantivis addendo *affixum negativum* Lear vel Leare. Hinc apud nos *Carelesse*, &c. Sciendum vero est Lear Anglo-Saxonicum deduci a M. Gothico *Laus*, quod significat *liber*, *solutus*, *vacuus*, et in compositione *privationem* vel *defectum* denotat. Hickes, A.S. Gram. pag. 42.

" Dr. Johnson gives us, in his Dictionary, the following *deduction* of the word LEST ;—" LEST, conjunction from the adjective LEAST, *That not*." Pag. 70.

"Your improvement upon Dr. Johnson is, *Lezed** *that*, i.e. *Hoc dimisso*. Is it not astonishing that a man should plume himself on having substituted this strange and far-fetched manner of speaking, for the easy and *natural* explanation which precedes?" Pag. 71.

"LEST, in the sense of *That not*, or the *Ne emphaticum* of the Latin, is generally written in the ancient language thus, LÆST. And as Læſ is used also in the Anglo-Saxon for the comparative of lýtēl, parvus, it is evident that þ læſ answers to the modern THE, or THAT LESS. þ læſt, to THAT LEAST, *supple*, OF ALL THINGS." Pag. 72.

I may answer them in the language of Shakespeare,

———"merely ye are death's fools;
For him ye labour by your flight to shun,
And yet run toward him still."

They contend that the conjunction UNLESS, and the privative termination LESS, come from the adjective

* "*Lezed*."—They misrepresent my words just as it suits their purpose. I have said LESED, not LEZED. They have not introduced the Z here by accident; for the change is important to the etymology. We could never arrive at LEST from LEZED: for (when the vowel between them is removed) Z must be followed by D in pronunciation, as S by T.—Take the word *Greased* for an instance: if you remove the vowel, you must either pronounce it *Greas'd*, or *Greas't*.

LESS ; and the conjunction LEST, from the superlative LEAST. Well : And what *is* the adjective LESS ? What *is* the comparative LESS ? and what *is* the superlative LEAST ? I say, *What are they ?* for that is the rational etymological question ; and not, whence do they *come*. —It is with words as with men : Call this Squire, my Lord ; then he will be comparative : Call him by the new-fangled title of Marquis, or call him Duke ; then he will be superlative : And yet whosoever shall trust him, or have to do with him, will find to their cost that it is the same individual Squire Windham still. So neither is the substance or meaning or real import or value of any word altered by its grammatical class and denomination.

The adjective *Less* and the comparative *Less** are the imperative of *Lejan* ; and the superlative *Least* is the past participle.

The idle objections of these Critics have brought me to mention this etymology out of its due course : and I do not intend to pursue its consequences in this place. But the reader will see at once the force of this adjec—

* Parvum—Comparative Minus. Little or Small—Comparative Less.

The reader will not be surprised at the irregularity (as it is called) of the above comparisons, when he considers the real meaning and import of *Minus* and *Less*.

tive as used by our ancestors, when, instead of *nineteen* and *eighteen*, they said, *Æn lær tƿentiz*—*Tƿa lær tƿentiz*. i. e. *Twenty*, *Dismiss* (or *Take away*) one. *Twenty*, *Dismiss* (or *Take away*) two. We also say,—“He demanded twenty: I gave him two *Less*.” i. e. I gave him twenty, *Dismiss* two. The same method of *resolution* takes place, when we speak of any other quantity besides bare numbers: nor can any instance of the use of *Less* or *Least* be found in the language, where the signification of *Dismissing*, *Separating*, or *Taking away*, is not conveyed.

VI.

“LEST for LESED, say you, as BLEST for BLESSED.—This is the whole of what you tender for our deference to your opinion: and small as the consideration is, it is made up of bad coin. *LESAN* and *BLESSIAN* cannot, whatever you may think of the matter, be coupled together, as belonging to one and the same order of verbs; the one has a single, the other a double consonant before the termination of the infinitive mood: that forms a long, this a short syllable in the participle passive; and consequently, though the latter will bear the contraction, it does not follow that the former will bear it likewise. And thus much for the bad coin with which you attempt to put us off.” Pag. 68.

The change of the terminating *D* to *T* in the past par-

ticiples (or in any other words) does not depend either upon single or double consonants, or upon the length or shortness of the syllables ; but singly upon the *sound* of the consonant which precedes it. There is an anatomical reason and necessity for it, which I have explained in pages 130 and 402 of the first edition of this volume. But, without the reason, and without the explanation, the facts are so notorious and so constantly in repetition, that they had only to open their eyes, or their ears, to avoid so palpable an absurdity as this rule about double consonants and long syllables, which they have, for the first time, conjured up. What then Should I not speak common English, if I should say to Mr. Windham,

“ Thou hast *Fac’t* many things ;
Face not me.”

“ You have *Fleec’t* the people, and *Splic’t* a rope for your own neck.”

Here are no double consonants ; and there are long syllables. But, if they will not believe their eyes and their ears, let them try their own organs of speech ; and they will find, that without a vowel between *s* and *n* (or an interval equal to the time of a vowel) they cannot follow the sound *s* with the audible sound *n* ; and that, if they will *terminate* with *n*, they must change the preceding *s* to a *z*. All this would be equally true of the *sound*, even if the spelling had always continued

with a D, and that no writer had ever conformed his orthography to the pronunciation*. But we have very numerous written authorities to dumbfound these critics†. I shall give them but two; believing they are two more than they wish to see.

“None other wise negligent
Than I you saie, haue I not bee.
In good feith sonne wel me quemeth,
That thou thy selfe hast thus acquite
Toward this, in whiche no wight
Abide maie, for in an houre
He LEST all that he maie laboure
The longe yere.”

Gower, de Conf. Aman. fol. 68. pag. 1. col. 2.

“In the towne of Stafforde was (William of Cantorbury saith, Ihon Capgraue confirminge the same) a lustye minion, a trulle for the nonce, a pece for a prince, with whome, by report, the kinge at times was very familiare. Betwixte this wanton damsel or primerose pearlesse and Becket the chancellor, wente store of presentes, and of loue tokens plenty, and also the louers met at times, for when he resorted thidre, at no place would he be hosted and lodged, but wher as she held residence. In the dedde tyme of the night (the storye saithe) was it her generall custome, to come alone to his bedchambre with a candle in her

* Ða halgan ƿaule ƿƿam ðam bendum ðær lichoman onlýrðe. *Bed.* 3. 8. Onlýrðe instead of onlýrð; the e being removed from between the ƿ and ð, this word must be pronounced onlýrte.—“D literam ratio poscit, aures magis audiunt s.”

† Satis hoc potuit admonendi gratia dixisse, præter agrestes quosdam et indomitos certatores, qui nisi auctoritatibus adhibitis non comprimuntur.

hand, to toy and trifle with him. Men are not so folish, but they can wel conceiue, what chastity was obserued in those prety, nice, and wanton metinges. But they say, he sore amended whan he was once consecrated archbishop of Cantorbury, and LEAST * well his accustomed enbracinges after the rules of loue, and became in life relygious, that afore in loue was lecherous."

John Bale. Actes of English Votaries. Dedicated to kyng Edwarde the syxte. 1550.

S I N C E.

SINCE is a very corrupt abbreviation ; confounding together different words and different combinations of words : and is therefore in modern English improperly made (like BUT) to serve purposes which no one word in any other language can answer ; because the same accidental corruptions, arising from similarity of sound, have not happened in the correspondent words of any other language.

Where we now employ SINCE was formerly (according to its respective signification) used,

Sometimes,

1. Seoððan, Sioððan, Seððan, Siððan, Siððen, Sithen, Sithence, Sithens, Sithnes, Sithns :

Sometimes,

2. Syne, Sine, Sene, Sen, Syn, Sin :

* He dismissed. He put away. He relinquished.

Sometimes,

3. Seand, Seeing, Seeing that, Seeing as, Sens, Sense, Sence.

Sometimes,

4. Sīððe, Sīð, Sithe, Sith, Seen that, Seen as, Sens, Sense, Sence.

Accordingly SINCE, in modern English, is used four ways. Two, as a Preposition ; connecting (or rather *affecting*) words : and Two, as a Conjunction ; *affecting* sentences*.

When used as a Preposition, it has always the signification either of the past participle *Seen* joined to *thence*, (that is, *seen and thenceforward* :)—or else it has the signification of the past participle *seen* only.

When used as a Conjunction, it has sometimes the signification of the present participle *Seeing*, or *Seeing that* ; and sometimes the signification of the past participle *Seen*, or *Seen that*.

* It is likewise used adverbially : as when we say—It is a year SINCE : i. e. a year SEEN.

In French—*une année passée*.

In Italian—*un anno fa* : i. e. *fatto*.

As a Preposition,

1. SINCE (for Siððan, Sithence, or Seen *and thence forward*,) as,

“ *Such a system of government as the present has not been ventured on by any King SINCE the expulsion of James the Second.*”

2. SINCE (for Sýne, Sene, or Seen,) as,

“ *Did George the Third reign before or SINCE that example?*”

As a Conjunction,

3. SINCE (for Seand, Seeing, Seeing as, or Seeing that,) as,

“ *If I should labour for any other satisfaction, but that of my own mind, it would be an effect of phrensy in me, not of hope ; SINCE it is not truth, but opinion that can travel the world without a passport.*”

4. SINCE (for Siððe, Sith, Seen as, or Seen that,) as,

“ *SINCE Death in the end takes from all, whatsoever Fortune or Force takes from any one ; it were a foolish madness in the shipwreck of worldly things, where all sinks but the sorrow, to save that*.*”

* *Vú*, the French past participle of *Voir*, to See, is used in the same conjunctive manner in that language.

“ *Dis nous pourquoi Dieu l’a permis,
Veux qu’il paroît de ses amis?*”

Junius says,—“SINCE *that Time*, exinde. Contractum est ex Angl. *Sith thence*, q. d. sero post : ut *Sith* illud originem traxerit ex illo **SEIÞN**, Sero, quod habet Arg. Cod.”

Skinner says,—“SINCE, a Teut. *Sint*. Belg. *Sind*. Post, Postea, Postquam. Doct. Th. H. putat deflexum a nostro *Sithence*. Non absurdum etiam esset declinare a Lat. *Exhinc*, E et H abjectis, et x facillima mutatione in s transeunte.” Again he says,—“SITH ab A.S. *Siððan*, *Sýððan*. Belg. *Seyd*, *Sint*. Post, Post illa, Postea.”

After the explanation I have given, I suppose it unnecessary to point out the particular errors of the above derivations.

Sithence and *Sith*, though now obsolete, continued in good use down even to the time of the Stuarts.

Hooker in his writings uses *Sithence*, *Sith*, *Seeing*, and *Since*. The two former he always properly distinguishes ; using *Sithence* for the true import of the Anglo-Saxon *Siððan*, and *Sith* for the true import of the Anglo-Saxon *Siððe*. Which is the more extraordinary, because authors of the first credit had very long before Hooker's time confounded them together ; and thereby led the way for the present indiscriminate and corrupt use of SINCE in all the four cases mentioned.

Seeing Hooker uses sometimes, perhaps, (for it will admit a doubt*) improperly. And *SINCE* (according to the corrupt custom which has now universally prevailed in the language) he uses indifferently either for *Sithence*, *Seen*, *Seeing*, or *Sith*.

T H A T.

There is something so very singular in the use of this Conjunction, as it is called, that one should think it would alone, if attended to, have been sufficient to lead the Grammarians to a knowledge of most of the other conjunctions, as well as of itself. The use I mean is, that the conjunction *THAT* generally makes a part of, and keeps company with, most of the other conjunctions.—*If that, An that, Unless that, Though that, But that, Without that, Lest that, Since that, Save that, Except that, &c.* is the construction of most of the sentences where any of those conjunctions are used.

* Such is the doubtful use of it by Shakespear in the following passage :

“ Of all the wonders that I yet have heard,
It seems to me most strange that men should fear ;
SEEING that death, a necessary end,
Will come when it will come.”

For it may either be resolved thus ;—It seems strange that men, *SEEING* that death will come when it will come, should fear :

Or—Strange that men should fear ; it being *SEEN* that death will come when it will come.

Is it not an obvious question then, to ask, why this Conjunction alone should be so peculiarly distinguished from all the rest of the same family? And why this alone should be able to connect itself with, and indeed be usually necessary to, almost all the others? So necessary, that even when it is compounded with another conjunction, and drawn into it so as to become one word, (as it is with *sith* and *since*,) we are still forced to employ again this necessary index, in order to precede, and so point out the sentence which is to be affected by the other Conjunction?

B.

De, in the Anglo-Saxon, meaning THAT, I can easily perceive that SITH (which is no other than the Anglo-Saxon Siððe) includes THAT. But when SINCE is (as you here consider it) a corruption for *Seeing-as* and *Seen-as*; how does it then include THAT?—In short, what is AS? For I can gather no more from the Etymologists concerning it, than that it is derived either from *as* or from ALS*: But still this explains nothing: for what *as* is, or ALS, remains likewise a secret.

H.

The truth is, that AS is also an article; and (however

* Junius says,—“As, *ut, sicut*, Græcis est *as*.” Skinner, whom S. Johnson follows, says—“As, a Teut. *Als*, *sicut*; eliso scil. propter euphoniā intermedio L.”

and whenever used in English) means the same as *It*, or *That*, or *Which*. In the German, where it still *evidently* retains its original signification and use, (as so* also does,) it is written—*Es*.

* The German *so* and the English *so* (though in one language it is called an *Adverb* or *Conjunction*, and in the other an *Article* or *Pronoun*) are yet both of them derived from the Gothic article **SA**, **SX**; and have in *both* languages retained the original meaning, viz. *It*, or *That*.

Mr. Tyrwhitt indeed (not perceiving that *Al-es* and *Al-so* are different compounds) in a note on the *Canterbury Tales*, v. 7327, says—"Our *AS* is the same with *Als*, Teut. and Sax. It is only a further corruption of *Also*." But the *etymological* opinions of Mr. Tyrwhitt (who derives *For the Nones* from *Pro nunc*) merit not the smallest attention.

Dr. Lowth, amongst *some* false English which he has recommended, and *much* good English which he has reprobated, says—"SO-AS, was used by the writers of the last century to express a consequence, instead of SO-THAT. Swift, I believe, is the last of our good writers who has frequently used this manner of expression. It seems *improper*, and is *deservedly* grown obsolete."

But Dr. Lowth, when he undertook to write his *Introduction*, with the best intention in the world, most assuredly sinned against his better judgment. For he begins most judiciously, thus,—“Universal Grammar explains the principles which are common to *All* languages. The Grammar of any particular language *applies* those common principles to that particular language.” And yet, with this clear truth before his eyes, he boldly proceeds to give a *particular* grammar; without being himself possessed of one single principle of *Universal* Grammar. Again: he says,—“The connective parts of sentences are the most im-

It does not come from *Als*; any more than *Though*, and *Be-it*, and *If* (or *Gif*), &c. come from *Although*,

portant of all, and require the greatest care and attention : for it is by these chiefly that the train of thought, the course of reasoning, and the whole progress of the mind, in continued discourse of all kinds, is laid open ; and on the right use of these, the perspicuity, that is the first and greatest beauty of style, principally depends. Relatives and Conjunctions are the instruments of connection in discourse : it may be of use to point out some of the most common inaccuracies that writers are apt to fall into with respect to them ; and a few examples of faults may perhaps be more instructive, than any rules of propriety that can be given."

And again,—“ I have been the more particular in noting the proper uses of these conjunctions, because they occur very frequently ; and, as it was observed before of connective words in general, are of great importance with respect to the clearness and beauty of style. I may add too, because mistakes in the use of them are very common."

After which he proceeds to his examples of the proper and improper use of these connectives :—without having the most distant notion of the *meaning* of the words whose *employment* he undertakes to settle. The consequence was unavoidable : that, (having no *reasonable* rule to go by, and no apparent *signification* to direct him) he was compelled to trust to his own *fanciful* taste (*as in the best it is*), and the uncertain authority of others ; and has consequently approved and condemned without truth or reason. “ Pourquoi (says Girard) après tant de siècles et tant d'ouvrages, les gens de lettres ont-ils encore des idées si informes et des expressions si confuses, sur ce qu'ils font profession d'étudier et de traiter ? Ou s'ils ne veulent pas prendre la peine d'approfondir la matière, comment osent-ils en donner des leçons au public ? C'est ce que je ne conçois pas.

and *Albeit*, and *Algif*, &c.—For *Als*, in our old English, is a contraction of *Al*, and *es* or *as* : and this *Al* (which in comparisons used to be very properly employed before the first *es* or *as*, but was not employed before the second,) we now, in modern English, suppress : As we have also done in numberless other instances ; where *All* (though not improper) is not necessary.

Thus,

“ She glides away under the foamy seas
As swift AS darts or feather’d arrows fly.”

That is,

“ She glides away (with) THAT swiftness, (with) WHICH feather’d arrows fly.”

When in old English it is written,

“ Sche _____
Glidis away under the fomy seis
ALS swift as ganze or fedderit arrow fleis :”

Douglas, booke 10. pag. 323.

then it means,

“ With ALL THAT swiftness *with* WHICH, &c.”

After what I have said, you will see plainly why so many of the conjunctions may be used almost indifferently (or with a very little turn of expression) for each other. And without my entering into the parti-

cular minutiae in the use of each, you will easily account for the slight differences in the turn of expression, arising from different customary abbreviations of construction.

I will only give you one instance, and leave it with you for your entertainment : from which you will draw a variety of arguments and conclusions.

“ And soft he sighed, **LEST** men might him hear.
And soft he sigh'd, **THAT** men might **NOT** him hear.
And soft he sighed, **ELSE** men might him hear.
UNLESS he sighed soft, men might him hear.
BUT that he sighed soft, men might him hear.
WITHOUT he sighed soft, men might him hear.
SAVE that he sighed soft, men might him hear.
EXCEPT he sighed soft, men might him hear.
OUTCEPT he sighed soft, men might him hear.
OUT-TAKE he sighed soft, men might him hear.
IF that he sigh'd **NOT** soft, men might him hear.
And **AN** he sigh'd **NOT** soft, men might him hear.
SET that he sigh'd **NOT** soft, men might him hear.
PUT CASE he sigh'd **NOT** soft, men might him hear.
BE IT he sigh'd **NOT** soft, men might him hear.”

B.

According to your account then, Lord Monboddo is extremely unfortunate in the particular care he has taken to make an exception from the general rule he lays down, of the Verbs being the *Parent* word of all language, and to caution the *candid* reader from im-

putting to him an opinion that the *Conjunctions* were intended by him to be included in his rule, or have any connexion whatever with *Verbs**.

H.

In my opinion he is not less unfortunate in his *rule* than in his *exception*. They are both equally unfounded : and yet as well founded, as almost every other position which he has laid down in his two first volumes. The whole of which is perfectly worthy of that profound politician and philosopher, who esteems that to be the most perfect form, and as he calls it—" *the last*

* " This so copious derivation from the verb in Greek, naturally leads one to suspect that it is the *Parent* word of the whole language : and indeed I believe that to be the fact : for I do not know that it can be certainly shewn that there is any word that is undoubtedly a primitive, which is not a *verb* ; I mean a *verb* in the stricter sense and common acceptation of the word. By this the candid reader will not understand that I mean to say that *prepositions*, *conjunctions*, and such like words, which are rather the *Pegs* and *Nails* that fasten the several parts of the language together than the language itself, are derived from verbs or are derivatives of any kind."

Vol. 2. part 2. b. 1. ch. 15.

Court de Gebelin is as positive in the contrary opinion,—
 " Il a fallu necessairement," says he, " que tous les autres mots vinssent des noms. Il n'est aucun mot, de quelque espece que ce soit, et dans quelque langue que ce soit, qui ne descende d'un nom."—*Hist. de la Parole*, page 180.

*stage of civil society**,” where Government leaves nothing to the free-will of individuals ; but interferes with the domestic private lives of the citizens, and the education of their children ! Such would in truth be the *last* stage of civil society, in the sense of the lady in the comedy, whose lover having offered—“to give her the *last* proof of love and marry her,”—she aptly replied, “The *last* indeed ; for there’s an end of loving.”

B.

But what say you to the bitter irony with which Mr. Harris treats the moderns in the concluding note to his doctrine of Conjunctions ? Where he says,—“It is somewhat surprising that the politest and most elegant of the Attic writers, and Plato above all the

* “ But the *private* lives of the subjects under those Governments are left as much to the free will of each individual, and as little subjected to rule, as in the American Governments above mentioned : and every man in such a State may with impunity educate his children in the worst manner possible ; and may abuse his own person and fortune as much as he pleases ; provided he does no injury to his neighbours, nor attempts any thing against the State. The *last* stage of civil society, in which the progression ends, is that most perfect form of polity which, to all the advantages of the Governments last mentioned, joins the care of the education of the youth, and of the private lives of the citizens ; neither of which is left to the will and pleasure of each individual ; but both are regulated by PUBLIC WISDOM.”—Vol. 1. page 243.

rest, should have their works filled with *Particles* of all kinds and with *Conjunctions* in particular; while in the modern polite works, as well of ourselves as of our neighbours, scarce such a word as a *Particle* or *Conjunction* is to be found. Is it that where there is connection in the meaning, there must be words had to connect; but that where the connection is little or none, such connectives are of little use? That houses of cards without *cement* may well answer their end; but not those houses where one would chuse to dwell? Is this the cause? Or have we attained an elegance to the antients unknown?

‘ Venimus ad summam fortunæ, ’ ” &c.

What will you say to Lord Monboddo, who holds the same opinion with Mr. Harris*?

* “ This abundance of Conjunctions and Particles,” says he, vol. 2. page 179. “ is, in my opinion, one of the greatest beauties of the Greek language, &c. For I am so far from thinking that that disjointed composition and short cut of style, which is so much in fashion at present, and of which Tacitus among the ancients is the great model, is a beauty, that I am of opinion it is the affectation of a deformity; nor is there, in my apprehension, any thing that more disfigures a style, or makes it more offensive to a man of true taste and judgement in writing,” &c.

“ I shall only add at present, that one of the greatest difficulties of composing in English appears to me to be the *want* of such connecting particles as the Greeks have,” &c.


H.

I say that a little more reflection and a great deal less reading, a little more attention to common sense*, and less blind prejudice for his Greek commentators, would have made Mr. Harris a much better Grammarian, if not perhaps a Philosopher.—What a strange language is this to come from a man, who at the same time supposes these *Particles* and *Conjunctions* to be words *without meaning* ! It should seem, by this insolent pleasantry, that Mr. Harris reckons it the perfection of composition and discourse to use a great many words *without meaning* !—If so, perhaps Master Slender's language would meet with this learned Gentleman's approbation :

“ I keep *but* three men *and* a boy *yet*, *till* my mother be dead ; *but what though yet* I live a poor gentleman born.”

Now here is *cement* enough in proportion to the building. It is plain, however, that Shakespeare (a much better philosopher by the bye than most of those who have written philosophical Treatises) was of a different opinion in this matter from Mr. Harris.

* The author would by no means be understood to allude to the COMMON SENSE of Doctors Oswald, Reid, and Beattie ; which appears to him to be sheer nonsense.



He thought the best way to make his Zany talk unconnectedly and nonsensically was to give him a quantity of these elegant words *without meaning* which are such favourites with Mr. Harris and Lord Monboddo.

B.

This may be raillery perhaps, but I am sure it is neither reasoning nor authority. This instance does not affect Mr. Harris : for *All cement* is no more fit to make a firm building than no cement at all. Slender's discourse might have been made equally as unconnected without any particles, as with so many particles together. It is the proper mixture of particles and other words which Mr. Harris would recommend ; and he only censures the moderns for being too sparing of Particles.

H.

Reasoning! It disdains to be employed about such conceited nonsense, such affected airs of superiority and pretended *elegance*. Especially when the whole foundation is false : for there are not any useful connectives in the Greek, which are not to be found in modern languages. But for his opinion concerning their employment, you shall have *authority*, if you please ; Mr. Harris's favourite authority : an Antient, a Greek, and one too writing professedly on Plato's

opinions, and in defence of Plato ; and which if Mr. Harris had not forgotten, I am persuaded, he would not have contradicted.

Plutarch says—" Il n'y a ny Beste, ny instrument, ny armeure, ny autre chose quelle qu'elle soit au monde, qui par ablation ou privation d'une siene propre partie, soit plus belle, plus active, ne plus douce que paravant elle n'estoit ; là où l'oraison bien souvent, en estans les *conjonctions toutes ostées*, a une force et efficace plus affectueuse, plus active, et plus esmouvante. C'est pourquoy ceulx qui escrivent des figures de Retorique louent et prisent grandement celle qu'ils appellent deliée ; là où ceulx qui sont trop religieux et qui s'assubjettissent trop aux regles de la grammaire, sans ozer oster une seule conjonction de la commune façon de parler, en sont à bon droit blasmez et repris ; comme faisans un stile enervé, sans aucune pointe d'affection, et qui lasse et donne peine à ouir," &c.*

I will give you another authority, which perhaps Mr. Harris may value more, because I value it much less.

" Il n'y a rien encore qui donne plus de mouvement au discours que d'en *ôter les liaisons*. En effet, un dis-

* *Platonic Questions*, Amyot's Translation.

cours que rien ne lie et n'embarrasse, marche et coule de soymême, et il s'en faut peu qu'il n'aille quelquefois plus vite que la pensée même de l'orateur." Longinus then gives three examples, from Xenophon, Homer, and Demosthenes ; and concludes—" En égalant et applanissant toutes choses par le moyen de *liaisons*, vous verrez que d'un pathétique fort et violent vous tomberez dans une petite afféterie de langage qui n'aura ni pointe ni eguillon ; et que toute la force de votre discours s'eteindra aussi-tost d'elle-mesme. Et comme il est certain, que si on lioit le corps d'un homme qui court, on lui feroit perdre toute sa force ; de même si vous allez embarrasser une passion de ces *liaisons* et de ces *particules inutiles*, elle les souffre avec peine ; vous lui otez la liberté de sa course, et cette impetuosité qui la faisoit marcher avec la mesme violence qu'un trait lancé par une machine*."

Take one more authority, better than either of the foregoing on this subject.

" Partes orationis similes nexu indigent, ut inter se uniantur ; et iste vocatur *Conjunctio*, quæ definitur *vocula indeclinabilis quæ partes orationis colligit*. Alii eam subintelligi malint, alii expresse et moleste repetunt : illud, qui attentiores sunt rebus ; hoc, qui rigorosius loquuntur. Omittere fere omnes conjunctiones Hispa-

* Boileau's Translation.

norum aut vitium aut character est. Plurimæ desiderantur in Lucano, plurimæ in Seneca, multæ in aliis authoribus. Multas omitto ; et, si meum genium sequerer, fere omnes. Qui rem intelligit et argumentum penetrat, percipit sibi ipsis cohærere sententias, nec egere particulis ut connectantur : quod, si interserantur voculæ connexivæ, scopæ dissolutæ illæ sunt ; nec additis et multiplicatis conjunctionibus cohærere poterunt. Hinc patet quid debuisset responderi Caligulæ, Senecæ calamum vilipendenti. *Suetonius : Lenius comptiusque scribendi genus adeo contempsit, ut Senecam, tum maxime placentem, commissiones meras componere, et ARENAM SINE CALCE, diceret.*—"Caligulæ hoc iudicium est, inquit Lipsius in iudicio de Seneca ; nempe illius qui cogitavit etiam de Homeri carminibus abolendis, itemque Virgilii et Titi Livii scriptis ex omnibus bibliothecis amovendis. Respondeo igitur meum Senecam *non vulgo nec plebi scripsisse, nec omni viro docto, sed illi qui attente eum legeret. Et addo, ubi lector mente Senecam sequitur, sensum adsequi : nec inter sententias, suo se prementes et consolidantes pondere, conjunctionem majorem requiri.*"

CARAMUEL, cxlii.

And I hope these *authorities* (for I will offer no *argument* to a writer of his cast) will satisfy the "*true taste and judgment in writing*" of Lord Monboddo ; who with equal affectation and vanity has followed Mr. Harris in this particular : and who, though incapable

of writing a sentence of common English, (*defuerunt enim illi et usus pro duce et ratio pro suasore*,) sincerely deplores the *decrease of learning in England**; whilst he really imagines that there is something captivating in his own style, and has gratefully informed us to whose assistance we owe the obligation.

* See *Mr. Boswell's Tour to the Hebrides*, p. 473.

ΕΠΕΑ ΗΤΕΡΟΕΝΤΑ,

&c.

CHAPTER IX.

OF PREPOSITIONS.

B.

WELL, Sir, what you have hitherto said of the Conjunctions will deserve to be well considered. But we have not yet entirely done with them : for, you know, the Prepositions were originally, and for a long time, classed with the Conjunctions : and when first separated from them, were only distinguished by the name of *Prepositive Conjunctions**.

* The philosophers of Hungary, Turkey and Georgia at least were in no danger of falling into this absurdity : for Dr. Jault, in his preface to (what is very improperly, though commonly, called) *Menage's Dictionary*, tells us—" Par le fréquent commerce que j'ai eu avec eux [*les Hongrois*] pendant plusieurs années, ayant tâché de pénétrer à fonds ce que ce pouvoit être que cet idiôme si différent de tous les autres d'Europe, je les ai convaincus qu'ils étoient Scythes d'origine, ou du moins que leur langue étoit une des branches de la Scythique ; puisqu'à l'égard de l'inflexion elle avoit rapport à celle des Turcs, qui constam-

H.

Very true, Sir. And these *Prepositive* Conjunctions, once separated from the others, soon gave birth to another subdivision*; and Grammarians were not ashamed to have a class of *Postpositive Prepositives*.—"Dantur etiam *Postpositiones* (says Caramuel); quæ *Præpositiones postpositivæ* solent dici, nulla vocabulorum repugnantia: vocantur enim *Præpositiones*, quia sensu saltem præponuntur; et *Postpositivæ*, quia vocaliter postponi debent."

B.

But as Mr. Harris still ranks them with *Connectives*, this, I think, will be the proper place for their investigation. And as the title of *Prepositive* or *Preposition* "*only expresses their place and not their character; their Definition, he says, will distinguish them from the former Connectives.*" He therefore proceeds to give a *complete* definition of them, viz.

—"A *Preposition* is a part of speech, devoid itself of

ment passoient pour Scythes, étant originaire du Turquestan, et de la Transoxiane; et qu'outre cela les PRÉPOSITIONS de ces deux langues, aussi bien que de la Georgienne, se mettoient toujours *après leur regime*, contre l'ordre de la nature et la signification de leur nom."

Look at the *English*, i. e. The language we are talking OF: The language we deal IN: The object we look TO: The persons we work FOR: The explanation we depend UPON; &c.

* Buonmattei has still a further subdivision; and has made a separate part of speech of the *Segnacasi*.

signification ; but so formed as to unite two words that are significant, and that refuse to coalesce or unite of themselves.”—Now I am curious to know, whether you will agree with Mr. Harris in his definition of this part of Speech ; or whether you are determined to differ from him on every point.

H.

Till he agrees with himself, I think you should not disapprove of my differing from him ; because for this at least I have his own respectable authority. Having defined a word to be a “ *Sound significant ;*” he now defines a Preposition to be a word “ *devoid of signification.*” And a few pages after, he says, “ *Prepositions commonly transfuse something of their own meaning into the word with which they are compounded.*”

Now, if I agree with him that words are sounds significant ; how can I agree that there are sorts of words *devoid of signification* ? And if I could suppose that Prepositions are *devoid of signification* ; how could I afterwards allow that they transfuse something of *their own meaning* ?

B.

This is the same objection repeated before to his definition of the *first* ~~word~~
But is it not ~~the same~~

H.

Mr. Harris no doubt intended it as such : for, in a note on this passage, he endeavours to justify his doctrine by a citation from Apollonius* ; which he calls “ rather a descriptive sketch than a complete definition.” But what he gives us in the place of it, as *compleat*, is neither definition nor even description. It contains a *Negation* and an *Accident* ; and nothing more. It tells us what the Preposition *is not* ; and the *purpose* for which he supposes it to be *employed*. It might serve as well for a definition of the *East India Company*, as of a Preposition : for of that we may truly say—“ It is not itself any part of the Government, but so formed as to unite those who would not have coalesced of themselves†.”—Poor Scaliger (who well knew

* “ Je n’entends pas trop bien le Grec, dit le Geant.

“ Ni moi non plus, dit la Mite philosophique.

“ Pourquoi donc, reprit le Sirien, citez-vous un certain Aristote en Grec ?

“ C’est, repliqua le Savant, qu’il faut bien citer ce qu’on ne comprend point du tout, dans la langue qu’on entend le moins.”

Voltaire, Micromegas.

† Let the reader who has any sense of justice, or who feels any anxiety for the welfare of his country, look back and reconsider the corrupt use which one Coalition would have made of this company in the year 1783, and the corrupt use which another Coalition has made of it since. Let him then recall to his mind the parallel history of the Company of St. George, at the close of the flourishing days of the Republic of Genoa ; and

what a definition should be) from his own melancholy experience exclaimed—" *Nihil infelicius grammatico definitore!*" Mr. Harris's logical ignorance most happily deprived him of a sense of his misfortunes. And so little, good man, did he dream of the danger of his situation, that whilst all others were acknowledging their successless though indefatigable labours, and lamenting their insuperable difficulties, he prefaces his doctrine of *Connectives* with this singularly confident introduction ;—"What remains of our work is a matter of less difficulty ; it being the same here as in some historical picture : when the principal figures are once formed, it is an *easy labour* to design the rest*."

in spite of all outward appearances, he will easily be able to foretell the speedy fate of this pilfered and annihilated body. Without any external shock, the sure cause of its rapid destruction is in its present despotic and corrupt constitution : to the formation of which (and to no supposed delinquency nor personal enmity) that much injured man, Mr. Hastings, was made the victim by all the corrupt parties in the kingdom.

* Such is the language, and such are the definitions of him who, in this very chapter of the Prepositions, has modestly given us the following note.—"And here I cannot but observe, that he who pretends to discuss the sentiments of any one of these philosophers, or even to cite and translate him (except in trite and obvious sentences) without accurately knowing the Greek tongue in general ; the nice differences of many words apparently synonymous ; the peculiar style of the author whom he presumes to handle ; the new coined words, and new significations given to old words used by such author and his sect ;

B.

However contradictory and irregular all this may appear to you, Mr. Harris has advanced nothing more than what the most approved Greek and Latin Grammarians have delivered down to him, and what modern Grammarians and Philosophers have adopted *.

the whole philosophy of such sect, together with the connections and dependencies of its several parts, whether *logical*, *ethical* or *physical*;—He, *I say*, that, without this previous preparation, attempts *what I have said*, will shoot in the dark; will be liable to perpetual blunders; will explain and praise and censure merely by chance; and though he may possibly to *fools* appear as a wise man, will certainly among the wise ever pass for a *fool*. Such a man's intellect comprehends antient philosophy, as his eye comprehends a distant prospect. He may see, perhaps, enough to know mountains from plains, and seas from woods; but for an accurate discernment of particulars and their character, this, without further helps, it is impossible to attain."

* "Præpositio seu adnomen, *per se non significat*, nisi addatur nominibus."—*Campanella*.

"Multas & varias hujus partis orationis definitiones invenio. Et præ cæteris arridet hæc,—Præpositio est vocula: modum quendam nominis *adsignificans*."—*Caramuel*.

"Ut omittam Particulas minores, cujusmodi sunt Præpositiones, Conjunctiones, Interjectiones, quæ *nullam habent cum nominibus affinitatem*."—*J. C. Scaliger. de L. L. cap. 192.*

Even Hoogveen, who clearly saw—"Particulas in sua *Infantia fuisse* vel verba vel nomina, vel ex nominibus formata adverbia;" yet gives the following account and *Definition* of them:

H.

Yes. Yes. I know the errors are ancient enough, to have been long ago worn out and discarded. But

“ Primam, ut reliquarum, ita Græcæ quoque linguæ originem fuisse simplicissimam, ipsa natura ac ratio docent; primosque *νομαθεται* nomina, quibus res, et verba, quibus actiones exprimerent, non vero *Particulas* instituisse, probabile est. Certe, cum ex nominibus et verbis integra constet oratio, quorum hæc actiones et affectiones, illa personas agentes et patientes indicant, *jure quæritur, an primæva lingua habuerit particulas*. Non utique necessariam, rem exprimendi, vim habere videntur, sed *adscititiam quandam*, et sententias per nomina et verba expressas *variandi, stabiliendi, infirmandi, negandi, copulandi, disjungendi, imminuendi, affirmandi, limitandi*, multisque modis afficiendi: *Ipsæ vero, quatenus particula, per se solæ spectatæ, nihil significant.*—

“ Natura, inquam, ipsa docet, *Particulis antiquiora esse nomina et verba*, quia, observato rerum ordine, necesse est, res et actiones prius fuisse natas et expressas, quam *Particulas*, quæ has vel conjungunt, vel disjungunt: priora sunt jungenda jungentibus, firmanda firmanibus, limitanda limitantibus, et sic deinceps. Neque mea hæc, neque nova est de particularum minus antiqua origine opinio: suffragantem habeo Plutarchum ad illam quæstionem, quæ inter Platonicas postrema est—‘Cur Plato dixerit orationem ex nominibus et verbis misceri.’ Ubi ait—‘Probabile esse, homines ab initio orationem distinguendum Particularum eguisse.’—

“ Dicamus ergo, *Particulam* esse voculam, ex nomine vel verbo *natam*, quæ sententiæ addita, aliquam ipsi passionem *affert*, et orationi *adminiculo* est, et *officiosa ministra*. *Ministram* voco, quia, orationi non inserta, sed per se *posita et solitaria, nihil significat.*”

I do not think that any excuse for repeating them. For a much less degree of understanding is necessary to detect the erroneous principles of others, than to guard against those which may be started for the first time by our own imagination. In these matters it shows less weakness of judgement, because it is more easy, to deceive ourselves than to be deceived by others.

B.

You will do well, Sir, to be particularly mindful of what you said last ; and to place your strongest guard there, where it may be most wanted : for you seem sufficiently determined not to be deceived by *others*. And with this caution, I shall be glad to hear your account of the Preposition. Perhaps I shall save time, at least I shall sooner satisfy myself, by asking you a few questions.—Pray how many Prepositions are there ?

H.

Taking the Philosophy of language as it now stands, your question is a very proper one. And yet you know, that authors have never hitherto been agreed concerning their number. The ancient Greek Grammarians admitted only eighteen (six monosyllables and twelve dissyllables). The ancient Latin Grammarians above fifty*. Though the moderns, Sanctius,

* Scotus determines them to be forty-nine.

Scioppius, Perizonius, Vossius, and others, have endeavoured to lessen the number without fixing it*.

Our countryman Wilkins thinks that thirty-six are sufficient†.

Girard says, that the French language has done the business effectually with thirty-two : and that he could not, with the utmost attention, discover any more‡.

But the authors of the *Encyclopédie* [*Preposition*], though they also, as well as Girard, admit only *simple*

* Sanctius says,—“ Ex numero Præpositionum, quas Grammatici pertinaciter asserunt ; aliquas sustulimus.”

† “ There are thirty-six Prepositions which may, with much less equivocalness than is found in instituted languages, suffice to express those various respects which are to be signified by this kind of Particle.”—Part 3. chap. 3.

‡ “ Quoique les rapports determinatifs qu’on peut mettre entre les choses soient variés et nombreux ; le langage François a trouvé l’art d’en faire enoncer la multitude et la diversité des nuances, par un petit nombre de mots : car l’examen du detail fait avec toute l’attention dont je suis capable, ne m’en offre que trente deux de cette espèce.—Il m’a paru que les dictionnaires confondent quelquefois des Adverbes et même des Conjonctions avec des Prepositions.—Je ne me suis jamais permis de ne rien avancer sans avoir fait un *examen profond et rigoureux* ; me servant toujours de l’analyse et des regles de la plus exacte Logique pour resoudre mes doutes, et tacher de prendre la parti le plus vrai. Je ne dissimulerai pourtant pas, que mes scrupules ont été frequents : mais ma discussion a été attentive, et mon travail opiniatre.”—*Vrais Principes*, Disc. 11.

prepositions, have found in the same language, forty-eight.

And Buffier gives a list of seventy-five ; and declares that there is a great number besides, which he has not mentioned.

The greater part of authors have not ventured even to talk of any particular number : and of those who have, (except in the Greek) no two authors have agreed in the same language. Nor has any one author attributed the same number to any two different languages.

Now this discordance has by no means proceeded from any carelessness or want of diligence in Grammatists or Lexicographers : but the truth is, that the fault lies with the Philosophers : for though they have pretended to teach others, they have none of them known themselves what the nature of a Preposition is. And how is it possible that Grammarians should agree, what words ought or ought not to be referred to a class which was not itself ascertained ? Yet had any of the definitions or accounts yet given of the Preposition and of language been just, two consequences would immediately have followed : *viz.* That all men would have certainly known the precise number of Prepositions ; and (unless Things, or the operations of the human mind, were different in different

ages and climates) their number in all languages must have been always the same.

B.

You mean then now at last, I suppose, to fix the number of real Prepositions in our own, and therefore in all other languages.

H.

Very far from it. I mean on the contrary to account for their variety. And I will venture to lay it down as a rule, that, of different languages, the least corrupt will have the fewest Prepositions: and, in the same language, the best etymologists will acknowledge the fewest. And (if you are not already aware of it) I hope the reason of the rule will appear in the sequel.

There is not, for instance, (as far as I am aware) a preposition in any language answering directly to the French preposition *CHEZ* *. Yet does it by no means

* In the same manner *Temoin* and *Moyennant* are prepositions peculiar also to the French, but which require no explanation: because the *Substantive* *Temoin*, and the *Participle* *Moyennant*, are not confined to their *prepositive* employment alone, (or, as in the Latin it is termed, put *absolutely*;) but are used upon all other common occasions where those denominations are wanted; and their signification is therefore evident. *MOIENING* was antiently used in English.—“
gacion and stirring I (Robert Copland) have:|

follow, that the modern French do therefore employ any operation of the mind, or put their minds into any posture different from their ancestors or from other nations ; but only that there happens not to be in any other language a similar corruption of some word corresponding precisely with *CHEZ*. Which is merely a corruption of the Italian substantive *CASA**: in

ing the helpe of God, to reduce and translate it.” (See *Amer's History of Printing* ; or see *Percy's Reliques*, vol. 2. p. 273.) Had the use of this word continued in our language, it would certainly have been ranked amongst the prepositions ; and we should consequently have been considered as exerting one *operation of the mind* more than we do at present.

* Though the bulk of the French language is manifestly a corrupt derivation from the Italian, yet, as Scaliger observed of the Romans—“ *Aliqui autem, inter quos Varro, etiam maligne eruerunt omnia e Latinis, Græcisque suas origines invidere:*” So have the French, in all former times, shewn a narrow jealousy and envy towards Italy, its authors, and language: to which however they originally owe every thing valuable which they possess. From this spirit Henri Estiene, *De la precellence du langage François*, (a book of ill-founded vanity, blind prejudice and partiality) asserts that the Italians have taken—“ *la bande des mots qu'on appelle indeclinables ; comme sont Adverbes, Conjonctions, et autres particules,*” from the French: and amongst others he mentions *se, se non, che, ma, and senza*. But I shall hereafter have occasion to shew clearly the injustice of Henry Estiene to the Italian language, when I come to compare the respective advantages and disadvantages of the modern languages of Europe, and whence they flow. In the mean time it may not perhaps be improper to offer a general rule, by which (when applicable) all etymological disputants ought to be de-

the same manner as *chose* is from *cosa*; or as *cheval*, *chemise*, *chemin*, *chetif*, *chevreuil*, *cher*, *chemu*,

terminated, whether such determination be favourable or adverse to their national vanity and prejudice: Viz. That where different languages use the same or a similar *particle*, that language ought to be considered as its legitimate parent, in which the true meaning of the word can be found, and where its use is as common and familiar as that of any other verbs and substantives.

A more modern author (and therefore less excusable), Bergier, *Elemens primitifs des Langues*, having first absurdly imagined what is contradicted by all experience, viz.—“A mesure que les langues se sont éloignées de leur source primitive, les mots ont reçu de nouveaux accroissemens : plus elles ont été cultivées plus elles se sont allongées. On ne leur a donné de l’agrément, de la cadence, de l’harmonie qu’aux dépens de leur ~~br~~éveté :”—proceeds to this consequence,—“Les Romains ne nous ont pas communiqué les termes simples, les liaisons du discours : la plupart de ces termes sont *plus courts* en François qu’en Latin, & les Gaulois s’en servoient avant que de connoître l’Italie ou ses habitants.”—And then, to shew more strongly the spirit which animates him (a spirit unworthy of letters and hostile to the investigation of truth), adds—“Sommes nous suffisamment instruits, lorsque nous avons appris de nos Etymologistes, que tel mot François est emprunté du Latin, tel autre du Grec, celui-ci de l’Espagnol, celui-la du Teuton ou de l’Allemand ? Mais les Latins ou les Allemands de qui l’ont-ils reçu ? Ne semble-t-il pas que nos ayeux ne subsistoient que des emprunts, tandis que les autres peuples estoient riches de leur propre fonds ? *Je ne puis souffrir qu’on nous envoie mendier ailleurs*, tandis que nous l’avons chez nous.”

Perhaps there was something of this jealousy in Menage, when (not being able to agree with Sylvius, that *CHEZ* should

chien, toucher, &c. are corrupted from *cavallo, camiscia, camino, cattivo, cavriuolo, caro, canuto, cane, toccare, &c.*

If the ingenious Abbé Girard had known what **CHEZ**

be written *Sus* or *Sur*) he asserts that—" **CHEZ** vient de **APUD**, d'où les Italiens ont fait **APO**, et les Espagnols **CABE** en proposant comme nous un **C**."

Mr. de Brosse however, superior to all little prejudices, says—" On voit bien que **CHEZ** est une traduction de l'Italien **CASA**, et que quand on dit **CHEZ** vous, c'est comme si l'on disoit **CASA VOI** (**MAISON** de vous). Et encore ce dernier mot est plutôt dans notre langue une *adverbe* qu'une *particule*; ainsi que beaucoup d'autres dont l'origine devient plus facile à reconnoître. Mais quand ce sont de *pures Particules*, il est mal aisé de retrouver la première cause de leur formation; qui sans doute a souvent été arbitraire & précipitée: comme je l'ai remarqué en parlant de petites expressions *conjonctives*, qui ne servent qu'à former la liaison du discours."

Formation mécanique des Langues, tom. 2. chap. 14. art. 254.

The French Law Term *Chezé*, which has caused to that people so much litigation, and to their lawyers so much controversy, (and which some of their authors would have written *Chesné*, because they supposed the land to have been formerly measured with a *Chain*; and others would have written *choisé* parce-que l'ainé *choisit*;) is derived in like manner from **CASA**, and means no more than what we in English call the *Home-stead* or *Home-stall*, whose extent is, of course, variable; but ought in reason to go with the house.

If therefore the French Etymologists thus stumbled at **CHEZÉ**, it is no wonder they knew not what to make of **CHEZ**, whose corruption had proceeded one step further.

really was, he would not have said (*Vrais Principes*, Disc. 2.) “CHEZ a pour son partage particulier une idée d’habitation, soit comme patrie, soit comme simple demeure domestique.” But he would have said CHEZ is merely a corruption of CASA, and has all the same meaning in French which CASA has in Italian*: and that is something more than *patrie* or *demeure domestique*; viz.—*Race, Family, Nation, Sect, &c.* [“Ancien patron de la CASE,” says M. de Bussy Rabutin in his *Memoirs*, tom. 2. pag. 175.] Neither again would he have said—“Il s’agit ici de la permission que l’usage a accordée à quelques prepositions d’en regir d’autres en certaines occasions : c’est à dire, de les souffrir dans les complemens dont elles indiquent le rapport ; comme—*Je viens DE CHEZ vous.*” He would have seen through this grammatical mystery of one preposition’s governing another ; and would have said, that DE may be prefixed to the *Substantive* CHEZ (id est, CASA) in the same manner as to any other substantive. For,—“*Je viens De CHEZ vous,*” is no other than—*Je viens de CASA à vous* ; or (omitting the *Segnacaso*†) *de CASA vous* ; or, *de CA vous*‡.

* S. Johnson (who was conversant with no languages but English, Latin, and Greek) under the word AT, says hardily, but not truly, that—“CHEZ means sometimes *application to*, or *dependence on*.”

† That this omission of the *Segnacaso* is not a strained sup-

But thus it is that when Grammar comes at length (for its application is always late) to be applied to a language; some long preceding corruption causes a difficulty: ignorance of the corruption gives rise to some ingenious system to account for these words, which are considered as original and not corrupted. Succeeding ingenuity and heaps of misplaced learning increase the difficulty, and make the error more obstinate, if not incurable.

position of my own, we have the authority of Henri Estienne (*De la precell. du lang. Fran.* p. 178.)

“ Qui la maison son voisin ardoir voit,
De la sienne douter se doit.

“ Et faut noter—*la maison son voisin*—estre dict à la façon ancienne; au lieu de dire—*la maison DE son voisin*.”

So the Diction. della Crusca—“CASA. Nome dopo di cui vien lasciato talvolta dagli autori per proprietà di linguaggio, l'Articolo e il *segnacaso*.”

“*Sen' andarono a casa i prestatori.*” BOCCAC.

‡ “Pourquoy si souvent de *Dissyllables* font ils (les Italiens) des *monosyllables*; de CASA, CA, &c.”

H. ESTIENE. *De la precell.*

Diction. della Crusca,—“CA, accorciato da CASA.”

So Menage.—“Fermato l'uso di questo troncamento di CA per CASA, familiare a nostri antichi.—*Saræ simile all' uomo savio, il quale edifica la CA sua sopra la pietra.* Vangel di San matteo volgare.—*Vinegia, ne' quali paesi si dice CA in vece di CASA.* Silvano Rozzi.” Many other instances are also given from Dante, Boccaccio, Giovan Villani, Franco Sachetti, &c.

B.

Do you acknowledge the preposition to be an indeclinable word?

H.

No.

B.

Do you think it has a meaning of its own?

H.

Yes, most certainly. And indeed, if prepositions had no proper meaning of their own, why several unmeaning prepositions*; when one alone must have answered the purpose equally? The cypher, which has no value of itself, and only serves (if I may use the language of Grammarians) to *connote* and *consignify*, and to change the value of the figures, is not several and various, but uniformly one and the same.

B.

I guessed as much whilst you were talking of Con-

* Speaking of Prepositions, Cour de Gebelin says, *Gramm. Univers.* page 238, " Mais comment des mots pareils qui semblent ne rien peindre, *ne rien dire*, dont l'origine est inconnue, et qui ne tiennent en apparence à aucune famille, peuvent ils amener l'harmonie et la clarté dans les tableaux de la parole et devenir si nécessaires, que sans eux le langage n'offrirait que des peintures imparfaites? Comment ces mots peuvent ils produire de si grands effets et repandre dans le discours tant de chaleur, tant de finesse?"

junctions : and supposed that you intended to account for them both in the same manner*.

* In a Letter to Mr. Dunning, published in the year 1778, I asserted in a note (page 23) that—"There is not, nor is it possible there should be, a word in any language, which has not a compleat meaning and signification even when taken by itself. *Adjectives, Prepositions, Adverbs, &c.* have all compleat, separate meanings, not difficult to be discovered."

Having in that letter explained the *unmeaning* conjunctions, with which alone I had at that time any *personal* concern ; and not foreseeing that the *equally unmeaning* Prepositions were afterwards by a solemn decision (*but without explanation*) to be determined *more certain* than *certainty* ; I was contented by that note to set other persons who might be more capable and more at leisure than myself, upon an enquiry into the subject : being very indifferent from whose hand the explanation might come to the public. I must acknowledge myself a little disappointed, that in eight years time, no person whatever has pursued the enquiry ; although the success I had had with the Conjunctions might reasonably have encouraged, as it much facilitated, the search. But though all men (as far as I can learn) have admitted my particular proofs concerning the Conjunctions, none have been inclined (as I wished they might be) to push the *principle* of my reasoning further, and apply it to the other *Particles*. The ingenious author of *Essays Historical and Moral*, published in 1785, says, (page 125)—"Possibly *Prepositions* were, at first, short interjectional words, such as our carters and shepherds make use of to their cattle, to denote the relations of place. Or perhaps a more skilful linguist and antiquarian may be able to trace them from other words, as the Conjunctions have been traced by the author above mentioned."—It is therefore manifest, that the *principle* of my reasoning was either not sufficiently opened by me, or has not taken sufficient hold of the minds of others ; and that it is necessary still further to apply it to the other *Particles*.

H.

You were not mistaken, Sir. For though Vossius and others have concurred with the censure which Priscian passes on the Stoics for classing Prepositions and Conjunctions, &c. together under one head; yet in truth they are both to be accounted for in the same way.

The Prepositions as well as the Conjunctions are to be found amongst the other Parts of Speech. The same sort of corruption, from the same cause, has disguised both: and ignorance of their true origin has betrayed Grammarians and Philosophers into the mysterious and contradictory language which they have held concerning them. And it is really entertaining, to observe the various shifts used by those who were too sharp-witted and too ingenuous to repeat the unsatisfactory accounts of these Prepositions handed down by others, and yet not ingenuous enough to acknowledge their own total ignorance on the subject.

The Grammarian says, it is none of his business; but that it belongs to the Philosopher: and for that reason only he omits giving an account of them. Whilst the Philosopher avails himself of his dignity; and, when he meets with a stubborn difficulty which he cannot unravel, (*and only then,*) disdains to be employed about *Words*: although they are the necessary

channel through which his most precious liquors must flow.

“Grammatico satis est,” says Sanctius, “si tres has partes posteriores (scil. *Adverbia, Præpositiones, Conjunctiones*,) vocet *Particulas indeclinabiles*; et functus erit officio perfecti Grammatici.—Significationes enumerare, magis Philosophi est quam Grammatici: quia Grammatici munus non est, teste Varrone, vocum significationes indagare, sed earum usum. *Propterea* nos in arte hæc prætermisimus.”

Mr. Locke complains of the neglect of others in this particular; denies it to be his business “to examine them in their full latitude:” and declares that he “intends not here, a full explication of them.” Like Scaliger—*Non in animo est*.—And this serves him as an apology for not examining them at all in any latitude; and for giving no explication of them whatever in *any* place.

The author of the Port Royal philosophical Grammar saves himself by an *Almost*. “Ce sont *presque* les mêmes rapports dans toutes les langues, qui sont marqués par les Prepositions.” And therefore he will content himself to mention some of the *principal* French Prepositions, without obliging himself to fix their exact number. And as Sanctius had his reason for turning the business over to a philosophical grammar, whilst he was treating of a *particular* language: so this au-

thor, who was writing a *general* grammar, had his reason for leaving it to those who wrote particular grammars.—“C’est pourquoi je me contenterai de rapporter ici les *principaux* de ceux qui sont marqués par les prepositions de la langue Française; sans m’obliger à en faire un denombrement exact, comme il seroit necessaire pour une Grammaire *particuliere*.”

M. L’Abbé de Condillac’s method is most conveniently cavalier, and perfectly adapted to a writer of his description.—“Je me bornerai à vous en donner quelques exemples: car *vous jugez bien*, Monseigneur, que je *ne me propose pas* d’analyser les acceptions de toutes les prepositions.” And again, concludes—“En voilà assez, Monseigneur *!”

Even the learned President de Brosses, in his excellent treatise *De la Formation mechanique des Langues*, is compelled to evade the inquiry. “L’accroissement en tête des mots y amene une quantité fort variée d’idées accessoires. C’est un effet commun des Prepositions; qui pourroit fournir la matiere d’un chapitre tres-philosophique sur leurs causes, leurs racines,

* In the same manner he skips over all sorts of difficulty with the Conjunctions.

“Mais, Monseigneur, il est *inutile* de faire l’énumération de toutes les conjonctions.”—“Je ne crois pas, Monseigneur, qu’il y ait *rien de plus à remarquer* sur les conjonctions.”

Partie 2. chap. 23.

leur force, leur effet, leurs significations, leurs variétés. Je ne ferai que toucher cette matiere en fort peu de mots dans un exemple que je donnerai, et *seulement pour mettre sur les voies.*"

Tom. 2. chap. 11. art. 198.

The laborious and judicious R. Johnson includes in one page of his *National Grammar* all that he has to offer on the *Adverb*, *Conjunction*, and *Preposition*: and concludes with saying—"And here, if I would shew the reader the defectiveness of this Grammar (Lilly's) in the account it gives of the use of the Prepositions, it would make a little volume.

"Sed nos immensum spatio confecimus æquor,
Et jam tempus Equum fumantia solvere colla*."

Our countryman Wilkins, who is fairer and more intelligent than any of them, does not deny that it falls properly within his province; but saves himself by *selecting* such as he conceives *sufficient*. Speaking of Particles, he says, (Part 3. chap. 2.)—"The words of this kind are exceeding numerous and equivocal in all languages, and add much to the difficulty of learning

* And in his *Noctes Nottinghamicæ* he says—"Præpositionum Constructio—

"We are come now to the most curious part of all grammar, and which, if it were truly stated, would at once instruct, and entertain the reader with a surprizing delight."

And there he leaves it.

them. It being a very hard matter to establish the just number of such as in all kinds are necessary*, and to fix to them their proper significations: which yet *ought to be done in a philosophical grammar*. I shall in this Essay *select* out of instituted languages, such of the several sorts as I conceive *sufficient* for this purpose."

The learned Alexander Gil employs the denomination *Consignificativa*; which is more comprehensive than *Particle*, but not more explanatory.

"DE CONSIGNIFICATIVIS.

"Vox consignificativa *Articulos* comprehendit, *Adverbia* item, *Conjunctiones*, *Præpositiones*, *Interjectiones*. Et quia in his invariabilibus *nihil difficultatis* est, præter ipsam vocum cognitionem, classes enim eædem sunt, ut usus idem qui Latinæ, et aliis linguis, *ad Lexicographos* harum rerum studiosum lectorem ablegabo."

Logonomia Anglica, pag. 67, 68.

Doctor Wallis, after Gil's example, says—"Adverbia eandem sortiuntur naturam apud nos quam

* No wonder that Wilkins found it so hard to fix the number which was necessary, since their number in every language depends merely upon how many of the most common words shall become obsolete or corrupted. This being mere matter of particular fact and of accident, can have no place in general or philosophical grammar.

apud Latinos, aliasque gentes. Conjunctiones item eundem habent usum quem apud Latinos, aliosque. Præpositiones etiam eandem sortiuntur naturam, quam aliis linguis. Si quis tamen harum aliquot voces potius adverbia esse dicat; aut etiam ex adverbiiis aliquot ad conjunctionum classem referre malit: non tanti est ut hac de re quis contendat; cum, et apud Latinos, eadem non raro vox nunc pro adverbio, nunc pro conjunctione censenda est. Neque aliquod grave detrimentum pateremur, si tam adverbia quam conjunctiones et interjectiones, ad eandem classem reducerentur. *Est quidem nonnihil discriminis, sed leviusculum.*” Cap. xiii.

Greenwood rashly ventures a little further than any other person; and upon Mr. Locke’s authority, acknowledging it to be his duty to do what other grammarians had neglected, says—

“I am sensible that what I have here done”—(and he has done nothing)—“is slight and superficial to what may and ought to be done; but if this shall meet with any encouragement, I may be excited to make farther improvements in these matters, by taking more pains to observe nicely the several *postures of the mind* in discourse*.”

* In the same manner Greenwood slips the Conjunctions.
 “But this shall suffice for the Conjunctions, since it would be

Now Greenwood's Grammar did actually meet with very great and extraordinary encouragement ; and went through several editions speedily during the author's life ; but he never fulfilled his promise : nor indeed is there any thing about him, to incline us to believe that he was a fit person for such an undertaking.

But not to multiply quotations without end (in which you are much better versed than I am), you know that all philosophers, philologists and grammarians, who have owned a dissatisfaction in the accounts already given of the Particles, have yet, for some shuffling reason or other, all desired to be excused from giving a satisfactory account themselves.

B.

But why not concur with MM. de Port Royal, and the President de Bosses ? They are free from the contradiction and inconsistency of Mr. Harris's account of the Prepositions. For they acknowledge them to have a signification.—“ On a eu recours,” say the former, “ dans toutes les langues à une autre invention ; qui a été d'inventer de petits mots pour être mis avant les noms ; ce qui les a fait appeller Prepositions.”

And M. de Bosses with great ingenuousness tells

too tedious to go through all the divisions of them ; and *I may some other time* explain them more largely and accurately.”

us, (*Traité de la Formation mechanique des Langues*, tom. 2. chap. 11. art. 198.)—"Chacune des Prepositions a son sens propre, mais qu'on applique à beaucoup d'autres sens par extension et par approximation. Elles sont des formules abrégées, dont l'usage est le plus frappant et le plus commode dans toutes les langues pour circonstancier les idées : elles sont d'elles-mêmes Racines primitives ; mais *je n'ai pas trouvé qu'il fut possible d'assigner la cause de leur origine* : tellement que j'en crois la formation *purement arbitraire*. Je pense de même des Particules, des Articles, des Pronoms, des Relatifs, des Conjonctions ; en un mot, de tous les *monosyllabes* si frequens qu'on emploie pour lier les paroles d'un discours, en former une phrase construite, et lui donner un sens déterminé pour ceux qui l'entendent. Car ce n'est qu'en faveur de ceux qui ecoutent qu'on introduit cet appareil de tant de conjonctions. *Un homme seul au monde ne parleroit que peu** ou point. Il n'auroit besoin d'aucune de ces conjonctions pour former sa phrase mentale. Les seuls termes principaux lui suffiroient ; parcequ'il en a dans l'esprit la perception circonstanciée, et qu'il sçait assez sous quel aspect il les emploie. Il n'en est pas de même, lorsqu'il faut exprimer la phrase au dehors. Un tas de mots isolés ne seront non plus une phrase pour l'auditeur, qu'un tas de pierres toutes taillées ne seroient une maison, si on

* This is *French* reasoning, "seul au monde, il parleroit peu!"

arrangeoit dans leur ordre, et si on ne les lioit
sable et de la chaux. L'apprêt de cette espece
pressé pour un homme qui veut se faire en-
Cependant *la nature, les images, l'imitation,*
atopée, tout lui manque ici : car il n'est pas ques-
peindre et de nommer *aucun objet reel ;* mais
ment de donner à entendre *de petites combinaisons*
les, abstraites, et vagues. Alors l'homme aura
pour conjonctions des *premiers sons brefs et vagues*
qui venoient à la bouche. L'habitude en aura bien-
tôt connoître la force et l'emploi. Ces petits signes
raison sont restés en grand nombre dans chaque
ue, où l'on peut les considerer comme *sons radi-*
és ; et ils y ont en effet leurs dérivés."

And again (Art. 254.) "J'ai fait voir combien il
est difficile de trouver le premier germe radical des
particules conjonctives du discours. Leur examen
fait pencher à croire qu'elles étoient pour la plu-
rt *arbitraires ;* et que le prompt et prodigieux be-
soin qu'on en a pour s'enoncer, ayant forcé les hommes
chaque pays à prendre le *premier monosyllabe* ou
vocal indéterminé qui lui *venoit à la bouche* dans
besoin pressant, l'usage réitéré en avoit déterminé
l'habitude significative. Il n'est guère plus aisé d'as-
surer la première origine de *Prepositions*, quoiqu'un
plus composées que les simples particules con-
junctives."

And again (Art. 274.) "On auroit à parler aussi de

la cause des différentes terminaisons dans les langues, de la signification des prepositions, de leur variété à cet égard : car les mêmes ont plusieurs *sens très-différents*. C'est une matière extrêmement *vaste et très-philosophique*."

H.

Messieurs de Port Royal and M. de Brosses deserve for ever to be mentioned with respect and gratitude ; but, upon this occasion, I must answer them in the words of Mer. Casaubon (*De Lingua Hebraica*)—"Persuadeant fortasse illis, qui de verbis singulis, etiam vulgatissimis, a philosophis, prius quam imponerentur, itum in consilium credunt. Nos, qui de verborum origine longe aliter opinamur, plane *pro fabula habemus*," p. 37.

Language, it is true, is an Art, and a glorious one ; whose influence extends over all the others, and in which finally all science whatever must centre. But an art springing from necessity, and originally invented by artless men ; who did not sit down like philosophers to invent "*de petits mots pour être mis avant les noms ;*" nor yet did they take for this purpose "*des premiers sons brefs et vagues qui leur venoient à la bouche** : but

* It will seem the more extraordinary that M. de Brosses should entertain this opinion of the *Particles*, when we remember what he truly says of *Proper names*.—"Tous les mots formant les noms propres ou appellatifs des personnes, ont en

they took such and the same (whether great or small, whether monosyllable or polysyllable, without distinction) as they employed upon other occasions to mention the same *real objects*. For *Prepositions* also are the names of *real objects*. And these *petits mots* happen in this case to be so, merely from their repeated corruption, owing to their frequent, long-continued, and perpetual use.

B.

You assert then that what we call *Prepositions*, and distinguish as a separate part of speech, are not a species of words essentially or in any manner different from the other parts : that they are not “ *little words invented to put before nouns, and to which all languages have had recourse* :” but that they are in fact either Nouns or Verbs. And that (like the Conjunctions) *Prepositions* are only words which have been disguised by corruption ; and that Etymology will give us in all languages, what Philosophy has attempted in vain.

quelque langage, que ce soit, ainsi que les mots formants les noms des choses, une origine certaine, une signification déterminée, une etymologie véritable. Ils n'ont pas, plus que les autres mots, été imposés sans cause, ni fabriqués au hasard, seulement pour produire un bruit vague. Cependant comme la plupart de ces mots ne portent à l'oreille de ceux qui les entendent aucune autre signification que de désigner les personnes nommées : c'est sur tout à leur égard que le vulgaire est porté à croire qu'ils sont dénués de sens et d'etymologie.”

And yet I cannot but perceive that such words as Prepositions are absolutely necessary to discourse.

H.

I acknowledge them to be undoubtedly necessary. For, as the necessity of the *Article* (or of some equivalent invention) follows from the impossibility of having in language a distinct name or *particular term* for each particular individual *idea**; so does the necessity of the *Preposition* (or of some equivalent invention) follow from the impossibility of having in language a distinct *complex term* for each different *collection of ideas* which we may have occasion to put together in discourse. The addition or subtraction of *any one* idea to or from a collection, makes it a different collection: and (if there were degrees of impossibility) it is still more impossible to use in language a different and distinct *complex term* for each different and distinct *collection of ideas*, than it is to use a distinct *particular term* for each particular and individual idea. To supply, therefore, the place of the complex terms which are wanting in a language, is the *Preposition* employed: by whose aid *complex* terms are prevented from being infinite or too numerous, and are used only for those collections of ideas which we have most frequently occasion to mention in discourse. And this end is obtained in the most sim-

* See before, Chap. V.

ple manner in the world. For having occasion in communication to mention a collection of ideas, for which there is no one single *complex* term in the language, we either take that complex term which includes the greatest number, though not *All*, of the ideas we would communicate : or else we take that complex term which includes *All*, and the fewest ideas *more* than those we would communicate : and then by the help of the Preposition, we either make up the deficiency in the one case, or retrench the superfluity in the other.

For instance,

1. "*A House WITH a Party-wall.*"
2. "*A House WITHOUT a Roof.*"

In the first instance, the complex term is deficient : The Preposition directs to add what is wanting. In the second instance, the complex term is redundant : The Preposition directs to take away what is superfluous.

Now considering it only in this, the most simple light, it is absolutely necessary, in either case, that the Preposition itself should have a meaning of its own : for how could we otherwise make known by it our intention, whether of adding to or retrenching from, the deficient or redundant complex term we have employed ?

If to one of our modern grammarians I should say —“*A House*, JOIN;”—he would ask me—“JOIN *what?*”—But he would not contend that JOIN is an indeclinable word, and has no meaning of its own: because he knows that it is the Imperative of the Verb, the other parts of which are still in use; and its own meaning is clear to him, though the sentence is not completed. If, instead of JOIN, I should say to him, —“*A House* WITH;”—he would still ask the same question, “WITH *what?*” But if I should discourse with him concerning the word WITH, he would tell me that it was a *Preposition*, an *indeclinable* word, and that it had no meaning of its own, but only a *connotation* or *consignification*. And yet it would be evident by his question, that he felt it had a meaning of its own; which is indeed the same as JOIN*. And the

* WITH is also sometimes the Imperative of *þýpðan*, *to be*. Mr. Tyrwhitt in his Glossary (*Art. BUT*) has observed truly,—that “BY and WITH are often synonymous.”—They are always so, when WITH is the Imperative of *þýpðan*: for BY is the Imperative of *Beon*, *to be*.

He has also in his Glossary (*Art. WITH*) said truly, that—“WITH *meschance*. WITH *misaventure*. WITH *sorwe*. 5316. 7797. 6916. 4410. 5890. 5922. are to be considered as parenthetical curses.”—For the literal meaning of those phrases is (not *God yeve*, but)—BE *mischance*, BE *misadventure*, BE *sorrow*, to him or them concerning whom these words are spoken. But Mr. Tyrwhitt is mistaken, when he supposes—“WITH *evil prefe*. 5829. WITH *harde grace*. 7810. WITH *sory grace*. 12810.”—to have the same meaning: for in those three instances,

only difference between the two words **WITH** and **JOIN**, is, that the other parts of the verb **ϒΙΦΑΝ**, **ϒιḡan**, to *join* (of which **WITH** is the imperative) have ceased to be employed in the language *. So that my instances stand thus,

1. *A House JOIN a Party-wall.*

2. *A House BE-OUT a Roof.*

WITH is the Imperative of **ϒΙΦΑΝ**; nor is any parenthetical curse or wish contained in either of those instances.

As **WITH** means **JOIN**, so the correspondent French Preposition **AVEC** means—*And Have that, or Have that also.* And it was formerly written *Avecque*, i. e. *Avezque*. So Boileau, *Satire 1.*

“ Quittons donc pour jamais une ville importune :
Où l'honneur est en guerre **AVECQUE** la fortune.”

And again, *Satire 5.*

“ Mais qui m'assurera, qu'en ce long cercle d'ans,
A leurs fameux epoux vos ayeules fidelles
Aux douceurs des galands furent toujours rebelles ?
Et comment sçavez-vous, si quelqu'audacieux
N'a point interrompu le cours de vos ayeux ?
Et si leur sang tout pur **AVECQUE** leur noblesse,
Est passé jusqu'à vous de Lucrece en Lucrece.”

* We still retain in English speech, though not often used in books, the substantives **WITH** or **WITHE**, **WITHERS**, and **WITHER-BAND**.

“ Me thou shalt use in what thou wilt, and doe that with a slender twist, that none can doe with a tough **WITH**.”

Euphues and his England, pag. 136.

“ They had arms under the straw in the boat ; and had cut

And indeed so far has always been plainly perceived, that **WITH** and **WITHOUT** are directly opposite and contradictory. Wilkins, without knowing what the words really were, has yet well expressed their meaning, where he says that **WITH** is a preposition—"relating to the notion of *social*, or circumstance of *society affirmed* ; and that **WITHOUT** is a preposition relating to the same notion of *social*, or circumstance of *society denied*."

And it would puzzle the wisest philosopher to discover opposition and contradiction in two words, where neither of them had any signification.

the **WITNES** that held the oars of the town-boats, to prevent any pursuit, if they should be forced to fly."

Ludlow's Memoirs, pag. 435.

And again, pag. 437. "One of the four watermen was the person who cut the **WITNES** of all the town-boats, to prevent them from pursuing."

"This troublesom rowing, though an ingenious invention of the Chineses, hath raised this proverb amongst them, *that their boats are paper, and their watermen iron* ; because they are made of very thin boards, like our slit deal, which are not nailed, but fastened together with **WITHS**, in the Chinese tongue called *rotang* ; by which means the boats, though often beaten by the strong current against the rocks, split not, but bend and give way."—*History of China*. By John Ogilby. vol. 2. pag. 609.

"The only furniture belonging to the houses, appears to be an oblong vessel made of bark, by tying up the ends with a **WITHE**."—*Captain Cook's Description of Botany Bay*.

B.

According then to your explanation, the Preposition **WITHOUT**, is the very same word, and has the very same meaning, as the Conjunction **WITHOUT**. Does not this in some measure contradict what you before asserted, concerning the faithfulness of words to the standard under which they were originally enlisted? For there does not appear in this case to be any melting down of two words into one, by such a corruption as you before noticed in some of the Conjunctions. And yet here is one and the same word used both as a Conjunction and as a Preposition.

H.

There is nothing at all extraordinary, much less contradictory, in this; that one and the same word should be applied indifferently either to single *words* or to *sentences*: (for you must observe that the apparently *different application* constitutes the only difference between Conjunctions and Prepositions :) For I may very well employ the same word of direction, whether it be to add a *word* or to add a *sentence*: And again, one and the same word of direction will serve as well to take away a *word* as to take away a *sentence*. No wonder therefore that our ancestors (who were ignorant of the false divisions and definitions of Grammar which we have since received) should have used **BUT** indifferently to direct the omission either of a *word*, or of a *sentence*; and should have used **WITH-**

OUT also indifferently for the omission of a *sentence* or of a *word*. But after our authors became more generally and better acquainted with the divisions and definitions of the Greek and Latin Grammarians, they attempted by degrees to make our language also conform to those definitions and divisions. And after that it was, that BUT ceased to be commonly used as a *known* Preposition; and WITHOUT ceased to be *correctly* used as a Conjunction.

As the meaning of these two words BUT (I mean that part which is corrupted from Butan) and WITHOUT, is exactly the same, our authors would most likely have had some difficulty to agree amongst themselves, which should be the Preposition and which the Conjunction; had it not been for the corruption* of BOT, which becoming BUT, must necessarily decide the choice: for though WITHOUT could very well supply the place of the *Preposition* BUT, it could not supply the place of the Bot-part of the *Conjunction* BUT: whereas BUT could entirely supply the place of the *Conjunction* WITHOUT. And this, I take it, is the reason why BUT has been retained as a Conjunction, and WITHOUT has been retained as a Preposition.

Not however that they have been able so to banish the old habit of our language, as that BUT should al-

* See p. 182.

ways be used as a Conjunction, and WITHOUT always as a Preposition (I mean that BUT should always apparently be applied to *sentences*, and WITHOUT always to *words*; for that, it must be remembered, is the only difference between Conjunctions and Prepositions): for BUT is still used frequently as a Preposition: though Grammarians, forgetful or heedless of their own definitions, are pleased to call it always a Conjunction;

As thus, "*All BUT one.*"

And, though it is not *now* an *approved* usage, it is very frequent in common speech to hear WITHOUT used as a Conjunction; where, instead of WITHOUT, a correct modern speaker would use UNLESS, or some other equivalent acknowledged conjunction: and that for no other reason, but because it has pleased our Grammarians to exclude WITHOUT from the number of Conjunctions.

B.

And is not that reason sufficient, when the best writers have for a long time past conformed to this arrangement?

H.

Undoubtedly. Nor do I mean to censure those who follow custom for the propriety of a particular language: I do not even mean to condemn the custom:

for in this instance it is perfectly harmless. But I condemn the false philosophy which caused it. I condemn those who wilfully shut their eyes, and affect not to perceive the indifferent application of BUT, AND, SINCE, IF, ELSE, &c. both to *words* and to *sentences*; and still endeavour by their definitions to uphold a distinction which they know does not exist even in the practice of any language, and which they ought to know cannot exist in theory.

To the pedagogue, indeed, who must not trouble children about the corruption of words, the distinction of prepositions and conjunctions may be useful enough (on account of the *cases* which they govern when applied to *words*; and which they cannot govern when applied to *sentences*); and for some such reason, perhaps, both this and many other distinctions were at first introduced. Nor would they have caused any mischief or confusion, if the *philosopher* had not adopted these distinctions; taken them for real differences in *nature*, or in the *operations of the human mind*; and then attempted to account for what he did not understand. And thus the *Grammatist* has misled the *Grammarian*, and both of them the *Philosopher*.

B.

“SANS eyes, SANS teeth, SANS taste, SANS every thing.”

This preposition too, which was formerly used instead of WITHOUT, you mean, I suppose, to account for

in the same manner : It can be shewn, I suppose, to be the Imperative of some obsolete Saxon verb having a similar meaning.

H.

SANS, though sometimes used instead of WITHOUT, is not an English but a French preposition, and therefore to be derived from another source.

“ Et je conserverai, malgré votre menace,
Une âme SANS courroux, SANS crainte, et SANS audace.”
Adelaïde.

Nor is it a *verb*, but a *substantive* : and it means simply *Absence*. It is one proof, amongst many others, that Plutarch's half-conjecture was not ill-founded. After all, he thinks it may be worth considering, whether the Prepositions may not be perhaps little fragments of words, used in haste and for dispatch, instead of the whole words *. SANS is corrupted from the preposition *Senza* of the Italians (by old Italian authors written *Sanza* †) who frequently use it thus ;

* Ορα δε μη κομμασι και θραυσμασιν ονοματων εοικασιν, ας περ γραμματων σπαραγμασι και κεραιαις δι σπενδοντες γραφουσι, κ. τ. λ.
Πλατωνικα Ζητηματα. θ.

† “ Vai alla taverna, ripariti in Casa femmine, et dove si giuoca spendi SANZA modo.”

Machiavelli. Clitia, atto 3. sce. 4.

“ SENZA et SANZA (says Menage) Da *Absentia*, per afe-

SENZA *di te*, i. e. ASSENZA *di te*. The French (as we have seen in *Chez*) omit the *Segnacaso*, and say SANS *toi*. And as from the Italian *Assenza* they have their *Absence*; or, as they pronounce it, *Absance* or *Absans*;

resi, lo cava il Cittadini. Viene secondo me da *Sine*. *Sine*, *Sines*, (come lo Spagnuolo *Antes da Ante*) *Senes*, (onde il Francese *Sens*, che si pronunzia *Sans*) *Sense*, *Sensa*, SENZA. SANZA disser piu volentieri gli antichi."

Again Menage says, that SANS *dessus dessous*, should be written SENS *dessus dessous* "comme on écrit, *En tout Sens, de ce Sens là*, &c. SENS, c'est à dire, *face, visage, situation, posture*," &c.—Menage is surely wrong: for it means, *without top or bottom*, i. e. a situation of confusion in which you cannot discern the top from the bottom; or say which is the top and which the bottom. We translate it by a similar expression in English, *Upside down*, by our old authors more properly written *Up so down*.

"But the other partie was so stronge,
That for the lawe of no statute
There maie no right be execute:
And upon this division
The londe was tourned UP SO DOWNE."

Gower, lib. 2. fol. 37. pag. 1. col. 2.

"Do lawe awaie, what is a kynge?
Where is the right of any thyng
If that there be no lawe in londe?
This ought a kynge well understonde,
As he whiche is to lawe swore,
That if the lawe be forelore
Withouten execucion,
It maketh a londe turne UP SO DOWNE."

Gower, lib. 7. fol. 159. pag. 1. col. 1.

so have they their preposition SANS from SENZA or SANZA. But I persuade myself that you can have no doubt of the meaning of this preposition SANS, when you find the signification of its *correspondent* words equally clear in other languages.

The Greek preposition *Χαρις* is the corrupted Imperative of *Χαριζω*, to sever, to disjoin, to separate.

The German preposition SONDER, the imperative of *Sondern*, which has the same meaning as *Χαριζω*.

The Dutch preposition ZONDER, the imperative of *Zonderen*, with the same meaning.

The Latin preposition SINE, i. e. *Sit ne. Be not.*

The Spanish *Sin*, from the Latin *Sine*.

{	The Italian <i>Fuori</i> The Spanish <i>Affuera</i> (as <i>Puerta</i> from <i>Porta</i>) The French <i>Hors</i> * (by their old authors written <i>Fors</i> †)	}	From the Latin <i>Foris</i> ‡.
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* *Menage, Cambiamenti delle Lettere*, page 8, exemplifies HORS used by the French for *Foris*.

† “Toute la troupe étoit lors endormie,
 FORS le galant qui trembloit pour sa vie.”
 Contes de la Fontaine. Le Muletier.

“ Elle étoit jeune et belle creature,
 Plaisoit beaucoup, FORS un point qui gâtoit

Whence *Hormis*, i. e. (*put out*) by the addition of the participle of *mettre*.

B.

If there were no other relations declared by the prepositions, besides those of *adding* or *taking away*, per-

Toute l'affaire, et qui seul rebutoit
Les plus ardents ; c'est qu'elle étoit avare."

Contes de la Fontaine. Le Galant Escroc.

Brantôme, *Des Dames illustres*, cites an account of the funeral of Queen Anne of Bretagne—"Ne furent à l'offrande **FORS** Monsieur d'Angoulesme." And again—"La reyne fut en colore de ce que tout ce grand convoi n'avoit passé outre, ainsi qu'elle attendoit, **FORS** Monsieur son fils, et le roy de Navarre."

‡ The Greek *Θυγα* became the Doric *Φοπα* and the Latin *Fora*, whence *Fores*, *Foris*, whence the Italian *Fuora*, *Fuore*, *Fuori*, and the French *Fors*; which, in the *prepositive* and *conjunctive* use of it, the French have latterly changed to *Hors*: but they have not so changed it when in composition. They say indeed *Fauxbourg* corruptly for *Forsbourg*, as it was anciently written by Froissart and others; ["La Bourg de Four n'estoit anciennement qu'un *Fauxbourg* qu'on appelloit en Savoyard *Bourg de Feu*, c'est à dire, *Bourg de Dehors*."—*Histoire de la Ville de Geneve*, par Jacob Spon; who gives us likewise from their Archives the translation of it into *Burgi Foris*. For the same reason, I suppose a part of the town of Reading, in Berkshire, is called The Forbery.] but in their compounds the French retain *For*:—"Corbleu, je luy passerois mon épée au travers du corps, à elle et au galant, si elle avoit *Forfait* à son honneur."

George Dandin, act 1. sc. 4.

From the French we have many English words preceded by *For* with this meaning: as, *Forfeit*, *Foreclose*, &c. and we had anciently many more.

haps this explanation might convince me; but there are assuredly Prepositions employed for very different purposes. And instead of selecting such instances as may happen to be suited particularly to your own hypothesis, I should have more satisfaction if you would exemplify in those which Mr. Harris has employed to illustrate his hypothesis.

“ From these principles (he says, book 2. chap. 3.) it follows, that when we form a sentence, the substantive without difficulty coincides with the verb, from the natural coincidence of substance and energy.—*The Sun warmeth*.—So likewise the energy with the subject on which it operates.—*warmeth the Earth*.—So likewise both substance and energy with their proper attributes.—*The splendid Sun genially warmeth the fertile Earth*.—But suppose we were desirous to add other substantives; as for instance, *Air* or *Beams*: how would these coincide, or under what character could they be introduced? Not as Nominatives or Accusatives, for both those places are already filled; the Nominative, by the substance *Sun*; the Accusative by the substance *Earth*. Not as Attributes to these last, or to any other thing: for, attributes by nature, they neither are nor can be made*. Here then we perceive the rise and use of *Prepositions*. By these we connect those substantives to sentences, which at the time are unable to coalesce of themselves. Let us as-

* N.B. Air Pump; Air Gun.

sume for instance a pair of these connectives, THRO' and WITH, and mark their effect upon the substances here mentioned. *The splendid sun WITH his beams genially warmeth THRO' the air the fertile earth.*—The sentence as before remains intire and one; the substantives required are both introduced; and not a word which was there before, is detruded from its proper place."

The first of this pair of his connectives (WITH) you have already explained, and I am willing to admit the explanation. It is,—*The splendid sun JOIN his beams*—instead of one single complex term including *sun* and *beams**.

But of what *real object* is THROUGH the name?

H.

Of a very common one indeed †. For as the French peculiar preposition CHEZ is no other than the Italian

* The *Sun-beams*.

† All *Particles* are in truth, in all languages, the signs of the most common and familiar ideas, and those which we have most frequently occasion to communicate: they had not otherwise become *Particles*. So very much mistaken was Mr. Locke, when he supposed them to be the signs or marks of certain operations of the mind for which we had either *none or very deficient names*; that the *Particles* are always the words which were the most common and familiar in the language from which they came.

substantive CASA or CA, so is the English preposition THOROUGH*, *Thourough, Thorow, Through, or Thro'*, no other than the Gothic substantive **ἈΛΗΚΣ**, or the Teutonic substantive *Thuruh* : and, like them, means *Door, gate, passage.*

So that Mr. Harris's instance (translated into modern English) stands thus,

“ *The splendid sun—JOIN his beams—genially warmeth—PASSAGE the air—(or, the air being the passage or medium) the fertile earth.*” And in the same manner may you translate the preposition *Through* in every instance where *Thro'* is used in English, or its equivalent preposition is used in any other language†.

After having seen in what manner the substantive *House* became a preposition in the French, you will not wonder to see *Door* become a preposition in the English : and though in the first instance it was more

* S. Johnson calls “*Thorough*,—the word *Through* extended into two syllables.”—What could possibly be expected from such an Etymologist as this? He might, with as much verisimilitude, say that **ΣΑΙΨΑΛΛΑ** was the word *Soul* extended into three syllables, or that *Ελεημοσυνη* was the word *Alms* extended into six.

† So, I suppose, the Greek word *Προς* has given the Latin and Italian preposition *Per*, the French *Par*, and the Spanish *Por*.

easy for you to perceive the nature of the French preposition *chez*; because, having no preposition corresponding to it in English, there was so much prejudice out of your way; yet I am persuaded you will not charge this to me as a fantastical or far-fetched etymology, when I have placed before you, at one view, the words employed to signify the same idea in those languages to which our own has the nearest affinity.

*Substantive.**Preposition.*

English	{ Door. Thorruke.*	{ Thourough. Thorough. Thurgh.† Thorow. Through. Thro.‡
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* “Than cometh ydelnesse, that is the yate of all harmes. This ydlenesse is the *Thorruke* of all wycked and vylayne thoughtes.”—*Chaucer, Persons Tale*, fol. 3. pag. 1. col. 2.

† “So in an antient roll in verse, exhibiting the descent of the family of the lords of Clare in Suffolk, preserved in the Austin Friary at Clare, and written in the year 1356.

“ ——— So conioyned be

Ulstris armes and Glocestris *thurgh* and *thurgh*,
As shewith our wyndowes in houses thre.”

Warton's Hist. of Engl. Poetry, vol. 1. pag. 302.

“Releued by thynfynye grace and goodness of our said lord *thurgh* the meane of the mediatrix of mercy.”

The Dictes and Sayinges of the Philosophers. 1477.

‡ The Greeks abbreviated in the same manner as the English: and as we use *Thro* for *Thorough*, so they used *Θρα* for *Θυρα*. Thus we find *Ουρηθρα*, the Urethra, or urine passage, compounded of *Ουρον* and *Θυρα*, and by abbreviation *Θρα*.

<i>Substantive.</i>	<i>Preposition.</i>
Anglo-Sax. { Dopa. Dupu. Dupe. Dupe. Đupa. *	{ Đupuh. Đuph. Đpuh. Đop.
Goth. { ᐃᐱᐢᐱᐱ. ᐃᐱᐢᐱ.	{ φᐱᐢᐱᐱ.
Dutch { Deure. Deur. Door. Dore.	{ Deur. Door.
German { Thure. Thur. Thor.	{ Durch.
Teuton. { Thurah. Thur. Thor. Tura. Dura. Dure.	{ Thuruh. Thurah. Thur. Duruch. Duruc. Duruh. Durch. Durh.

Though it is not from Asia or its confines, that we are to seek for the origin of this part of our language; yet is it worth noticing here, that the Greek (to which the Gothic has in many particulars a considerable resemblance) employs the word *Θυρα* for *Door*. And both the Persian (which in many particulars resembles

* *Elf* hīpan heora cýricean mape ðearf hæbben. heald hine mon on oþrum hūj. and þat næbbe ðonne ma ðura ðonne yeo cýrice.

Ælfrædeſ æ. cap. 5. Lambard. *Ἀρχαιονομία*, fol. 29.

the Teutonic*) and the Chaldean, use THRO for *Door*. You will observe, that the Teutonic uses the same word *Thurah* both for the *substantive* (*Door*), and for what is called the *preposition* (*Thorough*). The Dutch, which has a strong antipathy to our *Th*, uses the very word *Door* for both. The Anglo-Saxon, from which our language immediately descends, employs indifferently for *Door* either *Dure* or *Thure*. The modern German (directly contrary to the modern English) uses the initial *Th* (*Thur*) for our *substantive* (*Door*), and the initial *D* (*Durch*) for our *preposition* (*Thorough*): and it is remarkable, that this same difference between the German and the English prevails in almost all cases where the two languages employ a word of the same origin having either of those initials. Thus *Distel und Dorn*—in German—are *Thistles and Thorns* in English. So the English *Dear, Dollar, Deal*, are in German *Theur, Thaler, Theil*.

Minshew and Junius both concur that *Door, &c.* are derived from the Greek *Θυρα*: Skinner says, *perhaps* they are all from the Greek *Θυρα*: and then without any reason (or rather as it appears to me against all

* “On n’est pas étonné de trouver du rapport entre l’*Anglois* et le *Persan*: car on sçait que le fond de la langue Angloise est Saxon; et qu’il y a une quantité d’exemples qui montre une affinité marquée entre l’*Allemand* et le *Persan*.”

Form. mechan. des Langues, tom. 2. art. 166.

reason) chuses rather uselessly to derive the substantive *Door* from the Anglo-Saxon preposition *Thor*, *Thruh*, *Thurh*. But I am persuaded that *Door* and *Thorough* have one and the same Gothic origin **ÐANK**, mean one and the same thing; and are in fact one and the same word.

B.

There is an insuperable objection, which, I fear, you have not considered, to this method of accounting for the Prepositions: for if they were really and merely, as you imagine, common Nouns and Verbs, and therefore, as you say, the names of *real objects*, how could any of them be employed to denote not only *different** but even contrary relations? Yet this is universally maintained, not only by Mr. Harris, but by Messrs. de Port Royal †, by the President de Brosses, and by all

* “Certains mots sont *Adverbes*, *Prepositions*, et *Conjonctions* en même temps. Et repondent ainsi en même temps à diverses parties d’oraison, selon que la Grammaire les employe diversement.”—BUFFIER, art. 150.

† “On n’a suivi en aucune langue, sur le sujet des prepositions, ce que la raison auroit désiré: qui est, qu’un rapport ne fût marqué que par une preposition; et qu’une preposition ne marquât qu’un seul rapport. Car il arrive au contraire dans toutes les langues ce que nous avons vu dans ces exemples pris de la Française; qu’un même rapport est signifié par plusieurs prepositions: et qu’une même preposition marque divers rapports.”—MM. de Port Royal.

those writers whom you most esteem; and even by Wilkins * and Locke.

Now if these words have a meaning, as you contend, and are constantly used according to their meaning, which you must allow, (because you appeal to the use which is made of them as proof of the meaning which you attribute to them); how can they possibly be the names of *real and unchangeable objects*, as common nouns and verbs are? I am sure you must see the necessity of reconciling these contradictory appearances.

H.

Most surely. And I think you will as readily acknowledge the necessity of first establishing the facts, before you call upon me to reconcile them. Where is the Preposition to be found which is at any time used in contrary or even in different meanings?

B.

Very many instances have been given; but none stronger than those produced by Mr. Harris of the Pre-

*“Some of these prepositions are *absolutely determined* either to *motion* or to *rest*, or the *Terminus of Motion*. Others are relatively applicable to *both*. Concerning which this rule is to be observed: that those which belong to motion cannot signify rest; but those which belong to rest may signify motion in the *terminus*.”—WILKINS, part 3. chap. 3.

position FROM ; which he shews to be used to denote *three* very different relations, and the two last in absolute contradiction to each other.

“FROM,” he says, “denotes the detached relation of Body ; as when we say—*These Figs came FROM Turkey*.—So as to *Motion* and *Rest*, only with this difference, that *here* the preposition *varies its character with the Verb*. Thus if we say—*That lamp hangs FROM the cieling*—the preposition FROM assumes a character of *quiescence*. But if we say—*That lamp is falling FROM the cieling*,—the preposition in such case assumes a character of *motion*.”

Now I should be glad you would shew me what one Noun or Verb can be found of so versatile a character as this preposition : what name of any one real object or sign of one idea, or of one collection of ideas, can have been instituted to convey these different and opposite meanings ?

H.

Truly, none that I know of. But I take the word FROM (*preposition*, if you chuse to call it so) to have as clear, as precise, and at all times as uniform and unequivocal a meaning, as any word in the language. FROM means merely BEGINNING, and nothing else. It is simply the Anglo-Saxon and Gothic noun *Frum*,

FROM, *Beginning, Origin, Source, Fountain, Author**.

Now then, if you please, we will apply this meaning to Mr. Harris's formidable instances, and try whether we cannot make **FROM** speak clearly for itself, without the assistance of the *interpreting Verbs* ; who are supposed by Mr. Harris, to *vary its character* at will, and make the preposition appear as inconsistent and contradictory as himself.

Figs *came* **FROM** Turkey.

Lamp *falls* **FROM** Cieling.

Lamp *hangs* **FROM** Cieling.

Came is a complex term for one species of motion.

Falls is a complex term for another species of motion.

Hangs is a complex term for a species of attachment.

Have we occasion to communicate or mention the **COMMENCEMENT** or **BEGINNING** of these motions and of this attachment ; and the *place* where these motions and this attachment commence or begin ? It is impossible to have complex terms for each occasion of this

* “ Ne pædd ge je ðe on fnumman pophæ. he pophæ pæpman and pifman.” That is, Annon legistis, quod qui eos *in principio* creavit, creavit eos marem et foeminam ? St. Matt. xix. 4.

sort. What more natural then, or more simple, than to add the signs of those ideas, viz. the word BEGINNING (which will remain always the same) and the name of the *place* (which will perpetually vary) ?

Thus,

“ Figs came—BEGINNING Turkey.
Lamp falls—BEGINNING Cieling.
Lamp hangs—BEGINNING Cieling.”

That is

Turkey the *Place* of BEGINNING to come.
Cieling the *Place* of BEGINNING to fall.
Cieling the *Place* of BEGINNING to hang.

B.

You have here shewn its meaning when it relates to *place*; but Wilkins tells us, that “ FROM refers *primarily* to *place* and *situation*: and *secondarily* to *time*.” So that you have yet given but half its meaning.

—“ FROM morn till night th’ eternal larum rang.”—

There is no *place* referred to in this line.

H.

FROM relates to every thing to which BEGINNING relates*, and to nothing else: and therefore is refera-

* Is it unreasonable to suppose that, if the meaning of this word FROM, and of its correspondent prepositions in other languages,

ble to *Time* as well as to *motion*: without which indeed there can be no *Time*.

“The larum rang BEGINNING Morning:”

i. e. Morning being the *time* of its BEGINNING to ring.

had been clearly understood, the Greek and Latin Churches would never have differed concerning the *Eternal Procession* of the Holy Ghost FROM the Father, or FROM the Father and the Son? And that, if they had been determined to separate, they would at least have chosen some safer cause of schism?

“*Apelles*. I have now, *Campaspe*, almost made an end.

Campaspe. You told me, *Apelles*, you would never end.

Ap. Never end my love: for it shall be *Eternal*.

Cam. That is, neither to have *Beginning* nor ending.”

Campaspe by John Lilly, act 4. sc. 4.

—————“*Eternal* sure, as without end

Without Beginning.”—————

Paradise Regained, book 4, line 391.

“To say that *Immensity* does not signify boundless space, and that *Eternity* does not signify duration or time *without Beginning* and end; is, I think, affirming that words have no meaning.”—*Dr. Sam. Clarke's fifth Reply to Leibnitz's fifth Paper*, sect. 104-106.

Is it presumptuous to say, that the explanation of this single preposition would have decided the controversy more effectually, than all the authorities and all the solid arguments produced by the wise and honest bishop Procopowicz? and thus have withheld one handle at least of reproach, from those who assert —“Que l'on pourroit justement definir la theologie—L'art de composer des chimeres en combinant ensemble des qualites impossibles à concilier.”—*Systeme de la Nature*, tom. 2, p. 55.

B.

Still I have difficulty to trust to this explanation. For Dr. S. Johnson has numbered up *twenty* different meanings of this Preposition FROM. He says, it denotes,

- “ 1. *Privation.*
2. *Reception.*
3. *Descent or Birth.*
4. *Transmission.*
5. *Abstraction.*
6. *Succession.*
7. *Emission.*
8. *Progress from premisses to inferences.*
9. *Place or Person from whom a message is brought.*
10. *Extraction.*
11. *Reason or Motive.*
12. *Ground or Cause.*
13. *Distance.*
14. *Separation or Recession.*
15. *Exemption or Deliverance.*
16. *Absence.*
17. *Derivation.*
18. *Distance from the past.*
19. *Contrary to.*
20. *Removal.”*

To these he adds *twenty-two* other manners of using

it. And he has accompanied each with instances sufficiently numerous, as proofs*.

H.

And yet in all his instances (which, I believe, are above *seventy*) FROM continues to retain invariably one and the same single meaning. Consult them : and add to them as many more instances as you please ; and yet (if I have explained myself as clearly as I ought, and as I think I have done) no further assistance of mine will be necessary to enable you to extract the same meaning of the word FROM from all of them. And you will plainly perceive that the “ *characters of*

* Greenwood says—“ FROM signifies *Motion* from a place ; and then it is put in opposition to TO.

“ 2. It is used to denote the *Beginning of time*.

“ 3. It denotes the *Original of things*.

“ 4. It denotes the *Order of a thing*. (“ And in these three last senses it is put before *Adverbs*.”)

“ 5. It signifies *Off*.”

The caprice of language is worth remarking in the words *Van* (the Dutch *From*) and *Rear*, both of which we have retained in English as *Substantives*, and therefore they are allowed with us to have a meaning. But being only employed as *Prepositions* by the Dutch, Italian and French, our philosophers cannot be persuaded to allow them any transmarine meaning.—*Apinam mutant qui trans mare currunt*. And thus *Van* in Holland, *Von* in Germany, *Avanti* in Italy, and *Avant* and *Derriere* in France, are merely *des petits mots inventés pour être mis AVANT les Noms*, or, in the VAN of Nouns.

quiescence and of motion," attributed by Mr. Harris to the word FROM, belong indeed to the words *Hang* and *Fall*, used in the different sentences. And by the same manner of transferring to the *preposition* the meaning of some other word in the sentence, have all Johnson's and Greenwood's supposed different meanings arisen.

B.

You observed, some time since, that the Prepositions WITH and WITHOUT were directly opposite and contradictory to each other. Now the same opposition is evident in some other of the prepositions: And this circumstance, I should imagine, must much facilitate and shorten the search of the etymologist: For having once discovered the meaning of one of the adverse parties, the meaning of the other, I suppose, must follow of course. Thus—Going to a place, is directly the contrary of—Going FROM a place.—If then you are right in your explanation of FROM; (and I will not deny that appearances are hitherto in your favour;) since FROM means *Commencement* or *Beginning*, to must mean *End* or *Termination*. And indeed I perceive that, if we produce Mr. Harris's instances, and say,

" These figs came from Turkey to England.

The lamp falls from the cieling to the ground.

The lamp hangs from the cieling to the floor ;"

as the word FROM denotes the *commencement* of the motion and hanging; so does the word to denote their

termination : and the places where they end or terminate, are respectively *England, Ground, Floor*.

And since we have as frequently occasion to mention the *termination*, as we have to mention the *commencement* of motion or time ; no doubt it was as likely that the word denoting *End* should become a particle or preposition, as the word which signified *Beginning*. But in the use of these two words TO and FROM, I observe a remarkable difference. FROM seems to have *two* opposites ; which ought therefore to mean the same thing : and, if meaning the same, to be used indifferently at pleasure. We always use FROM (and *From* only) for the *beginning* either of *time* or *motion* : but for the *termination*, we apply sometimes TO and sometimes TILL : TO, indifferently either to *place* or *time* ; but TILL to *time* only and never to *place*. Thus, we may say,

“ *From morn TO night th’ eternal larum rang.*”
or, *From morn TILL night, &c.*

But we cannot say,—*From Turkey TILL England*.

H.

The opposition of Prepositions, as far as it reaches, does undoubtedly assist us much in the discovery of the meaning of each opposite. And if, by the total or partial extinction of an original language, there was no root left in the ground for an etymologist to dig up, the philosopher ought no doubt to be satisfied with reasoning from the contrariety. But I fear much, that

the inveterate prejudices which I have to encounter, and which for two thousand years have universally passed for learning throughout the world, and for deep learning too, would not easily give way to any arguments of mine *à priori*. I am therefore compelled to resort to etymology, and to bring forward the original word as well as its meaning. That same etymology will very easily account for the peculiarity you have noticed: and the difficulty solved, like other enemies subdued, will become an useful ally and additional strength to the conqueror.

The opposition to the preposition FROM, resides singly in the preposition TO. Which has not *perhaps* (for I am not clear that it has not) precisely the signification of *End* or *Termination*, but of something tantamount or equivalent. The preposition TO (in Dutch written TOE and TOR, a little nearer to the original) is the Gothic substantive **TANI** or **TANHTS**, i. e. *Act, Effect, Result, Consummation*. Which Gothic substantive is indeed itself no other than the past participle **TANID** or **TANIAS**, of the verb **TANGAN*** *agere*. And what is *done*, is *terminated, ended, finished*.†

* In the Teutonic, this verb is written *Tuan* or *Tuon*, whence the modern German *Thun*, and its preposition (varying like its verb) *Tu*. [Zu.]

In the Anglo-Saxon the verb is *Teogan*, and preposition *To*.

† “Dativus cuicunque orationi adjungi potest, in qua acqui-

After this derivation, it will not appear in the least mysterious or wonderful that we should, in a peculiar manner, in English, prefix this same word *to* to the infinitive of our verbs. For the verbs, in English, not being distinguished, as in other languages, by a peculiar termination, and it being sometimes impossible to distinguish them by their *place*, when the old termination of the Anglo-Saxon verbs was dropped, this word *to* (i. e. *Act*) became necessary to be prefixed, in order to distinguish them from *NOUNS*, and to invest them with the *verbal* character: for there is no difference between the *NOUN*, *Love*, and the *VERB*, *to Love*, but what must be comprised in the prefix *to*.

The infinitive, therefore, appears plainly to be, what the Stoics called it, the very verb itself; pure and uncompounded with the various accidents of *mood*, of *number*, of *gender*, of *person*, and (in English) of *tense*; which accidents are, in some languages, joined to the verb by variety of *termination*; and in some, by an *additional word* signifying the *added circumstance*. And if our *English* Grammarians and Philosophers had trusted something less to their reading and a little more to their own reflection, I cannot help thinking that the very awkwardness and imperfection of our own language, in this particular of the *infinitive*, would

sitio vel ademptio, commodum aut incommodum, aut FINIS, quem in scholis Logici *Finem* cui dicunt, significatur."

Scioppii Gram. Philosoph. pag. xiii.

have been a great benefit to them in all their difficulties about the VERB : and would have led them to understand and explain that which the perfection of more artificial and improved languages contributed to conceal from others. For I reckon it a great advantage which an *English* philosopher has over those who are acquainted with such languages only which do this business by *termination*. For though I think I have good reasons to believe, that all these *Terminations* may likewise be traced to their respective origin ; and that, however *artificial* they may now appear to us, they were not originally the effect of premeditated and deliberate *art*, but separate words by length of time corrupted and coalescing with the words of which they are now considered as the *Terminations* : Yet this was less likely to be suspected by others. And if it had been suspected, they would have had much further to travel to their journey's end, and through a road much more embarrassed ; as the corruption in those languages is of much longer standing than in ours, and more complex.

And yet, by what fatality I know not, our Grammarians have not only slighted, but have even been afraid to touch, this friendly clue : for of all the points which they endeavour to shuffle over, there is none in which they do it more grossly than in this of the Infinitive.

Some are contented to call to, a *mark* of the *infini-*

tive mood *. But *how*, or *why*, it is so, they are totally silent.

Others call it a *Preposition*.

Others, a *Particle*.

Skinner calls it an *Equivocal Article* †.

And others ‡ throw it into that common sink and repository of all heterogeneous unknown corruptions, the *Adverb*.

And when they have thus given it a *name*, they hope you will be satisfied : at least they trust that they shall

* Lowth (page 66) says—"The *Preposition TO* placed before the Verb makes the *Infinitive Mood*." Now this is manifestly not so : for *TO* placed before the Verb *loveth*, will not make the *Infinitive Mood*. He would have said more truly, that *TO* placed before some *Nouns* makes *Verbs*. But of this I shall have occasion to speak hereafter, when I come to treat of the *Verb*.

† Melius infinitiva sua Anglo-Saxones per term. *AN*, quam nos hodie *equivoco illo articulo*, *TO* præmisso, sæpe etiam omisso, distinxerunt."—*Canones Etymologici*.

‡ S. Johnson says—"To, *adverb* [*to*, Saxon ; *Te*, Dutch.]" And then, according to his usual method, (a very convenient one for making a bulky book without trouble) proceeds to give instances of its various significations, viz. "1. A particle coming between two verbs, and noting the second as the object of the first. 2. It notes the *intention*. 3. After an adjective it notes its *object*. 4. Noting *futurity*."

not be arraigned for this conduct; because those who should arraign them, will need the same shift for themselves.

There is one mistake however, from which this Prefix to ought to have rescued them: they should not have repeated the error, of insisting that the *Infinitive* was a mere *Noun**: since it was found necessary in English to add another word (*viz.*) to, merely to di-

* “The words *Actiones* and *Lectiones* (Wilkins says) are but the plural number of *Agere*, *Legere*.” However, it must be acknowledged that Wilkins endeavours to save himself by calling the *Infinitive*, not a mere noun, but a *Participle Substantive*. —“That which is called the *Infinitive Mode* should, according to the true analogy of speech, be styled a *Participle Substantive*. There hath been formerly much dispute among some learned men, *whither* the notion called the *Infinitive Mode* ought to be reduced according to the philosophy of speech. Some would have it to be the *prime* and *principal* verb; as signifying more directly the notion of action: and then the other varieties of the verb should be but the inflexions of this. Others question whether the *Infinitive Mode* be a verb or no, because in the Greek it receives articles as a noun. Scaliger concludes it to be a *verb*, but will not admit it to be a *Mode*. Vossius adds, that though it be not *Modus in Actu*, yet it is *Modus in Potentia*. All which difficulties will be most clearly stated by asserting it to be a *Substantive Participle*.”

Real Character, part 4, chap. 6.

Mr. Harris without any palliation says,—“These *Infinitives* go further. They not only lay aside the character of *Attributives*, but they also assume that of *Substantives*.”

Hermes, book 1, chap. 8.

stinguish the *Infinitive* from the *Noun*, after the *Infinitive* had lost that distinguishing *Termination* which it had formerly.

B.

I do not mean hastily and without further consideration absolutely to dissent from what you have said, because some part of it appears to me plausible enough. And had you confined yourself only to the *Segnacaso* or *Preposition*, I should not suddenly have found much to offer in reply. But when instead of the *Segnacaso* (as Buonmattei classes it), or the *Preposition* (as all others call it), or the *mark* of the *Infinitive* (as it is peculiarly used in English), you direct me to consider it as the necessary and distinguishing *sign* of the *VERB*, you do yourself throw difficulties in my way which it will be incumbent on you to remove. For it is impossible not to observe, that the *Infinitive* is not the only part of our English verbs, which does not differ from the noun : and it rests upon you to explain why this necessary *sign* of the *Verb* should be prefixed only to the *Infinitive*, and not also to those other parts of the verb in English which have no distinguishing *Termination*.

H.

The fact is undoubtedly as you have stated it. There are certainly other parts of the English verb, undistinguished from the noun by termination ; but this is

to me rather a circumstance of confirmation than an objection. For the truth is, that to them also (*and to those parts only* which have not a distinguishing termination) as well as to the Infinitive, is this distinguishing *sign* equally necessary, and equally *prefixed*. Do (the *auxiliary* verb as it has been called*) is derived from the same root, and is indeed the same word as TO. The difference between a T and a D is so very small, that an Etymologist knows by the *practice* of languages, and an Anatomist by the *reason* of that

* “ The verb to DO (says Mr. Tyrwhitt, Essay, Note 37) is considered by Wallis and other later grammarians, as an *auxiliary* verb. It is so used, though very *rarely*, by Chaucer. It must be confessed that the exact power which DO, as an auxiliary, now has in our language, is not easy to be defined, and still less to be accounted for from *Analogy*.”

In Chaucer's time the distinguishing terminations of the verb still remained, although not constantly employed ; and he availed himself of that situation of the language, either to use them or drop them, as best suited his purpose, and sometimes he uses both *termination* and *sign*. Thus, in the Wife of Bathes Tale, he drops the *Infinitive termination* ; and uses TO.

“ My liege lady : generally, quod he,
Women desyren TO *have* soveraynte
As well over her husbondes as her love.”

And again a few lines after, he uses the infinitive *termination*, excluding TO.

“ In al the court nas there wife ne mayde
Ne widow, that contraried that he saide,
But said, he was worthy HAN his lyfe.”

So

practice, that in the derivation of words it is scarce worth regarding*. And for the same reason that to is put before the Infinitive, DO used formerly to be put before such other parts of the VERB which likewise were not distinguished from the noun by termination. As we still say—*I DO love*,—instead of—*I love*. And *I DOED* or *DID love*—instead of *I loved*. But it is worth our while to observe, that if a distinguishing *termination* is used, then the distinguishing DO or DID *must* be omitted, the *Termination* fulfilling its office. And therefore we never find—*I DID loved*; or *He DOTH loveth*. But *I DID love*; *He DOTH love*.

So also,

“ I trowe that if Envye, iwys,
Knewe the best man that is
On thys syde or beyonde the see,
Yet somewhat LACKEN him wold she.”

Romaunt of the Rose.

The same may be shewn by innumerable other instances throughout Chaucer.

B. Jonson, in his Grammar, says—“ The *Persons plural* keepe the termination of the first person singular. In former times, till about the reigne of King Henry the Eighth, they were wont to be formed by adding *en*. But now (whatsoever is the cause) it hath quite growne out of use, and that other so generally prevailed that I dare not presume to set this afoot againe.” This is the reason why Chaucer used both TO and DO more rarely than we use them at present.

* See the Note, page 92.

It is not indeed an approved practice at present, to use *DO* before those parts of the *Verb*, they being now by custom sufficiently distinguished by their *Place*: and therefore the redundancy is now avoided, and *DO* is considered, in that case, as unnecessary and expletive.

However it is still used, and is the common practice, and should be used, whenever the distinguishing *Place* is disturbed by *Interrogation*, or by the *insertion* of a *Negation*, or of some other words between the nominative case and the verb. *As*,—

He *DOES* not *love* the truth.

DOES he *love* the truth?

He *DOES* at the same time *love* the truth.

And if we chuse to avoid the use of this *verbal Sign*, *DO*, we must supply its place by a distinguishing termination to the verb. *As*,—

He *loveth* not the truth.

Loveth he the truth?

He at the same time *loveth* the truth.

Or where the verb has not a distinguishing termination (as in plurals)—

They *DO* not *love* the truth;

DO they *love* the truth?

They *DO* at the same time *love* the truth—

Here, if we wish to avoid the *verbal sign*, we must remove the negative or other intervening word or words from between the nominative case and the verb ; and so restore the distinguishing *Place*. As,—

They *love* not the truth.

Love they the truth ?

At the same time they *love* the truth*.

And thus we see that, though we cannot, as Mr. Tyrwhitt truly says, account for the use of this *verbal sign* from any *Analogy* to other languages, yet there is no caprice in these methods of employing *to* and *do*, so differently from the practice of other languages : but that they arise from the peculiar method which the English language has taken to arrive at the same necessary end, which other languages attain by distinguishing *Termination*.

B.

I observe, that Junius and Skinner and Johnson have not chosen to give the slightest hint concerning the derivation of *to*. Minshew distinguishes between the preposition *to*, and the *sign* of the Infinitive *to*.

* It is not however uncommon to say—" *They*, at the same time, *love* the truth." Where the intervening words (*at the same time*) are considered as merely parenthetical, and the mind of the speaker still preserves the connexion of *place* between the nominative case and the verb.

Of the first he is silent, and of the latter he says —“ *το, as to make, to walk, to do, a Græco articulo τὸ; idem est ut το ποιειν, το περιπατειν, το πραττειν.*” But Dr. Gregory Sharpe is persuaded that our language has taken it from the Hebrew. And Vossius derives the correspondent Latin Preposition *AD* from the same source.

H.

Yes. But our Gothic and Anglo-Saxon ancestors were not altogether so fond of the Hebrew, nor quite so well acquainted with it, as Dr. Sharpe and Vossius were. And if Boerhaave could not consent, and Voltaire* thought it ridiculous, to seek a remedy in South America for a disease which was prevalent in the North of Europe, how much more would they have resisted the etymology of this pretended Jewish Preposition! For my own part, I am persuaded that the correspondent Latin Preposition *AD* has a more natural origin, and a meaning similar to that of *το*. It is merely the past

* “ *La Quinquina, seul spécifique contre les fièvres intermittentes, placé par la nature dans les montagnes du Pérou, tandis qu’elle a mis la fièvre dans le reste du monde.*”

Voltaire, Hist. generale.

“ *Il meurt à Mocha dans le sable Arabique*

Ce café nécessaire aux pays des frimats ;

Il met la fièvre en nos climats,

Et le remède en Amérique.”

Voltaire, Lettre au Roi de Prusse.

participle of *Agere* *. (Which past participle is likewise a Latin *Substantive*.)

$$\text{agitum-agtum} \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{agDum} \text{ — } \text{agD} \text{ — } \text{AD} \\ \text{or} \text{ — } \text{or} \text{ — } \text{or} \\ \text{actum} \text{ — } \text{act} \text{ — } \text{AT.} \end{array} \right.$$

The most superficial reader of Latin verse knows how easily the Romans dropped their final *um*: for their poets would never have taken that licence, had it not been previously justified by common pronunciation. And a little consideration of the organs and practice of speech, will convince him how easily *Agd* or *Act* would become AD or AT†, as indeed this pre-

* My much valued and valuable friend Dr. Warner, the very ingenious author of *METRONARISTON*, or a new pleasure recommended, in a dissertation upon Greek and Latin prosody, has remarked that—"C and G were by the Romans always pronounced hard, i. e. as the Greek *K* and *Γ*, before ALL vowels: which sound of them it would have been well if we had retained; for, had this been done, the inconvenience of many equivocal sounds, and much appearance of irregularity in the language, would have been avoided."—Perhaps it may seem superfluous to cite any thing from a book which must assuredly be in every classical hand: but it is necessary for me here to remind the reader of this circumstance; lest, instead of *Aggere* and *Aggitum* he should pronounce these words *Adjere* and *Adjitum*, and be disgusted with a derivation which might then seem forced and unnatural.

† If the reader keeps in mind the note to page 92, he will

position was indifferently written by the antients. By the moderns the *preposition* was written AD with the D only, in order to distinguish it from the other corrupt word called the *conjunction*, AT; which for the same reason was written with the T only, though that likewise had antiently been written, as the *preposition*, either AD or AT*.

B.

You have not yet accounted for the different employment of TILL and TO.

easily perceive how *actum* became the irregular participle of *agere*, instead of *agitum* or *agtum*. For it depended entirely on the employment or omission of the *compression* there noticed. And it is observable, that in *all* languages (for the natural reason is the same) if two of the letters (coupled in that note) come together, in one of which the compression should be employed and in the other omitted, the speaker for his own convenience will either employ the compression in both, or omit it in both; and that without any regard to the written character. Thus (amongst innumerable instances) an Englishman pronounces—oBZerve—and a Frenchman—oPserver. So we learn from Quintilian (lib. 1. cap. 7.) that the Romans pronounced oPtinuit, though they wrote oBtinuit.—“Cum dico *obtinuit*, secundam B litteram ratio poscit; aures magis audiunt P.”—In the same manner a Roman would pronounce the word either aGDum or aCTum, that he might not, in two letters coming close together, shift so instantly from the *employment* to the *omission* of the compression.

* “AD et AT, non tantum ob significationem, sed et originem diversam, diversimode scribere *satius* est.”

G. J. Vossius, *Etymol. Ling. Lat.*

H.

That **TILL** should be opposed to **FROM**, only when we are talking of *Time*, and upon no other occasion, is evidently for this reason, (viz.) that **TILL** is a word compounded of **TO** and *While*, i. e. *Time*. And you will observe that the coalescence of these two words, *Tohpile*, took place in the language long before the present wanton and superfluous use of the article **THE**, which by the prevailing custom of modern speech is now interposed. So that when we say—"From morn **TILL** night,"—it is no more than if we said—"From morn **TO TIME** night*." When we say—"From morn **TO** night," the word *Time* is omitted as unnecessary. So we might say—"From *Turkey* **TO** the **PLACE** called *England*;" or "**TO PLACE** *England*." But we leave out the mention of *Place*, as superfluous, and say only—"TO *England*."

B.

You acknowledge then that the opposition of pre-

* It is not unusual with the common people, and some ancient authors, to use *While* alone as a *preposition*; that is, to leave out **TO**, and say—"I will stay **WHILE** *Evening*." Instead of—"TILL *Evening*;" or, **TO WHILE** *Evening*. That is—"I will stay **TIME** *Evening*,"—instead of—"TO **TIME** *Evening*." Thus—"Sygeberte wyth hys two bretherne gave backe **WHYLE** they came to the ryver of Sigoune."—"He commaunded her to be bounden to a wylde horse taylor by the here of her hedde and so to be drawn **WHYLE** she were dede."

positions is useful, as far as it reaches. But, besides their *opposition* and absolute *contradiction*, I should imagine that the marked and distinguished manner also, in which different prepositions are sometimes used in the same sentence, must very much tend to facilitate the discovery of their distinct significations.

“ *Well! 'tis e'en so! I have got the London disease they call Love. I am sick of my husband, and for my gallant*.*”

Love makes her sick *of*, and sick *for*. Here *of* and *for* seem almost placed in opposition; at least their effects in the sentence are most evidently different; *for*, by the help of these two Prepositions alone, and without the assistance of any other words, she expresses the two contrary affections of *Loathing* and *Desire*.

H.

No. Small assistance indeed, if any, can be derived from such instances as this. I rather think they tend to mislead than to direct an inquirer. Love was not here the only disease. This poor lady had a complication of distempers; she had two disorders: a sickness *of* Loathing—and a sickness *of* Desire. She was sick *for* Disgust, and sick *for* Love.

* Wycherley's Country Wife.

Sick OF disgust FOR her husband.

Sick OF love FOR her gallant.

Sick FOR disgust OF her husband.

Sick FOR love OF her gallant.

Her disgust was the OFFSPRING of her husband, *proceeded from* her husband, was *begotten upon* her *by* her husband. Her gallant was the *cause* of her love.

I think I have clearly expressed the meaning of her declaration. And I have been purposely tautologous, that by my indifferent application of the two words *OF* and *FOR*—both to her disgust and to her love, the smallest appearance of opposition between these prepositions might be done away. Indeed, the difference between them (*thus considered*) appears to be so small, that the author, if it had pleased him, might have used *OF*, where he has put *FOR*. And that he might so have done, the following is a proof.

“Marian. Come, Amie, you’ll go with us.

“Amie. I am not well.

*“Lionel. She’s sick OF the young shep’ard that be-
kist her*.”*

In the same manner we may, with equal propriety, say—“*We are sick OF hunger,*”—or, “*We are sick FOR*

* Sad Shepherd, act 1. sc.6.

hunger." And in both cases we shall have expressed precisely the same thing.

B.

'Tis certainly so in practice. But is that practice justifiable? For the words still seem to me to have a very different import. Do you mean to say that the words OF and FOR are synonymous?

H.

Very far from it. I believe they differ as widely as CAUSE and CONSEQUENCE. I imagine the word FOR (whether denominated *Preposition*, *Conjunction*, or *Adverb*) to be a *Noun*, and to have always one and the same single signification, viz. CAUSE, and nothing else. Though Greenwood attributes to it *eighteen*, and S. Johnson *forty-six* different meanings: for which Greenwood cites above *forty*, and Johnson above *two-hundred* instances. But, with a little attention to their instances, you will easily perceive, that they usually attribute to the *Preposition* the meaning of some other words in the sentence.

Junius (changing P into F, and by metathesis of the letter R) derives FOR from the Greek Πρῶ. Skinner from the Latin *Pro*. But I believe it to be no other than the Gothic substantive **FAIRINA**, CAUSE.

I imagine also that OF (in the Gothic and Anglo-

Saxon **AF** and **AF**) is a fragment of the Gothic and Anglo-Saxon **AFARA**, posteritas, &c. **Απονα**, proles, &c.* That it is a noun substantive, and means always *consequence, offspring, successor, follower, &c.*

And I think it not unworthy of remark, that whilst the old patronymical termination of our northern ancestors was **son**, the Slavonic and Russian patronymic was **of**. Thus whom the English and Swedes named *Peterson*, the Russians called *Peterhof*. And as a polite foreign affectation afterwards induced some of our ancestors to assume *Fils* or *Fitz* (i. e. *Fils* or *Filius*) instead of **son**; so the Russian affectation in more modern times changed **of** to *Vitch* (i. e. *Fitz, Fils* or *Filius*) and *Peterhof* became *Petrovitch* or *Petrowitz*.

So M. de Broses (tom. 2. p. 295.) observes of the Romans—"Remarquons sur les noms propres des familles Romaines qu'il n'y en a pas un seul qui ne soit terminé en *ius*; desinence fort semblable à l'*υιος* des Grecs, c'est à dire *filius*†."

* "OF, a, ab, abs, de. A.S. *Of*. D. *Aff*. B. *Af*. Goth. **AF**. Exprimunt Gr. *απο*, ab, de: præsertim cum *απο* ante vocabulum ab adspiratione incipiens, fiat *αφ*." JUNIUS.

Minshew and Skinner derive **OF** from the Latin **AB**, and that from the Greek *απο*.

† "Et quamvis nunc dierum habeant quidem, ad Anglorum imitationem, familiarum nomina; sunt tamen ea plerumque mere

B.

Stop, stop, Sir. Not so hasty, I beseech you. Let us leave the Swedes, and the Russians, and the Greeks, and the Romans, out of the question for the present; and confine yourself, if you please, as in the beginning you confined my enquiry, to the English only. Above *two hundred* instances, do you say, produced by Johnson as proofs of at least *forty-six* different meanings of this one preposition FOR, when Harris will not allow one single meaning to all the prepositions in the world together! And is it possible that one and the same author, knowing this, should in the same short preface, and in the compass of a very few short pages, acknowledge the former to be “*the person best qualified to give a perfect Grammar**,” and yet compliment the grammar of the latter, as the standard of accuracy, acuteness and perfection!†

H.

Oh, my dear Sir, the wise men of this world know

patronymica: sunt enim Price, Powel, Bowel, Bowen, Pugh, Parry, Penry, Prichard, Probert, Proger, &c. nihil aliud quam *Ap Rhys, Ap Howel, Ap Owen, Ap Hugh, Ap Harry, Ap Henry, Ap Richard, Ap Robert, Ap Roger, &c.* . . . AP, hoc est MAB, filius.” WALLIS, Preface.

* See A Short Introduction to English Gram. *Preface*, p. 6.

† See id. p. 14.

full well that the family of the *Blandishes** are universal favourites. Good breeding and policy direct us to mention the living only with praise ; and if we do at any time hazard a censure, to let it fall only on the dead.

B.

Pray, which of those qualities dictated that remark?

H.

Neither. But a quality which passes for brutality and ill-nature : and which, in spite of hard blows and heavy burdens, would make me rather chuse in the scale of beings to exist a mastiff or a mule, than a monkey or a lapdog. But why have you overlooked my civility to Mr. Harris ? Do you not perceive that by contending for only one meaning to the word *FOR*, I am forty-five times more complaisant to him than Johnson is ?

B.

He loves every thing that is Greek, and no doubt therefore will owe you many thanks for this *Greek* favour.—*Danaos dona ferentes*.—But confirm it if you please ; and (if you can) strengthen your doubtful etymology (which I think wants strengthening) by ex-

* See the *Heiress*, (one little morsel of false moral excepted,) the most perfect and meritorious comedy, without exception, of any on our stage.

tracting your single meaning of FOR from all Greenwood's and Johnson's numerous instances.

H.

That would be a tedious task ; and, I trust, unnecessary ; and for that reason only I have not pursued the method you now propose, with all the other particles which I have before explained. But as this manner of considering the Prepositions, though many years familiar to me, is novel to you, I may perhaps suppose it to be easier and clearer than it may at first sight appear to others. I will risque therefore your impatience, whilst I explain one single instance under each separate meaning attributed to FOR.

Greenwood says—"The Preposition FOR has a great many significations, and denotes chiefly for what *purpose*, *end*, or *use*, or for whose *benefit* or *damage* any thing is done ; As—*Christ died FOR us.*" [i. e. *Cause* us ; or We being the *Cause* of his dying.]

"1. FOR serves to denote the *End* or *Object* which one proposes in any action ; As—*To fight FOR the public good.*" [i. e. *cause* the public good ; or, The public good being the *Cause* of fighting.]

"2. It serves to mark the *Motive*, the *Cause*, the *Subject* of any action ; As—*He does all things FOR the love of virtue.*" [i. e. The love of virtue being the *Cause*.]

“3. It is used to mark the use for which a thing is done; As—*Chelsey Hospital was built FOR disabled soldiers.*” [i. e. Disabled soldiers being the *Cause* of its being built.]

“4. It is used likewise to denote *Profit, Advantage, Interest*; As—*I write FOR your satisfaction.*” [i. e. Your satisfaction being the *Cause* of my writing.]

“5. It is used to denote for what a thing is *Proper*, or not; As—*It is a good remedy FOR the Fever.*” In which last example *to cure* is to be understood. [i. e. Curing the Fever being the *Cause* that it is called a *good remedy*.]

“6. This preposition is used to denote *Agreement* or *Help*; As—*The Soldier fights FOR the King.*” [i. e. The King being the *Cause* of his fighting.]

“7. It is used to denote the *Convenience* or *Inconvenience* of a thing; As—*He is big enough FOR his age.*” [i. e. His age being the *Cause* that he is big ENOUGH; or that his size answers our expectation.]

“8. It is used to denote *Exchange* or *Trucking, Recompence, Retribution* or *Requital* and *Payment*; As—*He rewarded him FOR his good services.*” [i. e. His good services being the *Cause* of reward.]

“Hither we may likewise refer these phrases, *Eye*

FOR *Eye*," &c. [i. e. An eye (destroyed by malicious violence) being the *Cause* of an eye taken from the convict in punishment.]

"9. It is used to denote *Instead of*, *In the Place of*; As—*I will grind* FOR *him*." [i. e. He being the *Cause* of my grinding.]

"Sometimes it serves to denote a *Mistake*; As—*He speaks one word* FOR *another*." [i. e. Another word being the *Cause* of his speaking that word which he speaks.]

"10. It is used to denote the *Distribution* of things by *Proportion* to several others; As—*He sets down twelve Acres* FOR *every man*." [i. e. Every or each man being the *Cause* of his setting down *twelve acres*.]

"11. It denotes the *Condition of Persons, Things and Times*; As—*He was a learned man* FOR *those times*." [i. e. The darkness or ignorance of those times being the *Cause* why he may be considered as a *learned man*.]

"12. It is likewise used to denote *In the quality of*; As—*He suborned him* FOR *a witness*." [i. e. For that he might be a witness; or, FOR to be a witness.—That he might be a witness; or, to be a witness being the *Cause* of his suborning him.]

“ It signifies likewise as much as *Because of, By reason of; As—To punish a man FOR his crimes.*” [i. e. His crimes being the *Cause* of punishment.]

“ It signifies *As, or To be; As—He was sent FOR a pledge.*” [i. e. That he might be a pledge, or to be a pledge being the *Cause* of his being sent.]

“ *During; to denote the Future Time; As — He was chosen [to some office] FOR life.*” [i. e. To continue in that office FOR life; or, FOR the continuance of his life—The continuance of his life being the *Cause* of the continuance of his office.]

“ *Concerning, About; As—As FOR me.*” [The sentence here is not complete; but it shall be explained amongst Johnson’s instances.]

“ *Notwithstanding: As, after having spoken of the faults of a man, we add, FOR all that, he is an honest man.*” [i. e. Though all that has been said may be the *Cause* of thinking otherwise, yet he is an honest man.]

S. Johnson says, “FOR, Preposition :

“ 1. *Because of—That which we FOR our unworthiness [i. e. our unworthiness the Cause] are afraid to crave, our prayer is, that God FOR the worthiness of his Son [i. e. the worthiness of his Son being the Cause] would notwithstanding vouchsafe to grant.*

“ 2. *With respect to, with regard to ; As—*

“ *Lo, some are vellom, and the rest as good
FOR all his lordship knows, but they are wood.*”

[i. e. As far as all that his lordship knows is the *Cause* of their being denominated *good* or *bad*, the rest are as good.]

“ 3. In this sense it has often *As* before it ; *As—As*
FOR Maramaldus the general, they had no just cause to
mislike him, being an old captain of great experience.”

[i. e. As far as Maramaldus the general might be a *Cause* of their discontent, they had no *just* cause to mislike him.]

“ 4. In the *character* of ; *As—*

“ *Say, is it fitting in this very field,
This field, where from my youth I’ve been a carter,
I in this field should die FOR a deserter?*”

[i. e. Being a Deserter, being the *Cause* of my dying.]

“ 5. *With resemblance of ; As—*

“ *Forward he flew, and pitching on his head,
He quiver’d with his feet, and lay FOR dead.*”

[i. e. As if Death, or his being dead, had been the *Cause* of his laying ; or, He lay in that *manner*, in which death or being dead is the *Cause* that persons so lay.]

“ 6. *Considered as ; in the place of ; As—*

“ *Read all the Prefaces of Dryden :*

FOR those our critics much confide in :

Though merely writ at first FOR filling,

To raise the volume's price a shilling.”

[i. e. Read, &c. the *Cause* why you should read them, being, that our critics confide in them. Though to fill up and to raise the volume's price was the *Cause* that they were at first written.]

“ 7. *In advantage of ; For the sake of ; As—*

“ *Shall I think the world was made FOR one,*

And men are born FOR kings, as beasts FOR men ?”

[i. e. Shall I think that one man was the *Cause* why the world was made ; that kings are the *Cause* why men were born ; as men are the *Cause* why there are beasts ?]

“ 8. *Conducive to ; Beneficial to ; As—It is FOR the general good of human society, and consequently of particular persons, to be true and just : and it is FOR men's health to be temperate.”* [i. e. The general good, &c. is the *Cause* why it is *fit* or a *duty* to be true and just : and men's health is the *Cause* why it is *fit* or a *duty* to be temperate.]

“ 9. *With intention of going to a certain place ; As—We sailed directly FOR Genoa.”* [i. e. Genoa, or

that we might go to Genoa, being the *Cause* of our sailing.]

“ 10. *In comparative respect ; As—FOR Tusks with Indian elephants he strove.*” [i. e. He contended for a superiority over the elephants ; Tusks, or the claim of a superiority in point of Tusks, being the *Cause* of the striving or contention.]

“ 11. *In proportion to ; As—As he could see clear, FOR those times, through superstition, so he would be blinded, now and then, by human policy.*” [i. e. The darkness, or ignorance, or bigotry of those times being the *Cause*, why even such sight, as he then had, may be called or reckoned clear.]

“ 12. *With appropriation to ; As—Shadow will serve FOR summer. Prick him : FOR we have a number of Shadows to fill up the Muster-book.*” [i. e. Summer is the *Cause* why Shadow will serve, i. e. will do ; or will be proper to be taken. Prick him : the *Cause* (why I will have him pricked, or set down) is, that we have many Shadows to fill up the Muster-book.]

“ 13. *After O, an expression of Desire ; As—*

*“ O ! FOR a Muse of fire, that would ascend
The brightest heaven of invention.”*

[i. e. O ! I wish FOR a Muse of fire, &c. i. e. A Muse of fire being the *Cause* of my wishing.]

“ 14. *In account of ; In solution of ; As—Thus much FOR the beginning and progress of the deluge.*” [i. e. The beginning and progress of the deluge is the *Cause* of thus much, or of that which I have written.] N.B. An obsolete and aukward method of signifying to the reader, that the subject mentioned shall not be the *Cause* of writing any more. It is a favourite phrase with Mr. Harris, repeated perpetually with a disgusting and pedantic affectation, in imitation of the Greek philosophers ; but has certainly passed upon some persons, as “*elegance of method, as Beauty, Taste, and Fine Writing.*”

“ 15. *Inducing to as a motive ; As—There is a natural, immutable, and eternal reason FOR that which we call virtue ; and against that which we call vice.*” [Or, That which we call virtue, we call virtue FOR a natural, eternal, and immutable reason, i. e. a natural, eternal, and immutable reason being the *Cause* of our so calling it.—Or, There is a natural, eternal, and immutable reason the *Cause* of that which we call virtue.]

“ 16. *In expectation of ; As—He must be back again by one and twenty, to marry and propagate : the father cannot stay any longer FOR the portion, nor the mother FOR a new set of babies to play with.*” [i. e. The Portion being the *Cause* why the father cannot stay any longer : a new set of babies to play with being the *Cause* why the mother cannot stay longer.]

“ 17. Noting *Power* or *Possibility* ; As—FOR a holy person to be humble ; FOR one, whom all men esteem a saint, to fear lest himself become a devil, is as hard as FOR a prince to submit himself to be guided by Tutors.”
[i. e. To be humble is hard or difficult *Because*, or, the *Cause* being, he is a holy person : To fear lest himself become a devil is difficult *Because*, or, the *Cause* being, he is one whom all men esteem a saint : To submit himself to be guided by Tutors is difficult *Because*, or, the *Cause* being, he is a Prince. And all these things are equally difficult.]

“ 18. Noting *Dependence* ; As—The colours of outward objects, brought into a darkened room, depend FOR their visibility upon the dimness of the light they are beheld by.” [i. e. Depend upon the dimness of the light as the *Cause* of their visibility.]

“ 19. In prevention of, for fear of ; As—
“ Corn being had down, any way ye allow,
Should wither as needeth FOR burning in Mow.”
[i. e. Burning in Mow, the *Cause* why it needeth to wither.]

“ And FOR the time shall not seem tedious
I'll tell thee what befell me on a day*.”

* So Chaucer,

“ This dronken myller hath ytolde us here
Howe that begyled was a carpentere
Perauerture in skorne FOR I am one.”

Reue's prol. fol. 15. pag. 2. col. 1.

“ FOR they seemed philosophers, they weren pursued to the dethe and slaync.”—*Boecius*, boke 1. fol. 221. pag. 1. col. 1.

[i. e. The *Cause* of my telling thee, is, that the time may not seem tedious.]

“ 20. *In remedy of; As—Sometimes hot, sometimes cold things are good FOR the tooth-ach.*” [i. e. Their curing the tooth-ach the *Cause* of their being called good.]

“ 21. *In exchange for; As—He made considerable progress in the study of the law, before he quitted that profession FOR this of Poetry.*” [i. e. The profession of Poetry, the *Cause* of his quitting the profession of the law.]

“ 22. *In the place of, Instead of; As—To make him copious is to alter his character; and to translate him line FOR line is impossible.*” [i. e. Line *Cause* of line, or, Each line of the original being the *Cause* of each line of the translation.]

“ 23. *In supply of, to serve in the place of; As—Most of our ingenious young men take up some cried-up English poet FOR their model.*” [i. e. To be their model the *Cause* of taking him.]

“ 24. *Through a certain duration; As—*

*“ Since hir’d FOR life thy servile Muse must sing
Successive conquests and a glorious king.”*

[i. e. The continuance of your life the *Cause* of the continuance of your hire.]

“ 25. *In search of, in quest of; As—Some of the philosophers have run so far back FOR arguments of comfort against pain, as to doubt whether there were any such thing.*” [i. e. Arguments of comfort against pain the Cause of running so far back.]

“ 26. *According to; As—Chymists have not been able, FOR aught is vulgarly known, by fire alone to separate true sulphur from antimony.*” [i. e. Any thing which is vulgarly known, being the Cause of ability, or of their being supposed to be able.]

“ 27. *Noting a State of Fitness or Readiness; As—Nay if you be an Undertaker, I am FOR you.*” [i. e. I am an Undertaker, an Adversary, a Fighter, &c. FOR you; or, I will undertake you; i. e. You the Cause of my being an Undertaker, &c.]

“ 28. *In hope of, for the sake of, noting the final Cause; As—Scholars are frugal of their words, and not willing to let any go FOR ornament, if they will not serve FOR use.*” [i. e. Ornament the Cause; Use the Cause.]

“ 29. *Of tendency to, Towards; As—It were more FOR his honour to raise the siege, than to spend so many good men in the winning of it by force.*” [i. e. His honour the Cause why it were more expedient, fitting, proper, &c. to raise the siege.]

“ 30. *In favour of, on the part of, on the side of; As—It becomes me not to draw my pen in the defence of a bad cause, when I have so often drawn it FOR a good one; [i. e. A good one being the Cause of drawing it.]*

“ 31. Noting *Accommodation, or Adaptation; As—Persia is commodiously situated FOR trade both by sea and land.*” [i. e. Trade the Cause of its being said to be commodiously situated.]

“ 32. *With intention of; As—*

*“ And by that justice hast remov’d the Cause
Of those rude tempests, which, FOR rapine sent,
Too oft alas involv’d the innocent.”*

[i. e. Rapine the Cause of their being sent.]

“ 33. *Becoming, Belonging to; As—*

*“ It were not FOR your quiet, nor your good,
Nor FOR my manhood, honesty and wisdom,
To let you know my thoughts.”*

[i. e. Your quiet is a Cause, your good is a Cause, my manhood, my honesty, my wisdom, each is a Cause, why it is not fit or proper to let you know my thoughts.]

“ 34. *Notwithstanding; As—Probability supposes that a thing may or may not be so, FOR any thing that yet is certainly determined on either side.*” [i. e. Any thing yet determined being the Cause of concluding.]

“ 35. **FOR ALL.** *Notwithstanding* ; **As—** **FOR ALL** *his exact plot, down was he cast from all his greatness* ;
[i. e. His exact plot being, all of it, a *Cause* to expect otherwise ; yet he was cast down.]

“ 36. *To the use of, to be used in* ; **As—**

“ *The Oak* **FOR** *nothing ill* ;

The Osier good **FOR** *twigs* ; *the Poplar* **FOR** *the Mill.*”

[i. e. Not any thing the *Cause* why the oak should be pronounced bad ; Twigs the *Cause* why the osier should be called good ; the Mill the *Cause* why the poplar should be esteemed useful.]

“ 37. *In consequence of* ; **As—**

“ **FOR** *love they force through thickets of the wood.*”

[i. e. Love the *Cause.*]

“ 38. *In recompense of* ; **As—**

“ *Now* **FOR** *so many glorious actions done*
FOR *peace at home, and* **FOR** *the public wealth,*
I mean to crown a bowl to Cæsar's health :
Besides in gratitude **FOR** *such high matters,*
Know I have vow'd two hundred Gladiators.”

[i. e. I mean to crown a bowl to Cæsar's health, the *Cause*—so many glorious actions ; the *Cause*—peace at home ; the *Cause*—the public weal. Besides, I have in gratitude vowed two hundred gladiators, such high matters being the *Cause* of my gratitude.]

“ 39. *In proportion to* ; **As—***He is not very tall, yet*

FOR *his years he's tall.*" [i. e. His years the *Cause* why he may be esteemed tall.]

" 40. *By means of; by interposition of; As—Moral considerations can no way move the sensible appetite, were it not FOR the will.*" [i. e. Were not the will the *Cause*.]

" 41. *In regard of; in preservation of; As—I cannot FOR my life.*" [i. e. My life being the *Cause*; or, To save my life being the *Cause* why I should do it: i. e. though my life were at stake.]

" 42. FOR *to; As—I come FOR to see you.*" [i. e. To see you being the *Cause* of my coming.]

———" *A large posterity
Up to your happy palaces may mount,
Of blessed saints FOR to increase the count.*"

[i. e. To increase the number being the *Cause* of their mounting.]

FOR. *Conjunction**; As—

* So the French correspondent *Conjunction* CAR (by old French authors written *Quhar*) is no other than *Qua re*, or, *Que* (i. e. *Kai*) *ea re*.

" QU and C (says Laurenbergius) *communione habuere apud antiquos, ut Arquus, oquulus, pro arcus, oculus. Prisc. Vicissim anticus, eculus, pro antiquus, equulus, antiqui libri. Cum et quum, cui et qui. Terentius Andriæ: Qui mihi expur-*

“ *Heav’n doth with us as we with torches deal,
Not light them FOR themselves: FOR if our virtues
Did not go forth of us, ’t were all alike
As if we had them not.*”

[i. e. Themselves not being the *Cause* of lighting them. If our virtues did not go forth of us, ’t were all alike as if we had them not: That is the *Cause* why heaven doth deal with us, as we deal with torches.]

gandus est, pro cui : annotat Donatus. *Querquera febris*, Lucilius : *Quercera*, Gellius, lib. 20. *Cotidie*, non *Quotidie*, scribunt Quintil. et Victorinus. *Stercilinium*, pro *sterquilinio*, habent libri veteres Catonis de R. R. et Terentius Phormione : *Insece* et *Inseque*. Ennius, Livius, Cato : ut disputat Gellius, lib. 18. cap. 19. *Hujusce*, et *hujusque*, promiscue olim scribebant. Hinc *Fortuna hujusce diei*, apud Plinium, lib. 34. et *Fortuna hujusque diei*, apud Ciceronem, lib. 2. de legibus. Et Victor de regionibus urbis : VICUS. HUIUSQUE. DIEI. FORT. ÆD. Lex vetus ædificii : DIES OPERIS K. NOVEMB. PRIMEIS DIES PEQVVN. PARS DIMIDIA DABITUR VBI PRÆDIA SATIS SUBSIGNATA ERUNT. ALTERA PARS DIMIDIA SOLVETUR OPERE PERFECTO PROBATO QUE.”

Of which innumerable other instances might also be given. And the Latins in cutting off the E at the end of *Que*, only followed the example of the Greeks, who did the same by *Kai* (as should have been mentioned before in the note to page 92). Thus in Sappho’s ode to Venus,

Ἡγε ὅττι δ’ ἦν το πειπονθα, κ’ ὅττι

Δευρο καλοῖμι.

Κ’ ὅττι γ’ ἐμω μαλίστ’ εἶλω γενεσθαι.

Αἱ δὲ μὴ φιλεῖ ταχέως φιλήσει

Κ’ ὅττι κείνη.

“ 2. *Because; on this account that; As—I doubt not but great troops would be ready to run; yet FOR that the worst men are most ready to move, I would wish them chosen by discretion of wise men.*” [i. e. The worst men are the most ready to move. That is the *Cause* why I would wish *them* (not the worst men, but the troops) chosen by discretion of wise men.]

“ 3. *For as much. In regard that; in consideration of; As—FOR as much as the thirst is intolerable, the patient may be indulged the free use of Spaw water.*” [i. e. As much as the thirst is intolerable, is the *Cause* why the patient may be indulged.]

“ 4. *FOR WHY. Because; For this reason that; As,—Solyman had three hundred field pieces, that a Camel might well carry one of them, being taken from the carriage: FOR WHY, Solyman purposing to draw the emperor unto battle, had brought no greater pieces of battery with him.*” [i. e. the *Cause*, that.]

B.

FOR, is not yet your own, however hard you have struggled for it: for, besides Greenwood and S. Johnson, you have still three others to contend with. Wilkins assigns *two* meanings to FOR. He says, it denotes—“ *the efficient or final cause, and adjuvancy or agreement with.*”

Lowth asserts that—“ FOR, in its primary sense, is

loco alterius, *in the stead or place of another.*" And he therefore censures Swift for saying—" *Accused the ministers FOR betraying the Dutch :*" And Dryden for saying—" *You accuse Ovid FOR luxuriancy of verse.*" Where, instead of FOR, he says OF should be written.

And Mr. Tyrwhitt, in his Glossary, says—" FOR. *Prep. Sax. sometimes signifies AGAINST.*" Of which he gives three instances.

" He didde next his white lere
Of cloth of lake fin and clere ;
A breche and eke a sherte ;
And next his shert an haketon,
And over that an habergeon
FOR percing of his herte."

Mr. Tyrwhitt says,—"*AGAINST*, or to prevent piercing."

" Therfore FOR stealyng of the rose
I rede her nat the yate unclose."

Mr. T. says—" *Against* stealing."

" Some shall sow the sacke
FOR sheding of the wheate."

Mr. T. says—" to prevent shedding."

H.

As Wilkins has produced no *instances*, he has given me nothing to take hold of. And let any ingenuity try whether it can, with any colour of plausibility, ap-

ply Dr. Lowth's meaning of *loco alterius*, or any other single meaning (except *Cause*) to the instances I have already explained. His corrections of Swift and of Dryden are both misplaced. For the meaning of these passages is,—

*Betraying the Dutch
Luxuriancy of verse* } CAUSE of the accusation.

So also in Mr. Tyrwhitt's instances, though their construction is awkward and faulty, and now out of use, yet is the meaning of **FOR** equally conspicuous. The *Cause* of putting on the Habergeon, of the advice not to open the gate, of sowing the sack—being respectively—that the heart might not be pierced, that the rose might not be stolen, that the wheat might not be shed.

B.

I will trouble you with only one instance of my own. How do you account for this sentence—" *To the disgrace of common sense and common honesty, after a long debate concerning the Rohillas, a new writ was moved FOR FOR old Sarum : and every orator was tongue-tied. Although it is as much the duty of the House of Commons to examine the claim of representation, as of the other House to examine the claim of peerage.*" Is the repetition of **FOR** tautologous, or only awkward ?

H.

Only awkward. For here are two *Causes* mentioned.

The *Cause* of the writ, and the *Cause* of the motion. By a small transposition of the words you may remove the awkwardness and perceive the signification of the phrase.—“*A motion was made FOR a new writ FOR old Sarum.*” [i. e. A new writ—*Cause* of the motion. Old Sarum, or a vacancy at Old Sarum—*Cause* of the writ.] And you will perceive that FOR may be repeated in a sentence as often as you mean to indicate a *Cause*; and never else. As, “*A motion was made FOR an order FOR a writ FOR the election of a burgess FOR to serve in parliament FOR the borough of Old Sarum.*”

1. An order—Cause of the motion.
2. A writ—Cause of the order.
3. Election of a burgess—Cause of the writ.
4. To serve in Parliament—Cause of the election.
5. Borough of Old Sarum—Cause of the service in Parliament.

So in these lines of Butler,

“The Devil’s master of that office
Where it must pass, if’t be a drum;
He’ll sign it with *Cler. Parl. Dom. Com.*
To him apply yourselves, and he
Will soon dispatch you FOR his fee.”

i. e. his fee the *Cause*.

B.

But if the words FOR and OF differ so widely as you

say ; if the one means *Cause* and the other means *Consequence* ; by what etymological legerdemain will you be able to account for that indifferent use of them which you justified in the instances of

“ *Sickness* OF hunger ; and *Sickness* FOR hunger.”

“ *Sickness* OF love ; and *Sickness* FOR love.”

H.

Qualified as it is by you, it is fortunate for me that I shall not need to resort to Etymology for the explanation. Between the respective terms

“ <i>Sickness</i>	—	<i>Hunger</i> ,
<i>Sickness</i>	—	<i>Love</i> ,”

it is certainly indifferent to the signification which of the two prepositions you may please to insert between them ; whether OF or FOR : this being the only difference, that if you insert OF, it is put in *apposition* to *Sickness* ; and *Sickness* is announced the *Consequence* : if you insert FOR, it is put in *apposition* to *Hunger* or to *Love* ; and *Hunger* or *Love* is announced the *Cause**.

* The Dutch are supposed to use *Van* in two meanings ; because it supplies indifferently the places both of our OF and FROM. Notwithstanding which *Van* has always one and the same single meaning, viz. *Beginning*. And its use both for OF and FROM is to be explained by its different *apposition*. When it supplies the place of FROM, *Van* is put in *apposition* to the same term to which FROM is put in *apposition*. But when it supplies the

B.

I do not well understand how you employ the term *Apposition*. Scaliger, under the head *Appositio*, (Cap. CLXXVII. de causis) says—"Causa propter quam duo *substantiva* non ponuntur sine copula, e philosophia petenda est. Si aliqua substantia ejusmodi est, ut ex ea et alia, unum intelligi queat; earum duarum substantiarum totidem notæ (id est *nomina*) in oratione sine conjunctione cohærere poterunt."

H.

What Scaliger says is very true. And this is the case with all those *prepositions* (as they are called) which are really *substantives*. Each of these—ejusmodi est, ut ex ea et *alia* (to which it is *prefixed*, *post-fixed*, or by any manner *attached*) unum intelligi queat.

B.

If it be as you say, it may not perhaps be so impossible as Lord Monboddo imagines, to make a Grammar even for the most barbarous languages: and the Savages may possibly have as complete a *syntax* as ourselves. Have you considered what he says upon

place of OF, it is *not* put in *apposition* to the same term to which OF is put in *apposition*, but to its *correlative*. And between two *correlative* terms, it is totally indifferent to the meaning which of the two correlations is expressed.

that subject, vol. 1. book 3. of his *Origin and Progress of Language**?

* “The last thing I proposed to consider was, the expression of the *relation* or *connexion* of things, and of the words expressing them : which makes what we call *Syntax*, and is the principal part of the grammatical art.”

“Now let ever so many words be thrown together of the most clear and determinate meaning, yet if they are not some way connected, they will never make discourse, nor form so much as a single proposition. This connexion of the parts of speech in languages of art is either by separate words, such as prepositions and conjunctions, or by cases, genders, and numbers, in nouns, &c. But in less perfect languages the most of them are denoted by separate words.

“Now as every kind of relation is a *pure idea of intellect*, which never can be apprehended by sense, and as some of those relations, particularly such of them as are expressed by cases, are very abstract and metaphysical, it is not to be expected that savages should have any separate and distinct idea of those relations. They will therefore not express them by separate words, or by the variation of the same word, but will throw them into the lump with the things themselves. This will make their syntax wretchedly imperfect.—There are only three barbarous languages, so far as I know, of which we have any particular account published that can be depended upon,—the Huron, the Galibi, and the Caribbee ; of which we have Dictionaries and Grammars also, so far as it is possible to make a Grammar of them. With respect to syntax, the Hurons appear to have none at all : for they have not *prepositions* or *conjunctions*. They have no genders, numbers, or cases, for their nouns ; nor moods for their verbs. In short, they have not, so far as I can discover, any way of connecting together the words of their discourse.

H.

I could sooner believe with Lord Monboddò, that there are men with tails like cats, as long as his lordship pleases *; and conclude with him, from the au-

Those savages therefore, though they have invented words, use them as our children do when they begin to speak, without connecting them together : from which we may infer, that Syntax, which completes the work of language, comes last in the order of invention, and perhaps is the most difficult part of language. It would seem however, that persons may make themselves understood without syntax. And there can be no doubt but that the *position* of the word will commonly determine what other word in the sentence it is connected with."

* As his Lordship (vol. 1. page 238) seems to wish for further authorities for human tails, especially of any tolerable length, I can help him to a tail of a foot long, if that will be of any service.

" Avant que d'avoir vû cette ile, j'avois souvent oüy dire qu'il y avoit des hommes à longues queues comme les bêtes ; mais je n'avois jamais pu le croire, et je pensois la chose si éloignée de nôtre nature, que j'y eus encore de la peine, lorsque mes sens m'ôterent tout lieu d'en douter par une aventure assez bizarre. Les habitans de FORMOSA étant accoutumés à nous voir, nous en usions ensemble avec assez de confiance pour ne rien craindre de part ni d'autre ; ainsi quoy qu'étrangers nous nous croyons en seureté, et marchions souvent sans escorte, lorsque l'expérience nous fit connoître que c'étoit trop nous hazarder. Un jour quelques uns de nos gens se promenant ensemble, un de nos ministres, qui étoit de la compagnie, s'en éloigna d'un jet de pierre pour quelques besoins naturels ; les autres cependant marchaient toujours fort attentifs à un récit qu'on leur faisoit ; quand il fut fini ils se souvinrent que le ministre ne revenoit

thority of his *famished* friend, that human flesh (even to those who are not *famished*) is the sweetest of all

point, ils l'attendirent quelque temps ; apres quoy, las d'attendre, ils allerent vers le lieu où ils crurent qu'il devoit être : Ils le trouverent mais sans vie, et le triste état où il étoit fit bien connoître qu'il n'avoit pas langui long-temps. Pendant que les uns le gardoient, les autres allerent de divers côtez pour decouvrir le meurtrier : ils n'allerent pas loin sans trouver un homme, qui se voyant serré par les autres, ecumoit, hurloit, et faisoit comprendre qu'il feroit repentir le premier qui l'approcheroit. Ses manieres desesperées firent d'abord quelqu'impression ; mais enfin la frayeur ceda, on prit ce miserable qui avoüa qu'il avoit tué le ministre, mais on ne put sçavoir pourquoy. Comme le crime étoit atroce, et que l'impunité pouvoit avoir de facheuses suites, on le condamna à être brulé. Il fut attaché à un poteau où il demeura quelques heures avant l'exécution ; ce fut alors que je vis ce que jusques-là je n'avois pu croire ; sa queue étoit longue de plus d'un pied toute couverte d'un poil roux, et fort semblable à celle d'un bœuf. Quand il vit que les spectateurs étoient surpris de voir en lui ce qu'ils n'avoient point, il leur dit que ce défaut, si c'en étoit un, venoit du climat, puisque tous ceux de la partie meridionale de cette Ile dont il étoit, en avoient comme lui."

Voyages de Jean Struys, An. 1650. tom. 1. chap. 10.

The meek, modest, sincere, disinterested, and amiable Doctor Horsley, LORD bishop of Rochester, could have furnished the *other Lord* with an authority for Tails nearer home, in his own metropolitan city :—" Ex hujus modi vocibus, fuerunt improbi nonnulli, quibus visa est occulta voluntas regis esse, ut Thomas e medio tolleretur ; qui propterea velut hostis regis habitus, jam tum cæpit sic vulgo negligi, contemni ac in odio esse, ut cum venisset aliquando Strodum, qui vicus situs est ad Medveiam flumen, quod flumen Rocestriam alluit, ejus loci accolæ

viands to the human taste, than admit that “every kind of *relation* is a *pure idea of intellect*, which *never can*

cupidi bonum patrem ita despectum ignominia aliqua afficiendi, non dubitarint amputare caudam equi quem ille equitaret; se ipsos perpetuo probro obligantes: nam postea, nutu dei, ita accidit, ut omnes ex eo hominum genere, qui id facinus fecissent, nati sint instar brutorum animalium caudati.”—As this change of shape may afford a good additional reason why such fellows should have “nothing to do with the laws, but to obey them,” the bishop perhaps will advise to sink what Polydore kindly adds in conclusion,—“Sed ea infamiæ nota jam pridem, una cum gente illa eorum hominum qui peccarint, deleta est.”

Polyd. Virg. Urb. Angl. Hist. fol. 218.

“But who considers right will find indeed,
 ’Tis *Holy Island* parts us, not the Tweed.
 Nothing but *Clergy* could us two seclude;
 No Scotch was ever like a Bishop’s feud.
 All Litanys in this have wanted faith,
 There’s no—*Deliver us from a Bishop’s wrath*.
 Never shall Calvin pardon’d be for sales;
 Never for Burnet’s sake, the Lauderdales;
 For Becket’s sake Kent always shall have tales.”

The Loyal Scot. By A. Marvell.

“Iohan Capgrave and Alexander of Esseby sayth, that for castynge of fyshe tayles at thys Augustyne, Dorsett Shyre menne hadde tayles ever after. But Polydorus applieth it unto Kentish men at Stroud by Rochester, for cuttinge of Thomas Becket’s horses tail. Thus hath England in all other land a perpetuall infamy of tayles by theyr wrytten legendes of lyes, yet can they not well tell, where to bestowe them truly.” Pag. 37.

And again, pag. 98.—“The spirituall sodomites in the le-

be apprehended by sense ; and that those particularly which are expressed by cases are more abstract and metaphysical than the others."

But his lordship and his fautors will do well to contend stoutly and obstinately for their doctrine of language, for they are menaced with a greater danger than *they* will at first apprehend : for if they give up their doctrine of language, they will not be able to make even a battle for their Metaphysics : the very term *Metaphysic* being nonsense ; and all the systems of it, and controversies concerning it, that are or have been in the world, being founded on the grossest ignorance of words and of the nature of speech.

As far as relates to *Prepositions* and *Conjunctions*, on which (he says) *Syntax* depends, the *principal and most difficult part* (as he calls it) of the Grammatical art, and which (according to him) is the *last in order*

gondes of their sanctified sorcerers have diffamed the English posterity with tails, as I have shewed afore. That an Englyshman now cannot travayle in an other land, by way of marchandise or any other honest occupyenge, but it is most contumeliously thrown in his tethe, that al Englishmen have tailes. That uncomly note and report have the nation gotten, without recover, by these laisy and idle lubbers the Monkes and the Priestes, which could find no matters to advance their canonised gains by, or their saintes as they call them, but manifest lies and knaveries."—*Iohan Bale. Actes of English Votaries.*

of invention, and completes the work of language : As far as relates to these prepositions and conjunctions, I hope it is by this time pretty evident that, instead of *invention*, the *classes* of them spring from *corruption* ; and that, in this respect, the Savage languages are upon an equal footing with the languages (as they are called) of *art*, except that the former are less corrupted : and that Savages have not only as *separate and distinct ideas* of those relations as we have, but that they have this advantage over us (an advantage in point of intelligibility, though it is a disadvantage in point of brevity), that they also *express* them separately and distinctly. For our *Prepositions* and *Conjunctions*, like the language of the Savages, are merely—"so many words of the most clear and determinate meaning thrown together," or, (as he afterwards strangely expresses it) "*thrown into the lump with the things themselves* *."

* What Lord Monboddo has delivered concerning Syntax, he has taken, in his own clumsy way, from the following erroneous article of M. de Brosses.—147. *Fabrique des Syntaxes barbares*.—" Dans son origine, elle n'a d'abord eu qu'un amas confus de signes épars appliqués selon le besoin aux objets à mesure qu'on les découvroit. Peu à peu la nécessité de faire connaître les circonstances des idées jointes aux circonstances des objets, et de les rendre dans l'ordre où l'esprit les place, a, par une logique naturelle, commencé de fixer la véritable signification des mots, leur liaison, leur régime, leurs dérivations. Par l'usage reçu et invétéré, les tournures habituelles sont devenues

B.

Well, Sir, after this tedious investigation of FOR, (one half of which I think might have been spared,) let us now, if you please, pause for a moment, and consider the ground which we have beaten. The Prepositions IF, UNLESS, BUT, WITHOUT, SINCE, you had before explained amongst the *Conjunctions*. To these you have now added the prepositions WITH, SANS, THROUGH, FROM, TO, WHILE, TILL, OF, and FOR. Though we

les préceptes de l'art bons ou mauvais, c'est à dire bien ou mal faits selon le plus ou le moins de logique qui y a presidé ; et comme les peuples barbares n'en ont gueres, aussi leurs langues sont elles souvent pauvres et mal construites : mais à mesure que le peuple se police, on voit mieux l'abus des usages, et la syntaxe s'épure par de meilleures habitudes qui deviennent de nouveaux preceptes. Je n'en dis pas davantage sur l'établissement des syntaxes ; et même si j'y reviens dans la suite, ce ne sera qu'en peu de mots. *C'est une matiere immense* dans ses details, qui demanderoit un livre entier pour la suivre dans toutes les opérations mechaniques du concept, qui en général la rendent nécessaire en consequence de la fabrique du sens interieur, mais tres arbitraire dans ses petits details, par le nombre infini de routes longues ou courtes, droites ou tortues, bonnes ou mauvaises, que l'on peut prendre pour parvenir au même but. Au surplus toutes ces routes bien ou mal faites servent également dans l'usage lorsqu'elles sont une fois frayées et connues." This *matiere immense*, as M. de Brosset imagines it, is in truth a very small and simple business. The whole of cultivated languages, as well as of those we call barbarous, is merely "*un amas de signes épars appliqués selon le besoin aux objets.*"

have spent much time, we have made but little progress, compared with what still remains to be done : at least if our language is as fertile in prepositions as Buffier supposes the French to be.

H.

I rather think we have made great progress. And, if you have nothing to object to my derivations and explanations, I must consider the battle as already won. For I am not here writing a dictionary (*which yet ought to be done, and of a very different kind indeed from any thing ever yet attempted any where*), but only laying a foundation for a new theory of language. However, though the remaining prepositions are numerous, the greater part require but little, and many of them no explanation.

BY.

BY (in the Anglo-Saxon written Bī, Be, Bīȝ) is the Imperative Bȝ of the Anglo-Saxon verb Beon, *to be*. And our ancestors wrote it indifferently either BE or BY. “Damville BE right ought to have the leading of the army, but, BYcause thei be cosen germans to the Admirall, thei be mistrusted.” 1568. See *Lodge’s Illustrations*, vol. 2. pag. 9. This preposition is frequently, but not always, used with an abbreviation of construction. Subauditur, *instrument, cause, agent, &c.* Whence the meaning of the omitted word has often been improperly attributed to BY. *With* (when it is

the imperative of *pȳpðan*) is used indifferently for *By** (when it is the imperative of *Beon*) and with the same *subauditur* and imputed meaning : As—" *He was slain BY a sword, or, he was slain WITH a sword.*"—" *Kenwalcus was warreyd WITH the King of Britons.*" Wallis, confounding together the imperative of *pȳpðan* with the imperative of *VIÐAN*, says—" *WITH indicat instrumentum, ut Latinorum ablativus instrumenti ; atque etiam concomitantiam, ut Latinorum cum.*"

By was also formerly used (and not improperly nor with a different meaning) where we now employ other prepositions, such as *For, In, During, Through*. As;—

" Aboute the XVIII yere of the reygne of Ine dyed the holy byshop Aldelme. Of him it is written, that when he was styred by his gostly enymy to the synne of the flesh, he to do the more

* In compound prepositions also, the Anglo-Saxon uses indifferently either *Pið* or *Be*; as,

<i>pið-æftan</i>	<i>Be-æftan</i>
<i>pið-ƿoran</i>	<i>Be-ƿoran</i>
<i>pið-geondan</i>	<i>Be-geondan</i>
<i>pið-innan</i>	<i>Be-innan</i>
<i>pið-neoðan</i>	<i>Be-neoðan</i>
<i>pið-uƿan</i>	<i>Be-uƿan</i>
<i>pið-utan</i>	<i>Be-utan</i>
<i>pið-hindan</i>	<i>Be-hindan</i>

though the modern English has given the preference to *Be*: having retained only two of the above prepositions commencing with *pið*, and dropped only two commencing with *Be*.

torment to himselfe and of hys body, wolde holde within his bedde by hym a fayre mayden BY so long a tyme as he myght say over the hole sauter." *Fabian* LXXVI.

"The which BY a longe time dwelled in warre." XLV.

"To whom the fader had BY hys lyfe commytted him." LXXII.

"He made Clement BY his lyfe helper and successour." LV.

"Whom Pepyn BY his lyfe hadde ordeyned ruler of Guian." LXXXIII.

"Sleyng the people without mercy BY all the wayes that they passyd." LXXVIII.

So also OF was formerly used, and with propriety, where we now employ BY with equal propriety.

"These quenes were as two goddesses
Of arte magike sorceresses
Thei couthe muche, he couthe more :
Thei shape and cast ayenst hym sore,
And wrought many a subtile wile.
But yet thei might hym not begyle.
Such crafte thei had aboue kynde,
But that arte couth thei not fynde,
OF whiche Ulisses was deceived."

Gower, lib. 5. fol. 135. pag. 1. col. 2.

BETWEEN. BETWIXT.

BETWEEN (formerly written *Twene*, *Atwene*, *Bgtwene*) is a *dual* preposition, to which the Greek, Latin, Italian, French, &c. have no word correspondent ; and is almost peculiar to ourselves, as some languages have a peculiar dual number. It is the Anglo-Saxon Imperative *Be*, and *Tpegen* or *twain*.

BETWIXT (by Chaucer written *Bytwyt**) is the imperative *Be*, and the Gothic **TVXS**, or *two* : and was written in the Anglo-Saxon *Betpeohs*, *Betpeox*, *Betpux*, *Betpýx*, and *Betpyxt*.

BEFORE, BEHIND, BELOW, BESIDE, BESIDES.

These Prepositions are merely the imperative *BE*, compounded with the nouns *FORE*, *HIND*, *LOW*, *SIDE*, which remaining still in constant and common use in the language ; as—The *fore part*, the *hind part*, a *low place*, the *side*,—require no explanation.

BENEATH.

BENEATH means the same as *Below*. It is the imperative *Be* compounded with the *noun*, *Neath*. Which word *Neath* (for any other use but this of the *preposition*) having slipped away from our language, would perhaps have given some trouble, had not the *nouns*, *Nether* and *Nethermost* (corrupted from *Neoðemært*, *Niðemært*) still continued in common use †. The

- * “ Thy wife and thou mote hange fer atwynne,
For that *Bytwyt* you shall be no synne.”

Miller's Tale.

- † “ ——— yet higher than their tops
The verd'rous wall of paradise up sprung :
Which to our general Sire gave prospect large
Into his NETHER empire neighb'ring round.”

Par. Lost, book 4. ver. 445.

word *Nether* is indeed at present fallen into great contempt, and is rarely used but in ridicule and with scorn : and this may possibly have arisen from its former application to the house of commons, anciently called (by Henry VIII.) "*The NETHER house of parliament**." That the word should thus have fallen into disgrace is nothing wonderful : for in truth this *Nether end* of our parliament has for a long time past been a mere sham and mockery of representation, but is now become an impudent and barefaced usurpation of the rights of the people.

NEATH, Neoðan, Neoðe, (in the Dutch *Neden*, in the Danish *Ned*, in the German *Niedere*, and in the Swedish *Nedre* and *Neder*) is undoubtedly as much a substantive, and has the same meaning as the word NADIR ; which Skinner (and after him S. Johnson) says, we have from the Arabians. This etymology (as

——— "among these the seat of men,
Earth with her NETHER ocean circumfus'd
Their pleasant dwelling place."

Par. Lost, book 7. v. 624.

"In yonder NETHER world where shall I seek
His bright appearances, or foot-step trace?"

Ibid. book 11. v. 328.

* "Which doctrine also the lordes bothe spirituall and temporall, with the NETHER house of our parliament, have both sene, and lyke very wel."

*A Necessary Doctrine and Erudition for any Christen Man.
Set furthe by the Kynges maiestie of Englande.* 1543.

the word is now applied only to astronomy) I do not dispute ; but the word is much more ancient in the northern languages, than the introduction of that science amongst them. And therefore it was that the whole serpentine class was denominated **NADK** in the Gothic, and *Nedpe* in the Anglo-Saxon.

If we say in the English,—“ *From the TOP to the BOTTOM,*”—the *nouns* are instantly acknowledged : and surely they are to the full as evident in the collateral Dutch, “ *Van BOVEN tot BENEDEN.*—*BENEDEN stad,*” &c.

UNDER.

UNDER (in the Dutch *Onder*), which seems by the sound to have very little connexion with the word *Beneath*, is yet in fact almost the same, and may very well supply its place : for it is nothing but *On neder*, and is a Noun.

“ Nor engine, nor device polemic,
Disease, nor Doctor epidemic,
Though stor’d with delectory med’cines
(Which whosoever took is dead since)
E’er sent so vast a colony
To both the UNDER worlds, as He.”

Hudibras, can. 2. v. 320.

BEYOND.

BEYOND (in the Anglo-Saxon *ƿiðgeondan*, *Biŷeond*, *Begeond*) means *be passed*. It is the imperative *Be*, compounded with the past participle *geond*, *geoned*,

or *goned*, of the verb *ġan*, *ġangan*, or *ġongan*, to *go*, or to *pass*. So that—"BEYOND *any place*," means—*Be passed* that place,"—or, *Be* that place *passed*.

WARD.

WARD, in the Anglo-Saxon *ƿarð* or *ƿearð*, is the imperative of the verb *ƿarðian* or *ƿearðian*, to *look at*; or to *direct the view*. It is the same word as the French *garder* *: and so Chaucer uses it, where it is not called a preposition.

"Take REWARDE of [i. e. Pay *regard* to, or *Look again* at] thyn owne valewe, that thou ne be to foule to thy selfe."

Parson's Tale, fol. 101. pag. 2. col. 2.

"And yet of Danger cometh no blame
In REWARD [i. e. *in regard*] of my doughter shame."

Rom. of the Rose, fol. 135. pag. 2. col. 1.

"This shuld a rigtwise lord haue in his thought
And nat be like tirauntes of Lombardy
That han no REWARDE [i. e. *regard*] but at tyranny."

Legende of good Women, fol. 206. pag. 2. col. 2.

"Wherfore God him self toke REWARD to the thynges, and
theron suche punyshment let fal."

Testament of Loue, boke 2. fol. 322. p. 2. c. 1.

Our common English word To reward †, which usu-

* "Literarum G et W frequentissima est commutatio," &c.

Wallis's Preface.

"Galli semper G utuntur pro Sax. p. id est, pro w."

Spelman Gloss. (Garantia).

† Skinner says—"REWARD q. d. *Re Award* (i. e. *contra*

ally, by the help of other words in the sentence, conveys *To recompence*, *To benefit* in return for some good action done ; yet sometimes means very far from benefit : as thus, —“ *Reward* them after their doings” — where it may convey the signification of punishment ; for which its real import is equally well calculated : for it is no other than *Regarder*, i. e. *To look again*, i. e. *To remember*, to reconsider ; the natural consequence of which will be either benefit or the contrary, according to the action or conduct which we *review*.

In a figurative or secondary sense only, *Garder* means to *protect*, to *keep*, to *watch*, to *ward*, or to *guard*. It is the same in Latin : *Tutus*, guarded, looked after, safe, is the past participle of *Tueor*, *Tuitus*, *Tutus*. So *Tutor*, he who *looks* after. So we say either, — *Guard*

seu *vicissim* assignare, ab A. S. *peapð*, versus, erga. V. AWARD." And under Award, he says—"AWARD, a part. initiali otiosa A, et A. S. *peapð*, versus, erga. q. d. erga talem (i. e.) tali addicere, assignare."

S. Johnson says "REWARD [*Re* and *Award*] to give in return. Skinner." Which is the more extraordinary because under the article Award, Johnson says, that it is "derived by Skinner, somewhat *improbably*, from *peapð* Sax. *towards*."

I suppose AWARD to be à *garder*, i. e. a determination à *qui c'est à garder* the thing in dispute ; i. e. to *keep* it—not *custodire*, as Spelman imagined ; but to *have* or *hold* it in possession : for *garder* in French is used both ways, as *keep* is in English, and in both properly.

him well, or, *Look* well after him. In different places in England, the same agent is very properly called either a *Looker*, a *Warden*, a *Warder*, an *Overseer*, a *Keeper*, a *Guard*, or a *Guardian*.

Accordingly this word *WARD* may with equal propriety be joined to the name of any person, place, or thing, *to* or *from* which our view or sight may be directed.

“ He saide, he came from Barbarie
To *Romeward*.”

Gower, lib. 2. fol. 34. pag. 1. col. 1.

“ This senatour repayreth with victorie
To *Romeward*.”

Chaucer, *Man of Lawes Tale*, fol. 23. p. 2. col. 1.

“ Kynge Demophon whan he by ship
To *Troiward* with felauship
Seyland goth upon his weie.”

Gower, lib. 4. fol. 67. pag. 1. col. 1.

“ Agameimnon was then in waye
To *Troiward*.”

Gower, lib. 5. fol. 119. pag. 1. col. 1.

“ — He is gon to *Scotlondward*.”

Chaucer, *Man of Lawes Tale*, fol. 22. p. 1. col. 1.

“ The morow came, and forth rid this marchant
To *Flaundersward*, his prentes brought him auaunt
Til he came to Bruges.”

Shyppmans Tale, fol. 70. pag. 1. col. 1.

“ His baner he displayed, and forth rode
To *Thebesward*.”

Knyghtes Tale, fol. 1. pag. 2. col. 1.

" And certayne he was a good felawe;
 Ful many a draught of wine had he drawe
 From *Burdeuxward*, while the chapmen slepe."

Chaucer, Prol. to Cant. Tales.

" That eche of you to shorte with others way
 In this viage, shal tel tales tway
 To *Canterburyward* I meane it so,
 And *Homwardes* he shall tel tales other two."

Ibid.

———— " and forth goth he
 To shyppe, and as a traytour stale away
 Whyle that this *Ariadne* a slepe lay,
 And to his *counfreyward* he sayleth blyue."

Ariadne, fol. 217. pag. 2. col. 1.

" Be this the son went to, and we forwrocht
 Left desolate, the wyndis calmit eik :
 We not bekend, quhat rycht coist mycht we seik,
 War warpit to *Seywart* by the *outwart* tyde."

Douglas, booke 3. pag. 87.

" The mone in till ane wauerand carte of licht
 Held rolling throw the heuynnis *MIDDILWARDE*."

Ibid. booke 10. pag. 322.

" The *Landwart* hynes than, bayth man and boy,
 For the soft sessoun ouerflowis ful of ioy."

Ibid. booke 13. pag. 472.

" Lo *Troylus*, right at the stretes ende
 Came ryding with his tenthe somme yfere
 Al softly, and *thyderward* gan bende
 There as they sate, as was his way to wende
 To *Paleysward*."

Chaucer, Troylus, boke 2. fol. 169. p. 2. c. 2.

" As she wold haue gon the way forth right
Towarde the garden, there as she had hight,
 And he was to the *Gardenward* also."

Frankeleyns Tale, fol. 55. pag. 2. col. 1.

"And thus he songe it wel and boldly
 Fro worde to worde according to the note,
 Twise a day it passeth through his throte
 To *Scolewarde*, and *Homwarde* when he went."

Prioresses Tale, fol. 71. pag. 2. col. 1.

"To *Mewarde* bare he right great hate."

Romaunt of the Rose, fol. 138. p. 1. c. 11

"He hath suche heynesse, and such wrathe to *uswarde*, by-
 cause of our offence."

Tale of Chaucer, fol. 82. pag. 1. col. 1.

"But one thing I wolde wel ye wist
 That neuer for no worldes good
 Myne hert unto *hirwarde* stood,
 But onely right for pure loue."

Gower, lib. 5. fol. 97. pag. 2. col. 2.

"But be he squier, be he knight
 Whiche to my *Ladywarde* pursueth,
 The more he leseth of that he seweth,
 The more me thinketh that I wyne."

Ibid. lib. 2. fol. 28. pag. 2. col. 2.

"Wheras the Poo, out of a wel small
 Taketh his first spring and his sours
 That *Estwarde* euer increseth in his cours
 To *Emelleward*, to *Ferare*, and to *Venyse*."

Chaucer, Clerke of Oxenf. Tale, fol. 45. p. 1. c. 2.

"If we turned al our care to *Godward*, we shuld not be de-
 stitute of such things as necessari this presente lyfe nedeth."

Tho. Lupset, Of dyngewell. pag. 203.

"It is hard for a man in a welthy state to kepe his mind in
 a due order to *Godward*."—*Ibid.* pag. 205.

"The which is with nothing more hurted and hyndered in his
 way to *Gracwarde* than with the brekinge of loue and charitie."

Lupset, Exhortacion to yonge Men.

So we may bid the hearer *look at* or *regard* either the *End* or *Beginning* of any *action* or *motion* or *time*. Hence the compound Prepositions TOWARD and FROMWARD, and Adverbs of this termination without number : in all of which, WARD is always the imperative of the verb, and always retains one single meaning ; viz. *Regard, Look at, See, Direct your view*.

Minshew, Junius, and Skinner, though they are very clear that WARD and GARDER are, on all other occasions, the same word ; (and so in *Warden* and *Guardian*, &c.) yet concur that WARD the *Affix* or *postpositive preposition*, is the Latin *Versus* : Skinner, with some degree however of doubt, saying—"A.S. autem *Ʒearð*, si a Lat. *Vertere* deflecterem, quid sceleris esset?"—Surely none. It would only be an error to be corrected.

The French preposition *Vers*, from the Italian *Verso*, from the Latin *Versus* (which in those languages supply the place of the English WARD, as *Adversus* also does of *To-ward*) do all indeed derive from the Latin verb *Vertere*, to *turn* ; of which those prepositions are the past participle, and mean *turned*. And when it is considered that in order to *direct our view* to any place named, we must *turn* to it ; it will not seem extraordinary, that the same purpose should in different languages be indifferently obtained by words of such different meanings, as *to look at*, or, *to turn to*.

ATHWART.

ATHWART (i. e. *Athweort*, or *Athweoried*), wrested, twisted, curved, is the past participle of *Ðpeopian*, to wrest, to twist; *flexuosum, sinuosum curvum reddere*; from the Gothic verb **THZVEKGAN**. Whence also the Anglo-Saxon *Ðpeop*, *Ðpeoph*, the German *Zwerch*, *Zwar*, the Dutch *Dwars*, *Zwerven*, the Danish *Tverer*, *Tvert*, *Tver*, the Swedish *Twert*, and *Swarfwa*, and the English *Thwart*, *Swerve*, and *Veer**.

AMONG, AMONGST, YMELL.

Minshew says—"ex Belg. *Gemengt*, i. e. *mixtus*."

Skinner says—"ab A.S. *Gemanz*, hoc a verbo *Gemenzan*†."

Junius says—"Manifeste est ex A.S. *Mængan*, *Mengian*, *miscere*."

Here all our Etymologists are *right* in the meaning of the word, and *therefore concur* in their etymology. Mr. Tyrwhitt alone seems to have no notion of the

* Junius derives *Swerve* from the Hebrew. And all our Etymologists *Veer* from the French *Virer*.

† In the Dutch *Mingen*, *Mengen*, *Immengen*.
 German *Mengen*.
 Danish *Mænger*.
 Swedish *Menga*.

word. For he says—" *I suspect* the Saxon *Ġemang* had originally a termination in *an*." But Mr. Tyrwhitt must not be reckoned amongst Etymologists.

EMONGE*, AMONGE†, AMONGES, AMONGEST‡, AMONGST, AMONG, is the past participle *Ġe-mæncged*, *Ġe-mencged*, (or, as the Dutch write it, *Gemengd*, *Gemengt*; and the old English authors, *Meynt* §,) of the Anglo-Saxon verb *Ġemænczan*, *Ġemenczan*, and the Gothic verb *ĠAMΛINGAN*. Or rather, it is the præ-

- * " The kynge with all his hole entent
Then at laste hem axeth this,
What kynge men tellen that he is
EMONGE the folke touchinge his name,
Or it be price, or it be blame."

Gower, lib. 7. fol. 165. pag. 1. col. 2.

- † " And tho she toke hir childe in honde
And yafe it souke; and euer AMONGE
She wepte, and otherwhile *songe*
To rocke with her childe aslepe."

lib. 2. fol. 33. pag. 2. col. 1.

- ‡ " I stonde as one AMONGEST all
Whiche am oute of hir grace *fall*."

lib. 8. fol. 187. pag. 2. col. 1.

- § " Warne milke she put also therto
With hony MEYNT, and in suche wise
She gan to make hir sacrifice."

lib. 5. fol. 105. pag. 2. col. 1.

- " That men in eueryche myght se
Bothe great anoye, and eke swetnesse,

terperfect Lemang, Lemong, Lemung, or Amang, Among, Amung, (of the same verb Mængan, Mengān) used as a participle, without the participial termination *od*, *ad*, or *ed* : and it means purely and singly *Mixed, Mingled*. It is usual with the Anglo-Saxons (and they seem to be fond of it) to prefix especially to their past participles *A, Æ, Be, Fon, Ge*.

Chaucer uses this participle *AMONGES* in a manner which, I suppose, must exclude all doubt upon the subject ; and where it cannot be called a preposition.

“ Yf thou castest thy seedes in the felde, thou shuldest haue in mynde that the yeres bene *AMONGES*, otherwhyle plentuous, and otherwhyle bareyn.”

Seconde Boke of Boecius, fol. 225. pag. 2. col. 2.

This manner of using the præterperfect as a participle, without the participial termination *ed* or *en*, is still very common in English ; and was much more usual formerly*. In the similar verbs, *To sink Ge-*

And ioye *MEYNT* with bytternesse,
Nowe were they easy, nowe were they wood.”

Chaucer, Rom. of the Rose, fol. 130. pag. 1. col. 1.

“ For euer of loue the sicknesse
Is *MEYNT* with swete and bitternesse.”

Rom. of the Rose, fol. 130. pag. 2. col. 2.

* Doctor Lowth is of a different opinion. He says—“ This abuse has been long growing upon us, and is continually making further incroachments,” &c. But Doctor Lowth was not much acquainted with our old English authors, and still less with the

rencan, To drink *Ge-drencan*, To stink *Ge-rtencan*, To hang *Dengan*, To spring *A-rppingan*, To swing *Spengan*, To ring *Ringan*, To shrink *A-rcpincan*, To sting *Stingan*, and in very many others, the same word is still used by us, both as præterperfect and participle; *Sunk*, *Drunk*, *Stunk*, *Hung*, *Sprung*, *Swung*, *Rung*, *Shrunk*, *Stung*. All these were formerly written with an o (as *Among* still continues to be), *Sonk*, *Dronk* (or *A-dronk*), *Stonk*, *Hong* (or *A-hong*), *Sprong* (or *Y-sprong*), *Swong*, *Rong*, *Shronk*, *Stong*. But the o having been pronounced as an u, the literal character has been changed by the moderns in conformity with the sound. And though *Among* (by being ranked amongst prepositions, and being unsuspected of being a participle like the others) has escaped the change, and continues still to be written with an o, it is always sounded like an u; *Amung*, *Amunkst*.

In the *Reve's Tale*, Chaucer uses the Preposition *YMELL* instead of *among*.

“ Herdest thou ever slike a song er now?
Lo whilke a complin is *YMELL* hem alle.

But this will give us no trouble, but afford a fresh

Anglo-Saxon. It is not an abuse, but cœval with the language, and analogous to the other parts of it: but it must needs have been highly disgusting to Doctor Lowth, who was excellently conversant with the learned languages, and took them for his model.

confirmation to our doctrine: for the Danes use *Mellem*, *Imellem*, and *Iblandt*, for this preposition *Among*, from their verbs *Megler*, *Melerer*, (in the French *Mesler* or *Mêler*), and *Iblander*, to mix, to blend; and the Swedes *Ibland*, from their verb *Blanda*, to blend.

YMELL means *y-medled*, i. e. *mixed*, *mingled*. A *medley* is still our common word for a *mixture*. *Ymeddled*, *ymelled*, and *ymell* by the omission of the participial termination, than which nothing is more common in all our old English writers.

“ He drinketh the bitter with the swete,
He MEDLETH sorowe with likynge
And liueth so, as who saieth, diynge.”

Gower, lib. 1. fol. 17. pag. 1. col. 2.

“ O mighty lorde, toward my vice
Thy mercy MEDLE with justice.”

lib. 1. fol. 24. pag. 2. col. 2.

“ But for all that a man maie finde
Nowe in this tyme of thilke rage
Full great disease in mareiage,
Whan venim MEDLETH with the sugre,
And mariage is made for lucre.”

lib. 5. fol. 99. pag. 1. col. 1.

“ Thus MEDLETH she with ioye wo,
And with her sorowe myrth also.”

lib. 5. fol. 116. pag. 1. col. 1.

“ Whan wordes MEDLEN with the songe,
It doth plesance well the more.”

lib. 7. fol. 150. pag. 1. col. 2.

“ A kinge whiche hath the charge on honde
 The common people to gouerne
 If that he wil, he maie well lerne
 Is none so good to the plesance
 Of God, as is good gouernance.
 And euery gouernance is due
 To pitee, thus I maie argue,
 That pitee is the foundement.
 Of euery kynges regimete.
 If it be **MEDLED** with Justice,
 Thei two remeuen all vice,
 And ben of vertue most vailable
 To make a kinges roylme stable.”

Gower, lib. 7. fol. 166. pag. 2. col. 1.

“ But he whiche hath his lust assised
 With **MEDLID** loue and tyrannie.”

lib. 7. fol. 170. pag. 2. col. 1.

“ And **MEDLETH** sorowe with his songe.”

lib. 8. fol. 182. pag. 2. col. 2.

“ We haunten no tauernes, ne hobelen abouten,
 Att markets and miracles we **MEDELEY** us neuer.”

Pierce Plowmans Crede.

“ There is nothyng that sauoureth so wel to a chylde, as the
 mylke of his nouryce, ne nothyng is to him more abhomynable
 than the mylke, whan it is **MEDLED** with other meate.”

Chaucer, Persons Tale, fol. 101. pag. 2. col. 1.

“ His garment was euery dele
 Ypurtrayed and ywrought with floures
 By dyuers **MEDELYNG** of coloures.”

Rom. of the Rose, fol. 124. pag. 1. col. 2.

“ O God (quod she) so worldly selynesse
 Whiche clerkes callen false felicite
 Y**MEDLED** is with many a bytternesse
 Ful anguyshous.”

Troilus, boke 3. fol. 177. pag. 1. col. 1.

“ Some on her churches dwell
 Apparailled porely, proude of porte,
 The seuen sacramentes they done sell,
 In cattel catchyng is her comfort,
 Of eche matter they wollen MELL.”

Plowmans Tale, fol. 97. pag. 2. col. 1.

“ Among the Grekis MYDLIT than went we.”

Douglas, booke 2. pag. 52.

“ And reky nycht within an litil thraw
 Gan thikkin ouer al the cauerne and ouerblaw,
 And with the mirknes MYDLIT sparkis of fire.”

Ibid. booke 8. pag. 250.

“ Syne to thare werk in manere of gun powder,
 Thay MYDLIT and they mixt this fereful souder.”

Ibid. booke 8. pag. 257.

“ And stedis thrawand on the ground that weltis,
 MYDLIT with men, quhilk zeild the goist and sweltis.”

Ibid. booke 11. pag. 387.

“ With blyithnes MYDLIT hauand paneful drede.”

Ibid. booke 11. pag. 394.

“ Quhil blude and brane in haboundance furth schede
 MYDLIT with sand under hors fete was trede.”

Ibid. booke 12. pag. 421.

“ Above all utheris Dares in that stede
 Thame to behald abasit wox gretumly
 Tharwith to MELL refusing aluterlie.”

Ibid. booke 5. pag. 141.

“ Quhen Turnus all the chiftanis trublit saw,
 And Eneas sare woundit hym withdraw;
 Than for this hasty hope als hate as fyre
 To MELL in fecht he caught ardent desyre.”

Ibid. booke 12. pag. 420.

AGAINST.

AGAINST (in the Anglo-Saxon *Ongegen*) is derived by Junius from *geond*.

“Dr. Mer. Casaubonus *mirabiliter* (says Skinner) deflectit a Gr. *κατα*.”

Minshew derives it from *κατεναντι*.

I can only say that I believe it to be a past participle, derived from the same verb (whatever it be, for I know it not) from which comes the collateral Dutch verb *Jegenen*, to meet, *rencontrer*, to oppose, &c. And I am the more confirmed in this conjecture, because in the room of this preposition the Dutch employ *Jegens* from *Jegenen*: and the Danes *Mod* and *Imod*, from their verb *Möder* of the same meaning: and the Swedes *Emot* from their verb *Môta* of the same meaning. The Danish and Swedish verbs from the Gothic **𐌹𐌿𐍄𐌹𐌺𐌰**; whence also our verb, to *meet*, and the Dutch *Moeten*, *Gemoeten*.

AMID OR AMIDST.

These words (by Chaucer and others written *Amides*) speak for themselves. They are merely the Anglo-Saxon *On-middan*, *On-midder*, in *medio*: and will the more easily be assented to, because the nouns *Mid*, *Middle* (i. e. *𐌹𐌿𐍄-ðæl*); and *Midst*, are still commonly used in our language.

ALONG.

On long, secundum longitudinem, or *On length* :

“ And these wordes said, she streyght her *On length* (i.e. she stretched herself **A LONG**) and rested awhile.”

Chaucer, Test. of Loue, fol. 325. pag. 1. col. 2.

The Italians supply its place by *Lungo* :

“ Così *Lungo* l'amate rive andai.”—*Petrarch*.

And the French by the obvious noun and article *Le Long* :

“ Joconde là dessus se remet en chemin

Révant à son malheur tout *Le Long* du voyage.”

La Fontaine.

So far there is no difficulty. But there was another use of this word formerly ; now to be heard only from children or very illiterate persons :

“ King James had a fashion, that he would never admit any to nearness about himself, but such an one as the queen should commend unto him, and make some suit on his behalf ; that if the queen afterwards, being ill treated, should complain of this *Dear one*, he might make his answer—‘ It is **LONG** of yourself, for you were the party that commended him to me.’ ”

Archbishop Abbot's narrative ; in *Rushworth's Collections*, vol. 1. p. 456.

The Anglo-Saxon used *two* words for these *two* purposes, *Ānðlang*, *Ānðlong*, *Onðlong*, for the first ; and *Lelang* for the second : and our most antient English

writers observed the same distinction, using ENDLONG for the one, and ALONG for the other.

“ She slough them in a sodeine rage
ENDELONGE the borde as thei ben set.”

Gower, lib. 2. fol. 31. pag. 1. col. 2.

“ Thys kynge the wether gan beholde,
And wist well, they moten holde
Her cours ENDLONGE the marche right.”

lib. 3. fol. 53. pag. 1. col. 1.

“ That nigh his house he lette deuise
ENDELONGE upon an axell tree
To sette a tonne in suche degree
That he it might tourne about.”

lib. 3. fol. 54. pag. 1. col. 1.

“ And every thyng in his degree
ENDELONGE upon a bourde he laide.”

lib. 5. fol. 100. pag. 2. col. 2.

“ His prisoners eke shulden go
ENDLONGE the chare on eyther honde.”

lib. 7. fol. 155. pag. 1. col. 1.

“ Than see thei stonde on every side
ENDLONGE the shippes borde.”

lib. 8. fol. 179. pag. 1. col. 2.

“ Loke what day that ENDELONG Brytayne
Ye remeue all the rockes, stone by stone,
That they ne let shyppe ne bote to gone,
Than wol I loue you best of any man.”

Chaucer, Frankeleyns Tale, fol. 53. pag. 1. col. 2.

“ This lady rometh by the clyffe to play
With her meyne, ENDLONGE the stronde.”

Hypsiphile, fol. 214. pag. 1. col. 2.

" I sette the point ouer ENDELONGE on the label."

Astrolabie, fol 286. pag. 2. col. 1.

" I sette the poynte of F, ENDELONGE on my labell."

Ibid. fol. 286. pag. 2. col. 2.

" We slyde in fluddes ENDLANG feill coystes fare."

Douglas, booke 3. pag. 71.

" Syne eftir ENDLANGIS the sey coistis bray

Up sonkis set and desis did array."

booke 3. pag. 75.

" ENDLANG the coistis side our nauy rade."

booke 3. pag. 77.

" Bot than the women al, for drede and affray,

Fled here and there, ENDLANG the coist away."

booke 5. pag. 151.

" In schawis schene ENDLANG the wattir bra."

booke 7. pag. 236.

" ENDLANG the styll fludis calme and bene."

booke 8. pag. 243.

" For now thare schippis full thik redde standis,

Brayand ENDLANG the coistis of thar landis."

booke 8. pag. 260.

" The bront and force of thare army that tyde

ENDLANG the wallis set on the left syde."

booke 9. pag. 293.

" ENDLANG the bankis of flude Minionis."

booke 10. pag. 320.

" The bankis ENDLANG al the fludis dynnys."

booke 11. pag. 372.

" Before him cachand ane grete flicht or oist

Of foulis, that did hant ENDLANG the coist."

booke 12. pag. 416.

“ For euer whan I thinke amonge,
Howe all is on my selfe **ALONGE**,
I saie, O foole of all fooles.”

Gower, lib. 4. fol. 66. pag. 2. col. 1.

“ I wote well ye haue long serued,
And God wote what ye haue deserued,
But if it is **ALONGE** on me,
Of that ye unauanced be,
Or els if it be **LONGE** on you,
The soth shall be preued nowe.”

lib. 5. fol. 96. pag. 1. col. 2.

“ And with hir selfe she toke such strife,
That she betwene the deth and life
Swounende lay full ofte amonge :
And all was this on hym **ALONGE**,
Whiche was to loue unkinde so.”

lib. 5. fol. 113. pag. 1. col. 2.

“ But thus this maiden had wronge
Whiche was upon the kynge **ALONGE**,
But ageyne hym was none apele.”

lib. 7. fol. 172. pag. 2. col. 1.

“ Ye wote your selfe, as wel as any wight
Howe that your loue al fully graunted is
To Troylus, the worthyest wyght
One of the worlde, and therto trouth yplight,
That but it were on him **ALONGE**, ye nolde
Him neuer falsen, whyle ye lyuen sholde.”

Chaucer, *Troylus*, booke 3. fol. 176. pag. 2. col. 2.

Once indeed (and only once, I believe) Gower has confounded them, and has used **ALONG** for both purposes :

“ I cary forth the night **ALONGE**,
 For it is nought on me **ALONGE**
 To slepe, that I soon go.”

lib. 4. fol. 78. pag. 2. col. 1.

Andlang or **ENDLONG** is manifestly *On long*; But what is **Gelang** or **ALONG**?

S. Johnson says it is—“ a word now out of use, but truly English.” He has no difficulty with it: accord- to him it is—“ **Gelang**, a fault, Saxon.”—But there is no such word in Saxon as **Gelang**, *a fault*. Nor is that, at any time, the meaning of this word **LONG** (or **ALONG**, as I have always heard it pronounced). *Fault* or *not Fault*, always depends upon the other words in the sentence: for instance,

“ Thanks to Pitt: it is **ALONG** of him that we not only keep our boroughs, but get peerages into the bargain.”

“ Curses on Pitt: it is **ALONG** of him that the free constitution of this country is destroyed.”

I suppose that Lord Lonsdale, Lord Elliot and the father of Lady Bath, would not mean to impute any *fault* to the minister in the former of these sentences: though the people of England do certainly impute an inextinguishable crime and treachery to him in the latter.

But Johnson took carelessly what he thought he

found, without troubling himself about the fact or the meaning; and he was misled by Skinner*: as he was also concerning the verb *To Long*. I mention the verb *To Long*, because it may possibly assist us in discovering the meaning of the other word.—“*To Long*,” says Skinner, “*valde desiderare, ut nos dicimus, to think the time LONG till a man ha's a thing.*”

The word *LONG* is here lugged in by head and shoulders, to give something of an appearance of connexion between the verb and the noun. But when we consider that we have, and can have, no way of expressing the acts or operations of the mind, but by the same words by which we express some corresponding (or supposed corresponding) act or operation of the body: when (amongst a multitude of similar instances) we consider that we express a moderate desire for any thing, by saying that we *incline* (i. e. *Bend* ourselves) to it; will it surprise us, that we should express an eager desire, by saying that we *LONG*, i. e. *Make long*, *lengthen*, or *stretch out* ourselves *after* it, or *for* it? especially when we observe, that after the verb *To in-*

* Skinner says—“*LONG* ab A.S. *ġelanġ*, *causa*, *culpa*, ut dicimus *It is LONG of him.*” Which were evidently intended by Skinner to be understood *causa*, *culpā*.

So Lye says—“*ġelanġ*, *Long of*: *Opera*, *causa*, *impulsu*, *culpa* *cujusvis.*—æt ðe ġr upe *lȳfe ġelanġ*, ut Anglice dici solet *It is LONG of thee that we live.*” Here is no *Fault*

cline we say *To* or *Towards* it; but after the verb *To Long* we must use either the word *For* or *After*, in order to convey our meaning.

Lenzian in the Anglo-Saxon is *To Long*, i. e. *To make long, To lengthen, To stretch out, To produce, Extendere, protendere.*

“Langað ðe apuht, Adam, up to Gode.” i. e. *Lengtheth* you, *Lengtheneth* you, *Stretcheth* you up to God.

Lang or *Long* is the præterperfect of Lenzian. The Anglo-Saxon and old English writers commonly use the præterperfect as a participle, especially with the addition of the prefixes *a* or *ge*.—

“Nota secundo,” says Hickes, “has præpositiones sæpe in vicem commutari, præsertim Ge, Be, et A.”—May we not then conclude that Ge-lang or A-LONG is the past participle of Lenzian, and means *Produced*?

ROUND, AROUND:

Whose place is supplied in the Anglo-Saxon by *hpeil* and *On-hpeil**. In the Danish and Swedish by *Omkring*. In Dutch by *Om-ring*; and in Latin by *Circum*, a Gr. *Kiexos*, of which *circulus* is the diminutive.

[* Qu. *hpeil*, *On-hpeil*?—ED.]

ASIDE, ABOARD, ACROSS, ASTRIDE, require no explanation.

DURING.

The French participle *Durant* ; from the Italian ; from the Latin. The whole verb *Dure* was some time used commonly in our language.

“ And al his luste, and al his besy cure
Was for to loue her while his lyfe mai DURE.”
Chaucer, Man of Lawes T. fol. 19. pag. 1. col. 2.

“ How shuld a fyshe withouten water DURE.”
Troilus, boke 4. fol. 186. pag. 2. col. 1.

“ ———Elementes that bethe discordable
Holden a bonde, perpetually DURYNG,
That Phebus mote his rosy day forthbring
And that the mone hath lorship ouer the nightes.”
Ibid. boke 3. fol. 172. pag. 1. col. 1.

“ Euer their fame shall DURE.”
Testament of Loue, boke 2. fol. 315. pag. 1. col. 1.

“ This affection, with reason knytte, DURETH in eueryche trew herte.”—*Ibid.* boke 3. fol. 331. pag. 1. col. 1.

“ Desyre hath longe DURED some speking to haue.”
Ibid. boke 1. fol. 306. pag. 1. col. 2.

PENDING.

The French participle *Pendant* ; from the Italian ; from the Latin.

OPPOSITE.

The Latin participle *Oppositus*.

MOIENING.

The French participle *Moyennant* ; from the Italian *Mediante* ; from the Low Latin.

SAVE.

The imperative of the verb. This prepositive manner of using the imperative of the verb *To save*, afforded Chaucer's Sompnour no bad *equivoque* against his adversary the Friar ;

“ God *save* you all, *SAVE* this cursed Frere.”

OUTCEPT.

The imperative of a miscoined verb, whimsically composed of *Out* and *capere*, instead of *Ex* and *capere*.

“ I'd play hun 'gaine a knight, or a good squire, or gentleman of any other countie i' the kingdome—OUTCEPT Kent: for there they landed all Gentlemen.”

B. Jonson, Tale of a Tub, act. 1. sce. 3.

OUTTAKE, OUTTAKEN.

The imperative, and the past participle, speak for themselves ; and were formerly in very common use.

“ Problemes and demaundes eke
His wisdom was to finde and seke :
Whereof he wolde in sondrie wise
Opposen them that weren wise.

But none of them it might beare
 Upon his worde to yeue answer
 OUTTAKEN one, whiche was a knight."

Gower, Conf. Am. fol. 25. pag. 1. col. 2.

" And also though a man at ones
 Of all the worlde within his wones
 The treasour might haue euery dele :
 Yet had he but one mans dele
 Towarde hymselfe, so as I thynke,
 Of clothyng, and of meate and drinke.
 For more (OUTTAKE vanitee)
 There hath no lorde in his degree."

Ibid. fol. 84. pag. 2. col. 2.

" For in good feith yet had I leuer,
 Than to coueite in suche awaye,
 To ben for euer till I deye
 As poore as Job, and loueles,
 OUTTAKEN one."

Ibid. lib. 5. fol. 97. pag. 1. col. 2.

" There was a clerke one Lucius,
 A courtier, a famous man,
 Of euery witte somewhat he can,
 OUTTAKE that hym lacketh rule,
 His owne estate to guyde and rule."

Ibid. lib. 5. fol. 122. pag. 2. col. 2.

" For as the fische, if it be drie,
 Mote in defaute of water die :
 Right so without aier on liue
 No man, ne beast, might thriue,
 The whiche is made of flesshe and bone,
 There is not, OUTTAKE of all none."

Ibid. lib. 7. fol. 142. pag. 1. col. 2.

" Whiche euery kynde made die
 That upon middel erthe stode,
 OUTTAKE Noe, and his bloode."

Ibid. lib. 7. fol. 144. pag. 1. col. 1.

" All other sterres, as men fynde,
Ben shinende of her owne kynde :
OUTTAKE onely the moone light,
Whiche is not of him selfe bright."

Gower, lib. 7. fol. 145. pag. 1. col. 1.

" Till that the great water rage
Of Noe, whiche was saide the flood,
The worlde, whiche than in synne stood,
Hath dreinte, OUTTAKE liues eight."

Ibid. lib. 8. fol. 174. pag. 1. col. 1.

" And ye my mother, my soueraigne plesance,
Ouer al thing, OUTTAKE Christ on lofte."

Chaucer, *Man of Lawes T.* fol. 19. pag. 2. col. 2.

" But yron was there none ne stele,
For all was golde, men myght se,
OUTTAKE the fethers and the tre."

Romaunt of the Rose, fol. 124. pag. 2. col. 1.

" Sir, sayden they, we ben at one
By euen accorde of eueryche one,
OUTTAKE rychesse al onely."

Ibid. fol. 147. pag. 2. col. 2.

" And from the perrel saif, and out of dout
Was al the navy, OUTTAKE four schippis loist."

Douglas, booke 5. pag. 151.

" And schortly euery thyng that doith repare
In firth or feild, flude, forest, erth or are,
Astablit lyggis styl to sleip and restis,
Be the small birdis syttand on thare nestis,
Als wele the wyld as the tame bestiall,
And euery uthir thingis grete and small :
OUTTAK the mery nyctyngale Philomene,
That on the thorne sat syngand fro the splene "

Ibid. prol. to booke 13. pag. 450.

"And also I resygne all my knyghtly dygnitie, magesty and crowne, with all the lordeshyppes, powre and pryuyleges to the foresayd kingely dygnitie and crown belonging, and al other lordshippes and possessyons to me in any maner of wyse pertaynyng, what nams and condicion thei be of; **OUTTAKE** the landes and possessions for me and mine obyte purchased and boughte."—*Fabian's Chronicle, Richard the Second.*

NIGH. NEAR. NEXT.

NIGH, **NEAR** is the Anglo-Saxon adjective *Nih*, *Neh*, *Neah*, *Neahg*, vicinus. And **NEXT** is the Anglo-Saxon superlative *Neahgert*, *Nehrt*.

"Forsoth this prouerbe it is no lye,
Men say thus alway, the **NYE** slye
Maketh the ferre loue to be lothe."

Chaucer, Myllers Tale, fol. 13. pag. 1. col. 1.

"Lo an olde prouerbe alleged by manye wyse: Whan bale is greatest, than is bote a **NYE** bore."

Test. of Loue, boke 2. fol. 320. pag. 2. col. 2.

Mr. Tyrwhitt in his Glossary says well—" *Hert*, Sax. *highest*. *Hegh*. *Heghest*. *Hegst*. *Hert*. In the same manner **NEXT** is formed from *Negh*."—But he does not well say that—" *Next* generally means the *nighest following*, but sometimes the *nighest preceding*." For it means simply the *nighest*, and never implies either *following* or *preceding*. As, "To sit **NEXT**." &c.

INSTEAD.

From the Anglo-Saxon *On rēde*, *In rēde*, i. e. *In place*. In the Latin it is *Vice* and *Loco*. In the Ita-

lian *In luogo*. In the Spanish *En lugar*. And in French *Au lieu*. In the Dutch it is either *In stede* or *In plaats*. In the German *On statt*. In the Danish *Istæden*. And in the Swedish (as we use either *Home STEAD* or *Home STALL*) it is *Istæellet*.

Our oldest English writers more rarely used the French word *Place*, but most commonly the Gothic and Anglo-Saxon word **STADS**, *Sted*, *Stede*. The instances are so abundantly numerous that it may seem unnecessary to give any.

“ But take this lore into thy wit,
That all thyng hath tyme and STEDE :
The churche serueth for the bede,
The chambre is of an other speche.”

Gower, lib. 5. fol. 124. pag. 1. col. 1.

“ Geffray, thou wottest wel this,
That euery kyndely thyng that is
Hath a kyndely STEDE there he
May best in it conserued be.”

Chaucer, *Fame*, boke 2, fol. 295. p. 2. c. 2.

“ Furth of that STEDE I went.”

Douglas, boke 2. pag. 59.

“ But ge, unhappy men, fle fra this STEDE.”

Ibid. boke 3. pag. 89.

The substantive STEAD is by no means obsolete, as S. Johnson calls it; nothing being more common and familiar than—“ *You shall go in their STEAD.*” It is likewise not very uncommon in composition; as *Home-*

*stead, Bedstead, Roadstead**, *Girdlestead*†, *Noonsted*‡, *Steadfast, Steady*, &c.

One easy corruption of this word *STED*, in composition, has much puzzled all our etymologists. Becanus thinks that *Step mother* is quasi *Stiff mother*, from *Stief, durus*; and so called because she is commonly "*dura, sæva, immitis, rigida*." Vossius on the contrary thinks she is so called, quasi *fulciens mater*, as a *stiff* and *strong*

* We often meet with the word *Roadstead* in Voyages, and I suppose it is still a common term with all seafaring men.—“On Thursday Captain Fauchey arrived at Plymouth. The purport of his dispatches, we conceive, can only be a representation of the necessity of evacuating L’Isle Dieu; as it produces nothing, has no good *Roadsted*, and is not tenable, if not protected by a fleet.”—*Morning Chronicle*, October 19, 1795.

“Extract of a letter from Plymouth. The Anson man of war, of 44 guns, rode out the storm like a duck, without the least damage, in the Sound; which, though an open *Rpadstead*, has most excellent holding ground.”

Morning Chronicle, January 27, 1796.

“In consequence of having received information on Wednesday night at eight o’clock, that three large ships of war and a lugger had anchored in a small *Roadsted* upon the coast, in the neighbourhood of this town.”

London Gazette Extraordinary, February 27, 1797.

† “His nose by mesure wrought ful right,
Crispē was his heere, and eke ful bryght,
His shulders of large brede,
And smalyshe in the *Gyrdelstede*.”

Chaucer, Rom. of the Rose, fol. 123. pag. 2. col. 2.

support of the family; “*quia fulcit domum cum nova hæreditate.*” Junius, observing that there is not only *Stepmother*, but also *Stepchild*, *Stepson*, *Stepdaughter*, *brother*, *sister*, &c. to all of whom this imputation of severity cannot surely belong, (neither can they be said *fulcire domum cum nova hæreditate*,) says *Stepmother* is so called, *quasi orphanorum mater*: “*nam Stepan Anglo-Saxonibus, et Stiufan Alamannis videntur olim usurpata pro orbare.*” S. Johnson, neither contented

“For hete her clothes down she dede,
Almost to her *Gerdylstede*
Than lay she uncovert.”

See *Warton's Hist. of Engl. Poetry*, vol. 3. p. xxxv.

“Divide yourself into two halves, just by the *Girdle-stead*;
send one half with your lady, and keep t' other to yourself.”

B. Jonson, Eastward Hoe, act 3.

‡ “Should all hell's black inhabitants conspire,
And more unhear'd of mischief to them hire,
Such as high heav'n were able to affright,
And on the *Noonsted* bring a double night.”

Drayton's Mooncalf.

“It was not long ere he perceiv'd the skies
Settled to rain, and a black cloud arise,
Whose foggy grossness so oppos'd the light,
As it would turn the *Noonsted* into night.”

Ibid.

“She by her spells could make the moon to stay,
And from the East she could keep back the day,
Raise mists and fogs that could eclipse the light,
And with the *Noonsted* she could mix the night.”

Ibid.

“With all our sister nymphs, that to the *Noonsted* look.”

Poly-olbion, First Song.

with any of the foregoing reasoning, nor yet with the *videntur olim usurpata*, determined also to try his hand (and a clumsy one God knows it is) at an etymology; but instead of it produced a Pun. *Stepmother*, according to him, is—"a woman who has *stepped* into the place of the true mother."

But in the Danish collateral language, the compounds remain uncorrupted; and there they are, with a clear and unforced meaning applicable to all—*Stedfader*, *Stedmoder*, *Stedbroder*, *Stedsöster*, *Stedbarn*, *Stedson*, *Steddotter*. i. e. Vice, Loco, in the place of, INSTEAD of, a father, a mother, a brother, &c.

ABOUT.

Spelman. "ABUTTARE, occurrere, vergere, scopum appetere, finem exerere, terminare. A Gallico *abutter*, seu *abouter*; hæc eadem significant.—*La Bout* enim *finem*, *terminum*, vel *scopum* designat: Inde Angl. a *But* pro meta; et ABOUT, pro circa rem vel scopum versare. Vox feodalis, et agri mensoribus nostris frequentissima, qui prædiorum fines (quos ipsi *capita* vocant, Marculfus *frontes*, Galli *bouts*) *abutare* dicunt in adversam terram; cum se illuc adigant aut protendant. Latera autem nunquam aiunt *abutare**: sed terram proximam adiacere."—*La Coustume reformée de Normandie*, cap. 556.—"Le Serjeant est tenue faire

* I hardly venture to say that I believe the correct and exact sense is here mistaken.

lecture des lettres, et obligations, et declaration, par *Bouts* et costes des dites terres saisies."

Junius. "BUT, Scopus. G. *But.* Fortasse desumptum est nomen ab illis monticellis, qui in limitibus agrorum ab Agrimensoribus constituebantur, atque ab iis *Bodones* sive *Botones* nuncupabantur, et ad quos, artem sagittandi exercentes, tela sua veluti ad scopum dirigebant."

Skinner. "ABOUT, ab A.S. *Abutan*, *Ymbutan*, *Circum*, illud, quantum ad priorem syllabam, a præp. *Ab*, hoc a præp. *Ymb*, quod a præp. loquerali, Lat. *Am*, Gr. *Αμφι*, ortum ducit, utr. secundum posteriorem syllabam ab A.S. *Ute* vel *Utan*, *Foris*, *Foras*, *Extremus*, item *Extremitas*, unde et defluxit Belg. *Buyten*, quod idem sonat; quod enim aliud ambit partes ejus exteriores, i.e. extimam superficiem attingit et obvolvit."

"ABUTT, a Fr. *Aboutir*. Vergere, confinem esse, ubi scilicet ager unus in, vel versus, alium protenditur, et ei conterminus est: hoc a nom. *Bout*, *Extremitas*, *Terminus*: quod satis manifeste a præp. Lat. *Ab*, et A.S. *Ute*, *Foras*, *Foris*, ortum trahit; q. d. quod foras protuberat vel extuberat."

"BUT, a Fr. G. *Bout*, *Extremitas*, *Finis*, *Punctum*, *Aboutir*, ad finem tendere, accedere, acuminari. *But* etiam in re nautica *Extremitatém* alicujus rei signat, manifeste Franco-Gallicæ originis."

Menage. "Bute—Botto et Botontinus se trouvent

en cette signification. Faustus et Valerius dans le recueil Des auteurs qui ont écrit De *limitibus* agrorum, page 312.—‘*In limitibus ubi rariores terminos constituimus, monticellos plantavimus de terra, quos BOTONTINOS appellavimus.*’” Le jurisconsulte Paulus livre V. de ces sentences titre 22.—“*Qui terminos effodiunt vel exarant arboresve terminales evertunt, vel qui convellunt* BODONES, &c.” Cujas sur ce lieu :—“BODONES, sic uno exemplari scriptum legimus, cujus nobis copiam fecit Pithæus noster. *Bodones* sive *Botones* vicem terminorum præstant. Vox est Mensorum, vel eorum qui de agrorum et limitum conditionibus scripserunt*.”

Spelman, Junius, Skinner and Menage, all resort to Franco-Gall. for their etymology. As for BORO and its diminutive BOTONTINUS (which have been quoted) they are evidently the translation of a Gothic word common to all the northern nations : which word, as it still remains in the Anglo-Saxon dialect, was by our ancestors written Boda (whence our English *To BODE* and many other words), and means the first outward extremity or boundary of any thing. Hence Onboda †, Onbuta, Abuta, ABOUT.

* So, *Vitalis de Limit.* “Hi non sunt semper a ferro taxati, et circa *Botontinos* conservantur.” *Innocent. de Cas. Litter.* “Alius fontanas sub se habens, super se montem, in trivio tres *Botontinos.*” *Auctor de Agrim.* “Si sint *Botontini* terræ ex superis prohibeo te sacramentum dare.”

[† No such word occurs in the Anglo-Saxon dictionaries. For Onbuta, &c. read On-butan, Abutan. ED.]

AFTER.

AFTER (Goth. **𐌹𐍄𐌹𐌸𐌺𐌰**. A.S. **ƿæfter**. Dutch *Agter*, *Achter*. Danish *Efter*, *Bag*. Swedish *Efter*, *Åtrå*, *Achter*;) is used as a noun adjective in Anglo-Saxon, in English, and in most of the northern languages. I suppose it to be no other than the comparative of the noun **AFT** (A.S. **ƿæft**): for the retention of which latter noun in our language we are probably obliged to our seamen.

Hind, *Aft*, and *Back*, have all originally the same meaning. In which assertion (although **AFT** had not remained in our language) I should think myself well justified by the authority, or rather the sound judgment, of Mr. de Brosse; who says well—"Quelquefois la signification primitive nous est dérobée, faute de monuments qui l'indiquent en la langue. Alors cependant on la retrouve parfois en la recherchant dans les langues mères ou collatérales." In the Danish language they express the same meaning by, *For* og *Bag*, which we express by *Fore* and *Aft*, or, *Before* and *Behind*. And in the Anglo-Saxon they use indifferently *Behindan*, *Beæftan*, and *Onbæc*.

DOWN, ADOWN.

In the Anglo-Saxon **Dun**, **ƿðun**. Minshew and Junius derive it from **Δυνα**, subeo.

Skinner says—"Speciose alludit Gr. **Δυνα**."

Lye says,—“ Non male referas ad *Arm. Doun*, profundus.”

S. Johnson, in point of etymology and the meaning of words, is always himself.

ADOWN, the adverb, he says, is “from *A*, and *Down* ;” and means—“ *On the ground*.”

ADOWN, the preposition, means—“ *Towards the ground*.”

But though ADOWN comes from *A*, and *Down*,—DOWN, the preposition, he says, comes from *Aduna*, Saxon: and means ; “ 1st. Along a *descent* ; and 2dly. Towards the *mouth* of a *river*.”

DOWN, the adverb, he says, means—“ *On the ground*.” But DOWN, the substantive, he says, is from *dun*, Saxon, a *hill* ; but is used now as if derived from the adverb: for it means, “ 1st. A large open *plain or valley*.”

And as an instance of its meaning a *valley*, he immediately presents us with *Salisbury Plain*.

“ *On the Downs* as we see, near Wilton the fair,
A hast'ned hare from greedy greyhound go.”

Arcadia, by Sir Ph. Sydney.

He then gives four instances more to shew that it means a *valley* ; in every one of which it means hills or rising grounds. To compleat the absurdity, he then says, it means, “ 2dly. A *hill*, a *rising ground* ; and that, *This sense is very rare*.” Although it has this sense in every

instance he has given for a contrary sense : nor has he given, nor could he give, any instance where this substantive has any other sense than that which he says is so rare.—But this is like all the rest from this quarter ; and I repeat it again, the book is a disgrace to the country.

Freret, Falconer, Wachter and De Brosses, have all laboriously and learnedly (but, I think, not happily) considered the word *Dun*.

From what Camden says of the antient names (*Danmonii* or *Dunmonii*, and *Dobuni*) of the inhabitants of Cornwall and Gloucestershire, and of the two rivers (*Daven* or *Dan* or *Dun* or *Don*) in Cheshire and in Yorkshire ; it seems as if he supposed that our English word *DOWN* came to us from the Britons.

Solinus, he observes, called the Cornish men *Dunmonii* ; “ which name seems to come from their dwelling there under hills. For their habitation all over this country is low and in vallies ; which manner of dwelling is called in the British tongue *Danmunith*. In which sense also the province next adjoining is at this day named by the Britons *Duffneint*, that is to say, *Low vallies*.”

Of the *Dobuni* he says,—“ This their name, I believe, is formed from *Duffen*, a British word ; because

the places where they planted themselves, were for the most part low and lying under the hills."

Speaking of the river in Cheshire, he says,—“Then cometh this *Dan* or more truly *Daven*, to *Davenport*, commonly called *Danport*.”

Of the river in Yorkshire, he says,—“The river *Danus*, commonly called *Don* or *Dune*, so termed, as it should seem, because it is carried in a channel low and sunk in the ground : for so much signifieth *Dan* in the British language*.”

Selden, in his notes on the first song of Drayton's

* “*Regionem illam insederunt antiquitus Britanni, qui Solino Dunmonii dicti. Quod nomen ab habitatione sub montibus factum videatur. Inferius enim, et convallibus passim per hanc regionem habitat, quod Danmunith Britannice dicitur: quo etiam sensu proxima provincia Duffneint, i. e. depressæ valles, a Britannis hodie vocatur.*”—Pag. 133. Folio Edit. 1607.

“*Dobunos* videamus, qui olim, ubi nunc Gloucestershire et Oxfordshire, habitârunt. Horum nomen factum a *Duffen* Britannica dictione credimus; quod maxima ex parte loca jacenta et depressa sub collibus insidebant.”—Pag. 249.

“*Dan* vel *Daven* e montibus &c. fertur ad &c. Deinde *Davenport*, vulgo *Danport* accedit.”—Pag. 461.

“*Danus*, vulgo *Don* et *Dune*, ita, ut videtur, nominatus, quod pressiori et inferiori in solum labitur alveo; id enim *Dan* Britannis significat.”—Pag. 562.

Polyolbion, gives full assent to Camden's etymology. He says,—“*Duffneint*, i.e. low valleys in British, as judicious Camden teaches me.”

Milton, I doubt not on the same authority, calls the river “the *gulphy* DUN.”

“Rivers arise; whether thou be the son
Of utmost Tweed, or Oose, or gulphy *Dun*.”

And Bishop Gibson concurs with the same; translating, without any dissent, the marginal note, “*Duffen* Britannice profundum sive depressum,” in these words, “*Duffen*, in British, deep or low.”

How then, against such authorities, shall I, with whatever reason fortified, venture to declare, that I am far from thinking that the Anglo-Saxons received either the name of these rivers, or their word *Dun*, *Adun* (which is evidently our word *DOWN*, *ADOWN*, differently spelled), in any manner from the British language? And as for *Duffen* (from which, with Camden, I think the words proceeded), we have it in our own language, the Anglo-Saxon, and with the same meaning of *sunk*, *depressum*, *deep* or *low*.

If, with Camden, we can suppose the Anglo-Saxon *dun* to have proceeded through the gradations of

Dufen { *Duven*, *Duwn*, *Dun*, *Don*, *Down*;
 { *Daven*, *Davn*, *Dan*;

I should think it more natural to derive both the name

of the rivers* and the preposition from Dupen†, the past participle of the Anglo-Saxon verb Dupian, mergere, to *sink*, to *plunge*, to *dive*, to *dip*. And the usual prefix to the Anglo-Saxon participles, A, in Adun, strongly favours the supposition‡. In most of the passages too in which the preposition or adverb DOWN is used in English, the sense of this participle is *clearly* expressed; and, without the least straining or twisting, the acknowledged participle may be put instead of the

§ I suppose the river *Dove* in Staffordshire to have its denomination from the same word, and for the same reason.

† The Anglo-Saxons use indifferently for the past participle of Dupian either Duped, or Dupen or Dopen. I suppose this same verb to have been variously pronounced,

Dopian	} Hence	{	Dopen. Doven. Dovn. Doun. DOWN. DON.
Dupian			Dupen. Duven. Duvn. DUN. DUNE.
Dapian			Dapen. Daven. Davn. DAN.
Dypian or Dyan	{	——	{ To Dive.

[‡ See *Lamb. ten Kate, Anleiding &c.* v. *Duiken, ducken, sese demittere*, vol. 2. p. 171; and v. *Duiv, dofen, gedofen, mergere*, *ib.* p. 625. Ten Kate considers these as cognate roots.

But Mr. Richardson (*Illustrations of Engl. Philology*) observes that Mr. Tooke does not seem confident in this etymology: and I shall take the liberty to suggest that DOWN, A DOWN, is a contraction of Of-dune, *off* or *from hill, downhill*, proclivis. See Lye v. "Of-dune. Deorsum."—Also, under the words Dun, mons, and Of, Lye refers to A.S. authorities for the expression "of dune. Downward, down. Deorsum."—ED.]

supposed preposition : although there may perhaps be some passages in which the *preposition* DOWN is used, where the meaning of the participle may not ~~so~~ plainly appear.

UPON. UP. OVER. BOVE. ABOVE.

These prepositions have all one common origin and signification, U_{pon}. U_{pan}. U_{pa}.

In the Anglo-Saxon U_{pa}. U_{pepa}. U_{pe}mæ_{rt}. are the nouns, *altus*, *altior*, *altissimus*.

U_{pon}, U_{pan}, U_{pa}. Altus (Fr. Th. *Uph*.) UPON, UP.

U_{pepa}, O_{pepe}, O_{pen}, Altior. OVER OR UPPER.

U_{pe}mæ_{rt}. Altissimus. UPMOST, UPPERMOST, UPPER-EST, OVEREST.

Be-u_{pan} or Bu_{pan}. BOVE.

On-bu_{pan}. ABOVE.

The use of these words in English as adjectives is very common ; as it is also in all the northern languages : for the same words are used in all of them*.

* Germ.	<i>Auf. Auber.</i> <i>Oben. Ober. Oberste.</i>
Dutch.	<i>Op. Opper. Opperste.</i> <i>Boven. Over. Overste.</i>
Danish.	<i>Oven. Over. Overste.</i> <i>Ober.</i>
Swedish.	<i>Uppe. Öfwer. Öfwerste</i> <i>Up. Öfre. Ypperst</i>

" Aboue his hede also there hongeth
 A fruite whiche to that peine longeth :
 And that fruite toucheth euer in one
 His OVER lippe."

Gower, lib. 5. fol. 85. pag. 2. col. 2.

" Her OVER lyp wyped she so clene
 That in her cup was no ferthyng sene."

Prol. to Cant. Tales. Prioress.

" Ful thredbare was his OVER courtpy."

Ibid. Clerke of Oxenf.

" That of his wurship recketh he so lyte
 Hys OVEREST sloppe is not worth a myte."

Prol. to Chan. Yeman's Tale.

" By which degrees men myght climben from the *neytherest*
 letter to the UPPEREST."

Boecius, boke i. fol. 221. pag. 1. col. 1.

" Why suffreth he suche slyding chaunges, that mysturnen
 suche noble thynges as ben we men, that arne a fayre persell of
 the erth, and holden the UPPEREST degree under God of be-
 nigne thinges."—*Test. of Loue*, fol. 312. pag. 1. col. 1.

It is not necessary for my present purpose, to trace
 the Particles any further than to some Noun or Verb of
 a determinate signification ; and therefore I might here
 stop at the Anglo-Saxon noun *Upan*, *altus*. But I
 believe that *Upon*, *Upa*, *UPON*, *UP*, means the same as
Top or *Head*, and is originally derived from the same
 source. Thus,


" —Lowliness is young ambition's ladder,
 Whereto the climber *Upwards* turns his face ;
 But when he hath attain'd the *Topmost* round,
 He then unto the ladder turns his back."

Where you may use indifferently either *Upward*, *Topward*, or *Headward*; or *Topmost*, *Upmost*, or *Headmost*.

Some etymologists have chosen to derive the name of that part of our body from the Scythian *HA*, altus; or the Islandic *HAD*, altitudo; or the Gothic *hanh*, altus; or (with Junius) from the Greek *ὑπατος*; or Theot. *HOH*; or the Anglo-Saxon *Deah*. But our English words *Head* and *Heaven* are evidently the past participles *Heaved* and *Heaven* of the verb to *Heave*: as the Anglo-Saxon *Deapod*, *Deapð*, caput, and *Deopen*, *Deapen*, cœlum, are the past participles of the verb *Deapan*, *Deoþan*, to *heave*, to *lift up*. Whence *Upon* also may easily be derived, and with the same signification. And I believe that the names of all abstract relation (as it is called) are taken either from the adjectived common names of objects, or from the participles of common verbs. The relations of *place* are more commonly from the names of some parts of our body; such as, *Head*, *Toe*, *Breast*, *Side*, *Back*, *Womb*, *Skin*, &c.

Wilkins seems to have felt something of this sort, when he made his ingenious attempt to explain the local prepositions by the help of a man's figure in the following Diagram. But confining his attention to ideas (in which he was followed by Mr. Locke), he overlooked the etymology of words, which are their signs, and in which the secret lay.

“ For the clearer explication of these *local* prepositions (says he) I shall refer to this following Diagram. In which by the *oval* figures are represented the prepositions determined to motion, wherein the *acuter* part doth point out the tendency of that motion. The *squares* are intended to signify rest or the term of motion. And by the *round* figures are represented such relative prepositions, as may indifferently refer either to motion or rest.”



In all probability the Abbé de l'Épée borrowed his

method of teaching the prepositions to his deaf and dumb scholars from this notion of Wilkins.

“ Tout ce que je puis regarder directement *en Face*, est *Devant* moi : tout ce que je ne peux voir sans retourner la tête de l'autre côté, est *Derrière* moi.

“ S'agissoit-il de faire entendre qu'une action étoit passée? Il jettoit au hasard deux ou trois fois sa main du côté de son épaule. Enfin s'il désiroit annoncer une action future, il faisoit avancer sa main droite directement devant lui.”

Des Sourds et Muets, 2 edit. pag. 54.

You will not expect me to waste a word on the prepositions *touching, concerning, regarding, respecting, relating to, saving, except, excepting, according to, granting, allowing, considering, notwithstanding, neighbouring, &c.*, nor yet on the compound prepositions *In-to, Un-to, Un-till, Out-of, Through-out, From-off, &c.*

B.

I certainly should not, if you had explained all the simple terms of which the latter are compounded. I acknowledge that the meaning and etymology of some of your prepositions are sufficiently plain and satisfactory : and of the others I shall not permit myself to entertain a decided opinion till after a more mature consideration. *Pedetentim progredi*, was our old favourite motto and caution, when first we began together in our

early days to consider and converse upon philosophical subjects ; and, having no fanciful system of my own to mislead me, I am not yet prepared to relinquish it. But there still remain five simple prepositions, of which you have not yet taken the smallest notice. How do you account for **IN**, **OUT**, **ON**, **OFF**, and **AT** ?

H.

Oh ! As for these, I must fairly answer you with *Martin Luther*,—" Je les defendrois aisément devant le Pape, mais je ne sçais comment les justifier devant le Diable." With the common run of Etymologists, I should make no bad figure by repeating what others have said concerning them ; but I despair of satisfying you with any thing they have advanced or I can offer, because I cannot altogether satisfy myself. The explanation and etymology of these words require a degree of knowledge in all the antient northern languages, and a skill in the application of that knowledge, which I am very far from assuming : and, though I am almost persuaded by some of my own conjectures concerning them*, I am not willing, by an apparently forced and far-fetched derivation, to justify your imputation of

* In the Gothic and Anglo-Saxon, **ĪNNA**, *inna*, means *uterus, viscera, venter, interior pars corporis*. (*Inna*, *inne*, is also in a secondary sense used for *cave, cell, cavern*.) And there are some etymological reasons which make it not improbable that **OUT** derives from a word originally meaning *skin*. I am inclined to believe that **IN** and **OUT** come originally from two *Nouns* meaning those two parts of the body.

etymological legerdemain. Nor do I think any further inquiry necessary to justify my conclusion concerning the prepositions ; having, in my opinion, fully intitled myself to the application of that axiom of M. de Brosses (Art. 215.)—" La preuve connue d'un grand nombre de mots d'une espèce, doit établir une précepte générale sur les autres mots de même espèce, à l'origine desquels on ne peut plus remonter. On doit en bonne logique juger des choses que l'on ne peut connoître, par celles de même espèce qui sont bien connues ; en les ramenant à un principe dont l'évidence se fait apercevoir par tout où la vue peut s'étendre."

I

I

2

4

I

4

1

ΕΠΕΑ ΠΤΕΡΟΕΝΤΑ,

&c.

CHAPTER X.

OF ADVERBS.

B.

THE first general division of words (and that which has been and still is almost universally held by Grammarians) is into *Declinable* and *Indeclinable*. All the *Indeclinables* except the *Adverb*, we have already considered. And though Mr. Harris has taken away the Adverb from its old station amongst the other *Indeclinables*, and has, by a singular whim of his own, made it a secondary class of *Attributives*, or (as he calls them) *Attributes of Attributes*; yet neither does he nor any other Grammarian seem to have any clear notion of its nature and character.

B. Jonson* and Wallis and all others, I think, seem

* "Prepositions are a peculiar kind of *Adverbs*, and ought to be referred thither."—*B. Jonson's Grammar*.

"Interjectio posset ad *Adverbium* reduci; sed quia majori

to confound it with the Prepositions, Conjunctions and Interjections. And Servius (to whom learning has great obligations) advances something which almost justifies you for calling this class, what you lately termed it, the common sink and repository of all heterogeneous, unknown corruptions. For, he says,—“*Omnis pars orationis, quando desinit esse quod est, migrat in Adverbium**.”

H.

I think I can translate Servius intelligibly—Every word, *quando desinit esse quod est*, when a Grammarian knows not what to make of it, *migrat in Adverbium*, he calls an Adverb.

These Adverbs however (which are no more a separate part of speech than the particles we have already considered) shall give us but little trouble, and shall waste no time: for I need not repeat the reasoning which I have already used with the Conjunctions and Prepositions.

All Adverbs ending in *lv* (the most prolific branch

bus nostris placuit illam distinguere; non est cur in re tam temerariæ hæreamus.—*Caramuel*.

“CHEZ est plutôt dans notre langue un *Adverbe* qu’une *Particule*.”—*De Broses*.

* “Recte dictum est ex omni adjectivo fieri adverbium.”—*Campanella*.

of the family) are sufficiently understood : the termination (which alone causes them to be denominated Adverbs) being only the word LIKE corrupted, and the corruption so much the more easily and certainly discovered, as the termination remains more pure and distinguishable in the other sister languages, the German, the Dutch, the Danish, and the Swedish ; in which it is written *lich, lyk, lig, liga*. And the *Encyclopædia Britannica* informs us, that—" In Scotland the word *Like* is at this day frequently used instead of the English termination *Ly*. As, for a *goodly* figure, the common people say, a *goodlike* figure."

ADRIFT

is the past participle *Adrifed, Adrif'd, Adrift*, of the Anglo-Saxon verb *Dripan, Ȓdripan*, to *Drive*.

" And what adventure has the hiddir *DRIFFE*?"

Douglas, booke 3. pag. 79.

i. e. *Driffed* or *Driffen*.

AGHAŒT, AGAST,

may be the past participle *Agazed*.

" The French exclaim'd—The Devil was in arms.

All the whole army stood AGAZED on him."

First part of Henry 6, act 1, sce. 1.

Agazed may mean, made to gaze : a verb built on the verb *To gaze*.

In *King Lear* (act 2. sce. 1.) Edmund says of Edgar,

“———GASTED by the noise I made,
Full suddenly he fled.”

Gasted, i. e. made aghast: which is again a verb built on the participle *aghast*. This progressive building of verb upon verb is not an uncommon practice in language.

In Beaumont and Fletcher's *Wit at several Weapons*, (act 2.) “Sir Gregory Fopp, *a witless lord of land*,” says of his clown,

“If the fellow be not out of his wits, then will I never have any more wit whilst I live; either the sight of the lady has GASTERED him, or else he's drunk.”

I do not bring this word as an authority, nor do I think it calls for any explanation. It is spoken by a fool of a fool; and may be supposed an ignorantly coined or fantastical cant word; or corruptly used for *Gasted*.

An objection may certainly be made to this derivation: because the word AGAST always, I believe, denotes a considerable degree of terror; which is not denoted by the verb *To Gaze*: for we may *gaze* with delight, with wonder or admiration, without the least degree of fear. If I could have found written (as I doubt not there was in speech) a Gothic verb formed upon the

Gothic noun **ARIS**, which means *Fear and Trembling* (the long-sought etymology of our English word *Ague**);

* Junius says—"AGUE, febris. G. *Aigu* est *acutus*. Nihil nempe usitatus est quam *acutus* dicere febres."

But Skinner, a medical man, was aware of objections to this derivation, which Junius never dreamed of. He therefore says—"Fortasse a Fr. *Aigu*, *acutus*. Quia (*sallem in paroxysmo*) *acutus* (*quodammodo*) morbus est, et *acutis doloribus* exercet: licet a medicis, durationem magis quam vehementiam hujus morbi respicientibus, non inter *acutas*, sed *chronicas* febres numeretur."

But Skinner's qualifying *paroxysmo, quodammodo, acutis doloribus*, by which (for want of any other etymology) he endeavours to give a colour to the derivation from *Aigu, acutus*, will not answer his purpose: for it is not true (and I speak from a tedious experience) that there are any *acute pains* in any period of the AGUE. Besides, S. Johnson has truly observed, that—"The *cold* fit is, in popular language, more particularly called the AGUE; and the *hot*, the fever." And it is commonly said—"He has an AGUE and fever."

I believe our word AGUE to be no other than the Gothic word **ARIS**, *fear, trembling, shuddering*:

1. Because the Anglo-Saxons and English, in their adoption of the Gothic substantives (most of which terminate in s), always drop the terminating s.

2. Because, though the English word is written AGUE, the common people and the country people always pronounce it AGHY, or AGUY.

3. Because the distinguishing mark of this complaint is the *trembling* or *shuddering*; and from that distinguishing circumstance it would naturally take its name.

4. Because the French, from whom the term *Aigu* is sup-

I should have avoided this objection, and with full assurance have concluded that AGAST was the past participle of **ARISAN**, i. e. **ARISEA**, **ARIS'A**, **ARIST**, i. e. made to shudder, terrified to the degree of trembling. There is indeed the verb **ARGAN**, timere; and the past participle **ARIAS**, territus; and it is not without an appearance of probability, that, as *Whiles*, *Amonges*, &c. have become with us *Whilst*, *Amongst*, &c. so **ARIAS** might become AGIDST, AGIST, AGAST; or **ARIAS** might become AGISD, AGIST, AGAST. And the last seems to me the most probable etymology.

Ago.

Go, Ago, Ygo, Gon, Agon, Gone, Agone, are all used indiscriminately by our old English writers as the past participle of the verb *To Go* *.

Go.

“ But netheles the thyng is *Do*,
This fals god was soone GO
With his deceite, and held him close.”

Gower, lib. 6. fol. 138. pag. 2. col. 2.

“ The daie is GO, the nightes chaunce
Hath derked all the bright sonne.”

Ibid. lib. 8. fol. 179. pag. 1. col. 2.

posed to have been borrowed, never called the complaint by that name.

* “ Questi è un cavaliere Inglese che ho veduto la scorsa notte alla testa di ballo.”—*Goldoni, La Vedova Scaltra*, vol. 5. p. 98.

“ But soth is sayed, GO sithen many yeres,
That feld hath eyen, and wode hath eres.”

Chaucer. Knyghtes Tale, fol. 4. pag. 1. col. 2.

“ How ofte tyme may men rede and sene
The treson, that to women hath *Be Do*:
To what fyne is suche loue, I can not sene,
Or where becometh it, whan it is GO.”

Ibid. Troylus, boke 2. fol. 167. pag. 1. col. 2.

AGO.

“ Of louers nowe a man maie see
Ful many, that unkinde bee
Whan that thei haue her wille *Do*,
Her loue is after soone AGO.”

Gower, lib. 5. fol. 111. pag. 2. col. 2.

“ As God him bad, right so he dede
And thus there lefte in that *stede*
With him thre hundred, and no mo,
The remenant was all AGO.”

Ibid. lib. 7. fol. 163. pag. 2. col. 2.

“ Thus hath Lycurgus his wille:
And toke his leue, and forth he went.
But liste nowe well to what entent
Of rightwisnesse he did so.
For after that he was AGO,
He shope him neuer to be founde.”

Ibid. lib. 7. fol. 158. pag. 2. col. 1.

“ For euer the latter ende of ioye is wo,
God wotte, worldely ioye is soone AGO.”

Chaucer. Nonnes Priest, fol. 90. pag. 1. col. 1.

“ For if it erst was well, tho was it bet
A thousande folde, this nedeth it not enquire,
AGO was euery sorowe and euery fere.”

Troylus, boke 3. fol. 181. pag. 2. col. 1.

" That after whan the storme is al AGO
 Yet wol the water quappe a day or two."
Lucrece, fol. 215. pag. 2. col. 1.

" Ful sykerly ye wene your othes last
 No lenger than the wordes ben AGO."
La Belle Dame, fol. 267. pag. 2. col. 2.

" Trough somtyme was wont to take auayle
 In euery matere, but al that is AGO."
Assemble of Ladyes, fol. 277. pag. 1. col. 1.

YGO.

" A clerke there was of Oxenforde also
 That unto Logike had longe YGO."
Prol. to Cant. Tales.

" To horse is al her lusty folke YGO."
Chaucer. Dido, fol. 212. pag. 2. col. 2.

GON.

" Thou wost thy selfe, whom that I loue parde
 As I best can, GON sythen longe whyle."
Troylus, boke 1. fol. 161. pag. 1. col. 1.

AGON.

" And euermore, whan that hem fell to speke
 Of any thinge of suche a tyme AGON."
Troylus, boke 3. fol. 180. pag. 1. col. 1.

" Thou thy selfe, that haddest habundaunce of rychesse nat
 longe AGON."—*Boecius*, boke 3. fol. 232. pag. 2. col. 2.

" Ful longe AGON I might haue taken hede."
Annelyda, fol. 273. pag. 1. col. 1.

GONE.

" I was right nowe of tales desolate,

Nere that a marchant, GONE is many a yere,
Me taught a tale, which ye shullen here."

Man of Lawes Tale, fol. 19. pag. 1. col. 1.

" But sothe is said, GONE sithen many a day,
A trewe wight and a thefe thynketh not one."

Squiers Tale, fol. 28. pag. 1. col. 2.

AGONE.

" Of suche ensamples as I finde
Upon this point of tyme AGONE
I thinke for to tellen one."

Gower, lib. 5. fol. 87. pag. 1. col. 1.

" But erly whan the sonne shone,
Men sigh, that thei were AGONE,
And come unto the kynge, and tolde,
There was no worde, but out, alas,
She was AGO, the mother wepte,
The father as a wood man lepte."

Ibid. lib. 5. fol. 104. pag. 2. col. 2.

" Whan that the mysty vapoure was AGONE,
And clere and fayre was the mornynge."

Chaucer. Blacke Knyght, fol. 287. pag. 1. col. 1.

" For I loued one, ful longe sythe AGONE
With al myn herte, body and ful might."

Ibid. fol. 289. pag. 1. col. 2.

" And many a serpent of fell kind,
With wings before and stings behind,
Subdu'd; as poets say, long AGONE,
Bold Sir George, Saint George did the dragon."

Hudibras, part 1. c. 2.

" Which is no more than has been done
By knights for ladies, long AGONE."—*Ibid.* part. 2. c. 1.

Tillotson, in a *Fast* sermon on a *thanksgiving* occasion, 31st January, 1689, says,

“ Twenty years AGONE.”

ASUNDER

is the past participle *Ārundnen* or *Ārundned*, *separated* (as the particles of *sand* are), of the verb *Sondrian*, *Sundrian*, *Sýndrian*, *Ārundrian*, &c. *To separate*.

“ In vertue and holy almesedede
They liuen all, and neuer ASONDER wende
Tyll deth departeth hem.”

Chaucer. Squiers Tale, fol. 24. pag. 2. col. 1.

“ And tyl a wicked deth him take
Hym had leuer ASONDRE shake
And let al his lymmes ASONDRE ryue
Than leaue his richesse in his lyue.”

Rom. of the Rose, fol. 145. pag. 2. col. 2.

“ These ylke two that bethe in armes lafte
So lothe to hem ASONDER gon it were.”

Troylus, boke 3. fol. 179. pag. 2. col. 2.

“ This yerde was large, and rayled al the aleyes
And shadowed wel, with blosomy bowes grene
And benched newe, and SONDED all the wayes
In which she walketh.”

Ibid. boke 2. fol. 167. pag. 2. col. 1.

This word (in all its varieties) is to be found in all the northern languages ; and is originally from A.S. *Sond*, i. e. *Sand*.

ASTRAY

is the past participle *Ārtþæged* of the Anglo-Saxon

verb *Strægan*, spargere, dispergere, *To Stray*, to scatter.

“ This prest was drunke, and goth *ASTRAYDE*.”

Gower, lib. 4. fol. 84. pag. 2. col. 1.

“ And ouer this I sigh also

The noble people of Israel

Dispers, as shepe upon an hille

Without a keper unaraied :

And as they wenten about *ASTRAIED*

I herde a voyce unto hem seyne.”

Ibid. lib. 7. fol. 156. pag. 2. col. 1.

“ Achab to the batayle went.

Where Benedad for all his shelde

Him slough, so that upon the felde

His people goth aboute *ASTRAIE*.”

Ibid. lib. 7. fol. 156. pag. 2. col. 2.

S. Johnson says—*To Stray* is from the Italian *Straviare* from the Latin *extra viam*. But **STRAYAN**, *Stræpian*, *Stræopian*, *Stræpian*, *Strægian*, *Strægian* : and *Strap*, *Stræop*, *Stræo*, *Stræa*, *Stræ*, were used in our own mother tongues, the Gothic and Anglo-Saxon, long before the existence of the word *Straviare*, and the beginning of the corrupted dialect of the Latin called Italian, and even of the corrupted dialect of the Greek called Latin. And as the words *To Sunder* and *Asunder* proceed from *Sonð*, i. e. *Sand* ; so do the words *To Stray*, *To Straw*, *To Strow*, *To Strew*, *To Straggle*, *To Stroll*, and the well-named *Strawberry* (i. e. *Straw'd-berry*, *Stray-berry*), all proceed from *Straw*, or, as our

peasantry still pronounce it, *Strah**. And *Astray*, or *Astray'd*, means *Strawed*, scattered and dispersed as the *Straw* is about the fields.

“Reaping where thou hast not sown, and gathering where thou hast not *strawed*.”—*St. Matthew*, chap. xxv. ver. 24.

ATWIST.

The past participle *Γε-τρῖρεδ*, *Ατρῖρεδ*, *Ατρῖρδ*, of the verb *Τρίραν*, *Τρύραν*, *Γε-τρύραν*, torquere: *Τρίραν* from *Τρα*, *Τραε*, *Τρι*, *Τρύ*, *Τρεο*, two.

AWRY.

The past participle *Ἀπρῦδεδ*, *Ἀπρῦδδ* of the verb *Πρῦδαν*, *Πρῖδαν*, *To Writhe*.

In the late Chief Justice Mansfield's time, for many years I rarely listened to his doctrines in the Court of King's Bench without having strong cause to repeat the words of old Gower;

“Howe so his mouthe be comely
His worde sitte euermore **AWRIE**.”

Lib. 1. fol. 29. pag. 2. col. 2.

ASKEW.

In the Danish, *Skiaev* is wry, crooked, oblique. *Skiaever*, to twist, to wrest. *Skiaevt*, twisted, wrested.

* “Me lyst not of the chaffe ne of the *Stree*
Make so longe a tale, as of the corne.”

Chaucer. Man of Lawes Tale, fol. 22. pag. 1. col. 1.

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to satisfy. S. Johnson cannot determine whether this word is a substantive, an adjective, or an adverb ; but he thinks it is all three.

“It is not easy,” he says, “to determine whether this word be an adjective or adverb ; perhaps, when it is joined with a substantive, it is an adjective, of which *Enow* is the *Plural**. In other situations it seems an adverb ; except that, after the verb *To have* or *To be*, either expressed or understood, it may be accounted a substantive.”

According to him, it means,—“ In a sufficient measure, so as may satisfy, so as may suffice. 2. Something sufficient in *greatness or excellence*. 3. Something equal to a man’s power or abilities. 4. In a sufficient degree. 5. It notes a *slight* augmentation of the positive degree. 6. Sometimes it notes *Diminution* ! 7. An exclamation noting fulness or satiety.”

In the Anglo-Saxon it is *Lenox* or *Lenoh* : and appears to be the past participle *Lenoged*, multiplicatum, *manifold*, of the verb *Lenogan*, multiplicare.

* In his Grammar, he says,—“ Adjectives in the English language are wholly indeclinable ; having neither case, gender, nor number ; being added to Substantives, in all relations, without any change.”

FAIN.

The past participle Fægened, Fægen, Fægn, lætus, of the verb Fægenian, Fægnian, gaudere, lætari.

“ Of that men speken here and there,
How that my lady beareth the price,
How she is faire, how she is wise,
How she is womanliche of chere :
Of all this thing whan I maie here
What wonder is though I be FAINE.”

Gower, lib. 1. fol. 23. pag. 1. col. 2.

“ For which they were as glad of his commyng
As foule is FAINE whan the sonne upryseth.”

Chaucer. Shypmans Tale, fol. 69. pag. 1. col. 1.

“ Na uthir wyse the pepyl Ausoniane
Of this glade time in hart wox wounder FANE.”

Douglas, boke 13. pag. 472.

LIEF. LIEVER. LIEVEST.

Leof, Leofne, Leofeft.

“ I had as LIEF not be, as live to be in awe
Of such a thing as I myself.”

Shakespeare's Julius Cæsar.

No modern author, I believe, would now venture any of these words in a serious passage : and they seem to be cautiously shunned and ridiculed in common conversation, as a vulgarity. But they are good English words, and more frequently used by our old English writers than any other word of a corresponding signification.

Leop (Leoped, or Lupað, or Lupoð or Luf) is the past participle of Lufian, *To love*; and always means *beloved**.

“ And netheles by daies olde,
Whan that the bokes were LEUER,
Wrytyng was *beloued* euer
Of them that weren vertuous.”

Gower, Prol. fol. 1. pag. 1. col. 1.

“ It is a unwise vengeance
Whiche to none other man is LEFE
And is unto him selfe grefe.”

lib. 2. fol. 18. pag. 1. col. 2.

“ And she answerd, and bad hym go,
And saide, howe that a bed all warme
Hir LIEFE lay naked in hir arme.”

lib. 2. fol. 41. pag. 1. col. 2.

“ Thre pointes whiche I fynde
Ben LEUEST unto mans kynde;
The first of hem it is delite,
The two ben worship and profite.”

lib. 5. fol. 84. pag. 2. col. 2.

“ For euery thyng is wel the LEUER
Whan that a man hath bought it dere.”

lib. 5. fol. 109. pag. 2. col. 1.

“ Whan Rome was the worldes chiefe,
The sooth sayer tho was LEEFE,

* “ The Fader Almychty of the heuin abuf,
In the mene tyme, unto Iuno his LUF,
Thus spak; and sayd—”

Douglas, booke 12. pag. 441.

Whiche wolde not the trowth spare,
But with his worde, playne and bare,
To themperour his sothes tolde."

Gower, lib. 7. fol. 154. pag. 2. col. 2.

"Of other mens passion
Take pitee and compassion
And let no thyng to the be LEEF
Whiche to an other man is grefe."

lib. 8. fol. 190. pag. 2. col. 1.

"They lyued in ioye and in felycite
For eche of hem had other LEFE and dere."

Chaucer. Monkes Tale, fol. 85. pag. 1. col. 2.

"In the swete season that LEFE is."

Rom. of the Rose, fol. 120. pag. 2. col. 1.

"His LEEFE a rosen chapelet
Had made, and on his heed it set."

Ibid. fol. 124. pag. 1. col. 1.

"And hym her LEFE and dere hert cal."

Troilus, boke 3. fol. 176. pag. 2. col. 2.

"Had I hym neuer LEFE? By God I wene
Ye had neuer thyng so LEFE (quod she)."

Ibid. boke 3. fol. 177. pag. 1. col. 2.

"Ye that to me (quod she) ful LEUER were
Than al the good the sunne aboute gothe."

Ibid. boke 3. fol. 178. pag. 2. col. 1.

"For as to me nys LEUER none ne lother."

Leg. of Good Women, Prol. fol. 205. pag. 2. col. 2.

"Remembrand on the mortall anciant were
That for the Grekis to hir LEIF and dere,
At Troye lang tyme sche led before that day."

Douglas, booke 1. pag. 13.

"Gif euir ony thanke I deseruit toward the
Or ocht of myne to the was LEIF, quod sche."

Ibid. booke 4. pag. 11.

“ O thou nympe, wourschip of fludis clere,
That to my saul is *hald* maist LEIF and dere.”

Douglas, booke 12. pag. 410.

ADIEU. FAREWELL.

The former from the French *à Dieu*, from the Italian *Addio*: the latter the imperative of Fapan, *To go*, or *to fare*. So it is equally said in English—How fares it? or, How goes it?

The Dutch and the Swedes also say, *Vaarwel*, *Farwål*: The Danes *Lev-vel*, and the Germans *Lebet-wohl*.

HALT

means—*Hold*, Stop, (as when we say—*Hold your hand*.)
Keep the present situation, *Hold still*.

In German *Still halten* is *To halt* or stop; and *Halten* is *To Hold*. In Dutch *Still houden*, to halt or stop; and *Houden*, to hold.

Menage says well—“ *Far Alto*, proprio di quel fermarsi che fanno le ordinanze militari: Dal Tedesco *Halte*, che vale, *Ferma là*; *dimora là*; imperativo del verbo *Halten*, cioè, *arrestarsi*.”

The Italians assuredly took the military term from the Germans.

Our English word HALT is the imperative of the

Anglo-Saxon verb *Dealban*, to *hold*; and *Hold* itself is from *Dealban*, and was formerly written *HALT*.

“ He leyth downe his one eare all plat
Unto the grounde, and *HALT* it fast.”

Gower, lib. 1. fol. 10. pag. 1. col. 2.

“ But so well *HALTE* no man the plough,
That he ne balketh otherwhile.”

lib. 2. fol. 50. pag. 1. col. 1.

“ For what thing that he maie enbrace,
Of gold, of catell, or of londe,
He let it neuer out of his honde,
But gette hym more, and *HALT* it fast.”

“ To seie howe suche a man hath good,
Who so that reasone understoode,
It is unproperliche sayde :
That good hath hym, and *HALT* him taide.”

lib. 5. fol. 83. p. 2. col. 2 ; fol. 84. p. 1. col. 1.

“ —Euery man, that *HALT* him worth a leke,
Upon his bare knees ought all hys lyfe
Thanke God, that him hath sent a wyfe.”

Chaucer. Marchauntes Tale, fol. 29. pag. 1. col. 1.

“ For euery wight, whiche that to Rome went,
HALTE not o pathe, ne alway o manere.”

Troilus, boke 1. fol. 163. pag. 1. col. 2.

“ Loue, that with an holosome ayaunce
HALTE people ioyned, as hym lyst hem gye.”

Ibid. boke 3. fol. 182. pag. 1. col. 1.

Lo.

The imperative of *Look*. So the common people

say corruptly,—“*Lo*’ you there now”—“*La*’ you there.”

Where we now employ sometimes **LOOK** and sometimes **LO**, with discrimination; our old English writers used indifferently **LO**, **LOKE**, **LOKETH**, for this imperative. Chaucer, in the Pardoner’s Tale, says

“—Al the souerayne actes, dare I say,
Of victories in the Olde Testament
Were don in abstynence and in prayere;
LOKETH the Byble, and there ye mowe it lere.”

“**LOKETH*** Attyla the great conquerour
Dyed in his slepe, with shame and dishonour.”

“**LOKE*** eke howe to kynge Demetrius
The king of Parthes, as the boke sayth us,
Sent him a payre of dyce of golde in scorne.”

“*Beholde* and *se* that in the first table
Of hye Gods hestes honourable,
How that the seconde heste of him is this,
Take not my name in ydelnesse amys.
LO, he *Rather*† forbyddeth suche swering
Than homicide, or any other cursed thing.”

Fol. 66. pag. 2. col. 2; fol. 67. pag. 1. col. 1.

So B. Jonson. (*Alchymist*, act 2. sc. 3.)

“For **LOOK**, how oft I iterate the work,
So many times I add unto his virtue.”

* In both these places a modern writer would say **LO**.

† *Sooner, earlier*.—He forbids such swearing *Before* he forbids homicide: i.e. in a *foregoing* part of the table.

Here, if it had pleased him, he might have said—
Lo how oft, &c.

And again

“ *Subtle.* Why, rascal—
 Face. LO you here, sir.”

Here, if it had pleased him, he might have said—
Look you here.

The Dutch correspondent adverb is *Siet*, from *Sien*, to look or see. The German *Siehe*, or *Sihe*, from *Sehen*, to see. The Danish *See*, from *Seer*, to look or see. The Swedish *Si*, or *Si der*, from *Se*, to look.

NEEDS.

Need-is,* used parenthetically. It was antiently written *Nedes* and *Nede is*. *Certain is* was used in the same manner, equivalently to *certes*.

“ And *certaine is* (quod she) that by gettyng of good, be men maked good.”

[* Mr. Tooke does not seem to have been aware of the formation of adverbs from the genitive absolute, which prevails in the Teutonic languages; otherwise he would probably have given a different account of this word.

NEEDS, genitive of Need, of necessity; as in German *Nachts*, by night, *Theils*, partly.—ED.]

“ I haue graunted that NEDES good folke moten ben myghty.”—*Boecius*, boke 4. fol. 241. pag. 1. col. 1, 2.

“ The consequence is false, NEDES the antecedent mote ben of the same condicion.”

Test. of Loue, boke 2. fol. 316. pag. 1. col. 2.

“ None other thyng signifyeth this necessite but onelye thus ; That shal be, may nat togider be and not be. Euenlyche also it is sothe, loue was, and is, and shal be, nat of necessyte ; and NEDE IS to haue be al that was, and *nedeful is* to be al that is.”—*Test. of Loue*, boke 3. fol. 328. pag. 1. col. 1.*

OFTEN, -er, -est.

PRITHEE.

I pray thee.

TOWIT,

though it is the infinitive of *pitān*, does not mean *To Know*, as Skinner† and S. Johnson have supposed ;

* Necesse—*nec esse aliter potest*.

[† Skinner is not chargeable with any error, as he is speaking merely of the obsolete verb WIT, and not of the adverbial expression TO-WIT. Mr. Tooke's account of this word is somewhat defective : it is not the *simple* infinitive *pitān*, which in A. Saxon is never preceded by TO, but the *derivative* or future infinitive terminating in NNE and always preceded by TO, and which in Anglo-Saxon, as well as in Francic, answers to gerunds, supines, and future participles. Nor is it necessarily Passive. Somner has “ hit ȝ to pitanne, *sciendum est* ; it is to wit, or to

but *To Be known*, Sciendum. For so (for want of *Gerunds*, as they are most absurdly called) our ancestors used the Active Infinitives, as well of other verbs as of *þitan**. Similar adverbs are those of the Latin and

be knowne :” Thus we say, The house is yet *to build*. Lye gives the following instances : *eop 17 ȝereald to þitanne*. Vobis datum est ad sciendum, Mar. 4. 11. *þa com hit to þitenne* ; ubi evenit id cognoscendum. Chr. Sax. 165. 26. And adds, “ Ab hac voce *þitan*, speciatim vero ab Infinitivo derivativo, *To þitanne*, phrasis ista, *I do you to wit*, q. d. *Id do eop to þitanne*, Facio vos scire ; Scire licet ; Videre licet : unde contractiores istæ scribendi formulæ tam Anglorum quam Latinorum, *To wit* ; Scilicet, videlicet.”—ED.]

* “ False fame is not *TO DREDE*, ne of wyse persons *TO ACCEPTE*.”—*Test. of Loue*, boke 1. fol. 308. pag. 2. col. 2.

Instances of this use of the Active Infinitives in English are very numerous ; but the reason of it appears best from old translations.

“ Quod si nec Anaxagoræ fugam, nec Socratis venenum, nec Zenonis tormenta novisti ; at Canios, at Senecas, at Soranos scire potuisti. Quos nihil aliud in cladem detraxit, nisi quod nostris moribus instituti, studiis improborum dissimillimi videbantur. Itaque nihil est quod admirere, si in hoc vitæ solo circumflantibus agitemur procellis, quibus hoc maxime propositum est, *pessimis displicere*. Quorum quidem tametsi est numerosus exercitus, *SPERNENDUS* tamen est.”

Boethius de Consol. lib. 1. prosa 3.

Thus translated by Chaucer :

“ If thou hast not knowen the exilynge of Anaxagoras, ne the enpoysoning of Socrates, ne the turmentes of Zeno ; yet mightest

French, *Videlicet, scilicet, à sçavoir*. And it is worth noting, that the old Latin authors used the abbreviated *Videlicet* for *Videre licet*, when not put (as we call it) adverbially*.

PERCHANCE.

Par-escheant, Par-escheance, the participle of *Escheoir, Echeoir, Echoir*, to fall.

PERCASE.

Per-casum, participle of *cadere*. Antiently written *Parcas, Parcaas*.

thou haue knowen the Senecas, the Canios, and the Soranos. The whiche men nothing els ne brought to the deth, but only for they were enformed of my maners and semeden most unlyke to the studies of wicked folke. And forthy thou oughtest not to wondren, though that I in the bitter see be driuen with tempestes blowing aboute. In the which thys is my moste purpose, that is to sayne, to displesen wicked men. Of whiche shrewes al be the hooste neuer so great, it is TO DISPISE."

Fol. 222. pag. 1. col. 1.

* "*Pam.* VIDELICET parcum illum fuisse senem, qui dixerit: Quoniam ille illi pollicetur, qui eum cibum poposcerit.

Ant. VIDELICET fuisse illum nequam adolescentem, qui illico,

Ubi ille poscit, denegavit se dare granum tritici."

Plautus. Stichus, act 4. sce. 1.

PERADVENTURE.

Antiently *Peraunter*, *Paraunter*, *Inaunter*, *Inaventure*.

MAYBE. MAYHAP.

In Westmoreland they say and write *Mappen*, i.e. *may happen*.

HABNAB.

Hap ne hap—happen or not happen.

“Philautus determined HAB NAB to send his letters.”
Euphues. By John Lilly, page 109.

PERHAPS. UPHAP.

By or through *Haps*. *Upon a Hap*.

“The HAPPEs ouer mannes hede
Ben honged with a tender threde.”

Gower, lib. 6. fol. 135. pag. 2. col. 2.

“In heuen to bene losed with God hath none ende, but endelesse endureth: and thou canste nothyng done aryght, but thou desyre the rumoure therof be healed and in euery wightes eare; and that dureth but a pricke, in respecte of the other. And so thou sekest rewarde of folkes smale wordes, and of vayne praysynges. Trewely therein thou lesest the guerdon of vertue, and lesest the grettest valoure of conscyence, and UPHAP thy renome euerlastyng.”

Chaucer. *Test of Loue*, boke 1. fol. 311. p. 1. c. 1.

BELIKE.

This word is perpetually employed by Sir Philip Sydney, Hooker, Shakespear, B. Jonson, Sir W. Ra-

leigh, Bacon, Milton, &c. But is now only used in low language, instead of *perhaps*.

In the Danish language *Lykke*, and in the Swedish *Lycka*, mean *Luck*, i.e. chance, hazard, *Hap*, fortune, adventure.

“ *Dionysius*. He thought BELIKE, if Damon were out of the citie, I would not put him to death.”

Damon and Pythias. By R. Edwards.

———“ Brutus and Cassius
Are rid like madmen through the gates of Rome.

Anth. BELIKE they had some notice of the people
How I had moved them.”

Julius Cæsar, act 3. scene 2.

“ How’s that? Your’s, if his own! Is he not my son, except he be his own son? BELIKE this is some new kind of subscription the gallants use.”

Every Man in his Humour, act 3. scene 7.

“ Than she, remembering BELIKE the continual and incessant and confident speeches and courses that I had held on my lord’s side, became utterly alienated from me.”

Sir F. Bacon’s Apology.

“ Will he, so wise, let loose at once his ire,
BELIKE through impotence, or unaware,
To give his enemies their wish ?”

Paradise Lost, book 1. v. 156.

AFOOT.

“ Many a freshe knight, and many a blisful route
On horse and ON FOTE, in al the fælde aboute.”

Chaucer. Annelida, fol. 270. pag. 2. col. 1.

“ Sum grathis thame ON FUTE to go in feild,
Sum hie montit *on horsbak* under scheild.”

Douglas, booke 7. pag. 230.

Of the same kind are the adverbs *Foot to foot*. *Vis à vis*. *Petto a petto*. *Dirimpetto*. The *Hand* and *Foot*, being the principal organs of *action* and *motion*, afford a variety of allusions and adverbial expressions in all languages ; most of which are too evident to require explanation : as when, of our blessed senators, we say, with equal truth and sorrow,—They assume the office of legislation *illotis pedibus*, and proceed in it with *dirty hands*.

So FOOT HOT ; which Mr. Warton has strangely mistaken in page 192 of his first volume of the *History of English Poetry*: [8vo. edit. vol. ii. p. 25.]

“ The table adoune rihte he smote,
In to the floore FOOTE HOT.”

Misled by the word *foot*, Mr. Warton thinks that FOOTE HOT means, “ *Stamped*.” So that he supposes the Soudan here to have fallen upon the table both with hands and feet : i.e. first he *smote* it with his fist ; and then he *stamped* upon it, and trampled it under foot.

But FOOT HOT means *immediately, instantaneously*, without giving time for the foot to cool : so our court of *Pie Poudre, pied poudré* ; in which matters are de-

terminated before one can wipe the dust off one's feet.
So *E vestigio*, &c.

“ There was none eie that might kepe
His heade, whiche Mercurie of smote,
And forth with all *anone* FOTE HOTE
He stale the cowe whiche Argus kepte.”

Gower, lib. 4. fol. 81. pag. 2. col. 1.

“ And Custaunce han they taken *anon* FOTEHOT.”

Chaucer. Man of Lawes Tale, fol. 20. pag. 2. col. 1.

“ Whan that he herde ianglyng
He ran *anon* as he were wode
To Bialacoil there that he stode,
Which had *leuer* in this caas
Haue ben at Reynes or Amyas,
For FOTE HOTE in his felonye
To him thus said Jelousye.”

Rom. of the Rose, fol. 138. pag. 1. col. 2.

———“ And first Ascanus,
As he on hors playit with his feris ioyus,
Als swyft and feirsly spurris his stede FUTE HOTE,
And *but* delay socht to the trublit flote*.”

Douglas, booke 5. pag. 150.

“ I sall declare all and reduce FUTE HATE†
From the beginning of the first debate.”

Ibid. booke 7. pag. 205.

* “ Primus et Ascanius, cursus ut lætus equestres
Ducebat, sic *acer* equo turbata petiuit
Castra.”

Virgil.

† “ *Ex-pedi-am*: et primæ revocabo exordia pugnæ.” *Ibid.*
Notice *Ex-ped-ire*.

“ The self stound amyd the preis FUTE HOTE*
Lucagus enteris into his chariote.”

Douglas, booke 10. pag. 338.

“ Wyth sic wourdis scho ansueris him FUTE HATE†.”

Ibid. booke 12. pag. 443.

“ All with ane voice and hale assent at accorde,
Desiris the as for thare prince and lord;
And ioyus ar that into feild FUTE HATE‡
Under thy wappinis Turnus lyis down bet.”

Ibid. booke 13. pag. 468.

ASIDE.

“ Now *hand to hand* the dynt lichtis with ane swak,
Now bendis he up his burdoun with ane mynt,
ON SYDE he bradis for to eschew the dynt.”

Douglas, booke 5. pag. 142.

I suppose it needless to notice such adverbs as
Aback, Abreast, Afront, Ahead, At hand, Beforehand,
Behindhand, &c.

* Interea.—*Virgil*.

† Talibus occurrit dictis.—*Ibid.*

‡ There is no word in the original of Maphæus to explain
or justify the FUTE HATE of Douglas in this passage: he
barely says,

——“ Turnumque sub armis Exultant cecidisse tuis.” But
the *acer petivit*, *expediam* and *occurrit dictis* of Virgil are
sufficient.

ABLAZE.

- “ That casten fire and flam aboute
Both at mouth and at nase
So that thei setten all ON BLASE.”

Gower, lib. 5. fol. 102. pag. 2. col. 2.

ABOARD.

- “ This great shyp *on anker* rode :
The lorde cometh forth, and when he sigh
That other ligge ON BORDE so nighe.”

Gower, lib. 2. fol. 33. pag. 2. col. 2.

- “ What helpeth a man haue mete,
Where drinke lackethe ON THE BORDE.”

Ibid. lib. 4. fol. 72. pag. 2. col. 1.

- “ And howe he loste hys steresman
Whiche that the sterne, or he toke kepe,
Smote *over the* BORDE as he slepe.”

Chaucer. Fame, boke 1. fol. 294. pag. 1. col. 2.

- “ We war from thens affrayit, durst nocht abide,
Bot fled *anon*, and *within* BURD has brocht
That faithful Greik.”

Douglas, booke 3. pag. 90.

- “ The burgeonit treis ON BURD they bring for aris.”

Ibid. booke 4. pag. 113.

- “ The stabill aire has calmyt wele the se,
And south pipand windis fare on hie
Challancis to pas ON BORD, and tak the depe.”

Ibid. booke 5. pag. 153.

ABROAD.

- “ The rose spred to spannishhyng,
To sene it was a goodly thyng,

But it ne was so sprede **ON BREDE**
That men within myght knowe the sede."

Chaucer. Rom. of the Rose, fol. 137. pag. 1. col. 2.

" Als fer as his crop hie **ON BREDE**
Strekis in the are, as fer his route dois sprede."

Douglas, booke 4. pag. 115.

" ———his baner quhite as floure
In sing of batel did **ON BREDE** display."

Ibid. booke 8. pag. 240.

ADAYS.

" But this I see **ON DAIES** nowe."

Gower, lib. 4. fol. 72. pag. 2. col. 1.

" Thus here I many a man compleine,
That nowe **ON DAIES** thou shalte finde
At nede few frendes kinde."

Ibid. lib. 5. fol. 110. pag. 1. col. 1.

" But certainly the dasit blude now **ON DAYIS**
Waxis dolf and dull throw myne unweildy age."

Douglas, booke 5. pag. 140.

ANIGHTS.

" He mot one of two thynges chese,
Where he woll haue hir suche **ON NIGHT**,
Or els *upon daies* light;
For he shall not haue both two."

Gower, lib. 1. fol. 17. pag. 2. col. 2.

" For though no man wold it alowe,
To slepe *leuer* than to wowe
Is his maner, and thus **ON NIGHTES**
When he seeth the lusty knightes

Reuelen, where these women are
Awey he sculketh as an hare."

Gower, lib. 4. fol. 78. pag. 1. col. 1.

"For though that wiues ben ful holy thinges,
They must take in patience *a nyght*
Suche maner necessaryes as ben plesinges
To folke that han wedded hem with ringes,
And lay a litell her holynesse asyde."

Chaucer. Man of Lawes Tale, fol. 22. pag. 1. col. 1.

"Madame, the sentence of this Latyn is,
Woman is mannes ioye and his blis,
For when I fele ON NYGHT your soft syde,
Al be it that I may not on you ryde,
For that our perche is made so narowe, alas,
I am full of ioye and solas."

Nonnes priest, fol. 89. pag. 2. col. 2.

AFIRE.

"Turnus seges the Troianis in grete yre,
And al thare schyppis and nauy set IN FYRE."

Douglas, booke 9. pag. 274.

ALIVE.

On live, i. e. *In Life**.

"For as the fissue, if it be drie,
Mote in defaute of water die :

* In the first book of the *Testament of Love*, fol. 305. pag. 1. col. 1, Chaucer furnishes another adverb of the same kind, to those who are admirers of this *part of speech*.—"Wo is hym that is *Aloue*."

Right so without aier, ON LIUE
No man ne beast might thriue."

Gower, lib. 7. fol. 142. pag. 1. col. 2.

"For prouder woman is there none ON LYUE."

Chaucer. Troylus, boke 2. fol. 143. pag. 2. col. 2.

"The *verray* ymage of my Astyanax zing :

Sic ene had he, and sic fare handis tua,

For al the world sic mouth and face perpay :

And gif he war ON LIFE quhil now in fere,

He had bene euin eild with the, and hedy pere."

Douglas, booke 3. pag. 84.

ALOFT.

On Loft, On Luft, On Lyft, i. e. *In the Luft* or *Lyft* :
or, (the superfluous article omitted, as was the antient
custom in our language, the Anglo-Saxon) *In Lyft, In
Luft, In Loft*.

"The golde tressed Phebus hygh ON LOFTE."

Chaucer. Troylus, boke 5. fol. 196. pag. 2. col. 1.

"Bot, lo *anone* (ane wounder thing to tell)

Ane huge bleis of flambyis brade doun fel,

Furth of the cluddys at the left hand straucht,

In manere of an lychtning or fyre flaucht :

And did alycht richt in the samyn *stede*,

Apoun the croun of fare Lauinias hede ;

And fra thine hie up IN *the* LYFT agane

It glade away, and tharein did remane."

Douglas, booke 13. pag. 476.

"——With that the dow

Heich IN *the* LIFT full glaide he gan behald,

And with her wingis sorand mony fald."

Ibid. booke 5. pag. 144.

In the Anglo-Saxon, *Lýft* is the *Air* or the *Clouds*. In St. Luke—"in *lýfte* cummente"—coming in the clouds. In the Danish, *Luft* is air, and "*At spronge i luften*"—to blow up into the air, or *Aloft*. In the Swedish also *Luft* is air. So in the Dutch, *De loef hebben*, to sail before the wind; *loeven*, to ply to windward; *loef*, the weather gage; &c. From the same root are our other words, *Loft*, *Lofty*, *To Luff*, *Lee*, *Leeward*, *To Lift*, &c.

AN EW.

"The battellis war adionit now OF NEW,
Not in manere of *landwart* folkis bargane,
But with scharp scherand wappinnis made melle."
Douglas, booke 7. pag. 225.

"Was it honest ane godly diuine wycht
With ony mortall straik to wound in ficht?
Or git ganand the swerd loist and adew
To rendir Turnus to his brand OF NEW,
And strength increscis to thame that vincust be?"
Ibid. booke 12. pag. 441.

A ROW.

"And in the port enterit, lo, we see
Flokis and herdis of oxin and of fee,
Fat and tydy, rakand ouer all *quhare*,
And trippis eik of gait *but* ony kepare,
In the rank gers pasturing ON RAW."
Douglas, booke 3. pag. 75.

"The pepil by him vincust mycht thou know,
Before him passand per ordour all ON RAW."
Ibid. booke 8. pag. 270.

ASLEEP*.

“ Whan that pyte, which longe ON SLEPE doth tary,
Hath set the fyne of al my heuynesse.”

Chaucer. La belle dame, fol. 269. pag. 1. col. 1.

“ Apoun the earth the uthir beistis al,
Thare besy thochtis ceissing grete and smal,
Ful sound ON SLEPE did caught thare rest be kind.”

Douglas, booke 9. pag. 283.

“ In these provynces the fayth of Chryste was all quenched
and IN SLEPE.”—*Fabian*.

AWHILE.

A time. *Whil-es*, i.e. Time, that or which. *Whilst* is a corruption ; it should be written as formerly, *Whiles*.

“ She died, my lord, but WHILES her slander liv'd.”

Much Ado about Nothing.

AUGHT, or OUGHT.

The Anglo-Saxon *hƿit*: *a whit*, or *o whit*. N.B. *O* was formerly written for the article *A*, or for the numeral *one*. So *Naught* or *Nought*: *Na whit*, or *No whit*.

FORTH.

“ Againe the knight the olde wife gan arise
And said ; Sir knight, here FORTH lyeth no way.”

Chaucer. Wife of Bathes Tale, fol. 38. pag. 2. col. 2.

[* “ For David—fell on sleep, and was laid unto his fathers”.
Acts 13, 36.—ED.]

“ Alas (quod he) alas, that euer I beheycht
 Of pured gold a thousande pounce of weight
 Unto this phylosopher! howe shall I do?
 I se no more but that I am **FORDO***:
 Myn herytage mote I *nedes* sell,
 And ben a beggar, here may I no lenger dwell.”

Frankelleyns Tale, fol. 55. pag. 2. col. 2.

“ Loke out of londe thou be not **FORE**†,
 And if suche cause thou haue, that the
 Behoueth to gone out of countre,
 Leaue hole thyn hert in hostage.”

Rom. of the Rose, fol. 132. pag. 2. col. 2.

From the Latin *Fores*, *Foris*, the French had *Fors* (their modern *Hors*). And of the French *Fors*, our ancestors (by their favourite pronunciation of *Th*) made *poþð*, **FORTH**: as from the French *Asses* or *Assez*, they made **ASSETH**, i. e. *enough*, *sufficient*.

“ Rychesse ryche ne maketh nought
 Hym that on treasour sette his thought:
 For rychesse stonte in *suffysaunce*,
 And nothyng in haboundaunce:
 For *suffysaunce* al onely
 Maketh menne to lyue rychely.
 For he that hath mytches tweyne
 Ne value in hys demeyne,
 Lyueth more at ease, and more is riche,
 Than dothe he that is chiche

* **FOR-DO**, i. e. *Forth-done*, i. e. *Done* to go **FORTH**, or caused to go **FORTH**, i. e. *Out of doors*. In modern language, turned out of doors.—[It should rather be explained in connection with other verbs compounded with **FOR**.—ED.]

† **FORE**, i. e. *Fors* or **FORTH**.—[Rather the past participle of **FARE**, to go.—ED.]

And in his barne hath, soth to sayne,
 An hundred mauis of whete grayne,
 Though he be chapman or marchaunt,
 And haue of golde many besaunt :
 For in the gettyng he hath suche wo,
 And in the kepyng drede also,
 And sette euermore his besignesse
 For to encrese, and nat to lesse,
 For to augment and multiplie,
 And though on heapes that lye him by,
 Yet neuer shal make rychesse
 ASSETH unto hys gredynesse*."

Rom. of the Rose, fol. 146. pag. 2. col. 2.

The adverbs *Outforth*, *Inforth*, *Withoutforth*, *Withinforth* (which were formerly common in the language), have appeared very strange to the moderns ; but with this explanation of FORTH, I suppose, they will not any longer seem either unnatural or extraordinary.

" Within the hertes of folke shall be the biting conscience, and *withoutforth* shal be the worlde all brenning."

Chaucer. Persons Tale, fol. 102. pag. 1. col. 2.

* I have been compelled to make the above long extract, that my reader's judgement may have fair play ; and that he may not be misled by the interpretation given of ASSETH in the glossary of Urry's edition of Chaucer ; where we are told, that ASSETH means—" *Assent*, to *Answer* ; from the Anglo-Saxon *Ȧreðian*, *affirmare*." When the reader recollects the *suffysaunce* which is spoken of in the first part of the extract, he will have little difficulty, I imagine, to perceive clearly what ASSETH here means : for the meaning of the whole passage is—*suffisance* alone makes riches ; which *suffisance* the miser's greediness will never permit him to obtain.

"Whan he was come unto his neces place,
Where is my lady, to her folke (quod he);
And they him tolde, and *Inforth* in gan pace,
And founde two other ladyes sit and she."

Troylus, boke 2. fol. 163. pag. 2. col. 1.

"And than al the derkenesse of his misknowing shall seme more evidently to the sight of his understanding, than the sonne ne seemeth to the sight *Without forth*."

Boecius, boke 3. fol. 238. pag. 2. col. 2.

"Philosophers, that hyghten Stoiciens, wende that ymages and sensibilities war emprinted into soules fro bodies *Withoutforth*."—*Ibid.* boke 5. fol. 250. pag. 2. col. 2.

"There the vaylance of men is demed in riches *Outforth*, wenen men to haue no proper good in them selfe, but seche it in straunge thinges."

Test. of Loue, boke 2. fol. 316. pag. 2. col. 2.

"The goodnesse (quod she) of a person maye not ben knowe *Outforth*, but by renome of the knowers."

Ibid. boke 2. fol. 319. pag. 1. col. 2.

"But he that *Outforth* loketh after the wayes of this knot, connyng with which he shuld knowe the way *Inforth*, slepeth for the tyme; wherfore he that wol this way know, must leave the loking after false wayes *Outforth*, and open the eyen of his consyence and unclothe his herte."

Ibid. boke 2. fol. 322. pag. 1. col. 2.

"Euery herbe sheweth his vertue *Outforthe* from wythin."

Ibid. boke 2. fol. 323. pag. 1. col. 1.

"Loue peace *Withoute forth*, loue peace *Withinforth*, kepe peace with all men."

"There is nothinge hid from God. Thou shalte be found guilty in the judgmentes of God, though thou be hid to mens judgmentes: for he beholdeth the hert, that is *Withinforth*."

Tho. Lupset. Gathered Counsaib.

GADSO.

CAZZO, a common Italian oath (or rather obscenity, in lieu of an oath), first introduced about the time of James the First, and made familiar in our language afterwards by our affected travelled gentlemen in the time of Charles the Second.—See all our comedies about that period.

Ben Jonson ridiculed the affectation of this oath at its commencement, but could not stop its progress.

“ These be our nimble-spirited CATSO’S, that ha’ their evasions at pleasure, will run over a bog like your wild Irish; no sobner started but they’ll leap from one thing to another, like a squirrel. Heigh! dance and do tricks in their discourse, from fire to water, from water to air, from air to earth: as if their tongues did but e’en lick the four elements over and away.”

Every man out of his humour, act 2. sce. 1.

MUCH. MORE. MOST.

These adverbs have exceedingly gravelled all our etymologists, and they touch them as tenderly as possible.

MUCH.

Junius, and Skinner (whom Johnson copies), for MUCH, irrationally refer us to the Spanish *Mucho*.

MORE.

Under the article MORE (that he may seem to say something on the subject), Junius gives us this so little

pertinent or edifying piece of information :—"Anglicum interim *more* est inter illa, quæ Saxonicum *a* in *o* convertunt; sicuti videmus usu venisse in *ban*, *bone*, *os*, *ossis*; *hal*, *whole*, integer, *sanus*; *ham*, *home*, *domus*, *habitatio*; *ŕtan*, *stone*, *lapis*," &c.

Skinner says—"MORE, *Mo*, ab A.S. *Ma*, *Mapa*, *Mæpe*, *Mape*, &c. Quid si omnia a Lat. *Major*?"

S. Johnson finds MORE to be adjective, adverb, and substantive. The adjective, he says, is—"The comparative of *Some* or *Great*." The adverb is—"The *particle* that forms the comparative degree."—"Perhaps some of the examples which are adduced under the adverb, should be placed under the substantive."—"It is doubtful whether the word, in some cases, be noun or adverb."

MOST.

Junius says, untruly,—"*Most*: Ex positivo nempe *mæpe* fuit comparativus *mæppe*, et superlativus *mæper̃t*, et contracte *mær̃t*."

Skinner—"Teut. *Meist* feliciter alludit Gr. *μειστον*, plurimum, maximum, contr. a *μεγιστον*."

S. Johnson again finds in MOST an adjective, an adverb, and a substantive. Of the adverb he says, it is

—"The *particle* noting the superlative degree." Of the substantive he says—"This is a *kind* of substantive, being according to its signification, *singular* or *plural*." And he gives instances, as he conceives, of its plurality and singularity.—I have wasted more than a page in repeating what amounts to nothing.

Though there appears to be, there is in reality no irregularity in MUCH, MORE, MOST : nor indeed is there any such thing as capricious irregularity in any part of language.

In the Anglo-Saxon the verb *Mopan*, *metere*, makes regularly the præterperfect *Mop*, or *Moþe* (as the præterperfect of *Slagan* is *Sloh*), and the past participle *Mowen* or *Meopen*, by the addition of the participial termination *en*, to the præterperfect. Omit the participial termination *en* (which omission was, and still is, a common practice through the whole language, with the Anglo-Saxon writers, the old English writers, and the moderns), and there will remain *Moþe* or *Mow* ; which gives us the Anglo-Saxon *Moþe* and our modern English word *Mow* : which words mean *simply*—that which is *Mowed* or *Mown*. And as the hay, &c. which was *mown*, was put together in a heap ; hence, *figuratively*, *Moþe* was used in Anglo-Saxon to denote *any* heap : although in modern English we now confine the application of it to country produce, such as

*Hay-mow, Barley-mow, &c.** This participle or substantive (call it which you please ; for, however classed, it is still the same word, and has the same signification) *Mow* or *Heap*, was pronounced (and therefore written) with some variety, *Ma*, *Mæ*, *Mo*, *Mope*, *Mow* ; which, being regularly compared, give

Ma . . . *Ma-er* (i. e. mape) . . . *Ma-est* (i. e. mæȝt)

Mæ . . . *Mæ-er* (i. e. mæpe) . . . *Mæ-est* (i. e. mæȝt)

Mope . . . *Mow-er* (i. e. mope) . . . *Mow-est* (i. e. moȝt)

Mo . . . *Mo-er* (i. e. MORE) . . . *Mo-est* (i. e. most).

I have here printed in the Anglo-Saxon character, those words which have come down to us so written in the Anglo-Saxon writings : and in Italics, the same words in sound ; but so written, as to show the written regularity of the comparison : and in capitals, the words which are used in what we call English ; though indeed it is only a continuation of the Anglo-Saxon, with a little variation of the written character.

* Gawin Douglas uses the word *MOWE* for a heap of wood, or a funeral pile.

“ Under the oppin sky, to this purpois,
 Pas on, and of treis thou mak an bing
 To be ane fyre, &c.
 Tharfore scho has hir command done ilk dele.
 But quhen the grete bing was upbeildit wele
 Of aik treis, and fyrren schidis dry
 Wythin the secrete cloys under the sky,
 Aboue the *MOWE* the foresaid bed was maid.”

Booke 4. page 117.

Mo (mope, acervus, *heap*), which was constantly used by all our old English authors, has with the moderns given place to **MUCH** *: which has not (as Junius, Wormius, and Skinner imagined of *Mickle*) been borrowed from *μεγας*, but is merely the diminutive of **MO**, passing through the gradual changes of *Mokel*, *Mykel*, *Mochil*, *Muchel* (still retained in Scotland), *Moche*, **MUCH**.

“ Yes certes (quod she) Who is a frayler thyng than the fleshy body of a man, ouer whiche haue often tyme flyes, and yet lasse thyng than a flye, **MOKEL** myght in greuaunce and anoyenge.”—*Chaucer, Test. of Loue*, boke 2. fol. 319. pag. 1. col. 1.

“ Opinion is while a thinge is in non certayne, and hydde frome mens very knowlegyng, and by no parfyte reason fully declared, as thus: yf the sonne be so **MOKEL** as men wenen, or *els* yf it be **MORE** than the erth.”

Ibid. boke 3. fol. 325. pag. 2. col. 2.

“ A lytel misgoying in the gynning causeth **MYKEL** error in the end.”—*Ibid.* boke 2. fol. 315. pag. 2. col. 1.

“ O badde and straye bene thilke (richesse) that at their departinge maketh men teneful and sory, and in the gatheryng of hem make men nedy. **MOCHE** folke *at ones* mowen not togider **MOCHE** therof haue.”—*Ibid.* boke 2. fol. 316. pag. 2. col. 1.

“ Good chylde (quod she) what *echeth* suche renome to the conscience of a wyse man, that loketh and measureth hys

[* But *Ma* or *Mo* is never found except as the comparative; thus *mýcle ma*, *much more*, *ma ðonne*, *more than*: while *Ōæpa*, *Ōæpe*, *magnus*, is *positive*, answering to the Teutonic *Mar*, *Mer*, and the Celtic *Mawr*. With regard to *Mickle*, it constantly occurs in all the earliest Teutonic dialects:—Goth. **MIKIAS**. Francic *Mihkil*, A.S. *Micel*, Isl. *Mikle*, Su.G. *Magle*.—ED.]

goodnesse not by sleuelesse wordes of the people, but by sothfastnesse of conscience : by God, nothyng. And yf it be fayre a mans name be *eched* by **MOCHE** folkes praysing, and fouler thyng that **MO** folke not praysen."

Test. of Loue, boke 2. fol. 319. pag. 2. col. 1.

"Also ryght as thou were ensample of **MOCHE FOLDE** errour, righte so thou must be ensample of *manyfolde* correction."—*Ibid.* boke 1. fol. 310. pag. 1. col. 2.

NEVERTHELESS.

In our old authors written variously, *Na-the-les*, *Ne-the-les*, *Nocht-the-les*, *Not-the-les*, *Never-the-later* : its opposite also was used, *Wel-the-later*.

"Truely I say for me, sythe I came thys Margarit to serue, durst I neuer me discouer of no maner disease, and **WEL THE LATER** hath myn herte hardyed such thynges to done, for the great bounties and worthy refreshmentes that she of her grace goodly without anye desert on my halue ofte hath me rekened."

Test. of Loue, boke 3. fol. 332. pag. 2. col. 1.

"Habyte maketh no monke, ne wearynge of gylte spurres maketh no knyghte : **NEVERTHELATER** in conforthe of thyne herte, yet wol I otherwyse answer."

Ibid. boke 2. fol. 322. pag. 2. col. 2.

RATHER.

In English we have *Rath*, *Rather*, *Rathest* ; which are simply the Anglo-Saxon *Rað*, *Raðon*, *Raðort*. *celer*, *velox*.

Some have derived this English word **RATHER** from the Greek ; as Mer. Casaubon from *οἷος*, "quod sane

(says Skinner) *longius distat quam mane a vespere* : and others, with a little more plausibility, from *Ῥαδιος*.

The Italians have received this same word from our Northern ancestors, and pronounce it *Ratto*, with the same meaning : which Menage derives either from *Raptus* or from *Rapidus*, "*Rapdus, Rapdo, Raddo, Ratto*."

Skinner notices the expressions *Rath* fruit, and *Rath* wine, from the Anglo-Saxon *Rað* ; of which, after Menage, he says—"Nescio an contract. a Lat. *Rapidus*."

Minshew derives *RATHER* from the Lat. *Ratus*. Ray has a proverb—"The *Rath* sower never borrows of the late."

S. Johnson cites *Spenser* (except himself, the worst possible authority for English words)—

"Thus is my harvest hasten'd all to *Rathe*."

And *May*—

"*Rath* ripe and purple grapes there be."

"*Rath* ripe are some, and some of later kind."

And *Milton*—

"Bring the *Rathe* primrose that forsaken dies."

And he adds most ignorantly—"To *have Rather*. This I think a barbarous expression, of *late intrusion* into our language ; for which it is better to say—*will rather*."

Dr. Newton, in a note on *Lycidas*, says of the word *Rathe*—"This word is used by Spenser, B. 3. cant. 3. st. 28.—

‘ Too *Rathe* cut off by practice criminal.’

“ And *Shepherd’s Calendar*,

‘ The *Rather* lambs been starved with cold.’ ”

T. Warton, in his note on the same passage of Milton, says,—“ The particular combination of, *Rathe primrose*, is perhaps from a pastoral called a *Palinode* by E. B. (probably Edmond Bolton,) in *England’s Helicon*, edit. 1614. signat. B. 4.

‘ And made the *Rathe* and timely primrose grow.’

“ In the West of England, there is an early species of apple called the *Rathe*-ripe. We have—‘ *Rathe* and late’—in a pastoral, in *Davison’s Poems*, edit. 4. London, 1621. p. 177. In *Bastard’s Epigrams*, printed 1598, I find—‘ The *Rashed* primrose and the violet.’ Lib. i. epigr. 34. p. 12. 12mo. Perhaps *Rashed* is a provincial corruption from *Rathe*.”

By the quotations of Johnson, Newton, and Warton, from Spenser, May, Bolton, Davison, and Bastard, a reader would imagine that the word *RATHE* was very little authorized in the language ; and that it was necessary to hunt diligently in obscure holes and corners for an authority.

“ And *netheles* there is no man
 In all this worlde so wise, that can
 Of loue temper the measure :
 But as it falleth in auenture.
 For witte ne strength maie not helpe
 And whiche els wolde him yelp,
 Is **RATHEST** throwen under foote.”

Gower, lib. 1. fol. 7. pag. 2. col. 2.

“ Some seyne he did well enough,
 And some seyne, he did amis.
 Diuers opinions there is.
 And commonliche in euery nede
 The werst speche is **RATHEST** herde.”

lib. 3. fol. 59. pag. 1. col. 1.

“ That euery loue of pure kynde
 Is fyrst forth drawe, well I fynde :
 But *netheles* yet ouer this
 Deserte dothe so, that it is
 The **RATHER** had in many place.”

lib. 4. fol. 72. pag. 1. col. 1.

——“ Who that is bolde,
 And dar travaile, and undertake
 The cause of loue, he shall be take
 The **RATHER** unto loues grace.”

lib. 4. fol. 75. pag. 1. col. 2.

“ But fortune is of suche a sleyght,
 That whan a man is most on height,
 She maketh hym **RATHEST** for to falle.”

lib. 6. fol. 135. pag. 2. col. 2.

“ Why ryse ye so **RATHE** ? Ey, benedicite,
 What eyleth you ?”

Chaucer, *Myllers Tale*, fol. 15. pag. 1. col. 1.

" O dere cosyn, Dan Johan, she sayde,
What eyleth you so RATHE to a ryse?"

Shypmans Tale, fol. 69. pag. 1. col. 2.

" For hym my lyfe lyeth al in dout
But yf he come the RATHER out."

Rom. of the Rose, fol. 141. pag. 2. col. 1.

" They wolde eftsones do you scathe
If that they myght, late or RATHE."

Ibid. fol. 152. pag. 1. col. 1.

" And haue my trouth, but if thou finde it so,
I be thy bote, or it be ful longe,
To peces do me drawe, and sythen honge.
Ye, so sayst thou? (quod Troylus) alas:
But God wot it is naught the RATHER so."

Troylus, boke 1. fol. 161. pag. 2. col. 1.

" Loke up I say, and tel me what she is
Anon, that I may gon about thy nede,
Knowe iche her aught, for my loue tel me this,
Than wold I hope RATHER for to spede."

Ibid. boke 1. fol. 161. pag. 2. col. 2.

" And with his salte teeres gan he bathe
The ruby in his signet, and it sette
Upon the wexe delyuerlyche and RATHE."

Ibid. boke 2. fol. 169. pag. 1. col. 1.

" But now to purpose of my RATHER speche."

Ibid. boke 3. fol. 179. pag. 2. col. 2.

" These folke desiren nowe delyueraunce
Of Antenor that brought hem to mischaunce.
For he was after traytour to the toun
Of Troy alas; they quitte him out to RATHE."

Ibid. boke 4. fol. 183. pag. 2. col. 1.

" But he was slayne alas, the more harme is,
Unhappely at Thebes al to RATHE."

Ibid. boke 5. fol. 195. pag. 2. col. 1.

“ Yf I (quod she) haue understonden and knowen utterly the causes and the habite of thy malady, thou languyshest and art defected for desyre and talent of thy RATHER fortune. She that ylke fortune onelye that is chaunged as thou faynest to thewarde, hath perverted the clerenesse and the estate of thy corage.”—*Boecius*, boke 2. fol. 225. pag. 1. col. 2.

“ Whylom there was a man that had assayed with stryuyng words an other man, the which not for usage of *very* vertue, but for proude wayne glorye, had taken upon him falsely the name of a phylosophre. This RATHER man that I spake of, thought he wold assay, wheder he thilke were a phylosophre or no.”—*Ibid.* boke 2. fol. 230. pag. 2. col. 2.

“ Diuyn grace is so great that it ne may not ben ful prayed, and this is only the maner, that is to say, hope and prayers. For which it semeth that men wol speke with God, and by reson of supplycacion bene conioyned to thylke clerenesse, that nys nat approached no RATHER or that men seken it and impetren it.”—*Ibid.* boke 5. fol. 249. pag. 2. col. 1.

“ Graunt mercy good frende (quod he)
I thanke the, that thou woldest so;
But it may neuer the RATHER be do,
No man may my sorowe glade.”

Dreame of Chaucer, fol. 256. pag. 1. col. 1.

“ The RATHER spede, the soner may we go,
Great coste alway there is in taryenge,
And longe to sewe it is a wery thyng.”

Assemble of Ladyes, fol. 275. pag. 2. col. 2.

“ Thilke sterres that ben cleped sterres of the northe, arysen RATHER than the degree of her longytude, and all the sterres of the southe, arysen after the degree of her longytude.”

Astrolabye, fol. 280. pag. 2. col. 1.

“ But lesynges with her flatterye
With fraude couered under a pytous face
Accept be nowe RATHER unto grace.”

Blacke Knyght, fol. 289. pag. 2. col. 2.

"That shal not nowe be tolde for me,
For it no nede is redily,
Folke can synge it bet than I,
For al mote out late or **RATHE**."

Fame, boke 3. fol. 302. pag. 1. col. 2.

"Who was ycrowned? by God nat the strongest, but he that **RATHEST** come and lengest abode and continued in the iourney and spared nat to trauayle."

Test. of Loue, boke 1. fol. 307. pag. 1. col. 2.

"Euery glytteryng thinge is not golde, and under colour of fayre speche many vices may be hyd and conseled. Therefore I rede no wight to trust on you to **RATHE**, mens chere and her speche right guyleful is ful ofte."

Ibid. boke 2. fol. 314. pag. 2. col. 2.

"Verly it is proued that rychesse, dygnyte, and power, been not trewe waye to the knotte, but as **RATHE** by suche thynges the knotte to be unbound."

"——Than (quod she) wol I proue that shrewes as **RATHE** shal ben in the knotte as the good."

Ibid. boke 2. fol. 319. pag. 1. col. 1.

"Ah, good nyghtyngale (quod I then)
A lytel haste thou ben to longe hen,
For here hath ben the leude cuckowe
And songen songes **RATHER** than hast thou."

Cuckowe and Nyghtyngale, fol. 351. pag. 1. col. 2.

"His feris has this pray ressauit **RAITH**,
And to thare meat addressis it for to graith."

Douglas, booke 1. pag. 19.

"Quhen Paris furth of Phryge, the Troyane hird
Socht to the ciete Laches in Sparta,
And thare the douchter of Leda stal awa,
The fare Helene, and to Troy tursit **RAITH**."

Ibid. booke 7. pag. 219.

“ And sche hir lang round nek bane bowand **RAITH**,
To gif thaym souck, can thaym culze bayth.”

Douglas, booke 8. pag. 266.

“ The princis tho, quhilk suld this peace making,
Turnis towart the bricht sonnys uprisyng,
With the salt melder in thare handis **RAITH**.”

Ibid. booke 12. pag. 413.

FIE;

The imperative of the Gothic and Anglo-Saxon verb **FIAN**, *Fian*, *To hate*.

QUICKLY.

Quick-like: from *Epīc*, *cpīcu*, *cpīcob*, *vivus*, (as we still oppose the *Quick* to the *Dead*). *Epīc* is the past participle of *Epīccian*, *vivificare*. **QUICKLY** means, in a *life-like* or *lively* manner; in the manner of a creature that has life.

SCARCE.

The Italians have the adjective *Scarso*:

“ Queste parole assai passano il core
Al tristo padre, e non sapea che fare
Di racquistar la sua figlia e l'onore,
Perche tutti i rimedj erano **SCARSI**.”

Il Morgante, cant. 10. st. 128.

which *Menage* improbably derives from *Exparcus*. The same word in Spanish is written *Escasso*. Both the Italian and the Spanish words are probably of

Northern origin. In Dutch *Skaars* is, *rare, unfrequent*. It is still commonly used as an adjective in modern English ; but anciently was more common.

“ Hast thou be SCARSE or large of gifte
Unto thy loue, whom thou seruest ?
And saith the trouth, if thou hast bee
Unto thy loue or SCARSE or free.”

Gower, lib. 5. fol. 109. pag. 1. col. 2.

“ What man that SCARSE is of his good,
And wol not gyue, he shall nought take.”

Ibid. fol. 109. pag. 2. col. 1.

“ That men holde you not to SCARSE, ne to sparyng.”

Tale of Chaucer, fol. 80. pag. 2. col. 1.

“ Loke that no man for SCARCE the holde,
For that may greue the manyfolde.”

Rom. of the Rose, fol. 131. pag. 1. col. 1.

SELDOM.

“ I me reioyced of my lyberte
That SELDEN tyme is founde in mariage.”

Clerke of Oxenf. Tale, fol. 46. pag. 1. col. 1.

The Dutch have also the adjective *Zelden, Selten*: The Germans *Selten*: The Danes *Seldsom*: The Swedes *Sellsynt*:—rare, unusual, uncommon.

STARK.

According to S. Johnson this word has the following significations—*Stiff, strong, rugged, deep, full, mere, simple, plain, gross*. He says, “ It is used to intend or

augment the signification of a word : as, *Stark mad*, mad in the highest degree. It is now little used but in low language."

In the Anglo-Saxon *Stapc*, *Steapc*, German *Starck*, Dutch *Sterk*, Danish *Stærk*, Swedish *Stark*, as in the English, all mean *Strong*. It is a good English word ; common in all our old writers, still retaining its place amongst the moderns, and never had an interval of disuse.

" And she that helmed was in STARKE stoures,
And wan by force townes stronge and toures."

Chaucer. Monkes Tale, fol. 85. pag. 2. col. 2.

" But unto you I dare not lye,
But myght I felen or espye
That ye perceyued it nothyng,
Ye shulde haue a STARKE leasyng."

Rom. of the Rose, fol. 154. pag. 2. col. 2.

" This egle, of which I haue you tolde,
Me flyeng at a swappe he hente,
And with his sours agayne up wente
Me caryeng in hys clawes STARKE
As lyghtly as I had ben a larke."

Fame, boke 1. fol. 294. pag. 2. col. 2.

" The followand wynd blew STERK in our tail."

Douglas, booke 3. pag. 71.

" So that, my son, now art thou souir and STERK,
That the not *nedis* to haue ony fere."

Ibid. booke 8. pag. 265.

“ Turnus ane lital, thocht he was STARK and stout,
Begouth frawart the bargane to withdraw.”

Douglas, booke 9. pag. 306.

“ Sa thou me saif, thy pissance is sa STARK,
The Troianis glorie, nor thare victorie
Sall na thing change nor dymynew tharby.”

Ibid. booke 10. pag. 336.

“ And at ane hie balk teyt up sche has
With ane loupe knot ane STARK corde or lace,
Quharewith hir self sche spilt with shameful dede.”

Ibid. booke 12. pag. 432.

“ As fast lock'd up in sleep, as guiltless labour,
When it lies STARKLY in the traveller's bones.”

Shakespeare. Measure for Measure, act 4. sc. 2.

“ 1 Boor. Come, English beer, hostess. English beer, by
th' belly.

“ 2 Boor. STARK beer, boy: stout and strong beer. So.
Sit down, lads, and drink me upsey-dutch. Frolick and fear
not.”—*Beaumont and Fletcher. Beggars Bush*, act 3. sc. 1.

VERY ;

Means *True*.

“ And it is clere and open that thilke sentence of Plato is
VERY and sothe.”

Chaucer. Boecius, boke 4. fol. 241. pag. 2. col. 2.

It is merely the French adjective *Vrai*, from the Italian, from the Latin. When this word was first adopted from the French, (and long after,) it was writ-

ten by them, and by us, VERAY ; which they have since corrupted to *Vrai*, and the English to VERY.

“ For if a kynge shall upon gesse
Without VERAY cause drede,
He maie be liche to that I rede.”

Gower, lib. 7. fol. 162. pag. 2. col. 2.

“ Constantyne thensample and myrrour
To princes al, in humble buxumnesse
To holy church o VERAY sustaynour.”

Prologue to Cant. Tales.

“ But as Christe was, whan he was *on lyue*,
So is he there VERAMENT”—(*vraiment*).

Plowmans Tale, fol. 99. pag. 2. col. 1.

“ O thou, my chyld, do lerne, I the pray,
Vertew and VERAY labour to assay.”

Douglas, booke 12. pag. 425.

“ Disce, puer, virtutem ex me *Verumque* laborem :
Fortunam ex aliis*.”

Virgil.

* The word *Aliis* in this passage, should in a modern version be translated *Lord Grenville*, *Mr. Rose*, *Mr. Dundas*, *Mr. Wyndham*, *Mr. Pitt*, *Lord Liverpool*, &c.—who only assert modestly (what our pilfering stewards and bailiffs will shortly tell us), that they hold their emoluments of office by *as good* a title, as any man in England holds his private estate and fair-earned property ; and immediately after *prove* to us, that they hold by a much better title.—Their proof is, for the present only a triple or quadruple (they may take half or two thirds of our income next year) additional assessment upon our innocent property ; whilst their guilty emoluments of office (how earned we know) remain untouched.

ONCE. AT ONCE. TWICE. THRICE.

Antiently written ANES, ANIS, ANYS, ONES, ONYS, TWIES, TWYIS, TWYISE, THRIES, THRYIS, &c. are merely the Genitives * of *Ane*, *An*, *ΤΥΛΙ*, *Tpa*, *Tpez*, *Tpiz*, *Θρι*, *Θρύ*, &c. i. e. *One*, *Two*, *Three* (The substantive *Time*, *Turn*, &c. omitted).

The Italian and French have no correspondent adverb : they say *Une fois*, *deux fois*, *Una volta*, *due volte*, &c. The Dutch have *Eens* for the same purpose ; but often forgo the advantage.

“ For ONES that he hath ben blithe
He shal ben after sorie THRIES.”

Gower, lib. 5. fol. 117. pag. 1. col. 1.

“ For as the wylde wode rage
Of wyndes maketh the sea sauage,
And that was caulme bringeth to wawe,
So for default and grace of lawe
The people is stered all AT ONES.”

Ibid. lib. 7. fol. 166. pag. 1. col. 1.

“ Ye wote yovr selfe, she may not wedde two
AT ONES.” *Knyghtes Tale*, fol. 5. pag. 2. col. 2.

“ Sythen Christ went neuer but ONYS
To weddyng.”

Wyfe of Bathe. Prol. fol. 34. pag. 1. col. 1.

“ And first I shrew myself, both blode and bones,
If thou begyle me ofter than ONES.”

Nonnes Priest, fol. 91. pag. 1. col. 1.

[* See Mr. Price's note (20) in p. 493 of his Edition of Warton's History of English Poetry, 8vo. Vol. 2. Appendix.—ED.]

" Sen Pallas mycht on Grekis tak sic wraik,
To birn thare schyppis, and all for ANIS saik
Droun in the seye." *Douglas*, boke 1. pag. 14.

" My faddir cryis, How! feris, help away,
Streik airis ATTANIS with al the force ge may."
Ibid. booke 3. pag. 8.

" The feblit breith ful fast can bete and blaw,
Ne gat he lasare ANYS his aynd to draw."
Ibid. booke 9, pag. 307.

" THRIES she turned hir aboute
And THRIES eke she gan downe loute."
Gower, lib. 5. fol. 105. pag. 1. col. 1.

" She made a cercle about hym THRIES,
And efte with fire of sulphur TWIES."
Ibid. lib. 5. fol. 105. pag. 2. col. 2.

" That hath been TWYSE hotte and TWYSE colde."
Chaucer. Cokes Prol. fol. 17. pag. 2. col. 2.

" For as Senec sayth: He that ouercometh his hert, ouer-
cometh TWISE."—*Tale of Chaucer*, fol. 82. pag. 2. col. 2.

" In gold to graif thy fall TWYIS etlit he,
And TWYISE for reuth failgeis the faderis handis."
Douglas, booke 6. pag. 163.

" He sychit profoundlye owthir TWYIS or THRYIS."
Ibid. booke 10. pag. 349.

ATWO. ATHREE.

On τπα. On ὀπῃ. *In two; In three.* The Dutch
have *Intween*; the Danes *Itu*.

" And Jason swore, and said ther,
That also wis God hym helpe,

That if Medea did myn helpe,
 That he his purpose might wyne,
 Ther shulde never par. **ATWYXSE.**"

Gower, lib. 5. fol. 102. pag. 2. col. 1.

"That death us shalke departe **ATWO.**"

Ibid. lib. 4. fol. 84. pag. 1. col. 1.

"And eke an axe to smyte the corde **ATWO.**"

Myllers Tale, fol. 14. pag. 1. col. 1.

"Ne howe the fyre was couched fyrst with *Stre*,
 And than with drye stickes clouen **ATHRE.**"

Knyghtes Tale, fol. 11. pag. 1. col. 1.

ALONE. ONLY.

All-one. One-like. In the Dutch, *Een* is **ONE**: *All-
 een*, **ALONE**: and *All-een-lyk*, **ONLY**.

"So came she to him priuely,
 And that was, wher he made his mone,
 Within a gardeine **ALL** him **ONE.**"

Gower, lib. 1. fol. 25. pag. 2. col. 1.

"The sorowe, doughter, which I make,
 Is not **ALL ONLY** for my sake,
 But for the bothe, and for you all."

Ibid. lib. 1. fol. 25. pag. 2. col. 2.

"All other leches he forsoke,
 And put him out of aventure
ALONLY to God's cure."

Ibid. lib. 2. fol. 45. pag. 2. col. 2.

"And thus full ofte a daie for nought
 (Saufe **ONLICHE** of myn owne thought)
 I am so with my seluen wroth."

Ibid. lib. 3. fol. 47. pag. 2. col. 1.

"Thre yomen of his chambre there
ALL ONLY for to serue hym were."

Gower, lib. 6. fol. 137. pag. 1. col. 2.

"For ALL ONELYCHE of gentill loue
My courte stont all courtes aboue."

Ibid. lib. 8. fol. 187. pag. 1. col. 2.

"Thou wost well that I am Venus,
Whiche ALL ONLY my lustes seche."

Ibid. lib. 8. fol. 187. pag. 2. col. 1.

ANON.

Junius is right. ANON means *In one* (subauditur *instant, moment, minute*).

"For I woll ben certayne a wedded man,
And that ANON in all the hast I can."

Marchauntes Tale, fol. 29. pag. 1. col. 2.

"Than Dame Prudence, without delay or tarieng, sent
ANONE her messanger."

Tale of Chaucer, fol. 82. pag. 1. col. 2.

All our old authors use ANON, for *immediately, instantly*.

Mr. Tyrwhitt, vol. 4. note to verse 381 (*Prol. to Canterb. Tales*), says—"From *Pro nunc*, I suppose, came *For the nunc*; and so, *For the Nonce*. Just as from *Ad nunc* came ANON."—I agree with Mr. Tyrwhitt, that the one is *just as* likely as the other*.

[* The reader is referred to Mr. Price's explanation of this phrase in his Appendix to Vol. 2. of Warton, 8vo. edition, p. 496.—ED.]

In the Anglo-Saxon, *Ān* means *One*, and *On* means *In*: which word *On* we have in English corrupted to *An* before a vowel, and to *A* before a consonant; and in writing and speaking have connected it with the subsequent word: and from this double corruption has sprung a numerous race of Adverbs; which (only because there has not been a similar corruption) have no correspondent adverbs in other languages.

Thus from *On dæg*, *On niht*, *On lenge*, *On bpæde*, *On bæc*, *On lande*, *On life*, *On middan*, *On rihte*, *On tpa*, *On peg*; we have *Aday*, *Anight*, *Along*, *Abroad*, *Aback*, *Aland*, *Alive*, *Amid*, *Aright*, *Atwo*, *Away*: and from *On Ān*, *ANON*.

Gower and Chaucer write frequently *In one*: and Douglas, without any corruption, purely *ON ANE*.

“Thus sayand, scho the bing ascendis *ON ANE*.”

Douglas, booke 4. pag. 124.

IN A TRICE.

Skinner, not so happily as usual, says—“*In a Trice*, fort. a Dan. *at reyse*, surgere, se erigere, attollere, q. d. tantillo temporis spatio quanto quis se attollere potest.”

S. Johnson—“believes this word comes from *Trait* Fr. corrupted by pronunciation. A short time, an instant, a *stroke*.”

The etymology of this word is of small consequence ; but, I suppose, we have it from the French *Trois* : and (in a manner similar to ANON) it means—In the time in which one can count *Three—One, Two, Three* and away.—Gower writes it TREIS.

“ All sodenly, as who saith TREIS,
Where that he stode in his paleis,
He toke him from the mens sight,
Was none of them so ware, that might
Set eie where he become.”

Gower, lib. 1. fol. 24. pag. 2. col. 1.

The greater part of the other adverbs have always been well understood : such as, *Gratis*, *Alias*, *Amen*, *Alamode*, *Indeed*, *In fact*, *Methinks*, *Forsooth*, *Insooth*, &c.

B.

But I suppose there are some adverbs which are merely *cant* words ; belonging only to the vulgar ; and which have therefore no certain origin nor precise meaning ; such as *SPICK* and *SPAN*, &c.

H.

SPICK, SPAN.

I will not assert that there may not be such ; but I know of none of that description. It is true S. Johnson says of *Spick* and *Span*, that “ he should not

have expected to find this word authorized by a polite writer." "*Span new*," he says, "is used by Chaucer*, and is supposed to come from *rpannan*, to stretch, *Sax.* *expandere*, *Lat.* whence *span*. *Span new* is therefore originally used of cloth, new extended or dressed at the clothier's: and *spick and span new*, is, newly extended on the spikes or tenters. It is, however, a *low* word." In *spick* and *span*, however, there is nothing stretched upon spikes and tenters but the etymologist's ignorance. In Dutch they say *Spikspelder-nieuw*. And *spyker* means a warehouse or magazine. *Spil* or *Spel* means a spindle, *schiet-spoel*, the weaver's shuttle; and *spoelder* the shuttle-thrower. In Dutch, therefore, *Spik-*

* Chaucer uses it, in the third book of *Troylus*, fol. 181. pag. 2. col. 1.

" This is a worde for al, that Troylus
Was neuer ful to speke of this matere.
And for to praysen unto Pandarus
The bounte of his right lady dere,
And Pandarus to thanke and maken chere.
This tale was aye SPAN newe to begynne,
Tyl that the nyght departed hem *atwynne*."

But I see no reason why Chaucer should be blamed for its use; any more than Shakespear for using *Fire-new*, on a much more solemn occasion.

" Maugre thy strength, youth, place and eminence,
Despight thy victor sword, and *Fire-new* fortune,
Thy valour and thy heart,—thou art a traitor."

King Lear, act 5. sc. 3.

spelder-nieuw means, new from the warehouse and the loom.

In German they say—*Span-neu* and *Funckel-neu*. *Spange* means any thing shining; as *Funckel* means to glitter or sparkle.

In Danish, *Funkcelnye*.

In Swedish, *Spitt spangande ny*.

In English we say *Spick and Span-new*, *Fire-new*, *Brand-new*. The two last *Brand* and *Fire* speak for themselves. *Spick and Span-new* means *shining new from the warehouse*.

B.

AYE. YEA. YES.

You have omitted the most important of all the Adverbs—AYE and NO. Perhaps because you think Greenwood has sufficiently settled these points—“*Ay*,” he says, “seems to be a contraction of the Latin word *Aio*, as *Nay* is of *Nego*. For our *Nay*, *Nay*; *Ay*, *Ay*; is a plain imitation of Terence’s *Negat quis? Nego. Ait? Aio*.” Though I think he might have found a better citation for his purpose—“*An nata est sponsa prægna? Vel ai, vel nega*.”

H.

I have avoided **AYE** and **NO**, because they are two of the most mercenary and mischievous words in the language, the degraded instruments of the meanest and dirtiest traffic in the land. I cannot think they were borrowed from the Romans even in their most degenerate state. Indeed the Italian, Spanish and French * affirmative adverb, *Si*, is derived from the Latin, and means *Be it* (as it does when it is called an hypothetical conjunction). But our *Aye*, or *Yea*, is the Imperative of a verb of northern extraction; and means—*Have it, possess it, enjoy it*. And **YES**, is *Ay-es*, *Have, possess, enjoy that*. More immediately perhaps, they are the French singular and plural Imperative *Aye* and *Ayez*; as our corrupted *O-yes* of the cryer, is no other than the French Imperative *Oyez*, *Hear, Listen* †.

* The French have another (and their principal) affirmative adverb, *Oui*: which, Menage says, some derive from the Greek *οὐτοι*, but which he believes to be derived from the Latin *Hoc est*, instead of which was pronounced *Hoce*, then *Oe*, then *Oue*, then *Oi*, and finally *Ouy*. But (though rejected by Menage) *Oui* is manifestly the past participle of *Ouir*, to hear: and is well calculated for the purpose of assent: for when the proverb says—“*Silence gives consent*,”—it is always understood of the silence, not of a deaf or absent person, but of one who has both heard and noticed the request.

† “ And after on the daunce went
Largesse, that set al her entent

Danish, *Ejer*, to possess, have, enjoy. *Eja*, Aye or yea. *Eje*, possession. *Ejer*, possessor.

Swedish, *Ega*, to possess. *Ja*, aye, yea. *Egare*, possessor.

German, *Ja*, aye, yea. *Eigener*, possessor, owner. *Eigen*, own.

Dutch, *Eigenen*, to possess. *Ja*, aye, yea. *Eigenschap*, *Eigendom*, possession, property. *Eigenaar*, owner, proprietor.

Anglo-Sax. *Agen*, own. *Agenbe*, proprietor. *Agen-nýrre*, property.

NOT. NO.

As little do I think, with Greenwood, that NOT, or its abbreviate NO, was borrowed from the Latin; or, with Minshew, from the Hebrew; or, with Junius, from the Greek. The inhabitants of the North could not wait for a word expressive of dissent, till the establishment of those nations and languages; and it is

For to ben honorable and free,
Of Alexander's kynne was she,
Her most ioye was ywis,

Whan that she yafe, and sayd: HAUE THIS."

Rom. of the Rose, fol. 125. pag. 2. col. 1.

Which might, with equal propriety, have been translated

"When she gave, and said YES."

itself a surly sort of word, less likely to give way and to be changed than any other used in speech. Besides, their derivations do not lead to any meaning, the only object which can justify any etymological inquiry. But we need not be any further inquisitive, nor, I think, doubtful concerning the origin and signification of *NOT* and *NO*, since we find that in the Danish *Nødig*, and in the Swedish *Nödig*, and in the Dutch *Noode*, *Node*, and *No*, mean, *averse*, *unwilling**.

And I hope I may now be permitted to have done with Etymology: for though, like a microscope, it is

* M. L'Eveque, in his "Essai sur les rapports de la langue des Slaves avec celle des anciens habitans du Latium," (prefixed to his *History of Russia*,) has given us a curious etymology of three Latin adverbs; which I cannot forbear transcribing in this place, as an additional confirmation of my opinion of the Particles.—"Le changement de l'O en A doit à peine être regardé comme une alteration. En effet ces deux lettres ont en Slavon tant d'affinité, que les Russes prononcent en A le tiers au moins des syllabes qu'ils écrivent par un O.

"Le mot qui signifioit auparavant (before *Terra* was used) la surface de la terre; ce mot en Slavon est *POLE*; qui par l'affinité de l'O avec l'A, a pu se changer en *PALE*. Ce qui me fait presumer que ce mot se trouvoit aussi en Latin, c'est qu'il reste un verbe qui paroît formé de ce substantif; c'est le verbe *PALO* ou *PALARE*, errer dans le campagne: *PALANS*, qui erre de côté et d'autre, qui court les champs. L'adverbe *PALAM* tire son origine du même mot. Il signifie *manifestement*, *à decouvert*. Or, qu'est ce qui se fait *à decouvert* pour des hommes qui habitent des tentes ou des cabannes? C'est ce qui se fait en plein champs. Ce mot *PALAM* semble même

sometimes useful to discover the minuter parts of language which would otherwise escape our sight; yet is it not necessary to have it always in our hands, nor proper to apply it to every object.

B.

If your doctrine of the *Indeclinables* (which I think we have now pretty well exhausted) is true, and if every word in all languages has a separate meaning of its own, why have you left the conjunction THAT

dans sa formation avoir plus de rapport à la langue Slavonne qu'à la Latine. Il semble qu'on dise PALAM pour POLAMI *par les champs, à travers les champs*. Ce qui me confirme dans cette idée, c'est que je ne me rappelle pas qu'il y ait en Latin d'autre adverbe qui ait une formation semblable, si ce n'est son opposé, CLAM, qui veut dire *secrètement, en cachette*; et qui me paroît aussi Slavon. CLAM se dit pour KOLAMI, et par une contraction très conforme au génie de la langue Slavonne, KLAMI, au milieu des Pieux; c'est à dire dans des cabannes qui étoient formées de *Pieux* revêtus d'écorces, de peaux, ou de branchages.

“ J'oubliois l'adverbe CORAM, qui veut dire *Devant, en présence*.—Il diffère de PALAM (dit Ambroise Calepin) en ce qu'il se rapporte seulement à quelques personnes, et PALAM se rapporte à toutes: il entraîne d'ailleurs avec lui l'idée de proximité.—Il a donc pu marquer autrefois que l'action se passoit en présence de quelqu'un dans un lieu circonscrit ou fermé. Ainsi on aura dit CORAM pour KORAMI, ou, *Mejdou Korami*; parce que la cloture des habitations étoit souvent faite d'écorce, *Kora*.”

I am the better pleased with M. L'Eveque's etymology, be-

undecyphered? Why content yourself with merely saying it is an *Article*, whilst you have left the *Articles* themselves unclassed and unexplained?

H.

I would fain recover my credit with Mr. Burgess, at least upon the score of *liberality*. For the freedom (if he pleases, harshness) of my strictures on my "*predecessors* on the subject of language" I may perhaps obtain his pardon, when he has learned from Montesquieu that—"Rien ne récule plus le progrès des connoissances, qu'un mauvais ouvrage d'un auteur célèbre : parcequ'avant d'instruire, il faut détromper:" or from Voltaire, that—"La faveur prodiguée aux mauvais ouvrages, est aussi contraire aux progrès de l'esprit, que le déchainement contre les bons." But Mr. Burgess himself has undertaken to explain the *Pronouns*: and

cause he had *no system* to defend, and therefore cannot be charged with that partiality and prejudice, of which, after what I have advanced, I may be reasonably suspected. Nor is it the worse, because M. L'Eveque appears not to have known the strength of his own cause: for CLAM was antiently written in Latin *calim*: (though Festus, who tells us this, absurdly derives *clam* from *clavibus*, "quod his, quæ celare volumus, claudimus") and *cala* was an old Latin word for wood, or logs, or stakes. So Lucilius (quoted by Servius) "Scinde, puer, *Calam*, ut caleas." His derivation is also still further analogically fortified by the Danish correspondent adverbs: for in that language *Geheim*, *geheimt*, *I Hemmelighed*, (from *Hiem* home,) and *I en rum* (i. e. in a room) supply the place of *Clam*, and *Fordagen* (or, in the face of day) supplies the place of *Palam*.

if I did not leave the field open to him (after his undertaking) he might perhaps accuse me of illiberality towards my *followers* also. I hope the title will not offend him; but I will venture to say that, if he does any thing with the pronouns, he must be contented to *follow* the etymological path which I have traced out for him. Now the *Articles*, as they are called, trench so closely on the *Pronouns*, that they ought to be treated of together: and I rather chuse to leave *one* conjunction unexplained, and my account of the *Articles* imperfect, than forestall in the smallest degree any part of Mr. Burgess's future discovery. There is room enough for both of us. The garden of science is overrun with weeds; and whilst every coxcomb in literature is anxious to be the importer of some new exotic, the more humble, though (at this period of human knowledge especially) more useful business of *sarculation* (to borrow an exotic from Dr. Johnson) is miserably neglected.

B.

If you mean to publish the substance of our conversation, you will probably incur more censure for the *subject* of your inquiry, than for your manner of pursuing it. It will be said to be ὑπερ ὀνοῦ σκιάς.

H.

I know for what building I am laying the foundation.

tion: and am myself well satisfied of its importance. For those who shall think otherwise, my defence is ready made :

“ Se questa materia non è degna,
 Per esser piu leggieri,
 D' un huom che voglia parer saggio e grave,
 Scusatelo con questo ; che s' ingegna
 Con questi van pensieri
 Fare il suo tristo tempo piu suave :
 Perche altrove non have
 Dove voltare il viso ;
Che gli è stato interciso
Mostrar con altre imprese altra virtue.”

END OF THE FIRST PART.



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